

Yes, Israel is indeed an island in a sense. And he, by the way, would be if not uninhabited, then - sparsely inhabited by the "chosen people", if not for the powerful immigration to it, primarily from Russia.

Once the "island" of Israel was called Palestine, and it was under this name that it described in such an authoritative source as the "Encyclopedic Dictionary" of the publishers F.A. Brockhaus (Leipzig) and I.A. Efron (St. Petersburg), where in volume XXII (semi-volume 44) on page 622 says:

"The fertility of P. was glorified in antiquity not only by the Bible, where she called the flowing milk and honey ... but also the classics; it is proven and the ruins of many cities, and the existence of a dense population in antiquities..."

Palestine was indeed rich in cedar and oak forests, cypresses, tamarisks, mulberry, pomegranate and pistachio trees, oranges and lemons, almonds, peaches, apricots, grapes, wheat, barley, millet, peas and beans, artichokes, watermelons, cucumbers and pumpkins, mustard and fragrant cumin, as well as lilies and especially famous roses - the so-called Jericho roses.

If not paradise, then its threshold - for sure!

But who lived in it? According to the first, still pre-war, edition of the Bolshoi Soviet encyclopedia in 1937 to Palestine (then its area was 26 thousand square kilometers) inhabited by 1,383,000 people. Of these, Arabs - 61%, Jews - 29%, other nationalities - 10%.

From 1920 to 1935, more than 260,000 Jews came to Palestine, and in 1937 there were 401,000 of them living there. A simple calculation, taking into account the fact that the Jews were reaching out to Palestine both before 1920 and after 1935, shows that immediately after the First World war within the "Jewish national home" lived a little more than a hundred thousand representatives of the "chosen people". A little ... If we take into account that by 1937 the trend of forcibly squeezing out the Arabs from their ancestral lands has already been fully formed in Palestine and that this trend was actively shaped by both local Zionists and their English patrons, it would not be wrong to assume that immediately after the First World War II, at least a million Arabs lived in Palestine.

Actually, this is confirmed by the data of such an authoritative source as Brockhaus and Efron:

"At the present time (not later than 1897. - S.K.), the population of the country that makes up ancient P. does not exceed 650,000 people. Main contingent are Syrians and Arabs; the Greeks, Turks, Jews and Franks (that is, Europeans) are significantly inferior to them in numbers. The vast majority of the population (80%) professes Islam; Muslims are followed by Christians of various confessions (mostly Orthodox) and, finally, Jews. Recent, mainly way, people from Europe (mainly from Russia. - S.K.), live predominantly in cities; in 1894 there were 65,000 of them."

So, at one time, on this threshold of paradise on earth, there were nine Jews per Jew. non-Jews. However, over the years, this statistic has been cruelly and bloodily changed: now On the island of Israel, there is one Arab for every four Jews.

And there was a time when they were almost not there, and only in the 80s of the XIX century began Jewish immigration to Palestine, with the first Jewish agricultural colonies were created at the expense of the Parisian

Rothschild. Palestine, gradually, since the 16th century, falling under the rule of Turkey, has always been a geostrategically important place - it was not for nothing that Bonaparte aspired to go there. Especially her increased in importance after the opening of the Suez Canal. And everyone was drawn to Palestine, starting

from the Rothschilds of Paris, London and Vienna. The

first Zionist organizations that put forward the slogan of creating a national Jewish state, were - as the authoritative first TSB informs us - "agencies first German, and later British imperialism. And indeed, after During the First World War, the British entrenched themselves here, receiving in April 1920 conference in San Remo an international mandate for the right to govern Palestine, separating from the newly formed Syria. But back in 1917, the then minister Foreign Affairs, Balfour published a declaration proclaiming the idea of education "Jewish national home". The main

passions flared up after the First World War, when liberated from Turkish dependence, newly formed Arab states realized that they are being imposed now, firstly, dependence on the British, completely expressing the will of the Zionists, and secondly, they impose the Zionists themselves as compatriots.

And not just Jews, but Zionists. In order not to be unfounded, I will inform you that the first British High Commissioner of Palestine from 1920 to 1925 was a Zionist Herbert Samuel, and the chief prosecutor is the Zionist Bentwich.

And from 1922 to 1936, the Jewish population of Palestine increased from 80,000 to 370,000. Human. Jewish immigrants behaved impudently, used terror, and on these, generously in the sun-scorched territories in the early 1920s, the first Arab partisans appeared. And in August 1929, an Arab uprising began, which was suppressed by the British. partisan the movement continued, the partisans attacked the Jewish colonies and destroyed Jewish plantations, but even the British parliamentary commission of Shaw and Simpson, working in Palestine in 1930, was forced to admit the main reason uprisings, the dispossession of the Arab peasantry by the Zionist colonizers.

However, in 1930 the British cabinet published Passfield's memorandum (Sidney Webb), which declared that "the Jewish population of Palestine is not must exceed the country's capacity. The

formula was clearly "rubber", and in 1932 Jewish immigration to Palestine tripled (!) - 30 thousand people per year. In 1934, it already exceeded 40 thousand, and in 1935 reached 60 thousand. The results were not slow to affect: in 1933 a new the Arab uprising, suppressed by the British and Zionist detachments even more brutally - the leader of the partisans, a peasant from near Nablus Abu-Jild, was executed in August 1934. However, in May 1936, a national war broke out, which since then, as we know, has not actually stopped, going through either "sluggish" or active phases. The British were alarmed, and in 1936 Lord Peel's commission proposed

to divide Palestine into three parts: English, Jewish and Arabic according to the principle: "Jews tops, and Arabs - what remains." The Arabs rebelled again, and the situation seemed to be favorable for them - the German-Polish war began, which England and France, with the encouragement of the United States, quickly turned into World War II. And now anti-English-minded - which was understandable - the Arabs were supported by the Germans and Italians.

But in the Second World War, it was not the patrons of the Arabs who won - the Germans, but the patrons Zionists - Anglo-Saxons. And now any actions of those Arab states that enjoyed the support of Hitler - the same Egypt, it was easy to pull up - as pro-Nazi. In addition, the factor of the "Holocaust" (supposedly universal the extermination of the Jews precisely by the Nazis during the war), inflated to universal scale, worked against the Arabs.

Accordingly, the idea of a national home for the Jews of the world acquired quite real outlines.

In 1947, England referred the Palestinian question to the Organization

United Nations. The United States was already almost completely in control there, already almost debugged the so-called "voting machine", a typical element of which were the Central and Latin American "banana republics". the only the stumbling block here was the right of "veto" of the Soviet Union - a permanent member UN Security Council. And the intention of the United States to establish guardianship over Palestine (read: to give it to the United States) did not pass.

The USSR in 1947 proposed the creation of a binational Arab-Jewish state, and if this proves impossible, divide Palestine into two independent states - Arab and Jewish. But there were also nuances. And it is significant that if in volume 17 of the second edition of the TSB, signed for printing on October 30, 1952, it was directly said about initiative of the USSR, then already in volume 31, signed for publication on February 7, 1955, in the article "Palestine" was simply told that the Soviet delegation voted for the formation of two states.

Indeed, on November 29, 1947, the British Mandate was terminated and it was adopted USSR proposal. By

the time the UN resolution on the partition of Palestine was passed, 1,845,000 people lived there, of which 608,000 were Jews. However, according to the partition plan under the territory of the Arab state was allocated 11.1 thousand km², and under the territory Jewish - 14 thousand km². Jerusalem was singled out as a separate administrative unit with international regime. Then

everything went like this ... Palestine seethed, and its Jewish part triumphed and became more and more active. On May 17, 1948, "independent" Israel was proclaimed, and the Palestinian Jews formed a provisional coalition government during led by the leader of the right-wing socialist Zionist party Mapai. She was guided not even on the British, but on the USA. However, at that time in England they already began to understand that the Middle The East, with the formation of Israel, will float from their hands to the hands of the Yankees, and therefore many in England was inclined to support the Arabs, who were still accustomed to focusing more on English.

As soon as the "state of Israel" was proclaimed, the first Arab-Israeli war of the "State of Israel" with seven members of the Arab League, in which included Egypt, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Lebanon, Transjordan and Yemen. Who is her started first, it's hard to say. Thus, the Great Russian Encyclopedia states that the war began "on the night of May 14-15, a few hours after (? - S.K.) the proclamation of the State of Israel" by the entry into Palestine of the troops of the

Arab League. But if this was so, then Israel itself wanted it, because it claimed more than it was given. And it is clear that this was possible only with the strong support of the United States and - yes, yes, England, although it is often stated that decisive arms deliveries to Israel through Czechoslovakia and Romania were provided by the Soviet Union. But more will be said about this in place.

In parallel, the Jews began a cruel and bloody anti-Arab terror, pursuing two goals. The first is to morally intimidate and deprive the will to resist. The second is to expel Arabs from their lands. Both goals were successfully met. 900 thousand Arabs fled from the territory of Palestine, and on January 25, 1949, the first elections to the Knesset were held in Israel. USA before the elections, they provided Israel with a "loan" (actually a subsidy) of 100 million then very significant dollars. And the Mapai party won the majority in the elections. A On February 17, 1949, the famous Zionist leader Chaim

Weizmann. In the meantime,

the war was going on. In February, March, July 1949, a number of Arab-Israeli truces were concluded. April 1950, the situation was determined: Israel rounded its territory not to 14 thousand, but to 20.7 thousand km² and occupied Jerusalem. Five thousand square kilometers Palestinian territory was ceded to Transjordan, soon renamed Jordan

hashemite kingdom. Between

May 1948 and June 1951, about 650,000 Jews entered Israel, and their number in Palestine was thereby brought to more than one million two hundred thousand Human. Given the mass expulsion from Palestine - now Israel - of Arabs, Jews in Palestine for the first time began to prevail. At the same time, only 90 thousand people were employed in industry, including small ones. But also in agricultural terms, Israel it was impossible to call it prosperous: the "country" met the needs for bread for its account by 10–12%, in other food products - by 20%. So the employment structure population in Israel immediately acquired an extremely entertaining

character. However, to some extent, the situation was mitigated by the fact that approximately 9% of the population of Israel served in the army, numbering 110 thousand people. But who are they fed? Usually, if the people do not feed their own army, they have to feed someone else's. But also here the "island of Israel" immediately found itself in a special position - its army was fed by strangers nations ... Suffice it to say that the US share in Israel's imports was then 43%, and the share of England in exports exceeded 54%.

Stalin was ambivalent about the scam with Israel. And there were many reasons for this of which had a long origin, some arose after 1917, and some - after 1945 and even later ... The

powerful influence of Russian Jews on Russian affairs was by no means only a trait post-revolutionary Russia - as stupid Russian nationalists assure. Can it would be nice to cite a lot of interesting documents on this subject from the era of the unforgettable Emperor Alexander I ... However, I will give only one example from the era of his cousin great-nephew of Alexander III ... Here is how on the eve of the First World War he described change in the Russian situation since the beginning of the 80s of the XIX century, the journal "Jewish Starina":

"In people from the Pale of Settlement, a complete metamorphosis took place: the farmer turned into a banker, the contractor into an entrepreneur of high flight, and their employees - in the capital's dandies. A phalanx of stock exchanges was formed brokers who produced colossal air revolutions. One Petersburg an old-timer Jew admired: "What was Petersburg? Desert; now it's Berdichev!" ..."

That is, Yiddish has long and fully sounded not only in southern Odessa, but also in Northern Palmyra, and the revolution only gave this process a more dynamic character: since the Russian intelligentsia for the most part from the Bolshevik revolution arrogantly turned away, the resulting vacuum was filled by people from the Jewish Pale of Settlement.

This is not an opinion, not a hypothesis. It

is a fact. At the same time, talking about "Jewish dominance" is stupid, because the main processes in country were determined by the conscious support of the Bolsheviks by the healthy forces of all peoples of the USSR, including their Slavic core. But there was influence, moreover, Soviet Jewry had ramified exits to foreign countries, primarily to the United States. So, taking advantage of hunger in Russia, the extreme Zionist organization "Joint" in cooperation with the famous The American Russian Association (ARA) developed in Soviet Russia just the same violent activity, uniting all Russian Jewish organizations from the Bund and the Poalei Ziona" to the right Zionists. By July 1922 the Jewish Public Committee (Evobshchestkom), but in fact - the ARA, had authorized employees with apparatuses in 300 cities of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus, that is, in every more or less large locality of the country. At the

same time, the leadership of the OGPU at the beginning of April 1923 reported to the Politburo of the Central Committee

"American APA employees are mostly qualified military, which, if necessary, can become first-class

instructors of counter-revolutionary uprisings ... Russian employees (75% former officers, 20% of landowners and officials) ... are excellent ... channels through which the information necessary about Russia flows to the Americans ... "

The Evobshchestkom actively cooperated with such Jewish public figures as party journalist David Zaslavsky, literary critic Isaak Nusinov, doctors Miron Vovsi and Boris Shimeliovich. I will especially note the last two, because they were the same Major General of the Medical Service Miron Vovsi, who in 1945 served as the chief therapist of the Red Army, and the same Boris Shimeliovich, who in 1945 worked as chief physician of the Botkin hospital in Moscow.

The frankly subversive nature of the Evobshchestkom and the Joint did not please everyone, but then one of the future "innocent victims of the Stalinist terror" stood up for them - Lev Kamenev, Deputy Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR. And then the "Joint" came out with "Southern" project of the Jewish colonization of the Crimea - with the expectation of the former huge the Crimean estate of Baron Gunzburg, etc. However, due to the danger of indignation of the masses the project was closed. However, on December 31, 1927, the agrarian branch of the Joint - Agro-Joint - concluded another three-year agreement with the Soviet government, which on February 15, 1929 was extended until 1953 (fifty-third) year.

Here are a few more figures taken from the monograph by G.V. Kostyrchenko with a provocative titled "Stalin's Secret Policy", published in 2001 with the financial support of Russian Jewish Congress. In

December 1926, every fifth private merchant in the country was a Jew ... business in Moscow, they owned 75.4% of all pharmacies, 54.6% of perfume stores, 48.6% of fabric stores, 39.4% of haberdashery stores. Of the 2469 large metropolitan 810 NEPmen (32.8%) were Jews, and in Ukraine and Belarus their share was even higher: 66 and 90%, respectively.

However, even among the new Soviet intelligentsia, a serious Jewish stratum: at the beginning of 1927, in the universities of the RSFSR, every tenth future teacher, every sixth future engineer and doctor, and every fifth future creative worker was a Jew. Some of them, by the way, will later fall as a result of purges, and will fall, including because many of them from their student days occupied openly Trotskyist positions.

In October 1937, the Moscow branch of Agro-Joint was first closed, and On June 1, its activities were officially terminated throughout the USSR.

Lev Kamenev was no longer in the Kremlin, and to stand up for the insolent Zionists there was no one. In 2001, the historian G. Kostyrchenko took pity on them, complaining that the pernicious Bolsheviks covered up the Agro-Joint, despite the fact that in the Soviet economy was de invested 25 million dollars. At the same time, the "historian" did not say how many of these millions were then sucked out of the Soviet economy by the "left" image. In addition, for comparison, I will cite the data of the same G. Kostyrchenko: only in 1948 American Jews invested \$170 million in Palestine! In 1937-1938, a

number of prominent Soviet Zionists were arrested, among them the Chief Rabbi Hasid Sh.Ya. Medalier, shot on April 26, 1938. On one of illegal assemblies, he declared: "... The Jewish people need unity ... in order to escape the onset of communism."

Yes, the Zionists in Stalin's USSR felt less and less comfortable, and should be surprised that the famous Jewish nationalist poet Chaim Nachman Bialik, who wrote in Hebrew, before his death in 1934, declared that Bolshevism was a curse Jewish people, and Hitlerism is its salvation. Readers who don't take my word for it can take the verbatim record of the First All-Union Congress of Soviet Writers and read a speech on it by the poet Itzik Fefer, where he quotes Bialik.

By the way, the wife of one of the most prominent participants in the Tukhachevsky conspiracy - d People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR, Head of the Main Political Directorate of the Red Army and Editor-in-Chief

"Red Star" Gamarnik, who shot himself shortly before his arrest, was the sister-in-law Bialik.

This is the detail...

The war came... And it turned out that Bialik was, to put it mildly, wrong. And from some moment in the USSR, the idea arose of creating what was later called the "Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee" - JAC. His idea worked on both sides. On the one hand, Stalin decided to use the international connections of Soviet Jewry to consolidate of all anti-Hitler forces in the world, and above all in the USA and England, and their mobilization for help from the USSR. On the other hand, the Jewish nationalists and The internal Zionists saw in the JAC a new chance to realize their long-standing hopes associated with the prospect of strengthening their positions in the country.

The creation of the JAC was publicly announced on April 23, 1942 in Kuibyshev at press conference of the deputy head of the Sovinformburo Solomon Lozovsky (Drizo). The committee consisted of 70 members, the presidium - 19, and the director became the chairman State Jewish Theater Solomon Mikhoels. Not all of the JAC members were, of course, nationalists. For example, Hero of the Soviet Union Israel Fisanovich, a talented Soviet submariner who died on the crossing from England to Murmansk in 1944, was taken to the JAC, as they say, for brilliance. But the core of the JAC was made up of others ... And it was their aspirations that could be understood already from the persistence with which a number of members JAC sought to publish its own newspaper in Yiddish. And on June 7, 1942, the first issue of the newspaper "Einikait", which meant "unity". Ten thousand copies were seems to be focused not so much on distribution in the USSR, but on foreign countries. But the question immediately arose - the unity of whom with whom? However, then Stalin was not up to finding out such details - there was a war, Mikhoels and Fefer traveled to the USA, met with Einstein, etc., there was some benefit from this, well, God bless them. In

general, as I guess, already during the war, Stalin began to understand that the game was not worth the candle. Suffice it to say that throughout the war, Jews throughout the world were about 45 million dollars were transferred to the USSR aid fund. The first time I heard about it, I amazed. In 1947 alone, from the United States alone, transfer 170 million dollars to Palestine and collect only 45 million from world Jewry during the four years of the war for country that bore the brunt of the fight against Nazism!

It is unlikely that this little-known historical fact needs detailed analysis. comments, and I will make only two brief remarks. Firstly, there is nothing to say - the JAC acted effectively in the outside world ... Secondly, you involuntarily wonder: were the Zionists afraid of the total Nazi "Holocaust", if so financed the most active anti-Nazi actions?

On the other hand, the JAC already during the war put forward the idea of creating a Jewish Autonomous republics in the Crimea - with a favorable, by the way, attitude towards this idea of Molotov. hardly whether this fact also needs to be commented on in detail, so I will simply give

Decree of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks of November 20, 1948, which read:

"To approve the following decision of the Bureau of the Council of Ministers of the USSR: "The Bureau of the Council of Ministers of the USSR instructs the Ministry of State security of the USSR to immediately dissolve the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee, so how, as the facts show, this committee is the center of the anti-Soviet propaganda and regularly supplies anti-Soviet information to the authorities foreign intelligence. In accordance with this, the press organs of this committee close, pick up the affairs of the committee, while no one is arrested.

Secretary of the Central Committee J. Stalin.

I note that I quoted this document according to the monograph by G. Kostyrchenko. However, in the collection documents "Lubyanka. Stalin and the MGB of the USSR. March 1946 - March 1953 ... "in full

textually coinciding with the above Resolution of the PB (with the exception of minor grammatical differences) decision of the Bureau of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, signed by Stalin and Molotov and sent to "Nine for approval", dated November 21, 1949 with a note: "Transmitted via HF from comrade Poskrebyshev on 21.XI. at 00:15 (1948)".

How to bring these inconsistencies of dates into logical correspondence, I do not know, but as amusing textological curiosity, I recommend it to the reader. But, of

course, I do not question the very fact of the dissolution of the JAC at the highest level. The JAC was dissolved in this way, and its ending was logical: the war ended, and The JAC did not let up and more and more turned not only into the center of intra-union Jewish nationalism, but really into a convenient international "roof" immediately for all - Zionists, intelligence officers, Trotskyists and secret emissaries of the Golden International.

Dear reader is free here to believe or not to take the author's word for it, but today quite a lot of archival documents have been published, convincing that Stalin - he was clearly the author of the text of the Decree - wrote the truth. And all these papers published by "democratic", naturally, "historians" (there are no other allow). These "historians", however, did not themselves understand what informational "bombs" they were. thereby planted under their own "concepts", but from this the value published by them only increases.

So G. Kostyrchenko, citing the text of the Resolution of the Politburo on the JAC, declares that Stalin de simply got rid of the JAC, "choosing for this the most suitable from his point of view vision, bureaucratic form. In other words, according to Kostyrchenko, JAC with The West did not start tricks, but only "interfered with the villain." But the very fact of the ultimate the closeness of the highest party-state document excluded the option of Stalin's "work" "to the public." In such documents, everything was always called by its proper name! They were read by a few people, whose very position did not give them any opportunities live by illusions or assumptions - they knew everything as it is!

So the JAC really got confused in everything at once - in ideological anti-Sovietism, in subversive activities, in cooperation with both the Zionists and the Western intelligence services...

And the finale of the JAC, I repeat, was logical.

By the time of the adoption of the Resolution of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the permanent chairman of the JAC Solomon Mikhoels was no longer alive - in January 1948, while in the service business trip in Minsk, he died there along with a theater critic Golubov-Potapov under the wheels of a car. Apparently, as a result of random collision.

Printing ink smeared a lot of paper in order to put into circulation "documents" about the involvement of state security agencies in the death of Solomon Mikhoels. Like, in At the beginning of 1948, the "tyrant" Stalin gave a secret order to "decapitate the Soviet Jewry", organizing the elimination of the "great" Mikhoels in Minsk. In the collection of documents "Lavrenty Beria. 1953, published by the Democracy Foundation in 1999, even Beria's note dated April 2, 1953, which explicitly states that Mikhoels and Golubov were killed on behalf of the Minister of State Security of the USSR Abakumov in pursuance of Stalin's instructions a group of the USSR Ministry of State Security, consisting of Deputy Minister of State Security of the USSR Ogoltsov and responsible an employee of the Ministry of State Security of the USSR Shubnyakov at the country dacha of the Minister of State Security of the Byelorussian SSR Ditches. Then, de corpses were brought to a back street, where a collision was simulated truck. The authenticity

of this note by Beria is sometimes questioned, and I do not believe in it either. especially, although I do not exclude that Beria did sign it. The essence of this paradox I will explain later - in the chapter "13th Department of the GRU". Now I will say this...

Further developments in 1950-1952 showed that Mikhoels could calmly arrest later, together with the entire "head" of the JAC, and together with it, condemn and shoot. This would not have been any problem for Stalin. Die Mikhoels and

Golubov, being heavily drunk after an evening in a restaurant with Itzik Fefer and employees of Minsk theaters, could, so to speak, on their own. Both from the restaurant moved to the acquaintance of Golubov - most likely to "add", walked on foot, along the dark streets ... Tragic cases like what happened to them in Minsk then were are frequent. And Mikhoels, even according to the testimony of G. Kostyrchenko, who was most loyal to him, usually liked to "pass a glass" and that evening he clearly missed them a lot, because he came to Minsk as a representative of the Stalin Prize Committee, and potential laureates treated it, presumably, to glory.

By the way, in the memoirs of Svetlana Alliluyeva, which Arno willingly quotes Lustiger, author of the book "Stalin and the Jews", there is such a description of the moment of receipt Stalin's message about the death of Mikhoels, which Alliluyeva herself (or her editors "Memories") regards as the father's involvement in the death of Mikhoels. But at close examination, the testimony of Stalin's daughter, on the contrary, refutes versions of Stalin's involvement in this case. An

interesting, by the way, detail is found in the notes of the head of the Main Directorate cinematography of the USSR B.Z. Shumyatsky about watching films by Stalin in the Kremlin. April 3 Shumyatsky wrote in 1935:

"To the criticisms of Laz. Moiseevich (Kaganovich. - S.K.) about nationalistic darling of the productions of the Jewish Theater (anniversary performance "King Lear") Koba said that, judging by the fragments given in the film magazine, the performance is very interesting, the production is exceptionally original, and the acting actors, especially Mikhoels (King Lear. - S.K.) and Zuskin (Jester - S.K.), in highly classy..."

At the same time, Stalin, in response to Kaganovich's remark that the music of the composer Pulver to chronicle film "Birobidzhan" about the capital of the Jewish Autonomous Region "foreign", objected that "she very correctly notices the special features of the Jewish poor and their oppression in past and at the same time, in its own way, gives new cheerful motives to new Jewish music.

And one more detail ... As can be seen from the documents related to the investigation of the death Mikhoels and Golubov, they died in the late evening of January 12, but for a long time in various For some reason, the sources of their death are attributed to January 13th. And why - I can not say.

One way or another, Moscow Jewry gave Mikhoels a grandiose funeral, and on January 14, 1948, Pravda printed a large obituary signed by almost six dozens of figures of art and literature.

The death of Mikhoels added to the mood primarily of Moscow Jewry some feverish hysteria. Kilometer-long queues stretched to the building of the Jewish Theater, where the coffin was exhibited, large posters announcing the death of Mikhoels were pasted all over Moscow. Pepper Markish read during the civil memorial service the poem "The Unquenchable Lamp", which spoke of the "murder of Mikhoels".

Shortly after the adoption of the Politburo Decree of November 20, 1948, a number of JAC activists were arrested, an investigation began, which ended on March 22, 1952. And on May 8, 1952, in the hall of the club of the MGB named after Dzerzhinsky, the trial in the JAC case began, which ended on July 18, 1952.

In fact, the topic of the JAC is interesting in itself, moreover, in sources loyal to the JAC, for example, in the monograph by G. Kostyrchenko "Stalin's Secret Policy: Power and anti-Semitism", books by A. Lustiger "Stalin and the Jews", Zh. Medvedev "Stalin and the Jewish Problem" and others, apart from the collections of documents published in the last ten years, one can find a lot of such information that refutes the lawyers of the JAC. But for purposes of this book, it is enough to say that Solomon Lozovsky, a figure in The USSR is much larger than Mikhoels, Itzik Fefer, Solomon Bregman, Iosif Yuzefovich, Boris Shimeliovich, Lev Kvitko, Peretz Markish, David Bergelson, David Gofshtein, Veniamin Zuskin, Leon Talmi (Leizer Talminovitsky), Ilya Vatenberg, Emilia Teumin, Seagull

(Haika) Vatenberg-Ostrovskaya and Lina Stern.

All of them, except Bregman and Lina Stern, were sentenced to death with confiscation of all property and executed on August 12, 1952.

The case against Bregman, who fell ill in prison, was suspended on July 9, 1952, and he died in custody on January 23, 1953.

Academician-biochemist-physiologist Lina Stern received three years of camps with defeat for three years in rights without confiscation of property. born in 1878, daughter of a wealthy businessman, exporter of Russian grain, from her youth familiar with Chaim Weizmann, the future president of the World Zionist Organization and the first president State of Israel, in 1925 she moved to the USSR from Geneva, where she was tenured professor at the University of Geneva. Why

did the 47-year-old Stern come to the USSR? Arno Lustiger claims that in order to "participate in creative work in the Soviet Union", but it is unlikely that this version Lustiger himself believes. I cannot now say something for sure, but the entire biography of this a woman who has never been married, powerful and self-confident, who died in Moscow in 1968 at the age of 90, suggests a major Zionist emissary in her fanatical and efficient.

As for the fate of the leaders of the JAC, they really were state criminals, because, endowed with considerable confidence of the state and receiving its support, they saw the meaning of their activities not in strengthening the positions of their own state, but firstly, in strengthening the position in this state of only one national group, and secondly, in the actual opposition to the natural process of assimilation, and thirdly, by encouraging the sympathy of a part of the citizens of their own state for the state foreign.

In fact, by the end of its existence, the JAC neglected the interests of not only of the entire Soviet state, but also by the interests of Soviet Jews, or rather, those of them who I felt like a Soviet citizen and did not want and could not be anyone else. But such then there was the majority...

Against the backdrop of the investigation into the JAC case, other processes were going on in the country, both criminal and systemic. For example, in January 1949, a process began that was called "the fight against cosmopolitanism", and it must be admitted that the grounds for such a struggle by that time were country have accumulated. For example, in a brochure on concrete work, its author used the term "agitator", which meant, in fact, a concrete mixer. Well, English the verb "agitate" really had two meanings: "agitate" and "mix", but... However, is it necessary to continue further? Yes, from

Gosplan of the USSR, 300 of them were fired at once ... But after all, the Russian was also fired from it its chairman is Nikolai Voznesensky. And those 236 secret and top secret documents that have disappeared somewhere in the Gosplan alone in five years, were hardly used to kindle Russian stoves. The high percentage of dismissed Jews is not in last of all was explained by their disproportionately high percentage in many state structures. Say, on October 1, 1948, in the universities of the USSR, the departments physicists were in charge of 301 Russians and 217 representatives of other nationalities, 153 of who were Jews. Among the physicists at the USSR Academy of Sciences there were 342 Russians, 123 Jews and 31 representatives of all other peoples of the USSR, including Ukrainians, Belarusians, Georgians...

In a note from the head of the sector of science of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, Yuri Zhdanov, to the secretary of the Central Committee, M. Suslov of October 23, 1950 was informed:

"In a number of institutes of the Academy of Sciences, there is a biased selection of personnel on a national basis ... Among theoretical physicists and physico-chemists formed a monopoly group - L.D. Landau, M.A. Leontovich,

A.N. Frumkin, Ya.I. Frenkel, V.L. Ginzburg, E.M. Lifshits, G.A. Grinberg, I.M. Frank, A.S. Kompaneets, N.S. Meiman and others. All theoretical departments of physical and physical and chemical institutes are staffed by supporters of this group, representatives of the Jewish nationality ... "

Many such figures and quotations could be cited - they are full, for example, more than once I have already mentioned the monograph of G. Kostyrchenko. However, I will limit myself reported, briefly touching only on a number of criminal trials at the turn of the 40s - early 50s years, using the information of the doctor of historical sciences G.V. Kostyrchenko...

As he reports, after the war, "the social and cultural the life of the Jews" at the Moscow Automobile Plant named after Stalin (ZIS). Some of them, "the most soldered on national soil", organized collective trips to the theater of Mikhoels, in May 1948 sent a telegram of congratulations to the JAC on the occasion of the formation of Israel and etc. The soul and organizer of such actions was A.F. Eidinov (Vyshedsky), assistant director of ZIS Likhachev. In

December 1949, Khrushchev became Secretary of the Central Committee and First Secretary of the Moscow Civil Co The CPSU (b) and soon raided the ZIS at the head of a special commission with a check, after which reported to Stalin about the serious trouble there "in connection with the vigorous activity Jewish nationalists..." This is how the "ZIS case" began, in which several dozen people, thirteen of which, including Eidinov, November 23, 1950 shot. Even

before the events around the ZIS, in August - December 1949, a group of ten Jewish workers at the Yaroslavl Automobile Plant, headed by the chief engineer A.M. Livshits. During interrogations, they testified that they were talking about what "under Russian Nazism is developing in the country as a cover for the fight against anti-patriotism (! - S.K.) and propaganda deliberately emphasizes the predominance of Jews among cosmopolitans (accurately would be the verb "states". - S.K.), thereby encouraging anti-Semitism..."

Some of the Yaroslavl residents were convicted, but the theme of "cosmopolitanism" then sounded not in vain. For example, at the Chelyabinsk Kirov Plant, where Isaac Saltsman was the director, the metallurgist Yakov Goldstein came from a family of a large mining industrialist and had relatives abroad, Deputy Head of Production Abram Belinkin had a native brother, uncle and two aunts in the USA, factory economist Yakov Yudilovich had only two uncles, but one of them was a big capitalist. It wouldn't be all that crime, if, say, Jews from the ZIS - citizens of the USSR - did not publicly greet the creation of the State of Israel... What was it before that Israel? Was he their homeland? Or did they perceive it as a kind of "spiritual", "historical" homeland? But then what was the Soviet Union for them?

Why, one wonders, did representatives of the secret Jewish community from Stalinsk (since 1961 - Novokuznetsk) of the Kemerovo region send a delegation to Moscow to greetings from the first envoy of Israel to the USSR, Golda Meir? In November 1949 in Stalinsk in the apartment of a certain I.B. Rapoport, an illegal synagogue was opened, with which many Jewish leaders from the Kuznetsk Metallurgical plant, including Deputy Director Ya.G. Mints, chief distributor S.A. Lieberman, head of the financial department S.Z. Arshavsky, head of the planning department G.Sh. Zeltser, head of the Quality Control Department A.Ya. Dekhtyar, head of the section rolling shop Z.Kh. Epshtein, Deputy Head of the Production Department S.A. Leshchiner ... On the "KMK case"

September 18, 1952 Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR sentenced four to death: Dekhtyar, Mints, Lieberman and Leshchiner - and to 25 years three camps: Arshavsky, Zeltser and Epshtein.

However, this did not mean the persecution of Jews as Jews. Let's remember impressions from Odessa of the envoy of Israel to the USSR Namir, who visited this capital Soviet Jewry in 1950: "... up to 200 thousand Jews live in the city, a third population. The streets are full of Jews ... Their energy, stormy temperament and assertiveness,

characteristic of the former Jews of Moldavanka, make a strong impression. In contrast from Moscow, Yiddish is heard on the street ... "

Yes, despite the fact that not much fewer Jews lived in Moscow than in Odessa, in unlike Odessa, Yiddish has not yet been heard on the streets of Moscow, and, as I understand it, from the point Namir's view, this was a serious shortcoming of Moscow. Some may have seen this is a serious sign of the anti-Semitism of the Stalinist Kremlin, but ...

But, one way or another, so far Russian speech has prevailed on the streets of the capital of the USSR. Although sometimes Jewish passions spilled out violently on the Moscow streets, and Yiddish sounded very loud... So,

on October 4, 1948, the celebration began in the Moscow Choral Synagogue Jewish New Year (Rosh Hashanah), which was attended by Israeli diplomats during led by envoy Golda Meir (Meyerson). A fifty-year-old (that year) native of Kyiv, she ended up in the United States at the age of 8, in 1921 she left for Palestine, where she returned in 1934 after two years in the US. She was an active and assertive Zionist, and her the visit to the Moscow synagogue was, I guess, a well-planned action. And the calculations were justified - at least 10 thousand Jews converged on the synagogue, many of whom did not were able to get in and stay outside.

According to eyewitnesses, the situation could be described in one word - psychosis. Intelligentsia and officers, soldiers and mothers with babies raised high in their arms so that the future prime minister of Israel could see their future citizens, shouting: "Our Golda! Sholom, Goldele!" etc.

On September 13, Meir again visited the synagogue, already on the occasion of the Day of Judgment (Yom Kippur). And again there was a huge crowd that roared to the prayer Chief Rabbi S.M. Shlifer "Next year - in Israel", and at the end of the service accompanied Meir to her residence at the Metropol Hotel.

In Zhores Medvedev's book "Stalin and the Jewish Problem", published in 2005, on page 105, it is absolutely unfoundedly stated that both October demonstrations in Moscow were allegedly "organized by the authorities themselves." I note that on the same 105th page Zh. Medvedev already declares that "these completely unusual for Soviet reality demonstrations were provoked (emphasis mine. – S.K.) by the authorities themselves..."

Organizing something and provoking something are, as they say in Odessa, two big difference. But Zh. Medvedev's "arguments" themselves do not withstand any criticism: they say, for Stalin and Molotov, the demonstrations were not unexpected, since the Ministry of Internal Affairs did not tell them about them. reported - neither in Sochi to Stalin, nor in Moscow to

Molotov. How did the "Kremlin agents" "organize" the pro-Israeli and pro-Zionist hysteria in Moscow, Zhores Medvedev is silent, and what is possible here invent? To say that the MGB officers went to the apartments of the Jews and invited them to a meeting with Meir? Well, that would be too much even for Zhores Medvedev!

No, if someone organized the actions on October 5 and 13, then it was by no means at the direction of Stalin, who allegedly wanted in this way to obtain grounds for the closure of the JAC. All explained more simply - Israel needed new unspoiled citizens, new workers hands and... And new cannon fodder, because Israel was already at war with the Arab League.

Meir's provocations aroused bright hopes among Soviet Jews associated with emigration to Israel and encouraged them to seek this emigration. After all, the Jews of the whole world expected that the then benevolent Soviet Union towards Israel foreign policy line will soon be supplemented by an official exit permit Jews from the USSR to

Israel. "Next year in Israel" - these were not only the words of the traditional Jewish prayers, but also a direct political slogan for Soviet Jews. Those who October 5 and 13 1948 welcomed Meir in Moscow, psychologically already left the land where they were born, and their thoughts were already in that "historical homeland", which neither they nor their

fathers, grandfathers and great-grandfathers never saw with one eye!

At the same time, in Israel itself, its "leadership" behaved in relation to the USSR simply impudently. Here is a clear confirmation of this ...

The Soviet Union became the first state in the world to officially recognize Israel de jure (America initially recognized it only de facto, having established with it diplomatic relations only in 1949). Already on August 9, 1948, the Soviet diplomatic mission arrived in Tel Aviv. And then this is what happened ... August 21 in Tel Aviv's Habima Theater staged the opera Tais, which was attended by Soviet diplomats. Before the performance, the orchestra played the Israeli national anthem first, and then ... American - in honor of the "special representative of the president" who was in the hall USA" J.K. McDonald's. Since

the Soviet anthem was not sounded, our diplomats immediately left the hall theater.

I think this was the "first call" for Stalin in the process of reassessing his position on Israel, which was, as already mentioned, ambiguous. The well-known "democrat" Zhores Medvedev (and not he, of course, alone) even claims that Stalin "showed himself active supporter of the establishment of the State of Israel.

"More can be said," Zh. Medvedev continues, "without the support of Stalin's project to create a Jewish state on the territory of Palestine is the state in 1948 could not have been created. - And sums up: - Because in reality, Israel could appear only in 1948, since it was at that time the British Mandate to administer the territory ended. Stalin's decision directed against Great Britain and its Arab allies (emphasis mine. - S.K.), was of historical significance.

The Medvedevs would not have been Medvedevs if they had not constantly distorted. Stalin had in mind to form two equal states and was not hostile to the Arabs. However he, perhaps, really at first expected that he could use the situation in interests of Russia. There is, for example, the testimony of the General of the NKVD - MGB Pavel Sudoplatov - not very, however, reliable - that Stalin allegedly offered Colleagues in the Politburo agree to the formation of a separate Jewish state, which will be "like a needle in the ass for the Arab states and make them turn around back to Britain.

Perhaps there was a sense in that, although such a position turned the backs of the Arabs and Russia, but they could not completely turn away from England because of the strong economic and political dependence. On the other

hand, the creation of Israel might have looked attractive to Stalin and because in the future it also drove a wedge between the Arabs and America. Not the last turn, therefore, the United States at first did not recognize Israel de jure and introduced a formal arms embargo in the region. Stalin could

have reasoned like this... The creation of Israel is predetermined one way or another - too powerful world forces wanted this. If the USSR from the very beginning of the official discussion of this issue in the UN will take a position of disagreement and resort to the right of "veto" as permanent member of the UN Security Council, this will not change the course of the process on the merits, but will greatly damage the USSR for reasons that are fairly obvious.

So isn't it better to take a position outwardly loyal to both the Arabs and Jews, that is, to put forward the idea of two states? And since the Arabs were then under entirely English control, rapidly transforming into Anglo-American control under the supremacy of the United States, then it is possible and necessary to indirectly support Israel. In this way one can gain some real influence there, if not in the Zionist leadership, then in the Israeli masses, whose pro-Soviet sentiments will influence

Israeli "tops". There

was logic in such a position ... And the USSR really supported Israel, although not as recklessly as "advanced" historians talk about it today. Let's say in various sources report that the first six weeks after the start of the first of the Arab-Israeli war, Israel was allegedly rescued by Soviet deliveries of all types of weapons, including fighter jets, coming from Czechoslovakia and Romania in transit through Yugoslav other Balkan countries. England de armed the Arabs, and the United States, with the outbreak of war, as already It is said that they have declared an arms embargo in the Middle East region.

The military organization of the Palestinian Jews "Haganah" ("Protection") is indeed bought weapons from the Czechs and Romanians, but it must be borne in mind that in both countries, especially in Romania, there has always been a strong Jewish lobby, and the positions of the USSR in them were then already strong, but not yet absolute. So the Haganah could have received weapons from Europe without us, which did not exclude at first some indirect supplies from the USSR. But, in fact, the transportation of weapons from Czechoslovakia to Israel was carried out by a group American pilots and technicians - allegedly against the will of the US authorities. So what do you need rather talk about the "American" rather than the "Soviet" trace in this story with weapons.

They also write that almost our military advisers were allegedly sent to Israel. It was not necessary to meet exact data on this subject, but former Soviet officers in Israeli armed forces were - due to the "creeping" emigration that took place. Someone could be sent under the guise of the same emigrant and on a special mission - the special services of the world always have many different options for penetrating into those of interest. their

countries. But one can reliably speak only about the political support of Israel by the Soviet Union Union - at the first, again, the pores of the history of this "state". In general, there US dominated from the beginning. Between 1920 and 1939, the United States invested £4 million in Palestine; between 1939 and 1947, already £7 million; May 1948 to the end of 1949 - £54 million. That's how it was American embargo. Only in the first quarter of 1949, the United States delivered to Israel goods worth 3,577,767 pounds, while only goods were received from the USSR for 231,831

pounds. In 1948, the American journalist Benzion Goldberg, who in 1946 visited USSR, wrote from New York to Itzik Fefer:

"The Zionist public (and at the present time all Jews almost everywhere "Zionist public") the prestige of the Soviet Union increased enormously. This prestige is so high that the Zionist leaders are even afraid to admit this fact ... because America can ban the collection of money ... And without American dollars The State of Israel is not a state, and the country is not country ... The State of Israel is still a long time (Goldberg could be more precise: "indefinitely long." - S.K.) time will be on the bread of the American Jews..."

This candid quote alone is enough to understand who created "The State of Israel" and in whose interests it was created. It is unlikely that Stalin from the very began to harbor special illusions on this score, but some illusions he, as to assume, in the beginning fed. But already in October 1948, through intelligence channels, he could receive a message (and probably received it) that, for example, who had been to Israeli well-known Zionist, financier, adviser to American presidents and director "Joint" Henry Morgenthau Jr. upon his return declared that the State of Israel "will be the only ... in the Mediterranean basin that we can count as a strong point of defense against communism. And the director of the American Jewish Anti-Communism League, Brigadier General J.

Kline, speaking in May 1949 on the occasion of the second anniversary of the formation of the league, stated:

“... They say that Russia supported Israel in the UN. However, at the very the height of Russia's so-called support for Israel, Zionism was crime in Russia. It is still a crime there.”

All alleged "non-recognition" of Israel by the United States and all the "struggle" for "recognition" was just a not-so-carefully placed smoke screen for everything more active penetration of the United States into the Middle East and the creation of a support base there only and not so much for the "defense against communism", but for the promising control over local oil.

Realizing this, Stalin quickly and finally revised his attitude to the problem. Israel. Although...

Although strategically, he understood everything correctly before. Stalin's old comrade revolutionary and state work, Alexandra Mikhailovna Kollontai was the Soviet ambassador to Sweden in November 1939, and during her trip to Moscow she spoke twice with Stalin in his office in the Kremlin. She left us a diary entry (now her diaries are kept in the Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation) about a certain forecast of Stalin, which stunned her then and which today cannot but stun us. I will give this

testimony in full at the end of this book, and in this chapter I will give only part of Kollontai's entry is the one where she quotes the following words of Stalin:

“Zionism, striving for world domination, will cruelly avenge us for our successes and achievements. He still views Russia as a barbarian country as a source of raw materials. And my name will also be slandered, slandered. To me many atrocities will be attributed ... World Zionism will by all means seek to destroy our Union so that Russia can never again get up...”

This was said in 1939, and less than ten years later, this general forecast became be concretized ... In the foreign policy aspect - in Winston's Fulton speech Churchill, in the idea of "rejecting communism", openly expressed by George Kennan in press of the United States, and in the domestic political aspect - in the increasingly nationalist, pro-Zionist and pro-American nature of the activities of the JAC and those circles of the elite Soviet Jewry, which the JAC rallied by no means in order to strengthen the Soviet power and Great Rus', which rallied around itself the rest of the union republics of the USSR.

Now Stalin, having before him a complete picture of the situation in the world and in the country, viewed through the prism of the problem of Zionism, could take foreign and domestic political actions to organize their own defense From him. And in this activity, he also made new mortal enemies among all that "Zionist public" about which Benzion Goldberg wrote to Fefer.

Israel, however, more and more turned out to be an "island" in the sea of Arab anger, and this "island" for the USSR was not an "island of treasures." It was necessary to be friends with the Arabs, v really turned away from England and the West and did not really want to get into dependence on the

US. In Egypt, by the beginning of the 1950s, the bourgeois party Hizb al-Wafd (Party delegation”) began to timidly demand the elimination of unequal agreements with England, etc. At the end of January 1952, in Egypt, however, a coup was carried out - pro-English and even more pro-American. However, on July 23 of the same year, the authorities in Egypt captured by the political organization "Free Officers" led by General Naguib. King Farouk was deposed and his seven-month-old son was proclaimed the new king. The Regency Council and the government came under the control of Naguib, who on September 7, 1952 became prime minister and military governor-general.

Since 1949, the Executive Committee of the Free Officers was headed by the then 31-year-old officer Gamal Abdel Nasser, since 1952 the Deputy Prime Minister of Egypt (in 1954 he became prime minister). The "free officers" treated Stalin, the USSR and communism without love (many of them preferred to have the Nazis as a model), but they also treated England and America without love, and therefore Israel. And from all this a political line crystallized, which soon led to the nationalization of the Suez Canal and to a reorientation towards the USSR. On January 26, 1953, at a meeting of the Bureau of the Presidium of the Central

Committee of the CPSU under the chairmanship of Stalin, as before at meetings of the Politburo of the Criminal Code of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, many different issues were considered, and the sixth item on the agenda was "On the payment agreement and barter transaction with Egypt." It is unlikely that such

trends pleased both the United States and Israel, and active parishioners.
Moscow Choral Synagogue...

BETWEEN the events of the end of 1948 and the January meeting of the Bureau of the Presidium of the Central Committee, four years passed, and they were filled for Stalin and his state with epoch-making changes in all respects. Russia rose from the ruins, it became nuclear and successfully launched "Stalin's construction of

communism." If we even briefly take a look at only the largest creative concerns of the country in just one post-war year - let's say, the same 1948, then they will say a lot about that time. Here are just a small part of the issues considered during this year at meetings of only the highest operational body of the executive power of the USSR - the Bureau of the Council of Ministers of the USSR - and taken from the chronicle of these meetings:

- * On the state budget of the USSR for 1948
- * On measures to ensure the fulfillment of the retail trade turnover plan for 1948
- * On the repair of the icebreaking and transport fleet of the Main Northern Sea Route in 1948
- * On measures to accelerate the construction of a blooming and rail and beam mill at the Azovstal metallurgical plant of the Ministry of Ferrous Metallurgy
- * On measures to accelerate the restoration and construction of peat enterprises of the Leningrad Trust of the Ministry of Power Plants
- * On increasing the production of excavators, ditchers, dump trucks, dump cars, mobile cranes, bulldozers and scrapers
- * On land use in the Transcarpathian region of the Ukrainian SSR
- * On the acceleration of the construction of the Gyumush power plant in the Armenian SSR
- * On geological exploration for oil in the Arctic
- * On the plan for the distribution of young workers who graduated from schools of FZO (factory training. - S.K.), crafts and railway schools of the Ministry of labor reserves
- * On measures to develop the culture of grapes in the Moscow region
- * On the production of middle-class cars at the Gorky Automobile Plant.
- Molotov
- * On saving the consumption of tin in the national economy
- * On the development of precision engineering
- * On the poor arrangement and provision of Korean workers at enterprises and construction sites in the Far East
- * On the integrated development of the new raw material region of the Murmansk Caves
- * On preparation for harvesting and processing of raw cotton harvested in 1948
- * On measures to improve the operation of housing stock in cities and workers

settlements of the USSR

Against this background, the JAC case and all the mouse fuss around the Moscow Choral Synagogue

looked like a small annoying detail. However, the most important consequences...

The "Island" of Israel was somewhere far away. However, its inhabitants - real and potential, as well as his admirers and patrons lived on the same planet with Stalin.

And Stalin really interfered with them on this planet. Moreover, in recent years there have appeared very interesting evidence in this regard, which I will give at the end of the book.

Chapter Five

1949 The last anniversary of the leader

The last anniversary that the country celebrated under the living Stalin was his seventieth birthday, which fell on December 21, 1949.

His sixtieth anniversary fell on the year 1939 - pre-storm, pre-war for the USSR and already military for Europe. Then Stalin was congratulated by the German Chancellor Hitler, but there were no congratulations from the "democratic" leaders, on the contrary - the USA, England and France were on the verge of breaking off diplomatic relations with us, Western the press was again full of vicious anti-Soviet articles. Precisely anti-Soviet, not anti-communist - there were always enough of them. The West could not forgive Russia: a) that in 1939, she began to pursue foreign policy in her own interests, and not in the interests of the West and concluded a non-aggression pact with the Germans; b) the fact that in the autumn of 1939 the USSR entered into war with Finland, having exhausted all peaceful possibilities for resolving the long overdue border issue. In other

words, just in the days of Stalin's anniversary in 1939, the "democratic" West almost did not hide the fact that now Stalin and his Power are especially hated by this West. The plot is so interesting and important that I, somewhat digressing from the topic, have a little stop.

Until May 1939, Maxim

Maksimovich Litvinov is a former shtetl Jew from Bialystok Max Wallach. He was an old revolutionary, at one time an agent of Iskra, lived in exile in England for a long time and even found a wife there - the Englishwoman Ivy, who, however, came from a bourgeois families of Hungarian Jews who settled on the English island since the time of Kossuth. After Revolution Litvinov-Vallah followed the diplomatic line. Stalin

trusted Litvinov for many years, and in 1930 Litvinov was replaced People's Commissar of the sick Chicherin. Hereditary diplomat and professional Leninist revolutionary, Georgy Vasilyevich was not only a bright personality, but also looked at the main foreign policy priority of Russia: regardless of differences state system, Russia must have extremely close and peaceful relations with Germany. With any Germany, because this was the main benefit of Russia in two reasons.

First: peace between Russia and Germany is peace in Europe. And peace in Europe is wide opportunities for Russia to devote all its strength to its internal development, for Russia it is extremely necessary already because it is too late. The second

reason was the traditionally strong and developed economic ties. Russia and Germany. No other nation has done so much for the economic development of Russia, like the Germans. At the same time, they pursued their own benefit, but Russia, while With the help of German capital, it developed its own manufacturing industry - Group A. This was already the case under the tsars, and when the first five-year plans began, we bought from there are so many Germans that it would not be a big exaggeration to say that the main the industrial base of these five-year plans turned out to be German in origin. In 1932 we exported from Germany almost all steam and gas turbines produced there, almost all presses, cranes and locomobiles, seventy percent of machine tools, sixty percent of excavators, dynamos and metal farms, half of nickel, bar iron, blowers and

fans...

Under Lenin and Chicherin, the truth about the need for friendship with Germany found its expression in the Rapallo Soviet-German Treaty of 1922, and already under Stalin and Chicherin it was confirmed by the Moscow Treaty, signed on December 12, 1925.

Stalin understood the importance of good relations with Germany and greatly appreciated Chicherin, but he completely failed. Litvinov, having become the people's commissar, fouled Soviet-German relations as best he could. His activity intensified especially after when the Nazis came to power in Germany, and he rushed everywhere with the stupidest (because unviable) idea of European "collective security" directed against Reich. This line was beneficial to the West - it quarreled with Russians and Germans, and the USSR favorably accepted into the League of Nations, from the rostrum of which Max willingly "Litvinov". For the USSR, it was a dead end, if not worse.

In the end, Stalin understood this, and in May 1939 the situation changed quickly and cool: Molotov replaced Litvinov in the NKID, having received Beria's "cadre" Vladimir Dekanozov as his deputy. Instead of the already outlined conflict between the USSR and Germany began - so far imperceptibly, within the framework of a secret diplomatic sounding - to be outlined mutually peaceful option.

It all ended, as you know, with a swift visit to Moscow by the Reich Minister Foreign Affairs Ribbentrop and the conclusion on August 23, 1939 of the Soviet-German non-aggression pact.

Cartoons immediately appeared in Western newspapers, where Stalin and Hitler, embracing, step forward through pools of blood, etc. And these cartoons already proved how the West is annoyed that the Russians and Germans could not be played off like this managed to do exactly a quarter of a century ago - in

1914. But back on April 28, 1933, in a conversation with the Soviet plenipotentiary Lev Khinchuk Hitler said: "Both of our states must recognize the inviolability of the facts mutual existence for a long time and proceed from this in their actions. Our countries are complete masters, each in itself, and both should not interfere in each other's inner life..."

Now it was becoming a fact. The West immediately put it to Stalin in the general account hatred for him, and so already considerable. Stalin was declared a warmonger, and only when soon, as a result of the German-Polish war, Poland, rotten from top to bottom, collapsed, and The USSR regained the Western Ukrainian and Western Belarusian lands, the Western press in general, as if off the chain.

However, they simply let her off the chain ... And soon Stalin's account of the "democratic" West was replenished in 1939 with another Finnish events. At one time, Emperor Alexander I, having conquered at the beginning of the 19th century Finland from Sweden and giving the Finns special rights, moved the border of Russia and the Great the Principality of Finland so that it passed - by the standards of the twentieth century - at a distance that allows the Finns to shell Leningrad with long-range artillery. Stalin offered the Finns to move the border to Vyborg, but no such luck! Finns openly dreamed of a "great Finland" almost to the Urals and rested. Now I had to to reason with them by force, although at first the fighting was unsuccessful for us.

The Reich took a politically friendly position towards the USSR, and Western countries sent to Finland "volunteers", weapons and equipment. Anglo-French, "at war" with the Germans are still in the "strange war" mode, they planned aerial bombardments Baku and Batumi, and the League of Nations expelled the USSR

from its membership. So the West was out of hand to congratulate Stalin on his 60th birthday. But This made Stalin especially upset. Especially since he treated his birthdays calmly.

His adopted son Artyom Sergeev recalled that big celebrations on the occasion of

there were no birthdays in Stalin's family. But Stalin gave gifts to the same Artyom, and, by the way, these gifts also characterized Stalin quite definitely. When Artyom turned 7 years old in 1928, his adoptive father gave him "Robinson Crusoe" and said at the same time:

- Written by Daniel Defoe. It says how a man after a shipwreck got on a desert island and lived alone. He was strong, did not lose heart, learned a lot himself, then taught another. And if he had lost heart, dismissed the nurses, he would have died ...

In 1930, Stalin gave Artyom "Mowgli", also briefly talking about the boy, who ended up in the forest with animals that became his friends. Then he added:

- Friends can be different. If you love and respect them, then they will always help protect. If you have no friends, you love no one and no one loves you, then you will die at a difficult moment ...

By 1930, Stalin had many difficult moments in his life, and he knew what he was talking about, because each time he overcame difficulties, he did not die. So, he had friends who loved him and whom he himself loved.

But these are the birthdays of the adopted son. And as Stalin noted his own days birth? Artyom Sergeev said about this:

"Everything went on as usual, without solemnity. To this routine something added, some detail, paint, and the conversations were different. But nothing special ... And therefore something bright was not preserved in the memory - an ordinary day. They usually sang

a lot ... Even in 1934, when Stalin turned 55, there were no special preparations, there was no sense of an organized holiday. Just in Volyn (the second, except for Zubalov, Stalin's state dacha. - S.K.) gathered more people... We laughed a lot, sang a lot, danced a little. There's a place for dancing there was no way to disperse ... ".

Then Budyonny came with a button accordion, and Stalin also danced a little, at the table was sociable. And so it remained in the future. Members of the Politburo came, there was a table. There were no gifts, as everyone knew that Stalin does not like personal gifts, because believes: a gift should be a gift. It is necessary to give and give from a pure heart, and if someone gives you something not from the heart? How to give

away this? But Stalin did not forget to wish happy birthday to the people serving him, and now he gave them gifts. And somehow, for Stalin's birthday, the children arranged a small performance: Svetlana read poems, the guys in simple suits played along ... Vasily bound old books for his father's birthday, and this was also perceived as present.

Stalin worked seven days a week and on his birthday too. Even for holidays table conversations were mostly businesslike - almost the same meeting of the Politburo, but in more relaxed environment. Yes, it is understandable - people dedicated to the cause, and at the feast talk about business, especially when it's not so easy to get everyone together in an informal okay. As

Artyom Sergeev recalled, when toasts were heard at the table to "newborn", Stalin perceived them with humor, and if they began to praise him, over jokingly teased the orator. He himself answered the toast in such a way that for each he found a special word - not edifying, but businesslike, simple and pleasant to a person.

However, the sixtieth anniversary is a serious milestone. And although Stalin himself still did not stick out, in the country this date could not be overlooked, and it was celebrated quite publicly. Although, sometimes, and peculiar.

However, such a "Russian" historian as Gennady Kostyrchenko believes that it's not is it equal? - that Stalin always prevaricates. Like, if he ever showed "modesty", then - pretense. Kostyrchenko writes that in 1934, "when the physical the elimination of the former opposition leaders was yet to come, Stalin was forced (?! - S.K.) , deliberately demonstrating personal modesty, to insist in the Politburo (historian Kostyrchenko hates everything Soviet so much that even a completely historical organ - the Politburo - always names with a lowercase letter, and not with a capital letter. - S.K.) on acceptance following decree..." And then comes a fragment of the decree:

"Respect the request of Comrade Stalin that on December 21 the day fiftieth anniversary of his birth no festivities or celebrations or speeches in the press or at meetings were not allowed.

Kostyrchenko "forgets" to remind the reader that December 21, 1934 did not forty days have passed since the death of a close friend of Stalin - Sergei Mironovich Kirov, who died on December 1, 1934. But even without this, Stalin did not need a pump. Tem at least in 1939, the year of his second "full" jubilee, no resolution The Politburo would not have kept the country from honoring Stalin. In 1934 behind Stalin consciously went mainly enthusiasts - even if there were already millions of them. Now follow him They went, convinced of his correctness, at least - tens of millions. There was something to celebrate and there was someone. But here, too, Stalin restrained unnecessary emotions. So, in the State Tretyakov Gallery in December 1939, a large art exhibition with the demonstrative title "Stalin and the people of the Soviet country in fine arts". Easel painting, portraits, graphics, sculpture - several hundred works. Among them were paintings dedicated to Stalin personally, for example, "Lenin and Stalin at the GOELRO map" by Nalbandian, "The house in Gori, where I.V. Stalin" Dm. Tarkhova, "Stalin with his mother" by Kutateladze, portraits of Stalin by Shegal, Ryazhsky, A. Gerasimov, Troitsky ...

Nevertheless, the name of the exhibition accurately reflected its content: it featured first of all, the people of the Soviet country are represented, and this is clearly seen from the December 1939 edition of 3,000 copies of the exhibition catalog. Here is randomly open spread, pages 18 and 19. Only portraits are listed here:

- Honored Artist of the RSFSR A. Orochko by Marina Volkova; - I.V. Stalin, "Hero of the Soviet Union, order bearer I.D. Papanin, deputy Supreme Soviet of the USSR" and "People's Artist of the USSR Order Bearer A.K. Tarasova, works by Alexander Gerasimov;
- Heroes of the Soviet Union, order bearers V.S. Grizodubova, P.D. Osipenko and M.M. Raskovoy work by Sergei Gerasimov; -
- Major Ageev, commander of the N squadron, participant in the battles for the liberation of peoples Western Ukraine, the work of Mikhail Goncharuk; -
- noble blast furnace worker of Donbass, order bearer I.G. Korobov, Deputy of the Supreme Council of the USSR, works by Grigory Gordon;
- Honored Scientist, Academician N.D. Zelinsky and Academician A.N. Bach Deputy of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, the work of Igor Grabar.

And this was the norm for the exhibition - it was dedicated primarily not to Stalin and not his anniversary, but the Soviet country celebrating the anniversary of Stalin. Opened the catalog graphic portrait of Lenin by P. Vasiliev, and only the second was the portrait of Stalin works by O. Vereisky. In the introductory article to the catalog, signed "I.S. Rabinovich", the name of Stalin was often met, but not a word was said about his anniversary. AND this was hardly an omission of the author of the article - he did not stint on molasses. Yes, exhibition was timed to coincide with the Stalin anniversary - he could go for it, especially considering the fact that

it was rather a demonstration in painting of the new people of the new country. But dedicate an exhibition for the jubilee - Stalin clearly considered this unnecessary.

So the last pre-war anniversary of the leader was celebrated.

The war began, during which Stalin's 65th birthday fell. But it was noted more than modestly, although December 1944 was sometimes quite appropriate.

And now his first post-war anniversary was approaching - already 70 years old. Almost two years before Stalin's seventieth birthday, February 23, 1948, at the Bolshoi Theater solemnly the thirtieth anniversary of the Soviet Army was celebrated. Stalin also sat on the podium. And many the speakers did not so much talk about the army as they welcomed him. Stalin no one interrupted, however, choosing a short break between speeches, he got up and said:

- Comrades, it seems to me that you have forgotten where and why you came. I don't have today anniversary. You came to the anniversary of the Red Army. So please, and talk about Red Army. I say this to those who have confused, forgot whose anniversary is today. Anniversary today The Red Army, not Comrade Stalin...

On December 21, 1949, the anniversary of Comrade Stalin himself came - the last under his life. Ten years later, in 1959, Stalin's 80th birthday, Khrushchev and the Khrushchevites will, in fact, fall silent. In the meantime, it was the end of 1949 in the yard ... And how was it noted in the USSR anniversary of Stalin this time?

Knowing Stalin as a close person, as a foster father, Artyom Sergeev testified:

"He did not revel in the exaltation of himself, but, on the contrary, accepted it as inevitable ritual, as a forced action that did not give him much pleasure. And in no case did he consider his birthday a holiday even their own, and not just the country ... "

However, the 70th anniversary of the birth of the Generalissimo of the Soviet Union, Chairman Council of Ministers of the USSR and General Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks I.V. Stalin was not so much his personal holiday as a serious social event. Moreover, it is an event on a global scale. After all, Stalin approached his 70th birthday as the most significant of the world leaders, as one of the "Big Three" during the war, as the head great power that defeated Nazism, liberated Europe and in a matter of years managed to rise from the ruins.

By the 70th anniversary of Stalin, he was the recognized leader of all world left forces and the emerging world system of people's democracy and socialism. Finally, he was the head of one of the two nuclear powers and the supreme leader the most powerful army in the world. And at the same time, there were armed forces on the territory of Germany, Austria, Poland, Hungary, Romania, for which Stalin's order was by order of the

Motherland. It was impossible not to celebrate the anniversary of Stalin, which meant that it was celebrated will be planetary.

Stalin could not fail to understand this ... Even if we imagine for a moment that he in a directive way would refuse any official honoring of himself - as it sometimes anniversaries do, then no one would understand this, not only in the country, but above all in outside world. The absence in the USSR of celebrations, and magnificent celebrations, in honor of the anniversary of Stalin would have caused lively comments, guesses, etc. Therefore, it was necessary to celebrate. And

this is how everything was organized ...

In issue 337 of Pravda for December 3, Wednesday, the message "In Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR", where it was said:

"December 21, 1949 marks the 70th anniversary of the birth of Comrade. I.V. Stalin. In this regard, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR formed a Committee in the following composition: t.t. Shvernik N.M. (chairman), Alexandrov G.V., Alekseev V.N., Amosov V.M., Angelina P.N., ... (then continued a long a list ending with D.D. Shostakovich, U. Yusupov and N.K. Yarygina. - S.K.) ...

The Committee is entrusted with the development and organization of events, associated with the seventieth anniversary of the birth of comrade. I.V. Stalin."

Starting from the next issue in Pravda's headline, apart from the traditional one for the end of the year in USSR of the announcement of the section "Reports to Comrade I.V. Stalin" in the second line appeared the name new section: "Let's celebrate the 70th anniversary of the birth of Comrade I.V. Stalin new production success." Below it went: "The socialist obligations of the mine Combine "Tulaugol" in honor of the 70th anniversary of the birth of comrade. I.V. Stalin (1 page); Socialist emulation is unfolding in honor of the 70th anniversary of the birth of comrade. I.V. Stalin (1 page) ... "From that day on, in every issue of Pravda until December 21, 1949, materials, the tone of which was set by the 339th issue, where it was reported:

"From all sides of our vast Motherland, information is received about an unprecedented upsurge of socialist emulation in honor of the seventieth anniversary of birth tov. I.V. Stalin. This year

has been marked by many new manifestations of the remarkable patriotic initiative of the masses. But never before has a wave of socialist competition and the Stakhanov movement did not rise as high as these days, when the Soviet country is preparing to celebrate ... the seventieth birthday great leader of peoples, beloved teacher and friend of all working people humanity Comrade I.V. Stalin..."

Kuznetsk Iron and Steel Works named after V.I. I.V. Stalin, Gorky Automobile Plant. V.M. Molotov, Balakhna Pulp and Paper Mill. Dzerzhinsky, copper smelters of the Urals, Leningrad Hydrolysis Plant. CM. Kirov, Moscow

car factory them. Stalin, Tomsk railway, cotton growers of Tajikistan and citrus growers Abkhazia - everything is as it should be: "From Moscow to the outskirts ...", from room to room.

Appeared in Pravda and permanent - until December 21, 1949 - the section "Working all over the world express their love and gratitude to the great leader and teacher I.V. Stalin." Poland,

Czechoslovakia, Hungary, France, Belgium, Italy, etc.

national celebration committees prepared gifts. Here is just one message Pravda, No. 342 of December 8:

"Sculptor from the city of Revel (Department of Haute-Garonne) Georges Kurdou sends Comrade Stalin a sculpture of a French worker with the inscription: "A modest gift to the one who shows the world the way to peace, bread and freedom" ... "

In the same issue, in the chronicle of the preparations for the anniversary of Stalin, one could read:

"PRAGUE. Dec 8 (TASS). According to the Telepress agency from Brussels, the Central Committee of the Belgian Communist Party will present I.V. Stalin on the day of his 70th birthday, an unpublished letter from Karl Marx, written by 90 years ago. The letter is well preserved. It was sent by Marx from Manchester to the Chairman of the Democratic Association of Brussels, Lucien Zhotran."

Just ten years ago, this could not have happened in Europe so openly, almost officially! Stalin's sixtieth birthday was celebrated as a fairly local event. The 70th anniversary was turning into a world-class event.

Could all this please the "cream" of the West, the Golden Elite of the capitalist peace? Stalin and Stalin's country - and this had to be admitted - became more and more appealing to the masses around the world. Today "advanced" "historians" and television commentators present the matter as if after the Red Army came to Europe, our soldiers and officers only drooled, looking at the European "chic" ... But, firstly, a smart person in such cases does not open his mouth in surprise, but clenched his teeth, thinking: "It would be quicker to get home and roll up your sleeves so that we can have the same..."

Secondly, the "chic" was sham, because it expressed the basic principle of capitalism: "For a minority - thick, for the majority - empty." The USSR has not yet produced refrigerators, but the son of a Soviet worker could become a student at Moscow State University, and for the son of an English worker Oxford University was impossible, as was Harvard University for my son American worker. A

Frenchman or Italian, walking through his own country, could stumble upon barbed wire with sign "PRIVAT", and the Soviet people passed through their vast Motherland as a master, freely - from Moscow to the outskirts, from the southern mountains to the northern seas ...

It used to be appreciated.

Having come to Europe, the Russians did not always create an idea of themselves among the Europeans, for Favorable for Russia, because a very different Russia has come to Europe!

Firstly, it was still Russia with "birthmarks" not so much capitalism, how much feudalism. Only twenty-eight years separated Russia-winner from the pre-revolutionary "staggering" Russia, described by Max Voloshin in 1923.

Secondly, Russia came to Europe with a soul wounded by great losses, public and personal. What did the Cossack feel, leaving behind liberated native city with the blown up Dneproges when he entered the well-groomed German town? And what about the children who lost the German and Italian-Hungarian-Romanian aggression against the USSR? And the sons who lost because of the war of

because of

the parents? Therefore, both vile stories and bloody excesses took place ... However, not only Voloshin's "Raseya" came to Europe, but also Soviet Russia, which has restrained dignity. Her appearance could not but attract, surprise and lead ordinary Europeans to serious reflections. That

is why the enthusiasm in the world for the upcoming anniversary of Stalin was genuine, and Stalin really had the right to be called (although he himself never stressed) the great leader and teacher of the working people of the

whole world. In short, Stalin turned out to be such a personal center of attraction for all truly progressive and healthy forces of the planet, the replacement and analogue of which these forces could not have. And he turned out to be a non-alternative, indispensable figure for anyone in world opposition of healthy world forces to reactionary forces, driven only by self-interest.

Even Lenin did not have such a real ideological and moral influence on the future world, which Stalin found by the beginning of the 50s. And there was no comparison material and military capabilities of the country of Lenin and the country of Stalin.

And this country now had strong military bases in the center of Europe. And had them in the result of not a war of conquest, but a war of liberation, that is, by right, not just victorious, but by right the victorious victim of

aggression. And in France, in Italy, in Belgium, in Austria, the authority and influence of communists, not to mention Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Czechoslovakia and East Germany. With difficulty, the British and Yankees managed to suppress the left

an uprising in Greece, and although Stalin's relations with Yugoslavia deteriorated completely, the Yugoslavs still for the most part wanted socialism.

There was something to think about and, speaking in official language, "the ruling circles capitalist countries, and world financiers, and multimillionaires, and monarchs, prime ministers, heads of special services ... And in general, the entire Golden Elite of the West.

The closer to the day of December 21, the more Pravda devoted its materials to upcoming event. Boris Polevoy published an article about "those halls of the Museum of the Revolution, where gifts from workers to Joseph Vissarionovich Stalin are exhibited ..." Yes, Stalin denied gifts to exclude the possibility of receiving an insincere gift. Nose at some point, the flow of gifts to Stalin was not from those who personally surrounded him, but from simple people, arose and flowed spontaneously. And it was no longer possible to stop him, although this over time, the natural stream began to flow in and streams organized by sycophants greater or lesser treasury ... Polevoy

talked about a wooden pipe donated to Stalin, cut from the wreckage of a German aircraft by sailors from the marine brigade defending Stalingrad ... About a plexiglass box for tobacco made for Stalin's guards foreman Igor Nikolsky, also from the remnants of a downed Luftwaffe aircraft. Own The foreman ended the letter to Stalin as follows: "... I wrote as I thought. I did the best I could." Headdress of an Indian leader for the honorary leader of the Indian tribes, Stalin ... His portrait embroidered by a Russian woman ... Gifts occupied several halls ... Stalin hardly most of them even saw it - it was physically impossible. But the gifts were coming and walked...

Alexei Surkov wrote in Pravda:

Love and tenderness of the motherland
Today, her sons are carrying
you. After all, seven decades of your life
Centuries in history are equal ...

And this was written, in general, sincerely. Even professional poets. Although there was enough artificial pathos ... So, on December 12, Pravda published, among others "folk" songs about Stalin and "Belarusian folk" song:

light path
Lenin paved,
Lenin's path
Stalin finished...

I do not think that Stalin was very pleased with this "folk" "creativity".

And the day of December 21 was approaching. On December 12, a Chinese delegation arrived in Moscow led by Mao Zedong. On the same day he was received by Stalin. Then the delegations went in a stream: the Bulgarian one headed by the secretary of the Central Committee of the BKP Vylko Chervenkov, the German one - with Ulbricht, Romanian - with Georgiou-Dej and Anna Pauker, Mongolian - with Tsedenbal, Hungarian - with Matias Rakosi ... On the day of

the anniversary, Pravda came out with a huge portrait of the hero of the day. Decrees were published of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on awarding him the Order of Lenin and on the establishment international Stalin Prizes "For the strengthening of peace between peoples". Award The awards were to be made on December 21 of every year beginning in 1950.

This issue of Pravda appeared on 12 pages, and almost all of it was devoted to huge articles, the first of which was Molotov's strip article "Stalin and Stalin's

leadership ", and the second is also a strip article by Beria" The great inspirer and organizer victories of

communism. Next came strip articles by Voroshilov, Mikoyan, Kaganovich and Bulganin, and then - two per strip - articles by Andreev, Khrushchev, Kosygin, Shvernik, Shkiryatov. The final article was Poskrebyshev's "Beloved father and great teacher", which took the right half of the 11th lane and the left half of the

12th. Most of these articles were, I must say, quite readable, despite officially jubilee character.

On the evening of December 21, at the Bolshoi Theater, the opening speech of the Chairman of the Supreme Council of the USSR Shvernik opened a solemn meeting. At the back of the stage was placed a huge portrait of Stalin, depicted with a single award, which he wore in life - the Gold Star "Hammer and Sickle" of the Hero of Socialist Labor.

In a photograph that appeared in Pravda on December 22, the presidium of the meeting was (from left to right) like this: Palmiro Togliatti, Kosygin, Kaganovich, Mao Zedong, Bulganin, Stalin, Walter Ulbricht, Yumzhagiin Tsedenbal, Khrushchev, Johann Kopenig from Austria, Dolores Ibarruri, Georgiou-Dej, Suslov, Shvernik, Vylko Chervenkov, Malenkov, V Wide (member of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia), Beria (between Malenkov and Voroshilov), Voroshilov, Molotov, Mikoyan, Matias Rakosi.

After Shvernik, many spoke, but very briefly, which was quite understandable: a total of thirty-five people performed that evening.

On December 22, there was a government reception in the Kremlin. And then the guests began to leave home. And in Pravda, several issues in a row published congratulations from all countries and from all

over the world. Restrainedly, through gritted teeth, Stalin was congratulated by the official leaders of the West countries: the French Vincent Auriol and Georges Bidault, the Englishman Attlee, the Italian de Gaspari, the Austrian Karl Renner ... Congratulated Stalin and Israeli Prime Minister David Ben Gurion. Norway, Iceland, Belgium, Iran, India, Finland, Afghanistan, etc. officially congratulated.

And only US President Truman did not find the strength to congratulate world leader No. 1 at least with a

couple of lines. And it was, of course, significant. The year of Stalin's last lifetime anniversary was for the West, and especially for not very successful in every respect.

The main blow was, of course, the August test by the Soviet Union of a nuclear weapons. Such a quick success in the United States

was not expected. It was also not encouraging that Mao Zedong finally won in China. October 1st Tiananmen Square, he proclaimed the People's Republic of China. Now in only one base in China remained at the disposal of the United States - Taiwan Chai Kanshi, and the USSR received, although not a problem-free, but powerful ally. If the Moscow-Beijing axis were strengthened, it would be more than dangerous for the West in the future.

Of course, the United States also had successes. April 4 in Washington DC Belgium, UK, Denmark, Iceland, Italy, Canada, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, USA and France signed the North Atlantic Treaty, forming NATO. But this success was overshadowed for the West by the creation in January of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance. CMEA included Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Romania, USSR and Czechoslovakia.

On May 24, the United States completed the process of splitting Germany - on this day the Federal Republic of Germany was formed and its first chancellor was Konrad Adenauer. But this success is largely depreciated by the proclamation of the GDR on

October 7. Only the victory of the monarchists in Greece could be called an unconditional success - on October 9, the war civile communist between National Liberation Army and the army of King Paul, the actual puppet USA and England. And it was especially gratifying that the victory came because Marshal Tito,

having broken with the USSR, he stopped the supply of weapons to the Greek "left". In general, the general world situation is out of control of the United States and the Golden The Internationale eluded more and more.

However, Stalin, in the year of his seventieth birthday, had no reason to be especially satisfied. The factor of the unfolding "Leningrad case", "JAC case" and other "cases" could not but overshadow Stalin's thoughts "about time and about himself" ...

On March 4, 1949, Molotov had to be replaced as Minister of Foreign Affairs Vyshinsky, and although Molotov remained Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR and a member the leading "five" of the Politburo, rely on him as before, Stalin could no longer. And was it only about

Molotov that one could say that? Already on the eve of the anniversary, December 12 1949, for "clamping criticism, lack of self-criticism and the wrong attitude towards cadres" I had to part with the 43-year-old first secretary of the Moscow City Party Committee and at the same time secretary of the Central

Committee of the CPSU (b). The story with Popov began on October 20, 1949, when Stalin received a letter signed: "Communist engineers of the plant named after Stalin Maretsky, Sokolova, Klimenko." On October 29, Stalin sent him to Malenkov along with his own large a note that began like this:

"Tov. Malenkov.

The other day I received a letter signed by communist engineers of the plant named after Stalin Maretsky, Sokolova, Klimenko about shortcomings in the work of the secretary MK t. Popov.

I do not know the comrades who signed the letter. It is possible that these names are fictitious (this needs to be verified) (Stalin guessed correctly. - S.K.). But that's not the point. The fact is that the facts mentioned in the letter feel good to me. known, I received several letters about them from individual comrades of the Moscow organizations. Maybe it's my fault for not paying enough attention. to these signals. I did not pay due attention, because Comrade believed. Popov. But Now..."

Stalin now proposed appointing a Politburo commission to investigate. A there was something to disassemble ... The authors of the letter to Stalin painted a gloomy picture, but - alas, in the difference from their surnames is not fictitious:

"Tov. Stalin and members of the Politburo of the Central Committee

of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks. The Bolsheviks of the Moscow Organization spoke in an undertone until on the sidelines, about whether the moment of a timely autopsy had come long ago a brewing abscess at the head of our organization. It's about very suspicious policy pursued by the secretary of the MC of the CPSU (b) Comrade Popov. <...>".

Stalin's slogan about self-criticism, regardless of faces, has been transformed According to Popov's school, only subordinates are subject to criticism. Major party the masses are eliminated from the life of the party. <...>

It seems to us that a chir has developed on our healthy body in Moscow no less Leningradsky.

Popov's actions are downright doubtful. Popov is the youngest secretaries of the Central Committee. Being possessed by ... the mania of leadership, he is overcome by the thought of future to become the leader of our party and people. <...> At

a banquet on the occasion of the 800th anniversary of Moscow, one of the sycophants raised a toast "For the future leader of our party, Georgy Maksimovich." present Popov missed the deaf ears and seemed to agree with the forecast. Then as needed was to straighten up the fool or after to discuss about his party membership ... "

The writing style was sharp and colorful, and its essence was concrete and evidential. AND despite the fact that formally it was anonymous, in fact it was a document, quite

deserving the highest attention in the country - Stalin's. The letter clearly inspired in the "apparatus" - there was no desire to discredit the young leader, but there was a clearly stated intention to expose him, for Popov did a lot of "arts". The authors reported:

"All the workers of the MK and the Moscow Council, nominated by comrade Shcherbakov, Popov dispersed to the last man and put forward his own ... What kind of cadres are these? Popov was worn like a written bag with the secretary of the district committee Zharikov, who turned out to be a traitor after Motherland - Commissar of the Army Vlasov. Favorite of the enemy of the people Prigulsky (former director of the plant named after Ilyich) - Kozlov Olympiad, working secretary of the Zamoskvoretsky district party committee, furnished her apartment with German trophies delivered by Prigulsky from Germany. At the regional conference Kozlova was exposed and escorted out with a bang. Popov picked it up and put it into secretaries of the MK ... By the way, he introduced

her to his harem. The young careerist Komsomol member Krasavchenko went to the front, ended up in captivity ... it is not known where the party card is. Escaped by unknown ways rear of the enemy. He would have a place in the camps. But Popov gave him a new party card, <...>, urged the election of Krasavchenko at the last congress of the Komsomol as secretary of the Central Committee Komsomol. But even the youth saw through what kind of fruit Krasavchenko was, and failed him. <...>

Stupid of the stupids of Tsaregorodtsev ... nominated by Popov for the post of leader political agencies of the Ministry of Railways. politically illiterate the man Firubin, who licked Popov's heels, was nominated for the post of secretary City Party Committee. The editor who praised Popov in the Moscow press "Moscow Bolshevik" Gubin planted the editor of "Izvestia". To Armenia Popov's sycophant Pogosov was sent, Panov was sent to Kaluga, and so on. In a word, Popov places his cadres wherever he can, in order to an opportune moment to take the steering wheel of the country into your own hands.

Thus, Popov competed with the Leningraders in the placement of "his" people. Preparations were underway to seize leadership ...

In MK circles, they openly say that Comrade Popov is behind him. Stalin and what post the great leader will go to Popov ... "

Perhaps this description of Popov's personality and the atmosphere around him is better than any The confessions of Voznesensky (three years older than Popov) and Kuznetsov (a year older than Popov) confirmed the guilt of the latter two. All three were from the same generation - they did not sit in tsarist prisons, did not go under bullets in civil and Great Patriotic War - even for Leningrader Kuznetsov, the personal risk of blockade was no higher than that of hundreds of thousands of residents Leningrad ...

Stalin had great hopes for all three. And all three did not justify his hopes. But Stalin's hopes were the hopes of the motherland...

Popov replaced in May 1945 the deceased A.S. Shcherbakov, and up to a certain point he seemed to be active, diligent, and suited Stalin. But the same could be said about Voznesensky ... And about Kuznetsov ... And now after them it was necessary to do something with Popov.

At the end of the letter, the Moscow Communists wrote:

"Won't the Politburo really check Popov's activities. At least verified the facts we have stated. Don't the signals of the masses need verification? We are not slanderers. <...> We

believe that if the Politburo of the Central Committee does not listen to the voice of the lower classes in the case Popov, then people who know the affairs of Popov will lose faith in the existence of party truth.

And Stalin listened, and how could it be otherwise! In addition, he himself more than once

spoke sternly with Popov. A Politburo commission was appointed consisting of Malenkov, Beria, Kaganovich and Suslov, and as a result of its work, Popov was removed from party posts and was appointed Minister of the Ministry of Urban Development specially created "for him" construction of the USSR. From March to December 1951 he was minister agricultural engineering, later - the director of an aircraft plant in Kuibyshev, Ambassador to Poland ...

The Politburo's decision to release Popov stated that the charges anonymous authors of the letter to Popov regarding the "dispersal of proven personnel of the MK and of the Moscow City Council and in planting ... in responsible areas in the party of their people "do not confirmed, but it is unlikely that this was the case. In any case, none of those mentioned in letter as Popov's creatures, he did not subsequently get glory for himself, but someone "showed" himself rather unworthy. But

Stalin until the last believed in the best in people who once entered the circle of his employees. In addition, Popov, who had imagined himself, was not in the "activities" political aspect - in contrast to the activities of the "Leningraders", which Stalin, of course, took into account. However, Popov did not recover, although he worked in various positions until 1965, when he retired (he died in 1968, aged 62). Khrushchev, recalled from Kyiv, was appointed Secretary of the

Central Committee instead of Popov on December 13, 1949. It is unlikely that on this date, on the part of Stalin or someone else, there was some a hint... But the date turned out to be, as they say now, "significant"... Khrushchev next to Stalin became for the unsuspecting Stalin in the foreseeable future mortally dangerous.

It is interesting how many years after the death of both Stalin and his father Nikita Khrushchev's case with Popov was presented in his "memoirs" by Khrushchev's son Sergei. In his In the description, it appeared that Stalin was informed about the existence of a "Moscow" conspiracy, similar to the "Leningrad" conspiracy, headed by Popov. Stalin urgently summoned Khrushchev and "handed him a pile of documents" allegedly accusing him of anti-Soviet activities almost all the Moscow leadership ...

And Khrushchev de started investigating, and when Stalin a few weeks later asked about the results, Khrushchev Sr. "tried to convince him that the denunciation lime". Further, Khrushchev Jr. reported that Popov "was appointed director of the plant, there he did not pose a threat in the eyes of Stalin," and summarized: "... and therefore, life him (Popova. - S.K.) was safe ... "The reader who is familiar

with the state of affairs in documents, he can determine himself.

The anniversary year for Stalin was coming to an end. And he was like all the rest of his years of life, full of big and small problems... There were sometimes "anniversary" problems among them, but we are not talking about the Stalin jubilee. On October 10, Khrushchev called from Kyiv to Moscow via HF about the celebration of the 10th anniversary of the annexation of Western Ukraine. He proposed to hold demonstrations and military parades in Kyiv, Lvov and Uzhgorod, lay monuments, release a documentary and... rename the city of Stanislav to the city Stalinokarpatsk. The

telephone message was handed over to Stalin to the south, where from September 5 to December 7 he was in vacation, and Stalin approved everything, except for the idea of renaming (only in 1962, Stanislav renamed Ivano-Frankivsk). There, to the

south, Poskrebyshev also sent papers similar to the letter from the chief editor of the Ogonyok magazine Alexei Surkov, where he asked for sanctions on November 18, 1949 for the publication in the 50th issue of the magazine of an article by cameraman M. Oshurkov "Unforgettable meeting "- about the filming of Stalin.

The article was written in a frankly sugary manner, and its fate turned out to be the same as and Khrushchev's idea with Stalinokarpatsk.

So "vacation" was a very conditional concept for Stalin - and on "vacation" things, large and small, were not released from oneself ... Let's say, in the Air Force and in Disasters have become more frequent in the civil air fleet ... And already on "vacation" Stalin thinks about some kind of replacement for Vershinin in the Air Force and Baidukov in the Civil Air Fleet and on September 12, 1949 writes Malenkov that "Baidukov is a good pilot, but as a leader he is very weak" and that Vershinin could be replaced by Zhigarev ... And already in September 1949, the former second Chkalov's pilot, 42-year-old Georgy Baidukov, is sent - no, not to the Gulag, but to study in Higher Military Academy. K.E. Voroshilov, after which he will receive in 1952 the post of Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Air Defense Forces of the country for a special technique.

Stalin had to think about things even less pleasant than replacing weak leaders ... So, in 1949, the question arose of restoring the canceled May 26 1947 death penalty. In 1950 it was restored for "spies, traitors and saboteurs", and this was a necessity - the United States increasingly threw into the territory The USSR was precisely the saboteurs and increasingly deployed reconnaissance against us, using, in including the personnel of the German special services - the Abwehr and the SD, as well as reserves from "displaced persons". Yes, and internal reasons for tougher capital punishment there were.

In connection with the latter, I note: the Soviet Union of the late Stalin era (not to mention about the USSR at the end of the 30s) "advanced" "historians" are presented as almost a continuous GULAG. In refutation of this, many personal memories can be cited. living contemporaries of that era. Let's say my father, in response to the question: "Did you feel like slaves?" just laughed. By the way, just in 1949, at twenty-five years old, he, a young duty officer on the hill of the Nizhnedneprovsk-Uzel station, joined the ranks of the CPSU (b). It is possible to refute the lies about the "gulag" way of life in the post-war USSR bring documents - today, in principle, available. However, I will introduce the reader with just one diary entry by the writer Mikhail Prishvin. It was pure personal diary, there are practically no entries about politics, events in society, etc. besides, Prishvin was not very exacted at that time by official attention and affection. And this circumstance - if you believe the "historians" - "democrats" - in itself could provide him attention from the "organs". So, on July 17, 1952, Prishvin wrote:

"Yesterday a young man went uphill with buckets, saw me, put the buckets on the ground and approached.
- Hello, Mikhail Mikhailovich, I have read your book Our Country. - So what? - It turned out that you were in Siberia. After that, there was a hitch. - And what are you doing? I asked the reader. - I am a senior inspector of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. - The Ministry of Internal Affairs, - I said, - this is Moscow ... And what next? - What do you! - answers. - What is Moscow, it is for the whole internal affairs.
So we met and parted ways with my reader ... "

This is how a "police" power, in which an educated, developed and somewhat even a disgraced (in those years) citizen is not familiar with the abbreviation behind which the main thing is hidden "police" department! No, as

the country freed itself from the weight of the ruins, it breathed more and more full breasts, because every year she became richer, more educated, more powerful, which means - and freer.

Stalin himself was aging and weakening ... In 1945, in response to a proposal to stage his

gigantic statue, he rejected the idea in a very ironic manner. And ended up in Berlin, a Soviet liberator soldier stood on the Victory pedestal with the rescued by him a German girl in her arms and with a sword in her right hand. Moreover, the sculptor Vuchetich recalled that on the model of the monument, the soldier had a machine gun in his hand, but it was Stalin offered to replace it with a sword, once again showing the exact artistic taste and political wisdom. By the

beginning of the 50s, he no longer objected, for example, to the development in 1949 projects of a monument to yourself for the All-Union Agricultural Exhibition or against installation at the entrance to the Volga-Don Canal in Stalingrad of a huge bronze statue of him.

However, this could hardly be regarded as a sign of personal decrepitude. Stalin. He remained Stalin to the end and was, as I understand it, enough for bronze. indifferent. However, the Volga-Don, starting in a city that not only bears his name, but which became a symbol of the invincible people, was to become one of the symbols of the era.

And this was the era - whatever one may say - of Stalin! It was the era of both Lenin and repay the country he started, and Stalin himself, as the only an outstanding student of Lenin. But after all, this was done on the same Volga-Don - on one on the shore at its mouth was to stand a huge bronze Lenin. However,

the country was obliged to pay tribute to Stalin himself. Lenin on one the bank of the entrance to the Volga-Don - this is logical. But even for architectural symmetry (not to mention already about the "symmetry" of the historical) Stalin was to stand on the other side.

Everyone understood this, Stalin

understood it too. In addition, he was already in his eighth decade - a considerable age in any century human history. Bronze Stalin at the entrance to the Volga-Don could already in the coming years become a memorial.

No, I do not see anything in Stalin's consent to his own monuments. unworthy. After all, he left his fellow citizens a country that "from Moscow to the very suburbs" were covered with scaffolding. The mature Stalinist era was truly an era great buildings!

And many could not forgive Stalin for this either.

Chapter Six

1950–1951. The restoration of the new and the onset of the old

Immediately after the end of the war, the peoples of the USSR were faced with a task that nowhere else never stood before any people.

On the one hand, it was necessary to restore an unprecedentedly destroyed country and its economy, and recover as soon as possible. On

the other hand, it was necessary at the same time to provide the country with protection against American atomic weapons by creating their own such weapons, as well as their means delivery to the USA.

And besides the restoration of the destroyed, it was necessary to create a new one - and in the material realm, and in the spiritual. And all this - in a country where almost everyone had a reason to give up: for some - from the sight of the ruins, for others - from irretrievable losses.

However, the country has already accumulated vast experience in that work together, without which it was not possible to restore and build a new one. And work on all "fronts" at once.

Since August 1945, the atomic problem has gone seriously, to the leadership of which Stalin connected Beria. The beginning of Soviet nuclear weapons efforts was still at the end 1941, but now everything was speeding up. Widely unfolded and work on ballistic missiles, jet aircraft.

And along with all this went, if I may say so, the restoration of that new Russia managed to accumulate ten pre-war years of turbulent socialist construction. In the course of the war, this new, which arose in the stone of new buildings and in the souls of people,

suffered considerable damage, and now it had to be replenished. But not everything here was like this. just... In

1924, Russia was still NEP. In 1929, she began to become in earnest socialist and in just ten years made a stormy and successful breakthrough to all-round progress. The war made ambiguous adjustments to this process. She destroyed the industrial giants of the first five-year plans, but in the rear, in the previously bearish corners, new factories arose. The war destroyed the results of the cultural revolution, and on occupied territories revived the old social relations. And she is created stronger and more perfect relations between people within the surviving USSR to each other, to the state, to the Fatherland.

Difficult problems were generated by the war, although the problems born by the war are always, alas, not simple. On December 31, 1946, Beria sent a note to Stalin No. LB-298, which was, in fact, a cover letter to the note by Minister of State Security Abakumov "on food difficulties in some areas of the Moldavian SSR, Izmail regions of the Ukrainian SSR, about complaints of famine in the Voronezh and Stalingrad regions identified "as a result of covert control" by the Ministry of State Security of the USSR of letters, mainly sent by relatives to servicemen in the army.

Even selectively quoting this document is difficult, and I can understand Abakumov, who, it seems, did not dare to send it directly to Stalin, but turned first to Beria, and he, to his credit, was not afraid to send the "paper" to Stalin. For a

correct understanding of what he will read below, today's young reader it is necessary, perhaps, to explain that the terrible reality that arose from the lines of these letters - also documents of the era, did not determine the nature of time. The way you describe your life authors of illuminated letters, lived far from all of the tens of millions of simple people in the USSR, although only scoundrels lived comfortably and without problems then. But also in There was a bitter truth in the letters mentioned.

From dozens of excerpts from the "Voronezh" and "Stalingrad" letters (there were about 8 thousand viewed by special officers) I will give three:

15. XI-46 "... The impending famine frightens, morale depressed. Our children live a brutal life - forever angry and hungry ... " (Efremova M.S., Voronezh region, Buturlinovka station, Glavmuka, - Efremova N.A., PP (field mail. - S.K.) 39273)

24. XI-46 "...We are dying of hunger. There is no bread, there is nothing, there is nothing to eat. There are only a few days left to live, because, eating water, you can only live a week ...

"(Bobrovskikh A.S., Voronezh region, Begribanova village, Trudovaya st., 40 - to Bobrovsky I.V., PP 8948)

24. XI-46 "... Mother is swollen from hunger, there is nothing to support her ... I will finish suicide, so as not to see these torments ... " (Shamygina,

Komsomolsky district, *village* Sennoy, - Shamygin, PP82116)

The MGB certificate also cited excerpts from letters from the workers of plant No. 402 from Arkhangelsk region, workers mobilized to work in the coal industry Stalin (later - Donetsk) region of the Ukrainian SSR. So, N.D. Koval wrote from Donbass to P.G. Gorely to the Chernihiv region: "... They feed us here like dogs: in the morning half a liter of gruel, on lunch is the same and a spoonful of porridge. Balanda is boiled from flour. Earnings are very poor - 300 rubles per month, and I need 600 rubles for food ... I can't stand it until spring. Many fled from here ... "And a certain Murnilo from Stalingrad wrote to L. Alexandrova in the Pskov village Merzlyak is this: "I sold everything to save a life ... I'm already starting to swell. I don't prison is terrible, because there I can get a piece of bread ... "

So Stalin knew how people live. But even without knowing whether Stalin knows about it, ordinary people understood that in order to live better, one had to work hard and hard.

And the country, even starving, worked.

In November 1945, the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR adopted a resolution on the restoration of 15 the oldest cities of the USSR, destroyed by the Nazi invaders.

In July 1946, navigation was opened on the restored White Sea-Baltic canal, and at the end of the year the first stage of the Vladimir Tractor Plant was launched. It was only one of the post-war new buildings, but so far the country has mainly concentrated and collected again the scattered stones not by her. Restored Dneprodzerzhinsk nitrogen-fertilizer plant, Makeevsky Pipe Foundry, Riga Electric Machine Building Plant, Minsk Machine Tool Plant. March 18, 1947 the

Supreme Soviet of the USSR adopted the law "On the five-year plan restoration of the national economy of the USSR for 1946–1951". Concentration ended. Works began that were akin to battles.

On March 3, 1947, the first unit of the restored Dneproges named after V.I. Lenin. On August 16, the

construction of the Saratov-Moscow gas pipeline was completed. On

November 4, 1947, the restoration of the first stage of Rostselmash was completed. And under the end of the year, on December 14, a resolution of the Council of Ministers of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks "On carrying out monetary reform and the abolition of cards for food and industrial goods.

The year 1948 was marked by the development of the "Stalin Plan for the Transformation of Nature", which provided for the creation of a network of artificial seas, the construction of giant hydroelectric power stations, and the planting of forest shelterbelts. And in July of the same year, at the su a decision is made to place the new building of Moscow State University on the Lenin Hills in the center of the bend Moscow River and build it as a high-rise.

On August 29, the Kharkov Tractor Plant was completely restored. November 6 builders commissioned new gas pipelines Kohtla-Jarve - Leningrad and Dashava - Kyiv. Were the Farhad and Sukhumi HPPs were put into operation.

After a series of famine years, the situation in agriculture improved, although about there was no need to speak of a favorable situation here. We will see this again.

On the whole, a huge amount of work has been done in the three or four post-war years. And that's it this is in the conditions of ever-increasing pressure from the West, the creation of a ring around the USSR US bases and developing plans for direct nuclear aggression against

Russia. In March 1946, at the University of the American city of Fulton, Churchill called for unification of the West against the USSR, and on April 4, 1949 in Washington it was proclaimed creation of NATO.

The Soviet Union initiated in 1949 the creation of the Council of Economic mutual aid, CMEA. In the same year, the Minsk Tractor Plant came into operation, Zaporizhstal named after G.K. Ordzhonikidze, and the Council

The Ministers of the USSR adopted resolutions on the construction of the Kuibyshev hydroelectric power station, the Stalingrad hydroelectric power station, and the Kakhovskaya hydroelectric power station; on irrigation of lands in the southern region northern regions of the Crimea, arid lands in the Rostov and Stalingrad regions.

In 1950, among others, the Transcaucasian Metallurgical plant in Rustavi, on July 27, 1952, the Volga-Don Shipping Canal named after M. IN AND. Lenin, and in the same year the Tsimlyanskaya hydroelectric power station was opened, put into operation railway lines Chardzhou - Urgench and Barnaul - Aryshta on the South Siberian highways. And at the Leningrad plant "Elektrosila" a 150 thousand kW hydrogen-cooled turbogenerator was built.

The Elektrosila turbine generator was a world-class achievement, but it was not only in this. In its first years, our nuclear project, and the fact that Leningraders were now switching to an outstanding peaceful products, it was significant - the US nuclear monopoly was eliminated, on approach was a hydrogen bomb, and now the country was breathing easier.

On March 12, 1950, elections were held for the new Supreme Soviet of the USSR. Wherein

the authority of the communists in the country was really huge. French communist party, the main force of the French Resistance during the war years, was called the "party shot." But if there was anyone this definition suited to in the first place, it was All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks. During the war years, died on the fronts three million communists. And yet, by the end of the war, there were 3.3 million communists in the active army - 60% of the army. And this army of the party was reinforced at the front millions of communists in the rear.

Now this "army" of many millions, whose fighters are accustomed to: whether you like it or not, but you have to go ahead, was again at the forefront of life. Moreover, such a life, the essence of determined not by considerations of profit, but by debt.

In official speeches, in newspaper articles and in private conversations, the word "communism".

On February 15, 1951, Mikhail Prishvin wrote in his diary:

"People are walking around me, throwing all their best into a common fire in order to he was on fire for everyone..."

On July 15, 1951, Prishvin made the following entry in his diary:

"It would be nice to remake The Sovereign's Road (a fairy tale novel published in 1957. - S.K.), or rather, to implement the plan of the most initial: depict the birth of a communist in the boy Zuyka against the background the collapse of the old world and the struggle and ascent of the new. The wisdom of the author have an effect in giving a picture of a possible communism into which we all believe, which must win, and separate it from the picture of failures on the way to goals...

It is necessary to make sure that this work is independent, ... unhurried and modern, that is, in the most serious way collected and brought modernity into its higher sense."

This was written for himself by a man who in 1951 was already 78 years old. and who had three more years to live, a non-party man and enough apolitical.

And he sincerely saw the highest meaning of modernity - no matter how unpleasant it learn "advanced" slanderers of the era of Stalin - in the struggle for communism.

In the biographical information about Mikhail Mikhailovich, placed in the Illustrated Book published in 2003 by the Big Russian Encyclopedia encyclopedic dictionary "(compiled by A.P. Gorkin), it is said:" In the diaries (Prishvina. - S.K.) captured the life of Russia since the 1910s, social and morals. tragedy people in the era of totalitarianism..." etc.

The "encyclopedists" did not say a word about Prishvin's dream and faith in communism. Yes, and why be surprised - in the house of the hanged man they do not talk about the rope.

But if the idea of the practical construction of communism - not as an inexhaustible feeders, but as a free, conscious community of educated and well-rounded developed, and therefore free people, - was carried away by the end of his life Prishvin, how did tens of millions of those who was "in all seriousness" busy translating this idea into action, into new factories, cities, varieties wheat and new scientific research facilities! And in the

same country lived, alas, millions of those to whom these ideas were not that hostile but indifferent. And

there were those - of course, they were a minority - to whom these ideas were inconvenient, alien or even hateful. There were few of them, but they, firstly, were. Secondly, they were by no means always limited to grumbling or inactive hatred. Sometimes they

even had very real opportunities to seriously mess up and introduce enzymes spiritual decay into a social organism that is still fundamentally healthy.

I will remind the reader that in June 1949 the Trotskyite Slomnitskaya declared that in There is no socialism in the USSR, that arbitrariness and lack of rights prevail in the country. But here's the cover magazine of the Central Committee of the All-Union Leninist Young Communist League "Technology - youth" for July 1951. Magazine then and for many years after that he enjoyed great popularity among the Soviet youth - he woke up the imagination and dream, but summed up a scientific, engineering, real basis for them, showed perspective of the development of science, technology, life. And on the cover of the July issue was the main building of Moscow State University is depicted - then only under construction, but already shining on the cover glass windows, slender, brand new ...

Against its background, confident in themselves and in the country, smart young boys and girls walked with faces illuminated from within by the light of mind and soul. They were not luxuriously dressed, but attractive and tasteful. The artist depicted not a utopia, but tomorrow. AND open, proud faces filled with beauty and dignity were also not propaganda varnishing of some unsightly reality. The artist saw these faces around him, and therefore it was not difficult for him to portray them truthfully and without embellishment.

It was the post-war Stalinist generation of young builders. They lived to build, and built to live. And in the USSR, Stalin had every opportunity for this, although he they could ensure the future only by hard work, which does not always immediately give their fruits. But it wasn't that important back then. What was important was that people in the new restored country saw a very real optimistic perspective.

Only in one issue of "TM" for 1951 were materials "Today and earthmoving machines tomorrow", "Scrapers", "Giant digger", "Excavator commanders", "Sormovsky-1 dredger", "Machines dig a canal", "Soviet soil science", "Explosion-builder", "Walking excavator" ...

In the April issue for 1946, the academician-chemist, Hero of Socialist Labor N.D. Zelinsky published in "TM" an article "To the limits of compression", in a double in the August-September issue of the magazine for the same year, A. Georgiev wrote about recently discovered a new physical effect - the "Cherenkov glow", and the honored worker of science and technicians V. Okhotnikov - about the amazing earth-moving "underground boat" of the Soviet engineer A.I. Trebelev, constructed according to the laws of the then non-existent bionics - taking into account how the mole digs the ground. Trebelev started doing it amazing project in 1937, which for like-minded Trotskyists Slomnitskaya was only "the year of repression and the Gulag"...

In 1953, "TM" published an article by A. Sternfeld "On the eve of space flight" ...

However, in those same years, processes and figures were taking shape and developing, for of socialism are potentially destructive, hostile to creation.

At the turn of the 1940s and 1950s, very different processes were going on in the country. Someone worked hard and consciously, equipping first of all the power, and then - as the state grew stronger and richer - equipping its everyday life. And someone tried to "snatch" his own and went to great lengths for this ... Someone carefully cherished his hurt pride, and someone became embittered because of that poverty that still peeped out from many angles. And he immediately became angry at socialism, at Stalin.

Someone could not forget the prosperity that he saw in even destroyed Germany, not Realizing, however, that this wealth has been achieved as a result of such careful labor, to which in Russia has always lacked mass taste. The war, on the one hand, deprived the country of millions of wonderful people, enthusiastically

engaged in the socialist development of science, industry, agriculture, culture and new life in general – new in big and small. On the other hand,

the war brought a lot of turbidity to life ... Without developing this idea, I will cite a few documents, and then, perhaps, it will become clearer to the reader that the author means. For

example, back on September 27, 1944, People's Commissar of Internal Affairs Beria signed top secret special message No. 1030/b. I am quoting it in full:

"GOKO to Comrade STALIN I.V. Council of People's
Commissars of the USSR - Comrade V. M. MOLOTOV. Central Committee
of the All-Union Communist Party of the Soviet Union to Comrade MALENKOV G.M.

From August 25 to September 4 this year. were thrown into the regions of Minsk, Borisov, Orsha, Baranovich and Nevel and into the territory of the Smolensk region groups of German paratroopers-saboteurs, consisting of teenagers aged from 8 (eight. - S.K.) to 15 years.

Of those thrown out, 22 people were detained.

According to the detainees, in 1943 in the mountains. Konino (Poland) and in the mountains. Hamburg, the Germans organized sabotage schools for teenagers taken from orphanages in Orsha, Minsk, Yartsevo and Orel. The

school taught topography, subversion and transition tactics.
across the front line.

After graduation from school, teenagers were thrown into our rear with the task blowing up

locomotives. Briquettes of explosives, shaped and colored, were confiscated from the detainees. hard coal issued to them for tossing into tenders. The search for the remaining paratroopers continues. People's Commissar
of Internal Affairs
USSR L. Beria

As a reader, I don't know, but this document stunned me. But on reflection, I could not help but pay tribute to the ingenuity and ingenuity of the Abwehr. The idea was clearly a good one. Of course, no one shot the brats who got caught. Someone was sent to the children's at home, some - in the camps. In 1950, the eldest of them were already twenty years old, the youngest - fourteen. Even the younger ones are of Komsomol age. But what was in the soul of these citizens of the Soviet Union? By

the way, already in Putin's "Rossiyanie" the film "Bastards" was shown on a wide screen, where the situation was distorted exactly "quite the opposite." Like, these are the "Jesuits" - de Beria they prepared in the camps and sent saboteur boys to the German rear. I don't know biographies of the authors of this film, but I do not exclude that one of them was either one of those about whom Beria informed Stalin in 1944, or is related to them, in any case
- spiritual. Here

is another document - a special message from the head of the counterintelligence department "Smersh" V.S. Abakumov to Stalin No. 551/A. It is dated 5 October 1944 and reproduced here partially:

"... I present the protocol of the interrogation of the arrested TYMOSHENKO Athanasius Prokofievich, who is the nephew of Marshal of the Soviet Union S.K. TYMOSHENKO.

TYMOSHENKO Athanasius confessed that, living in the occupied opponent of the territory of the Odessa region, he was for some time chief of the district police, and then was recruited by the chief of the Romanian gendarmerie ȘTEFANESCU, on whose instructions he identified partisans, communists and persons hostile to the invaders. Shortly before the liberation of the Odessa region ... with TYMOSHENKO A.P.

the Siguran officer DRAGULESCU, who came from Bucharest, met twice.

<...>

In addition, Timoshenko A.P. said that with him the territory occupied by the enemy was Marshal's sister TYMOSHENKO - KUZUYMA A.K., who ... was not subjected to repressions from side of the occupying authorities ...

<...>

It is characteristic that in May G.... KUZUYMA A.K. came to Moscow to S.K. TYMOSHENKO and stayed at his dacha. During his stay at the dacha of S.K. TYMOSHENKO and KUZUYMA had long conversations with each other, specially leaving the premises for this, as a result of which they were recorded conversations with operational equipment failed ... "

What could Stalin think after that? After all, Semyon Konstantinovich Timoshenko is not obeyed him - that, they say, Comrade Stalin, what a bad luck with his sister and nephew came out ... They let me down, they say, but let's not flog the guilty head ...

On January 5, 1950, the same Abakumov, already as Minister of State Security of the USSR, in special message No. 6328/a asks Stalin for permission to arrest two Heroes Soviet Union: 28-

year-old former military commandant of the port of Sulina on the Danube, party member, senior Lieutenant M.A. Sysoev after his dismissal from the army became the head of the personnel department Kursk regional trust of local industry. And now he was exposed as a spy. Abakumov reported:

"The arrested MGB of the USSR and the exposed agent of American intelligence PETROV, ex. battalion commander of the 7th Guards Army of the Central Group troops, testified during interrogation that, being associated with espionage activities with American intelligence officer Alfred FOKLER, he, with the knowledge of the latter, In 1947 he recruited ... SYSOEV, with whom he was in close relations and knew about his anti-Soviet sentiments.

PETROV's testimony... was confirmed by the arrested person...

FOKLER. From the testimony of PETROV and FOKLER, it is established that SYSOEV handed over to American intelligence ... information about the deployment on the territory Hungary of a number of headquarters, formations and units of the Soviet army, as well as the Danube military flotilla, ... obtained and handed over ... documents with seal and stamp imprints reserve regiment of the Central Group of Forces ... ", etc.

By the way, Sysoev, as Abakumov reported, "having been fired from the Soviet Army in reserve and having received a direction to the Kursk region, he tried to evade leaving for THE USSR". And this fact highlights Sysoev additionally. No older than 23 he gets Star of the Hero and remains to serve abroad - in Hungary, in Romania. This is not for you devastated Kursk region. But even at home, a healthy guy preferred a stationery, obviously having received it due to a high rank - for personnel officers with Zvezdochka then she had her own kind of

fashion. The second in Abakumov's message was a 57-year-old member of the CPSU (b), Major General tank troops, former commander of armored and mechanized troops 3rd Shock Army of the Group of Soviet Occupation Forces in Germany F.N. Rudkin. This "simply" held a stone in his bosom both against Stalin and against socialism, in 1938 was expelled from the party for helping to find a job for his wife's brother, a defector due to border, later exposed as a spy and shot.

In fact, Belarusian Filipp Rudkin, born in 1893, a native of the village of Chernaya Sosna, Mstislavsky district, Mogilev region, had a rich combat biography - from it can be found in volume 2 of the Komkory military biographical dictionary, published by the Kuchkovo Pole publishing house in 2006.

Since 1915, Philip served as a private in the tsarist army. In 1917, elected Commander-Commissar of the 138th-1st Infantry Division; in civilian life - the commissar of the Cheka detachment, the commander of the Cheka brigade; from November 1926 - head of the special unit of the OGPU in Moscow. November 1937 - head of the armament department of the NKVD troops of Ukraine and Crimea.

Obviously, the story with the brother-in-law was the reason for Rudkin's retirement, but by seniority in the Red Army and the bodies of the Cheka, OGPU, NKVD. Since 1940, he again, however, in cadres of the NKVD, and then the Red Army, and from August 1942 he commanded the 215th and 179th tank brigades, becoming a Hero in the spring of 1943. From June 11, 1943 - commander of the 15th tank Corps, soon transformed into the 7th Guards Tank Corps. And here a failure

occurred: on August 6, 1943, at the request of the Military Council, the 3rd guards tank army, Rudkin is relieved of his post "as unable to cope with work, unable to direct the battle of the corps" and sent to Tambov to command tank training camp. It seems that a good brigade commander turned out to be weak as a commander. Well, it happens ... Especially since on January 11, 1944, Rudkin became the commander of the 11th tank corps, and ends the war as deputy commander of the armored and mechanized troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front.

But the "resentment" was not forgotten, but poisoned the soul. And poisoned her. I don't know how it was with Sysoev, and Rudkin was only transferred from German South Ural Military District and in 1952 was dismissed. The supposedly "bloodthirsty" Stalin showed the maximum possible tolerance towards the offender here.

Alas, General Rudkin was one of the not so few. Created and raised Soviet power, strengthened under the leadership of not someone in general, namely Stalin, these people now grumbled at the Soviet government and bit Stalin, but in fact they bit their hands Motherland. The product of a new era, majestic in its audacity, they lived his inner life according to the old, petty-bourgeois laws. outwardly good and prosperous, internally they were already rotten. They

also did not like Stalin and would also be glad of his death. Opening for them as it seemed to them, new life and career horizons.

Here is Lieutenant General Oslikovskiy ... April 10, 1951 Minister of State Security Abakumov sends Stalin top secret note No. 7710/a about this general, where offers to transfer him from the post of head of the Higher Cavalry School "to one of internal military districts, where KGB surveillance will be established for him.

Alas, there were grounds for this, which clearly followed from the materials attached to the note. I, dear reader, will give an extensive quotation from them, because one of them, if you think about it, is enough for, after sound reflections, to the question: "Was a multi-layered vile conspiracy against Stalin by the beginning of the 1950s?" answer in the affirmative and finish the book.

Abakumov reported:

"... Lieutenant General OSLIKOVSKY N.S. - morally decomposed attitude towards a person and shows hostility to the party and the Soviet government moods. The

Ministry of State Security of the USSR recently arrested a number of people for anti-Soviet activities. persons of Jewish nationality who were closely associated with OSLIKOVSKY, in particular AMSTISLAVSKY M.A. - former Deputy Director of the 1st Moscow Medical Institute for the administrative and economic part and his cousins: AMSTISLAVSKY F.S. - former deputy Chairman of the All-Russian Association of Graphic Artists and Amstislavskiy A.S. - former deputy director of the institute epidemiology and microbiology in the administrative and economic part.

AMSTISLAVSKY M.A., with whom OSLIKOVSKY was especially close, testified during interrogation that OSLIKOVSKY often visited his apartment, which is a gathering place for hostile and morally corrupted persons, and participated in the drinking and orgies that took place there ... In these gatherings

the writers brothers TUR (TUBELSKY L.D. and RED P.L.), who have been closely associated with OSLIKOVSKY since the period of the Patriotic War, also took part. ... OSLIKOVSKY, using his rights as a corps commander given to him during the war, he awarded the TUR brothers with the Order of the Red Star. Regarding his relationship with the TUR brothers, OSLIKOVSKY spoke AMSTISLAVSKY: "In their circle I feel free, especially since wine and women have now become the goal of my life.

Nikolai Sergeevich Oslikovsky turned fifty-one that year - a prominent man in the color of his years, a combat (and what a combat!) general, a dashing cavalryman from a civilian war, commander of the cavalry corps in the Patriotic War, from May 29, 1945 - Hero Soviet Union. From July 1947 - Head of the Higher Red Banner Officer cavalry school. CM. Budyonny.

Ukrainian by nationality - from the Jewish town of Letichev in Ukraine, he is in the civilian one was organized by the Letichevsky partisan cavalry detachment, and so he went to warhorse into a high-profile combat biography. But the grunt was hot, broke down, and "joys life" was no stranger. In June 1938, he was dismissed from the Red Army to the reserve under Article 43, paragraph "b", and more specifically, for embezzlement of public funds in the amount of 70 thousand rubles only fired, in 1938 (thirty-eighth) year! But with the beginning of the war, he returned to duty, fought gloriously. And in August 1946 he was removed from the post of commander of the 3rd guards cavalry corps for concealing and misappropriating trophy property, and the party commission of the Carpathian military district expelled Oslikovsky from the party as reborn. However, he was sent at the disposal of the Commander-in-Chief Ground Forces, in 1947 by the decision of the Party Commission of the Main Political Directorate The Soviet Army was reinstated in the party with a severe reprimand and received appointment to the Higher Cavalry School. He seemed to have good patrons.

In fact, the nature of the general from what has already been said above for any wise (but wise, and not just burdened) person with worldly experience should be clear. However, for complete clarity, I will cite something else from Abakumov's note:

"It is characteristic that OSLIKOVSKY was happy to show AMSTISLAVSKY and his other close ties he has with period of the Patriotic War, photographs where he was taken in the company of American and English generals, and OSLIKOVSKY stated that these photographs remind him of happy moments in life.

Especially with great enthusiasm OSLIKOVSKY in a conversation with AMSTISLAVSKY recalled how in 1945 in Germany, when he was commander of the 3rd Guards Cavalry Corps, he was awarded English order by Field Marshal MONTGOMERY, whom he in every possible way praised and admired his military talents ... "

Why did the "brothers" Tur and the Amstislavsky brothers water, feed and please Oslikovsky - it's hard to say. Maybe - they were just glad that they had their own "wedding general" ... But, most likely, they had more serious views on him ... And obviously not only them.

In any case, under Oslikovsky, with his full approval and with his participation, they vilified Stalin (what is he up to Montgomery!), And the Soviet government, and the party, and cleverly they fished out completely closed (and even what closed!) information from him ...

And Oslikovsky kept complaining to them that "he, as a military specialist, is being overwritten and hush up his merits. And, as it was said in Abakumov's note, "in connection with this ... he expressed his anger ..." Moreover, Abakumov reported that Oslikovsky was passing "through testimony of a member of the anti-Soviet military who was sentenced to death in 1938 organization SHEIDEMAN E.S. - former head of the Tambov cavalry school, as his accomplice in enemy activities ... "Stalin's decision on Abakumov's note is unknown to me. I only know that

Oslikovsky was not arrested, and from April 1953 he was in the reserve. Died in 1971.

Yes, the war raised a lot of turbidity, and part of it after the war was never filtered out. On the contrary, its active part remained "afloat" and prospered. Here is an example offhand - data from the Department of the Ministry of State Security of the Crimean region on a number of those arrested in Crimea on at the turn of the 40s and 50s (from a special message to Stalin dated December 17, 1949 No. 6288 / a):

"American intelligence agent V.A. KARPENKO, born in 1925, before arrest manager of a store in the mountains. Sevastopol. During the Patriotic war ... was a German accomplice, ... fled to Austria, where later was recruited by American intelligence ... and under the guise of a repatriate arrived in Soviet Union.

Author and distributor of anti-Soviet anonymous letters RUBLEVSKY V.M., born in 1908, member of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, head of the Sevastopol communication offices...

Trotskyist SHAGIN A.A., born in 1901, member of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, before arrest Lecturer in the Department of History of the USSR, Crimean Pedagogical Institute ...

Those who worked in the German death camp "Ravensbrück" killed Soviet citizens by injecting poisonous drugs - CHECHKO V.K., born in 1910, doctor of the Simferopol clinic, FEDCHENKO A.V., born in 1913 birth, doctor of the regional tropical station, M.A. KLUGMAN, born in 1907 birth, head of the medical unit of the tuberculosis hospital ...

Traitor to the Motherland, commandant of the German camp for Soviet citizens, KAFANOV S.E., born in 1906, before the arrest, the manager of the local history museum ...

German punisher GLUSHCHENKO N.M., born in 1894, before the arrest of the head. Bakhchisarai bus station ... "

Figures like Oslikovsky, brothers Tur and Amstislavsky in Moscow, figures like Trotskyite Shagin and punisher Glushchenko in the Crimea - that was the spectrum of systemic conspiracy against Stalin and Stalin's state by the beginning of the 50s. It has not been framed organizational, but he was.

Oslikovsky and Glushchenko never knew each other, and during the war the first hesitation, he would have shot the second completely out of inner conviction. But they were bound one chain - selfish, anti-Stalinist, and therefore anti-Soviet.

And times were troubled again. On June 25, 1950, the Korean War began, and all The foreign policy situation deteriorated rapidly. In fact, for the first time in history Russia and the United States (not counting the participation of the United States in the intervention in the civil war) two powers entered into a direct military, although legally non-existent, conflict with each other. On the Korean War, we,

dear reader, should perhaps stop a little. In August 1945, the troops of Imperial Japan, located on the territory Korean Peninsula north of the 38th parallel, surrendered to Soviet troops, and located to the south - American. We left Korea, the USA did not. And in August 1948 Lee Seungman, on behalf of 21 million "South Koreans", proclaimed the "Republic of Korea" with capital in Seoul. And then in September, Kim Il Sung announced the creation of a nine millionth Democratic People's Republic of Korea with its capital in Pyongyang.

It is difficult to say today who launched the offensive on June 25, 1950 first. Perhaps it was the Korean People's Army - it was clearly superior to the South Korean first of all, in his morale, because Lee Seungman was, of course, a puppet, and his regime, respectively, is puppet. However, an initiative from the South is not ruled out.

One way or another, the Seoul regime collapsed instantly - on June 27, the northerners entered Seoul. But then the Big Boss stepped in. Using an obedient majority in the UN, the United States As early as June 25, they achieved the adoption of a resolution "condemning aggression." Now they've spent new resolution they needed, and on July 7, General Douglas MacArthur was appointed

commander of the "UN troops" in Korea.

On July 4, Andrei Gromyko, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, stated that "Koreans have the same right to arrange their internal national affairs in the field of unification of the South and North into a single national state that the North Americans had and implemented in the 60s of the last century. When they united the North and the South into a single state. And everything was noticed here correctly - then, after all, the Yankees also could not do without the

thunder of guns. It should be noted that in the summer of 1950, the Korean People's Army did not have Chinese "volunteers" (in quotation marks) from the PRC, nor "Chinese" "volunteers" (double quotation marks) from the USSR. At that time, only a few of our military advisers were in the DPRK. And in the end On October 19, the Yankees entered Pyongyang, almost completely occupying the Korean Peninsula and leaving by the end of October in a number of places on the Korean-

Chinese border. It was then that the time came for the "volunteers" of both types. entered the strategic leadership of that distant war and Stalin. Entered as a commander. And he was a commander ingenious.

After the crushing blows of the Yankees in Korea, Stalin sent on September 27, 1950 directive to the Chief Military Adviser to the Commander-in-Chief of the KPA, Lieutenant General V.N. Razuvaev (since November 29, 1950, he also became the USSR ambassador to the DPRK) and the then ambassador Colonel General T.F. Shtykov. This vast, precise and brilliant in all Unfortunately, I can cite only a partial directive in regards to this – it is too long. But I'll give part of it:

"PYONGYANG

MATVEEV (pseudonym V.N. Razuvaev. - S.K.)
SHTYKOV

The serious situation that has developed in recent days on the front of the Korean People's Army, both in the Seoul area and in the southeast, to a large extent degree is a consequence of major mistakes made by front command, command of army groups and military formations both in matters of command and control of troops, and especially in matters of tactics of their combat use. Our

military advisers are even more to blame for these mistakes. Our military advisers did not achieve accurate and timely execution of the order of the Commander-in-Chief on the withdrawal of four divisions from the main front to the Seoul area, while the full there was an opportunity for this at the time of the decision, because of this, it was lost seven days, which brought the Americans near Seoul a great tactical benefit...

<...>

Draws serious attention to the wrong and completely unacceptable tactics of using tanks in battle. Tanks lately are used in your battle without preliminary artillery strikes with the aim of cleaning the battlefield for tanks, which is why our tanks are very easily burned adversary...

Attention is drawn to the strategic illiteracy of our advisers, as well as their blindness in the intelligence business. They did not understand the strategic the significance of the enemy landing in Chemulpo ... This blindness and absence strategic experience led to the fact that the need to transfer troops from the south to the Seoul area was called into question, the transfer itself was stretched and slowed down...

The assistance of our military advisers to the Korean command and in such critical issues as communications, command and control troops, organization of reconnaissance and combat ... ".

Someone can say that for Stalin, the Korean theater of operations after his leading a huge war was something of a children's sandbox. But war is war, especially since there was a serious and very bloody war going on in Korea. And Stalin studied its course, judging around, no less carefully and carefully than during the Great Patriotic War. And so the recommending part of the directive was specific and deliberate:

"... In the context of the current situation ... our advisers need to to achieve:

1. Withdrawal of the main forces to carry out under the cover of strong rearguards allocated from divisions ... put experienced combat troops at the head of the rearguard commanders, rearguards to strengthen the military and, above all, anti-tank artillery, sapper troops. And where there is an opportunity, and tanks.

2. The rearguards are obliged to fight from line to line ... using for this mines and improvised means.

3. The main forces of the divisions, if possible, should be conducted in non-scattered groups, but compactly, ready to fight their way through.

4. Use tanks only in conjunction with infantry and after preliminary artillery strikes. 5.

Gorges, bridges, crossings, passes over ridges and important road junctions on the path of movement of the main forces, one should strive to occupy and hold them up to the passage of the main forces by detachments sent forward.

<...>

7. When organizing defense on the lines, one should avoid stretching all forces along the front, but firmly cover the main directions and create strong reserves for action.

<...>

Report the measures taken. FYN SI".

"Fyn Xi" was a conventional signature, Stalin's "Korean" pseudonym. And this one the main "Chinese volunteer" of the Soviet Union guided distant comrades in weapons for tough, skillful resistance and for such a withdrawal that would cost the enemy less than our offensive.

On October 1, he sends a cipher to our ambassador in Beijing signed "Filippov" - "for immediate handover to MAO ZEDONG or ZHOU ENLAI."

In it, Stalin wrote that "according to the information that came to me today ... I see that the position of the Korean comrades is becoming desperate." Stalin asked to provide the Koreans help, "immediately move at least five or six divisions to the 38th parallel ..." At the same time, he noted that "Chinese divisions could appear as voluntary, of course, with led by the Chinese command." On

October 2, Mao Zedong responded evasively, offering to "be patient, the troops will not put forward, actively prepare forces. And Korea, they say, "having temporarily suffered a defeat, will change form of guerrilla warfare.

However, it soon became clear that if the United States firmly occupied the entire Korean Peninsula, it would quickly turn into a convenient springboard for further aggression by the "UN troops" against the PRC. After all, the legitimate head of China for the Yankees and the Blue Helmets was C Taiwan.

And on October 25, 1950, Chinese troops launched a powerful counteroffensive, "blue helmets" were thrown far back. And on the first day of 1951, a successful the offensive is already northerners. Seoul was again occupied, but on March 15 it was recaptured by MacArthur.

Thus began a three-year war waged under the UN flag by the Yankees, camouflaged "for decency" by the British, Australians, Canadians, French, Thais, Dutch, Turks, Greeks, Colombians, Belgians, Danes, Norwegians, Filipinos and even Luxembourgers and Ethiopians. However, the worst

"cannon fodder" - the ground forces - was only half American. Main the burden here fell on the shoulders of the South

Koreans themselves. The Soviet Union supplied the PRC and the DPRK with military equipment and much required for modern warfare, but directly in combat only pilots of the 4th Fighter Aviation Corps participated. I emphasize - fighter! We didn't even bomb South Korea, we defended China and North Korea. Korea from American bombings.

Actually, the first US aircraft - B-25 - was shot down by Soviet pilots over Black Sea near Odessa in the autumn of 1949. And on April 8, 1950, not far from Liepaja Naval Base was shot down by a reconnaissance PB4Y "Praiveter" of naval aviation USA. Our pilots shot down American planes before the Korean War and over China - the Soviet 351st and 29th Guards air regiments were stationed there, fighting against the forces Chiang Kai-

shek. And in the Korean War, the first F-51 was shot down on November 1, 1950 by Lieutenant Chizh from the 72nd Guards Aviation Regiment. In total, there were more than a thousand such victories on account of twenty-seven Soviet air regiments that fought in Korea

- about 1100. Nikolai Sutyagin had twenty-one victories, Evgeny Pepelyaev had twenty, and Alexander Smorchkov, Serafim Subbotin and Lev Shchukin - fifteen each. They all became Heroes of the Soviet Union.

Our total combat losses amounted to 299 people (138 officers and 161 sergeants and privates). Of these, 120 pilots.

54,246 Americans were killed and 103,284 were wounded. And from the comparison loss figures, it is clear that the United States was the engine of this war. Not having achieved decisive victory, failing to destroy the DPRK and threatening to use atomic weapons, they still achieved the preservation of a divided Korea.

And it was a brutal war on the part of the Yankees. Here are her partial statistics: the total losses of the Chinese - about a million people, Koreans - 9 (nine) million people, of which 84% are civilians.

As you can see, for the sake of "rejecting communism" Washington did not hesitate to genocide, leaving the Nazi one far behind in relative terms.

And to go - for the sake of the same "rejection" - to the murder of one person, the US elite was more than ready. But getting to him - I mean, of course, Stalin - was extremely difficult. But I certainly wanted to get there. After all, Stalin led the the main country, which already on the whole planet counteracted the united force Golden International and the Blue Helmets.

The Korean War never ended during Stalin's lifetime. But here in Russia it's already seven years when peace reigned - only in the dense forests and in the underground were still clutching machine guns and axes nationalists: Bandera, Lithuanian "forest brothers" ...

It was already 1952, the country continued to build itself anew. And even the recent past already faded into the background. Today in public circulation, among many others insinuations about those years, a lie was also launched about the alleged cancellation by Stalin of the celebration of the Day Victory. Like, he said that there is nothing to celebrate, we have to work ...

But here before me is the old issue of the Literaturnaya Gazeta, dated Thursday, May 8, 1952. The front page features an article by the secretary of the Moscow Writers' Organization Lieutenant General of Moscow "Victory Holiday". Here is an article by M. Semyonov "Heroism of the people's struggle", and it begins like this: "Tomorrow our people have a great holiday - Victory Day ... "Yes,

Victory Day remained a great holiday. However, the Victory of the 45th is already really became history. And we had to think about the future.

Chapter Seven

Spring 1952. "Economic problems of socialism" ...

The English bourgeois philosopher Thomas Carlyle once wrote:

"A world full of heroes instead of a whole world of fools in which not one a valiant king cannot reign - that is what we are striving for! ..

Let's discard everything base and deceitful. Then we will hope that we will be govern nobility and truth..."

He, of course, did not know that the Bolshevik would live on the same, in fact, aspirations. Stalin. But if Carlyle only thought and dreamed of a world of liberated heroes, then Stalin acted in this direction, pointing the course towards a new man and the whole huge the country he ruled.

In 1950, the American artist Rockwell Kent, who came to Paris for another meeting of supporters of the peace movement, unexpectedly for him was invited to Moscow. In his autobiographical book *It's Me, Lord!* he writes about it like this:

"...Moscow! This fabulous capital of the forbidden country! ... And if we want world, where else can we defend it, if not in the main citadel of its enemies, which this city supposedly is? So we fly to Moscow..."

Moscow appeared before me as a great city full of people, people well-dressed and actively participating in the nationwide struggle for peace. I saw the cleanest city in the world, even cleaner than Stockholm and Copenhagen...

Every evening we were taken to the opera, ballet, theater or cinema. The halls were crowded. No one in the audience stood out enough to be call rich or poor..."

The "note" "democrat" will contemptuously wrinkle his nose: "Varnishing! Yes from him agents The NKVD did not withdraw." But I must disappoint him, because further Kent wrote this:

"One night, on my way home, I got lost. Looking for policeman who would show me the way, I passed countless Moscow quarters. So without meeting a single policeman, I had to turn to a passerby who turned out to be very friendly ... "

This is evidence of Russia in the early 50s from the West, belonging to a man who came to post-war Russia, considering it his enemy, but left Russia for her friend.

And here is a testimony from the West, belonging to a man who came to Russia during during the war on a tank and which remained its enemy. I mean major general Wehrmacht Friedrich Wilhelm von Mellenthin, whose book *"Panzer battles 1939-1945"* ("Tank battles 1939-1945") was published in London in 1956 and in 1957 published by us:

"... The skillful and persistent work of the communists has led to the fact that since 1917 Russia has changed in the most amazing way. There can be no doubt that the Russian is increasingly developing the skill of independent action, and the level his education is constantly growing ... "

Von Mellenthin knew how to analyze, and therefore he captured a key feature in the appearance new Russia - the ever-growing level of education of the broadest masses. This the level hit the Germans in the Russians already during the war, and already during the war it was good so much so that, faced in the occupied territories or in Germany itself with

Soviet workers, the Germans were only surprised at their ability - unlike the Germans themselves - to think broadly.

There was, however, a man in Russia who, better than many others, understood how important provide not only a good education for the younger generations in the Soviet Union, but to instill in them the spirit of that only lasting freedom that only well-rounded personality.

This man, acutely understanding the essence of the era and catching its "nerve", was, of course, Stalin. Moreover, he expressed his thoughts on this matter quite definitely, clearly and publicly. And it was like this ...

On the eve of the opening of the first post-war Congress of the CPSU (b) - XIX, the conversation about which there will still be us, in No. 278 (12480) of Pravda, October 4, 1952, two and a half strips, starting with the second, the famous Stalinist "Economic Problems of Socialism". And in the same issue of Pravda on the front page in editorial "For new victories of communism!" talked about the "new classic work comrade I.V. Stalin." This

small work turned out to be truly classic in many ways. relations, including because in the USSR it was "classically" ignored by almost immediately after Stalin's death. But in this work was hidden as a possible triumph socialism, and its possible collapse.

A triumph - in the event that the ideas of Stalin became workers for the country, acting. Collapse - if the potential of these ideas was slowly "lowered on the brakes." The second happened, due to which the collapse of socialism became possible, and then realized.

Formally, these were answers to the participants in the discussion on economic issues that began in April 1950 in connection with the development of a draft textbook on political economy. Moreover, the very fact of such a discussion and its tone refute the myth about the USSR as a intellectual desert, where one luminary shone - Stalin. The participants in the discussion are was closed - on many fundamental issues they disagreed with Stalin, although the subsequent history of the country proved them wrong. However, the value The "Economic Problems of Socialism" went far beyond the scope of the current discussion - in fact, they became Stalin's political testament to posterity. So, alas, and not understood ...

A full, detailed analysis of this last Stalinist work in my tasks now, of course not included. But I will stop there...

The task of writing a popular textbook on political economy was set by Stalin himself, and He explained the need for it this way:

"The fact is that every year they approach us, as the leading core, thousands of young cadres, they are eager to help us, they are eager to show themselves, but do not have sufficient Marxist education and ... are forced wander in the dark. They are stunned by the colossal achievements of the Soviet authorities, they are dizzy by the extraordinary successes of the Soviet system, and they begin to imagine that the Soviet government "can do anything", that it "doesn't care about anything", that it ... can form new laws (meaning economic laws. - S.K.) ... I think that the systematic repetition of the so-called "well-known" truths, patient explanation of them is one of the best means of Marxist education ...

<...>

We need a textbook that could serve as a reference book for the revolutionary youth not only within the country, but also abroad.

So, the work of the leader of the USSR was directly addressed primarily to the young. And if talk about its main, main idea, then it consisted in the fact that the main the economic problems of socialism are not purely economic, because they lie

in the sphere not so much of production as in the sphere of moral, ideological.

Stalin, over and over again, carried out the idea that in order to solve the main economic problems of socialism and build a developed socialist, and then communist society, the Soviet youth needed, using the already powerful material base of real socialism, to build itself as a new community of developed and educated people. And this powerful young force, which will have no barriers at sea and on land, can become an example for the youth of the whole

world. I will illustrate what has been said with examples from Stalin's work, but for now I will say that consisted of four parts dated February 1, April 21, May 22 and September 28, 1952: "Remarks on economic issues related to the November discussion of 1951", "Answer to comrade Notkin Alexander Ilyich", "On the mistakes of comrade Yaroshenko L.D." and "Answer comrades Sanina A.V. and Venzher V.G."

It can be assumed that Stalin finally established himself in what he wrote in "Economic problems", by the autumn of 1952 - which is confirmed by the time they publications on the eve of the 19th Congress. It is unlikely that he would delay the publication of this work if it had been completed much sooner. The dating of the first part allows to think that Stalin began to study the results of the November discussion while on "vacation", which lasted in 1951 from August 10 to December 22.

After the vacation, first "Remarks ..." appeared, and then, when they got acquainted participants in the discussion and expressed their (!) remarks on Stalin's "Remarks ...", the last wrote the other three parts. At the same time, the fact that they were formally addressed to specific people meant nothing. It is unlikely that Notkin's questions, Yaroshenko's complaints that his "overwrite", articles by Sanina and Venzher were for Stalin the true starting point for his thoughts. He simply took advantage of the form, convenient in all respects. Besides the same form and tact - he did not smash, but conducted a conversation in the style of a public scientific discussions, thus inviting everyone else to it. Perhaps one

of the main thoughts of Stalin, which smart Marxist politicians, then is - the Bolsheviks, should have taken as a basis for further practical work on construction of the Power, there was an idea that economic social laws in those the periods while they operate are as unshakable as the laws of nature! And they are unshakable because they reflect objective processes that occur regardless of the will of people in society, just as the laws of nature reflect the objective processes taking place regardless of the will of people in nature. The peculiarity of the laws of political economy Stalin wrote that "its laws, unlike the laws of natural science, are short-lived", that they "are valid for a certain historical period, after what ... give way to new laws.

But while they are in effect, they cannot be bypassed and canceled - how can this be done with legal laws, warned Stalin. Stalin, by the way,

formulated (absolutely precisely!) the basic economic law of both capitalism and socialism:

"The main features and requirements of the basic economic law modern capitalism could be formulated something like this way (note how accurate Stalin was in formulating the idea that characteristic only of true scientists. - S.K.): ensuring maximum capitalist profit (the emphasis here and elsewhere is mine. - S.K.) by exploitation, ruin and impoverishment of the majority of the population of a given country, through enslavement and systematic robbery of the peoples of other countries, especially backward ones, and finally, through wars and the militarization of the national economy, used to ensure the highest profits

<...>

Essential features and requirements of the basic economic law socialism could be formulated something like this:

ensuring maximum satisfaction of constantly growing material and cultural needs of the whole society through continuous growth and improvement of socialist production on the basis of higher technology.

And here I will ask the reader to work a little harder than before, because for some time he will have to deal mainly not with the facts reported by the author, but with his arguments - I hope, in one way or another convincing. And dear reader I'll have to reason with the author ... So ...

Stalin

was brilliantly accurate in the main ideas of his last work, and personally I understood this completely only while working on this chapter of my book! I repeat: he clearly stated that the laws of society are just as unshakable - as long as they are in effect, like the laws nature. But what follows from this?

And the fact that when they are ignored, social economic laws take revenge on them violators as cruel as the laws of nature. You can ignore the law of the world gravity and thoughtlessly step into the abyss. But the result will be clear.

Well, let's look at the basic laws of capitalism and socialism - according to Stalin ... On what - according to Stalin - is the basic law of capitalism based? On needs produce profit. And nothing more. In other words, capitalism is based on greed, on the principle: "Envious eyes, raking hands!" The successful capitalists once in a moment of frankness, they admitted that they themselves did not know why they were multiplying capital, and explained their behavior by the fact that capital could not but produce capital.

That is, not the production of happiness for the population of the Planet, but the production of capital for the sake of capital - this is the basic economic law of capitalism. This, incidentally, confirmed once and one of the presidents of the company "General Motors", stating that the delusion de consider that his company produces cars - it makes a profit.

This was said after Stalin's death. Just as after Stalin's death, US President Eisenhower publicly warned of the danger of a militarized economy in the United States and put into circulation the commonly used concept of "military-industrial complex". However, for the first time, as we see, Stalin spoke about the military-industrial complex as a threat to humanity!

As long as capitalism exists, so does its basic economic law. It cannot be canceled, just as it is impossible to cancel the law of universal gravitation or the laws Ohm. And as long as it works, the driving force behind the capitalist economy is greed! The opposite can also be argued: as long as a society is ruled by greed, this society can be only capitalist!

Is greed inherent in man? To a certain extent, yes. In what? Yes, in the one in which there is an animal in a person. And the private-property society is still on stage of Ancient Rome proclaimed: "Homo homini lupus est" - "Man is a wolf to man." True, these words belonged to the famous ancient Roman comedy poet Titus Maccius Plautus, but the world of normative greed elevated them to their principle in earnest.

A predatory beast can at some moments be affectionate, complacent and almost magnanimous. However, he cannot ultimately not kill - otherwise he cannot live. Capitalism can have a completely human face in some of its features. However he cannot, in the end, not be based on greed - otherwise he cannot live, exist. That is,

capitalism cannot but reduce a person - in the final analysis - to the level of beast. Capitalism has nothing else to offer mankind - in accordance with its basic economic law, which, as long as capitalism exists, is unshakable in capitalist society, just as Newton's laws are unshakable in the world.

Two words about impoverishment... One of the ideologists of globalization, Nobel laureate 2001 in Economics, Joseph Stiglitz has long recognized that as globalization increases the bulk of the world's population does not get richer, but becomes more and more impoverished and lives on less than two dollars a day. Moreover, this share of the poor as globalization intensifies

increases.

As an "honest" classical bourgeois liberal, Stieglitz, former Vice President World Bank, in their book *Globalization. Disturbing tendencies* tries to find humane version of globalization, but the Marxist Stalin already in 1952 clearly explained that this was impossible in principle, because it contradicted the basic economic law of capitalism, which cannot be abolished or changed as long as it exists capitalism.

But are there forces in man more powerful than greed? Yes, they exist in to the extent that a person has overcome the beast in himself and brought up a man in himself. However capitalism cannot educate people, it educates - in the end - animals in human form.

And what about socialism, with its basic economic law? Let me remind you that, Stalin, it consists in ensuring the maximum satisfaction of the ever-growing material and cultural needs of the whole society through continuous growth and improvement of socialist production on the basis of higher technology.

After all, this is also not someone's desire or whim - this is an objective law that cannot be bypassed as long as socialism exists. And while this law is in effect, socialist society - in full accordance with it - develops as socialist society. That is, it increases prosperity for the whole society - if not for everyone at once by a lot, but continuously and for everyone who works. And increases not on the basis of robbing someone (for example, on the basis of a raw robbery own grandchildren and great-grandchildren, as is happening now in "Rossiania"), and on the basis of continuous growth and improvement of production. And in such a society increases the number of advanced members who are increasingly successful in using "higher technique".

At least from the second half of the thirties to the end of the fifties in The USSR did. It was like that for some time and later - by inertia.

Ultimately, in accordance with its basic economic law

socialism produces happiness - for everyone. More precisely - for everyone who works or has worked hard. AND the basic law of socialism is that as long as socialism exists, it can neither be canceled nor changed!

What is

allowed? You can ignore it, but only in the same way as a blind man, going to the abyss, does not a calculation of the law of gravity. The referents and "scientists" of the times of Khrushchev, Brezhnev, Gorbachev, not to mention Khrushchev, Brezhnev and Gorbachev and their "politburahs"...

By referents, I do not mean here those who should be listed under the department of "agents influence", but those half-educated people who, in their youth, secretly laughed at the lessons of study of "Economic Problems", and after Stalin's death, they immediately arrogantly turned away.

"Agents of influence" - and, as a reader, I hope you have already understood them, even in Stalin's USSR enough - they only pushed these ignoramuses and their "bosses" in the right direction, to the abyss. And these ignoramuses almost immediately after 1953 began to increasingly brazenly and stupid fundamental economic law of socialism, beginning with the adventure of the virgin lands, with the transfer agricultural machinery to collective farms - which Stalin considered disastrous for the development agriculture, and continuing with a formal attitude towards comprehensive education youth and to the introduction of "higher technology" into our lives. I will say more about this later...

If capitalism ignores its fundamental law and stops putting corner of profit, it will not be able to exist as capitalism and will turn into its own the opposite is socialism. But socialism, if it ignores its basic law and stop putting the needs of a comprehensively developed person at the forefront, too will not be able to exist as socialism and will turn into its opposite - into capitalism.

Here is one of the main conclusions, which leads to a thoughtful analysis of the latter Stalinist work and which is fully confirmed by the processes in the USSR that began almost immediately after Stalin's death. But that is not all...

Capitalism is impossible without encouraging the beast in man. But so does socialism is impossible without continuous, constant encouragement and education in a person.

Lenin in the very first years of Soviet power, addressing the youth, warned them that You can become a communist only when you enrich your memory with the knowledge of all those riches that mankind has developed.

Stalin, as a true disciple of Lenin, developed Lenin's thought in "Economic problems of socialism. I already wrote about this, but I think it's worth saying and repeating! Stalin thought like this:

"It is necessary to achieve such a cultural growth of society, which would ensure to all members of society the comprehensive development of their physical and mental faculties, so that the members of society have the opportunity to receive sufficient education to become active workers social development..."

So, the education of the masses was seen by Stalin not just as a means of ensuring economic prosperity, and above all a means of creating intellectually and a socially active society that would be a nightmare for any bureaucrat, bossy tyrant and tyrant! Stalin said and this is what:

"It would be wrong to think that it is possible to achieve such a serious cultural growth of members of society without major changes in the current labor position. To do this, first of all, it is necessary to reduce the working day by at least until 6, and then until 5 o'clock. This is necessary so that members Societies have been given enough free time to get comprehensive education. For this, it is necessary, further, to introduce the obligatory polytechnic training necessary for the members of society to have the opportunity to freely choose a profession and not be chained for the whole life to any one profession. For this it is necessary, further, fundamentally improve living conditions and raise the real wages of workers and employees at least doubling, if not more, as by directly raising the monetary salaries, and especially by further systematic reduction of prices for consumer goods".

That is, Stalin was the only head of state in world history who practically set grandiose social tasks, the condition (and not the consequence) of the fulfillment of which was a five (!) hour working day?! Moreover, he

perfectly understood that real life is full of contradictions, but he himself convinced the country that "with the correct policy of the governing bodies, these contradictions will not can turn into the opposite", and then, as head of state, directly pointed out:

"... It is necessary to go through a number of stages of economic and cultural re-education (not coercion, but re-education! - S.K.) of society, during whose labor, from a means of merely maintaining life, will be transformed in the eyes of society in the first vital need, and public property - in unshakable and inviolable basis of the existence of society ...

... The task of the governing bodies is to ensure that
to notice the growing contradictions and take timely measures to overcome them
by adapting production relations to the growth of productive
strength..."

"Such are the basic conditions for preparing the transition to communism," Stalin concluded.
- Only after the fulfillment of all (the selection of Stalin. - S.K.) of these preconditions, taken
together, it will be possible to hope that labor will be turned in the eyes of society from a burden
"into the first necessity of life" (Marx), that "work from a heavy burden will turn into
pleasure" (Engels)..." "But

socialism has collapsed," the reader will object to me.

"Yes," I answer, "collapsed. Because he could not help but collapse in conditions where everything
Soviet society stubbornly, for decades, starting especially from the mid-sixties
years, ignored the basic economic law of socialism, formulated
Stalin." If we recall the immortal "Prisoner of the Caucasus", then we can say that
"Comrade Saakhov's diagnosis" in this particular area could not be confirmed if
Comrade Saakhov was in charge of this particular area. So it is in the whole country - if it
led by people who disregard the basic economic law of the country, and the people
the masses did not prevent them, then how could this country not fall into the abyss?

Here it is in the abyss and collapsed, but has not yet reached its
bottom. And it will be

painful. I note right away that we have the opportunity not to crash - we urgently need to pull out
"parachute" ring, which in Russia can only be restored in their rights
that economic social law, the action of which brings up in a person not a beast,
but a person.

What about all the apparent successes of modern capitalism? Well, they're in front of everyone, but
many of them can only be seen on TV screens. Not without reason after the collapse of the GDR
some in West Germany admitted that no more perfect
social system, but the more advanced television programs of the West. Well, let
dust in the eyes of capital has been studying for more than one thousand years. And, I must admit, I learned. And on the sly
he is making full use of one of the most impressive achievements of socialism provided by the
policies of Lenin and Stalin - that mass of educated, cultured
specialists trained for capitalism by the best system of higher education in the world
education - Soviet ...

However, in two areas it has not trained sensible specialists for a long time: I have
mind of economists and historians. Once again, this can be understood by getting acquainted with the estimates
"Economic Problems", given in 2005 by the historian Yuri Zhukov. Regarding this
Stalinist work, he writes that in the summer of 1952, when the "narrow" leadership allegedly
"the struggle for leadership was shaking," Stalin de "suddenly took up purely theoretical, purely
abstract issues ..." So, even after all

the troubles that fell on our heads, our own
social stupidity and civic laziness, Yuri Zhukov speaks of Stalin's work
actually condescending. But Zhukov is not only not the worst, but one of
the best examples of the modern professional historian! He did not understand much
the era of Stalin he describes, but he tries to write about it honestly and introduced it into the scientific
turn a lot of interesting facts and arguments!

But knowledge does not always, alas, mean understanding.

But first of all, with his "Economic Problems", Stalin showed how much he was worried and
worried about the future of socialist Russia as a community of people creating people worthy of
being called them.

And it was precisely with his "Economic Problems" that Stalin showed how alien to him
the complacency of a tyrant.

What is the most afraid of a tyrant, a despot? There cannot be two answers - he is more freedom-loving people are afraid of everything. Moreover, he should be afraid of freedom-loving weight. And mass freedom-loving is impossible without mass fundamental education, to ensure which - as a guarantee of building a new society - called on Russia Stalin. Let me remind you that he wrote: "... it is necessary ... to introduce a compulsory polytechnic training necessary to enable members of society to freely choose a profession and not be chained for life to one professions."

This is the essence of the true Stalin.

Meanwhile, during his lifetime, and immediately after his death, and even more so in the last "Russian" years often wrote about Stalin as a "tsar" ... They hinted at his self-identification with Ivan the Terrible, other analogies were made ...

This approach to Stalin is characteristic even of some very good and intelligent books about Stalin... So, in many respects, the simply brilliant books of the "Stalinist" cycle of Alexander Bushkov are called "Ice Throne", "Red Monarch". Is there any reason for that? It

would seem that yes - there is ... Here, please, a quote from an article that I mentioned more than Maximilian Voloshin "Crucified Russia":

"Socialism ... is condensed state in its essence. He by the inevitable logic of things will be led to the fact that he will begin to look for it (the point supports. - S.K.) in a dictatorship, and then in Caesarism ... Monarchy with a social the program is not absurd. This is the policy of Caesar and Napoleon III ... Everything is very broad democratic movements in the imperial and world scale, inevitably lead to Caesarism ... I think that a difficult and bloody fate Russia on the way to the Invisible City will also lead her through social-monarchism, which will become the key to the vault being erected by the present civil war.

This was written in the Crimea, in Koktebel, on May 17, 1920. And someone reading these lines and remembering the books of the same Bushkov, he can exclaim: "Wow! Well, Max Voloshin! How I looked

into the water! .. "But all this, dear reader,

is nonsense! Stalin and Caesarism - this is from the "Radzin" area of "philosophy" place. I hope I have said enough already for the reader to agree with me. And if compare Stalin with one of the Russian tsars, then you can remember Peter the Great with his sovereign dream to form Russia, with his desire to join the nobility undergrowth, and indeed all sensible Russian people to

knowledge. Clever Peter understood that you cannot build a new, powerful Russia without a new person - even a royal, autocratic one. And the same - but immeasurably more sharply a Stalin, because he set the task of creating not just a new powerful Russia, but such Russia, in which no despotism is possible!

However, the analogy with Grozny is also acceptable, but not in the usual sense. is done - with a hint of the great attention paid by Stalin to the film "Ivan the Terrible". This film is considered by stupid people as ordered to Eisenstein by Stalin himself. an apology for tyranny and terror, but only a fool or a scoundrel can understand the idea of the film in this way. February 26, 1947 Stalin in a conversation with director Sergei Eisenstein and actor Nikolai Cherkasov directly explained: "Tsar Ivan was a great and wise ruler ... Ivan's wisdom consisted in the fact that he stood on the national point of view ... Peter I also great sovereign, but he treated foreigners too liberally, allowing Germanization of Russia..."

"Ivan the Terrible" is, first of all, a film about how solid foundations were laid nation state. That is, the state, which puts life at the forefront - at the level era - the interests of the active part of the national society, and not the interests of

cosmopolitan in their psychology of the nobility, the elite, as it turned out in the decayed over time Poland. But this is so - by the way ...

Returning to the thoughts and anxieties of Stalin in the early 50s, it must be said that, although after the war he was worried about many things, including purely economic problems socialism, most of all he was worried about the moral problems of socialism, the ethical problems of socialism, its civilizational problems, finally! He understood

perfectly well that capitalism was still strong and that it was not so much strong economically - prosperity in a smart society will come with time, how strong is the fact that appeals in man to the beast. And to break is not to build ... Spend a deafening evening in the crowd under the glare of laser projectors is easier than to see in the silence of the library hall suddenly flashed for you a ray of knowledge and understanding.

In a conversation with Alexandra Kollontai in 1939, he foresaw that in the future "development will go more difficult and even frantic paths, the turns will be extremely sharp ... "He understood this and was worried - who will win in the growing clash of the old and the new? What will win? About a world filled

with heroes instead of fools, about a world in which no one - not even the most valiant and just - the king will not be able to reign, about a world where people will be to manage nobility and truth, many dreamed even before Stalin - the same Carlyle. But only Stalin and his country, continuing the work of Lenin, brought under this dream both a real, creative ideological base and a real material base.

Yes, there was a base by the beginning of the 50s, and it had excellent development prospects. And so no less, and perhaps just because of this, Stalin was worried. November 10, 1947 in an interview with Yuri Zhdanov, he said: "There are few restless people in our leadership ... There are such people: if they feel good, then they think that everyone is fine ..." How

can he already for these words, for these thoughts and for the deeds awakened by such thoughts, should have been hated by all those who were already well now - even in Moscow, even in Washington and London, even in the cozy apartment of a Parisian rentier ...

And how all the smart enemies of Russia and socialism for his potentially disastrous work for the enemies of Russia and socialism, presented to the public in the fall of 1952. And Stalin was getting old. Fatigue

accumulated - not only physical, but what else more dangerous, psychological. Stalin could not fear physical death as much as he afraid of the common man. He knew that regardless of whether his prediction came true development of the situation, which he did in a conversation with Kollontai, or will not come true, he personally long ago immortalized

himself. But was he able to guarantee immortality to the cause of Lenin, the successor of which he became? Is a stable historical perspective provided for the Power that has grown before his eyes, with his daily active participation and guidance?

And is there anyone you can rely on personally? Have they formed a narrow stratum in the highest administration and that powerful layer in the mass of the people, the presence of which only capable of developing socialism, democracy and all the productive forces of Russia?

Who exactly can you rely on? How to guess in advance - is there a wormhole in a person? Here is General Oslikovsky ... From the poor, to civilian - the commander of partisan detachments in Letichev and Proskurov, the squadron commander, fought bravely with Denikin and Wrangel ... And then - a breakdown ... And again the war, battles, courage ... And after the war - again a breakdown. Trial Man endured death more than once. The test of life is not.

Mikhail Romm - lazy after the war "master". But he's once in the meager conditions, he shot "Pyshka" according to Maupassant, by heart - frame by frame - he learned "Battleship "Potemkin", "Mother", "Parisian" by Chaplin, covered hundreds of pages with notes, worked for fifteen hours, slept for five ... He took off "Thirteen", took off "Lenin in October" and a lot other great movies...

"Leningrader" Alexei Kuznetsov was the son of a worker and himself in 1922, at seventeen years, started as a worker. At nineteen he became the secretary of the Orekhovsky volost committee Komsomol, and then off and on: instructor of the ukoma, secretary of the district committee, district committee, since 1932 - at twenty-seven years old - instructor of the Leningrad City Party Committee four years - already a member of the Central Committee of

the CPSU (b)! An active Soviet biography, and -

also a breakdown! And the "Leningrader" Nikolai Voznesensky? Also a brilliant start and even more a brilliant continuation, and then - the growing swagger, complacency, and as a result - a

breakdown. Not all of them were like that, but there were still depressingly many of them ... This was the result of some innate systemic defects of socialism and not Stalin's miscalculations, but the result of that centuries-old Asiaticism, which over the centuries of autocracy has ingrained itself into the soul of the people too deep and strong.

On whom could one hope without a doubt? Stalin could not over this think more and more. And the conclusion was obvious: to a new, educated and free from "birthmarks" of capitalism, Soviet youth. It was, so to speak, a general conclusion. But specific Stalin's actions to change the basic principle of the formation of power in the country. I mean the Soviet electoral system.

In December 1936, a new Constitution of the USSR was adopted, and a year later first elections to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. This is known to everyone. But to this day, few people know that, according to Stalin's plan, they were supposed to become alternative ones, which were alternative samples of ballot papers were prepared, where several names stood. Between by the way, we owe the publication of this fact to Yuri Nikolayevich Zhukov.

In giving citizens the opportunity to choose from several candidates put forward by various public organizations, Stalin saw a counterbalance the growing "partoplasm" - party and non-party. However, in 1937 resistance of the decayed part of the party-state and economic leadership manifested itself so clearly, this "elite" revealed its true face so it is obvious that in the same 1937, Stalin and the Stalinist "core" of the party had to resort to large-scale purges.

Chronologically, the purges in the party-state leadership coincided with the purges in the army, caused by the Tukhachevsky conspiracy, as well as large-scale preventive measures against the potential "fifth column", including - in the people's "lower classes". But at the undoubted systemic connection of these three repressive purges with each other is only a purge "elite" was associated with Stalin's failed idea about the alternativeness of elections to bodies Soviet power. I am

convinced that Stalin was determined to return to this idea before the next elections in December 1941. However, that December was not before the elections, as in the whole string of subsequent Decembers.

The first post-war elections to the Supreme Soviet were held in 1946, the next on March 12, 1950. And they were also non-alternative. Only the last name on the ballot was one candidate, and the whole choice of voters was whether to keep her on the ballot or delete it. At that

time, the rejection of alternative elections was a perfectly reasonable decision. On the one hand, the country exerted all its strength in order to quickly overcome the devastation, and it was necessary to ensure the maximum unity of all. On the other hand, many lived hard, not everyone understood that not the worst, but the best was ahead, few knew about the forced large expenditures on such defense projects as nuclear, missile, on the creation jet aircraft and new electronics ... And this discontent could affect election results in such a way that instead of unity in society, "discord" could turn out.

However, new elections were coming up in March 1955. And they had to come a country qualitatively different from the country in 1950! And for the first time to the urns must were to come young voters born in 1937. They, their senior comrades, their grown-up fathers-winners could already quite consciously choose from several candidates, nominating the really most worthy to power.

In the "non-alternative" ballot, it was not necessary to resort to a pen - if you voted "for", it was enough just to put the ballot in the ballot box. With the

"alternative" option, the use of a pen was mandatory - one way or another otherwise it was necessary to strike

someone out. And this immediately ruled out automatic election to the deputies of the Supreme Co high party, Soviet and economic leaders. They could be elected if they had not exaggerated, but real, earned by them authority among the masses, but they might not elect.

But if the first secretary of the district committee or regional party committee or the chairman district executive committee or regional executive committee would be outvoted, then this is something would automatically mean their expulsion from power. Yes, and the economic leaders who ran for the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, in this case, life would also become uncomfortable.

While the year was 1952, the elections were far away, and it was difficult to say for sure - what position will Stalin take regarding their possible alternativeness. And here "partoplasm" could assume something on this score.

And it is unlikely that these assumptions pleased her.

And Stalin was getting old ... However, it was still far from decrepitude, but such people as Stalin, and do not become decrepit in the literal sense of the word - they are usually in extreme old age retain clarity of thought, unless the vessels of the brain fail them too much - as happened with Lenin. However, Stalin

was getting tired, getting more and more tired, and everyone in leading Moscow knew this and understood. And so the question of a successor could not arise one way or another. Soon in the very party "tops" had to come a whole detachment of quite young people - for such level - leaders, new secretaries of the Central Committee. But in real time they all were secondary figures. Only with the passage of time could one of them acquire the necessary qualities of the head of state, moreover, a certain period was necessary in order to a new young generation of enthusiasts of socialism has multiplied and strengthened, which could to support and support the young leader of the state. If there is such a thing in society mass stratum and the requirements for a leader might not be as high as their presented the era to Stalin himself.

For everyone who had information and was familiar with the situation at the "top", it was obvious enough. What was not obvious was the candidacy of a successor.

The standard thesis of "Russian" historians - borrowed, however, from Western Sovietologists - became the thesis of an allegedly fierce struggle for power among the "narrow" leadership, which allegedly intensified especially in the last years of Stalin's life. Yes, in

preface to the scientific publication "The Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council of Ministers of the USSR. 1945-

1953 "(circulation 1500 copies), its compilers actively pursue this thesis and are not even shy directly refer to the primary sources of their "insights", reporting, for example, that more On March 3, 1957, the émigré historian B.I. Nikolaevsky in a letter to the publisher B.K. Souvarine wrote: "You oversimplify everything by claiming that there was only Stalin. Deal a lot more difficult. In order to dictatorship (n-yes! - S.K.), Stalin allowed to develop under his oversight of conflicts (? - S.K.) in the Politburo and made the decision not at the beginning of the dispute, but only when the situation cleared up..."

"Russian" "historians", as well as "historians" emigrants, are unlikely to ever held in their hands something heavier than a silver spoon or a crystal glass bohemian glass. And it is unlikely that these "historians" made decisions more important than:

"Throwing a black or white ball on the defense of the dissertation imyarek?" Perhaps that is why they it is not clear that the decision-making procedure described by Nikolaevsky is normative for any competent leader acting in any field of management.

To them, who are now watching the squabbling of political jackals in sheep and bear skins - it is also not clear that one can argue and quarrel over issues not selfish, but business-like, and they slander Stalin, and even his colleagues, claiming that "Stalin himself encouraged rivalry in the Politburo", but that "at the heart of this rivalry and conflicts lay not a clash of principled positions, but a struggle for maximum proximity to Stalin. To reduce

Klim Voroshilov or the "iron commissar" Lazar Kaganovich to the level modern politicians? And about what kind of even more "maximum proximity to Stalin" speech? Stalin and his staff were "red", not "blue", their the relationship did not have the character of a relationship between the king and the courtiers! And what would this give "maximum proximity to Stalin" to any of the members of the Politburo? Head seat "RAO UES" or "representative" of "Rossiyaniya" in NATO? The closer - in a comradely, businesslike way - a person was to Stalin, the more affairs and the greater was his responsibility both to Stalin and to the cause, to him trusted! At

the same time, even Nikolaevsky admitted that "members of the Politburo were not at all faceless", that "a number of them came to Stalin with their ideas, for which Stalin took them to their closest collaborators ...

"There is nothing to argue with - Stalin was surrounded by colleagues, each of whom had his own face. And, like every person who knows his own worth, they could not help but evaluate their capabilities as Stalin's successor. However, this did not necessarily encourage intrigue, as against Stalin, and against each other.

Thought to think. So I almost openly thought about it myself Stalin...

He has so far held two of the three highest posts in the country: he was the General Secretary of the Central Committee VKP(b) and Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR. Third highest post - Chairman Since 1946, after the death of Kalinin, Shvernik has occupied the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, and he was, of course, only a nominal "head" of state. However,

Stalin was already inclined to move away from the operational leadership as the party and the national economy, especially since this actually happened more and more often. Soon - at the 19th Party Congress - the post of General Secretary of the Central Committee will be abolished. Stalin will be elected "simply" secretary of the Central Committee. This was quite in line with his course of change. the role of the party in Soviet society. From the leading, actually state, force, she was supposed to become a force guiding society at the expense of the ideological, moral and intellectual leadership of its leadership and its members. As

for the Council of Ministers of the USSR, even after the 19th Congress, Stalin remained Chairman of the Council of Ministers without a clearly defined first deputy, although in fact there were three - Beria, Malenkov and Bulganin.

But after all, Stalin could - closer to the elections to the Supreme Soviet - leave this post as well. AND then he would have remained the only state position - "just" a deputy Supreme Soviet of the

USSR. Could there be any doubt that in this case at the next session - rather of all, extraordinary - the Supreme Council, all other deputies would unanimously elect Deputy Stalin as its Chairman? This would have happened even without Stalin's pressure, and of course, because of the obvious naturalness of such a step. Deputies have no other option could have imagined - and not even because of such universal love for Stalin ... option would not allow the people

themselves! And then the post of Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR would

nominally, but actually the first! And all the fullness of real power would move to where it theoretically always concentrated, that is, to the Supreme Council!

Power would finally become Soviet! And

Stalin would be its head. So

fundamentally very probable and, perhaps, quite close in time the broad socialist democratization of Soviet society desired by Stalin was another additional factor that forced the anti-Stalinist forces to hurry with its removal. I

cannot confirm all of the above with documents, but it is unlikely that they are today anywhere and will be found! If there was anything about this in the archives, then everything was destroyed if not under Khrushchev, then under Gorbachev for sure. However, all of the above was possible, and nothing that we know today about those years, such a version contradicts!

But even in this case, the question of Stalin's successor in office remained open.

Chairman of the Council of Ministers. At the same time, over the years, for a completely understandable reason, more and more sharply arose the question of a "full" successor to Stalin.

It was clear that it could not be some "grey eminence". Should replace Stalin was a well-known, large, authoritative and quite popular figure. But which of these figures could translate Stalin's ideas into a real

thing? In 1953, Stalin was in his 74th year, Voroshilov was in his 72nd, Molotov was in his 63rd, Kaganovich was in his 60th... Mikoyan and Bulganin were born in 1895, and in 1953 they were, therefore, 58 years

old. So in terms of age among the top management in 1953, the "full" successors Stalin was most suitable Malenkov - born in 1901, Ponomarenko - 1902 born, Saburov - born in 1900, Pervukhin - born in 1904 and Beria - born in 1899.

This is by age, by length of service in senior positions ... And by business qualities?

What about the ability to force

yourself? And in proximity to those Stalinist ideas about the essence of social development, which included in the "Economic Problems"? In particular, who of all was especially sensitive to youth education? Who had the greatest propensity to boldly advance personnel?

Perhaps none of the top leadership, except, of course, Stalin himself, here with Beria could not compare.

Firstly, Beria most passionately, persistently, repeatedly asked for him the opportunity to get a higher education. Asked the Azerbaijani Central Committee in Baku in 1920, asked the Georgian Central Committee in Tiflis in 1922, asked later - Ordzhonikidze in the early 30s ... And this was when Beria already occupied very high positions in the Cheka, had excellent leadership prospects!

Be ready to change the office of the head of the Secret Political Department of the GruzChK and the position occupied by the owner of this office, on a student card and modest student meals? No, for this one had to really really love the knowledge of how such. And Beria loved him. But Stalin knew this.

The main thing is that Beria, like Stalin, strove for people to live and work around him. educated, in which he, like Stalin, saw the key to the successful development of the country.

Moreover, Beria did not just indulge in beautiful dreams - he was always actively acted, and it was not accidental, but absolutely natural that it was under Beria Tbilisi became one of the leading centers of higher education in the USSR, which Beria, Georgian science began to develop powerfully in its most serious branches, in including in mathematics.

One story was also connected with Beria, which Stalin himself hardly knew, but not it is possible that he knew. This is the little-known story of the young physicist Oleg Lavrentiev. The beginning of his fate turned out to be brilliant, because it began in the USSR of Stalin and Beria. His further fate - already in the USSR Khrushchev and Brezhnev - was very sad, although not entirely dysfunctional from a formal point of view. One way or another, it will be useful for us to know the history of Oleg Lavrentiev. Useful because it, like a

drop of water, reflected Beria's approach to the young personnel, which was a concrete embodiment of a general approach to educating young generations of Soviet people, proposed by Stalin in his "Economic Problems" ...

At the age of 18, Lavrentiev went to the front, fought, and after the war he was sent to serve to the Sakhalin Military District in the 221st Anti-Aircraft Artillery Battalion as a radio telegraph operator. Physics was his passion, and on Soviet Sakhalin, from which tsarist times, Anton Chekhov had depressing impressions, Sergeant Lavrentiev could through Posyltorg subscribe books on physics and even the scientific journal "Uspekhi fizicheskikh Sciences, while studying at the evening high school. Then

all the newspapers wrote about what President Truman put before the American physicists are tasked with creating a "superbomb" - the so-called "hydrogen bomb". A "conventional" atomic bomb would serve as its "fuse", creating "stellar" temperatures necessary for the reaction of helium fusion from heavy hydrogen isotopes H₂ - deuterium, and H₃ - tritium. The physical principle of the superbomb itself was not a secret - it was written about, for example, in volume 3 of the 2nd edition of the Great Soviet Encyclopedia, signed for publication on May 17, 1950. In the same place, on page 434, it was reported that "American warmongers are trying to threaten the USSR and the countries of people's democracy with this hydrogen bomb even before it implementation ...

"The difficulty was that hydrogen and its isotopes are gases with negligible density, which becomes acceptable only in liquid hydrogen. And liquid hydrogen is temperature of almost absolute zero, this is cosmic cold, which is so easy on Earth you won't provide.

They actively worked on a thermonuclear bomb not only in the United States, but also - without publicity - in THE USSR. And so, in 1949, Sergeant Lavrentyev wrote a letter addressed to Stalin, where he claims that he knows how to make a hydrogen bomb. Today it looks incredible, but after the considerations of the sergeant were familiarized with the specially sent to his unit lieutenant colonel of the engineering service Yurganov, Lavrentiev was sent to Moscow - to hand over exams for the Faculty of Physics of Moscow State University. He was accepted into the Central Committee, they were seriously interested in him, and the sergeant was worth

it! In order for the reader to understand that this was indeed the case, I will report the following IN the basis of the first Soviet hydrogen bomb RDS-6s, tested on August 12, 1953, was three fundamental ideas were laid down, two of which belong to A.D. Sakharov, and the third nominated by V.L. Ginzburg. And for his proposal to use as a thermonuclear fuel solid deuteride lithium-6 Ginzburg after testing RDS-6s received an order Lenin.

But the same idea, which the best minds of Soviet physics reasonably set themselves in great merit, completely independently of everyone - albeit later than the "luminaries", - expressed the young Oleg Lavrentiev! And he was the first to formulate one of the key ideas regarding controlled thermonuclear fusion! So Beria immediately became interested in the

former sergeant, expected from the young student of physics, took care of his life and professional growth, personally met with him.

By the way, the young Andrei Sakharov took the wide road not without attentive and Beria's sensitive attitude to himself - for the first time in his office he was just together with Lavrentiev.

To finish the story of Lavrentiev, I will say that the Moscow clan of "elite"

physicists saw in a promising young man a future dangerous competitor, and as soon as Beria was eliminated, the physicist Lavrentiev was quickly escorted to Kharkov, to the Ukrainian Institute of Physics and Technology, where he did become a doctor of sciences and did in the field there are many controlled synthesis. But even today, the scientific merits of the former protege of Beria are more recognized in the West than ours.

Yes, Beria, with his flair for the new, with his interest and craving for knowledge, with his interest in talented youth, could better than anyone else perceive Stalin's ideas about a new comprehensively educated citizen as the main guarantee of the fortress and historical prospects for a new society.

And if Stalin decided to leave the post of Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, then Beria could be the most successful replacement for him. This is why, among other things, Beria, after the death of Stalin and the death of Beria himself, especially many vile, false abominations were written. As, however, about Stalin himself. Beria would

also be nice as a full successor to Stalin - in the event of Stalin's death. But the link could be especially effective: "Stalin - Chairman of the Presidium Supreme Soviet of the USSR and Beria - Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR. Malenkov could become a "party" "attached" one. In

the autumn of 1952, Stalin - as I understand it - was not yet ready for such a development. I did not see the situation and the successor in Beria. But this did not mean that from some point he did not would have come to that conclusion. Moreover, he could come to her soon enough. And this is by itself would be mortally dangerous for all those external and internal forces to which Stalin and socialism was a bone in the throat. And a fundamentally not excluded variant of the higher ligament "Stalin-Beria" also forced the anti-Stalinist and anti-socialist forces hurry. For all

that, it is Beria who has long been charged with a grave accusation of intent against Stalin, and today these ridiculous accusations have received a new impetus in the book of Nikolai Dobryukha How they killed Stalin. They, these accusations, are really ridiculous - no matter how see what else will be said. Yes, the

theme of "Stalin and Beria" is fundamentally dramatic, but it is devoid of impure passions and petty calculations. Their relationship was in the nature of an ever-evolving process, and although they did not develop into friendly, and could not develop - Beria was exactly twenty years younger than Stalin, over the years their relationship more and more resembled teacher-student relationship in the phase when a talented student has already outgrown the teacher into operational-tactical, so to speak, sense, but still inferior to him in the strategic wisdom and ability to correctly see the historical perspective ...

Moreover, the relationship between Stalin and Beria did not receive its logical conclusion. On the one hand, this was prevented, as I guess, by behind-the-scenes intrigues against Beria, fed, perhaps, not so much by someone from Stalin's higher entourage as inconspicuous little men from the environment of the Stalinist environment, for whom the final the rapprochement between Stalin and Beria was undesirable. Undesirable for various reasons - to whom for purely selfish reasons, and to whom and due to the position of these "little men" as agents external, hostile to Russia, forces. Stalin was aging, and in recent years his bile has been poisoned was not so difficult, although all the stories about his distrust of Beria are worth little, and I I will prove this later.

On the other hand, the logical conclusion of the relationship between Stalin and Beria was prevented violent death of both. It's a pity...

After all,

the "Stalin-Beria" connection has always had a huge, unique creative potential.

Chapter Eight

Stalin and Beria

In 1953, there were two political assassinations, the fact of which affects the course of world history to this day. In the beginning - on the border between the winter and spring of 1953 - there was Stalin is killed. And no later than, most likely, the beginning of August 1953, Beria was also killed.

“Advanced” “historians” connect these two names like this: “Beria is the murderer of Stalin ...” But, of course, this, as already mentioned, is a lie. Yes, and a lie of a very old and not of domestic origin ... back in 1976, a Western Sovietologist Chechen-Hitler-overseas origin Abdurakhman Avtorkhanov published in Frankfurt am Main book entitled "The Mystery of Stalin's Death". At that

time, few people in Russia knew about this book and about its author ... The Lubyanka apparatus and Central Committee, social science "beau monde", leaders of "samizdat" and regulars of some intelligent kitchen "cabals" - that's, perhaps, everyone who was somehow about I have heard of

Avtorkhanov. However, since January 1991, with the start of publication in the academic journal Voprosy "history" of the author's book "Technology of power", the name of the former pre-war director The Chechen branch of Partizdat became officially permitted. In May 1991, the baton The Academy of Sciences of the USSR was picked up by the Union of Writers of the USSR, and in No. 5 of the journal Novy Mir published, without any comments, chapters from Avtorkhanov's old book about Stalin ...

From that point on and off, and now the name of Avtorkhanov, previously forbidden, in the current "Russians" is known very widely. We

still have to talk about Avtorkhanov's book and about himself - in due time. A now I will simply quote the first lines of his book "The Mystery of Stalin's Death":

“At the top of the pyramid of the Soviet partocracy there was not enough space for two criminal geniuses - for Stalin and Beria. Sooner or later one must was to yield to the other, or both perish in mutual struggle.

Due to its anti-historical and deceitfulness, the above quotation can be considered classical. But especially provocative, provocative - given the time of writing - “for growth” makes this quote, firstly, the opposition of Beria to Stalin, and secondly, an attempt to present them as equivalent figures.

In reality, Lavrenty Pavlovich Beria never himself to Stalin contrasted and never - probably even in thoughts - equaled with him. Although they are unlikely relations were always cloudless. In addition - I'm sure of this - there were those who wanted to Stalin and Beria quarrel, substitute the second before the first. Opportunities for this were many, for only those who do nothing do not make mistakes. Beria, although always did a huge amount of work and most of his problems heaped on him himself Stalin made almost no mistakes. But, everything happens...

About Stalin and Beria in the book concerning the death of Stalin, it must be said separately already because the death of Stalin Avtorkhanov and other Radzinskys are dumping it on Beria - they say, he killed, the

executioner, and that's it. Of course, there was nothing of the kind in reality - I have already spoken about this I will say. And any - the most indirect, the most indirect - Beria's participation in any anti-Stalinist actions was impossible from any point of view. First of all, with psychological point of view. Beria, if he was dissatisfied with Stalin, then only as sometimes a talented and long-fledged student is dissatisfied with the teacher, whose teacher not yet fully grown. The very fervor shown by Beria in such a resentment, testifies in favor of Beria ...

A typical example of a slander against Beria. In the book of Nikolai Dobryukha “How they killed Stalin ", its author reports that when he met with Chkalov's son, he categorically

declared: the death of Chkalov is on the conscience of Stalin

and Beria ... But even Dobryukha, who himself raised a lot of slander against Beria, objects to his son Chkalova and writes that now, not according to rumors, but according to declassified documents, it is possible literally minute by minute to trace how, first of all, Beria, Voroshilov and Stalin tried to save Chkalov and rescued on December

12. This is exactly so, because then Beria banned the flight in the most severe way Chkalov, and three days later the leaders of the pilot plant and Chkalov himself, with this ban neglected. But, come on, that Beria, fearing de Chkalov as a competitor, "removed" him, only the lazy did not write from the "democrats". And many people still believe in it!

At a time when Beria entered Stalin's closest circle of business contacts, that is, to early 1939, this circle was very narrow. Who was included in it? Firstly,

Molotov, Mikoyan and Voroshilov ... These were professional Bolshevik revolutionaries with pre-revolutionary experience, members of the Leninist guard, for whom Stalin remained at the right moment still Koboi. Only with them three Stalin was on "you" in personal conversations and personal correspondence. And only three of them naturally allowed themselves to address Stalin as "you". Next was Lazar

Kaganovich - adjoining the top three, but not being in Stalin is as close as she is. And behind him - without any special personal priorities - Stalin was surrounded Zhdanov, Malenkov, Beria, Bulganin, Khrushchev, Shcherbakov, Voznesensky, Andreev. And for all of them, Stalin was unquestionably "comrade Stalin", and in any case the distance was preserved.

Within this close company, personal ties were of a different nature, but none was painted with special warmth - from young nails no one knew each other, but on none of them had a normal human friendship and, in fact, there was no time. Eat good working contacts - and okay! As I

guess, there was also this ... Since for all hidden enemies country and self-seekers, Beria was the most dangerous - as the most powerful manager, it was against Beria, as a rule, that behind-the-scenes intrigues were woven. I guess, that they were not initiated and led directly by Stalin's associates (I think even Khrushchev when Stalin was alive, he didn't sin with this), but some of Stalin's comrades-in-arms. But sometimes the "Olympians" themselves could be sinful. After all, they were people too, and, as shown life after Stalin, they had hidden passions.

Here, perhaps, the conflict described by the Chief Air Marshal Golovanov. One day, in preparation for the Tehran Conference, he entered hallway at Stalin's dacha, I heard the loud voice of the Supreme: "Bastard! Scoundrel!" ... Not wanting to be an unwitting witness to the "scrape", Golovanov wanted to leave, but Stalin had already noticed him and invited him: "Come in!"

Molotov was half-sitting on the windowsill in a small room, and opposite Stalin Beria stood with his back, whom Golovanov did not

immediately recognize. "Look at this bastard," Stalin said sharply and ordered Beria to turn around. A when he turned around looking confused, Stalin ordered him to take off his glasses. Beria took off pince-nez, and Stalin exclaimed: "You see, a snake ... He wears glasses, although his eyesight is one and a half units. Vyacheslav wears glasses out of necessity, he is short-

sighted, and this one is disguised. There was silence. Then Stalin, already calmly, wished everyone all the Golovanov, Beria and Molotov came out, and Beria ardently proved something to Molotov, who was imperturbable, silent and did not react to Beria's explanation.

Golovanov did not understand what he was witnessing. And he was one of those witnesses. cases when someone - I do not exclude that Molotov - "set up" Beria. By the way, Beria was short-sighted, like Molotov, and wore pince-nez not to disguise. But someone made sure Stalin is the opposite. And someone aroused Stalin's anger towards Beria ... If only

this anger was caused by some kind of "blunder" of Lavrenty Pavlovich himself, then he would hardly have been confused. His confusion was clearly due to the fact that he did not expect some kind of slander on himself and was unsettled by Stalin's sharp reaction - which is why he tried to explain something even Molotov.

Molotov did not like Beria - there can be no two opinions. And the rest of him, it seems, did not really like him, except perhaps for Kaganovich and, to one degree or another, Malenkov and Zhdanov. Perhaps this

came from the fact that from the very beginning of the war, Beria was almost the only one of the top managers who helped Stalin directly, who practically had no failures at that difficult time. And self-criticism is a natural state personality - was peculiar in this circle only to Stalin himself, and even then not always.

It is interesting that Chief Marshal of Aviation Golovanov, in relation to everyone about whom he recalls, quite objectively, this objectivity changes in two cases - when he writes about Vasily Stalin and Beria. So, Golovanov, comparing Beria and Malenkov, declares that the second de compares favorably with the first by allegedly outstanding organizational skills and the ability to mobilize people for action. Moreover, Alexander Evgenievich believes that Malenkov was Stalin's best assistant in military affairs and military industry. But anyone familiar with distribution duties during the war, and those who coped with them as they were, will understand that Golovanov, to put it mildly, was mistaken. Busy with long-range aviation, he just couldn't assess the scale and nature of Beria's efforts to organize defense production.

Golovanov writes that Beria was an inveterate, rude swearer. And here I am to him I believe, although in the memoirs of various people we find evidence to the contrary ... However, in a situation where, of the entire top leadership, only Beria - except, of course, Stalin himself - every day I had to pretend to be Figaro not on stage, but in life, such emotional outlet in relation to people who were close to Lavrenty Pavlovich in terms of status, was quite understandable. Of course, Beria had before his eyes an example of an unchanging courtesy of Stalin. But he was not Stalin, and he, in order not to disrupt numerous and varied orders of Stalin, sometimes had to break himself. At the same time, Golovanov and Beria were still people of a very different type. Yes, and you must notice different calibers. For

Beria, the main thing was the content, not the form. He could be dapper, or he could sometimes look almost shabby - everything was determined by the specific situation. Golovanov He treated people who were constantly inwardly fit. But he managed to do much less than the "inveterate swearer." Not the one, I repeat, was with Alexander Evgenievich state "caliber".

In addition, Beria could secretly irritate both Golovanov and especially the elders. his colleagues by the fact that at any moment he looked very confident, which the other can would be considered self-confident and self-satisfied. Beria expressed in this way its outstanding business activity and potential. He himself was in constant willingness to act and was ready to spur others to action. Here with him up to some degree could only be compared with Lazar Kaganovich, but he just belonged to Beria more loyal than others.

As for Stalin, he, as I understand it, did not underestimate Beria - if it was if so, then Stalin would not have entrusted him with the most serious matters. But the scale and scope of Beria's tasks that Stalin set for him were constantly expanding, to the point that in the final, most important, in a sense, phase of the war, Stalin made Beria even formally man No. 2 in the USSR, appointing him instead of Molotov as deputy Chairman of the State Defense Committee - GKO. Yes, and after the war the system Beria's position in the economy was leading every now and then - after Stalin.

However, Stalin, alas, did not evaluate Beria as the latter deserved it. Other

In other words, Stalin did not see him as his natural (natural due to universalism) successor as leader of the state. Beria himself - according to his later testimony widows - believed that in the event of Stalin's death or his retirement, claim the first the role in the USSR for him, another "nationalist", is unlikely to be reasonable. This can be believed - Beria was ready to become a "workhorse" under the formally first Malenkov, as it actually happened at the beginning after Stalin's death. But Beria

was ready, perhaps, for the first role - I will talk about this later. And if if Stalin himself put him forward for a potentially first role, then ... Malenkov, or Bulganin, or Ponomarenko, or even Voroshilov and Kaganovich is so popular in the country that the broad masses were simply outraged if Stalin's successor turned out to be someone not from their number.

Even Molotov in this sense was not indisputable for the masses. On the other hand, not so unpopular was Lavrenty Pavlovich - especially if we mean not just the masses, not just "grassroots", but the mass of those "grassroots" specialists, professionals who determined face of the new country. Here Beria was even, perhaps, unprecedentedly popular. And not only among nuclear scientists, rocket scientists or citrus growers. There is a curious document, which is still little available today, since it was published in a capital, but small circulation (1000 copies) in the collection "Kremlin Cinema. 1928-1953...", published by the publishing house Rossplan in 2005. This document is a letter dated May 8, 1951, sent to Beria outstanding film actor Nikolai Cherkasov:

"Dear Lavrenty Pavlovich!

After much deliberation, I decide to trouble you on the following question. In my creative plans of recent years, the first place was occupied by continues to occupy the dream - to embody in the cinema the image of the best, most talented poet of our Soviet era Vladimir Mayakovsky.

The script written by Comrade. B.A. Katanyan, focuses all attention viewer on Mayakovsky ... not in the family and domestic terms and not in the narrow literary environment, but in the poet's relations with his readers, with the people. Such an image of Mayakovsky, historically deeply truthful, fascinated me very much. I got used to it and I'm already working over it...

Two years ago, this script was accepted by the Lenfilm studio, but then its movement along the chain of command was suspended.

If this continues, I will probably be deprived of the opportunity bring this wonderful image to the screen for a very simple reason - I I'm getting old, ... and Mayakovsky should be played young.

My ardent desire to work on this worthy of the most inspirational labor role and makes me bother you with a request to help me in this deed..."

Why did Cherkasov turn specifically to Beria? Questions of culture and ideology were engaged in Malenkov, Voroshilov, Suslov, Fadeev, finally, the Minister of Cinematography Bolshakov ... On the same days - May 12, 1951 - director Mikhail Ilyich Romm worked for operator Boris Izrailevich Volchek through "dear Georgy Maksimilianovich" Malenkov. And Cherkasov

wrote to Beria. Why? We find the answer in Cherkasov himself:

"I mustered up the courage to write you this letter and send you the script, because the meeting with you and your amazing attention are fresh in my memory. With deep respect.

*N. Cherkasov, devoted to you
May 8, 1951 "*

However, Lavrenty Pavlovich had no real relation to "culture", and all he could do was forward a letter to the Central Committee to Malenkov with the resolution: "In the Central Committee VKP(b). Malenkov G.M. Please be interested. L. Beria. May 14. Malenkov addressed Cherkasov's request to the secretariat to Suslov, on which the matter again died out. Not needed was an "agitator, bawler and leader" with his "hundred volumes of party books" to a gang of "poetic grabbing and burning out. And non-poetic

ones too. As for Beria, then, as we see, he is among truly creative Russians intellectuals-intellectuals were valued and respected - like Stalin himself. However, Beria appreciated by the common people, and evidence of this is also found in the archives. Yes, June 9 1950 to the Secretary of the Central Committee M.A. Suslov was sent a note from the Department of Agitation and propaganda of the Central Committee, where excerpts were given from letters that came to Pravda after the release of the film "The Fall of Berlin". The film was criticized by ordinary, unofficial Soviet people, and this is how, in particular, they criticized:

"... Tov. Vagin (Moscow):

"... The members of the Politburo are so distorted that it is directly inconvenient for directors. It is impossible, hiding behind a good idea and content, to show ugly leaders. Comrades Voroshilov, Molotov, Mikoyan, Beria and other members of the Politburo are loved by the people, and they must be shown as people know them."

Tov. Semenov (lieutenant colonel):

"I, a participant in several parades in Moscow, happened to see comrades Molotov, Voroshilov, Malenkov, Bulganin, Beria and others on the podium. They are not speeches were made at this time, but these are energetic, strong-willed people. You don't take away this impression after watching the movie "The Fall of Berlin", here they are shown as passive, I would say, caricatured..."

I draw the reader's attention to the tone of the letters - there is not even a shadow of that supposedly slavish psychology, which is attributed to the Soviet masses by the current "advanced" "historians", "masters of the word", "political scientists".

So, the inspector of the district department of public education from Kronstadt Danilova, the master of the Moscow plant of grinding machines Drozdov, a teacher from Krasnogorsk Ivanov, a locksmith from Rostov, Yaroslavl region Burevoy, Titov and Belkanov from Riga, Kovalenko from Murmansk, Mekhonoshin from Yaroslavl, Osminkin from Leningrad, conspiring, they harshly condemned the introduction into the picture of a certain steelworker "Aleksey Ivanov", presented in the film as an "advanced Stakhanovite" who met with Stalin ...

"The viewer is embarrassed and even ashamed for ... a guy ... Completely inappropriate and no one needed to show a noble young man in the role of a silly Ivanushki ... " "Why did Alexei, at the request of the screenwriter, remain somehow underdeveloped a simpleton, a limited, primitive person? ... " "The image of a steelworker in peaceful conditions and in the war - an uncouth, uneducated, ill-mannered guy! Is not real image of an advanced Soviet person ... Even our smart Soviet children with indignantly follow Alexei Ivanov and throw the most unflattering remarks about him ... " "Who is he - ... a Soviet worker who grew up in a team, loving Comrade Stalin with childhood, or a peasant of pre-revolutionary times from a bear's corner ... "

These are all "unkempt" "ordinary" opinions. And these are the opinions of people who feel themselves masters of the country and life and not prone to being stupefied...

But even more important for us now are the assessments given by these people to Beria. They are also sincere and show that Beria did not have the reputation of an "executioner" among the people. Once again in

this can be seen when getting acquainted with the history associated with the name of the film director Alexandra Dovzhenko ...

In January 1944, Stalin harshly, but, alas, rightly criticized Dovzhenko's scenario "Ukraine on fire". I must say that his performance can be considered a model intelligent and politically accurate purely professional criticism. Stalin named Dovzhenko Ukrainian nationalist, but this was not a sentence - Dovzhenko filmed documentaries films, in 1948 he staged the feature film Michurin and received Stalin Prize. The director was bullied by fellow filmmakers: they pushed, excommunicated from teaching at VGIK, they paid less than others ... And so Dovzhenko's wife, actress Yulia Solntseva, wrote to Beria on August 20, 1951:

“Dear Lavrenty Pavlovich!

I appeal to you with a request to accept and listen to me. I want with you talk about Dovzhenko. The created situation around this person, which does not give ability to work is getting worse every day. He had a second heart attack, and apparently only a few years left to live (Dovzhenko died on 11/25/56 - S.K.). Now Dovzhenko is on the highway Zaporizhia - Kakhovka. Working on scenario.

Please forgive me for my concern. I want to assure you of the utmost the need for this letter. Y.

Solntseva

August 20 , 51

tel. G1-18-39”.

The Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, Chairman of the Special L.P. Committee Beria then (as, indeed, his entire post-war life) had enough trouble with major national economic problems, with "atomic" and missile affairs ... In work was in full swing on the Moscow Berkut air defense system ... So personally meet with he didn't have time to be Dovzhenko's wife, and what could Beria personally do? However, he did what he could: through his assistant to the Council of Ministers B. Lyudvigov, he sent on August 27 1951 letter from Solntseva to the head of the Department of Fiction and art of the Central Committee V.S. Kruzhkov and instructed Ludwigov to arrange the admission of Solntseva to the Central Committee. In his "eparchy" Beria used to set precise deadlines, but in He did not give orders to the Central Committee, and the "paper" moved slowly. Solntseva's letter was registered with the Technical Secretariat of the Organizing Bureau of the Central Committee on August 28, 1951, however the author was heard only in October.

October 24, 1951 V.S. Kruzhkov reported this to Suslov, referring to an agreement "with the secretariat of comrade. Beria. Kruzhkov also reported that the minister cinematography, Bolshakov “means to call Comrade Dovzhenko for a conversation, to show great attention to his creative work (two months after the plea of his wife! - S.K.) and try to dispel any notion of any discrimination against him”...

The examples of Cherkasov and Solntseva were hardly the only ones - just them today declassified at least in small-circulation collections of documents. But these examples amaze! After all, Cherkasov and Solntseva almost simultaneously turned to Beria independently. from each other without speaking! It turns out that it was Beria who had a reputation as a person considerate, obligatory, sensitive and fair? And then what remains of the image "monster" and

"executioner"? But without creating such an image, it is difficult to record Beria as Stalin's poisoners. And the death of Stalin on Beria, you will not get away from the slippery question: “And who then, if this is not Beria? And for

what?”. So this, quite rational - for some, - the reason is explained careful dissemination of all sorts of vile things about Beria for decades.

And the real Beria, even the drape cut, issued to him for the people's commissar's overcoat, for minus the material that was needed for sewing one overcoat, he gave it to his colleagues.

It is unlikely that Stalin was well aware of this side of Beria's nature - every day both were so loaded that the main issue was performance and competence, not humanism, purely business, not personal, qualities. Beria himself to look better in front of Stalin than he is, obviously did not try - contrary to the statements of his detractors.

In this sense, it is significant and interesting what article Beria gave in Pravda to 70th anniversary of Stalin. Let me remind you that on December 21, 1949, Pravda published dedicated Stalin articles by Molotov, Beria, Voroshilov, Mikoyan, Kaganovich, Bulganin, Andreev, Khrushchev, Kosygin, Shvernik, Shkiryatov and Poskrebyshev.

So, a curious detail ... Despite the fact that Lenin was mentioned in all the articles, of course, more than once, only Beria, whom the "advanced" "historians" represent groveling before Stalin, clearly carried out in his article the idea of Lenin's priority, rightly assigning Stalin the role of the great successor of Lenin's work. About this Beria said right away, starting the article like this:

“After the great Lenin, there was and is no name in the world so close hearts of millions of working people, as the name of the great leader Stalin ... <...> Of all contemporaries of Lenin, no one could fully, like Stalin, understand and appreciate the greatness Lenin...”

The same thought - passing, I repeat, through the entire article like a red thread - present at the end:

“The whole life and activity of Comrade Stalin is a great an inspiring example of loyalty to Leninism and boundless love for Lenin, an example of selfless service to the working class and all labor people, the cause of the liberation of mankind from oppression and exploitation ... ”

Beria was also the only one who devoted part of his article to the meaning self-criticism. He directly and extensively quoted Stalin and wrote: “Self-criticism is permanent weapon of Bolshevism, is inextricably linked with its nature and revolutionary spirit. Actually, and this was, in fact, an unquoted quote from Stalin's article "Against the vulgarization of the slogan of self-criticism", published in Pravda on June 26, 1928.

Beria was the only one who emphasized in his article the greatness of the Russian people and its special role as the leading force of the Soviet Union. And in the fourth section of the article, he wrote like this:

“In the years of severe military trials ... the Soviet people are even clearer and saw more clearly in Comrade Stalin the traits of his great teacher Lenin. They we saw that our army and people were led by a tried and tested a leader, like Lenin, fearless in battle and merciless to the enemies of the people, like Lenin, free from any semblance of panic, like Lenin, wise and bold in decision complex issues, like Lenin, clear and definite, truthful and honest, loving his people the way Lenin loved them ... ”

It is up to you, but the desire to flatter Stalin here can only be seen very already a frank hater of Beria.

Moreover, if you want - believe it, if you want - no, but Beria turned out to be the only one of all authors of articles placed in Pravda No. 555 of December 21, 1949, which is not certified Stalin as a "brilliant leader." In an article, say, by Khrushchev, the volume is exactly

half less than Beriev's, this formula was used three times. In Beria's article - never.

This did not mean, of course, that Beria refused the undoubtedly brilliant Stalin genius. But Beria did not use the very formula "brilliant leader" used by Stalin's "well-wishers". He wrote about the genius of Stalin not in a bureaucratic manner, but - here this word is quite appropriate - creatively, comprehending the essence of Stalin cleverly, in the spirit of dialectics! Beria stated that "... the name of Comrade Stalin is among the names of the great humanity - Marx, Engels, Lenin ... ", and describing the war years, he noted:

"All the activities of our party and the Soviet state were directed comrade Stalin. His brilliant insight, the ability to quickly grasp and unravel the meaning of impending events, the features of each stage of the war, his ability to aim and direct the forces of the party and people to fulfillment of the main and decisive tasks, his invincible will, firmness and perseverance in carrying out the decisions made - provided our state victory over the enemy."

But that's how it was! And who, if not comrade L.P. Beria, Deputy Chairman of the State Defense Committee Comrade I.V. Stalin, it was to know fully? Moreover, it was all the easier for Beria to find in his soul such words addressed to Stalin and put them on paper that these words could be attributed - with the exception of epithet "brilliant" - and to Beria himself. He's been through for over ten years. continuous "full-time education" at the school of higher state administration, led by Stalin, plus about ten previous years had the opportunity to receive lessons in this "school" periodically.

And Beria was a capable student - this was recognized even by such a disloyal to him a man like academician Kapitsa, but not just anywhere, but in a letter addressed to Stalin.

In the final part of the anniversary article, Beria touched on the topic of genius Stalin once again - but again, without praising, but objectively, saying:

"The genius of our leader is combined with his simplicity and modesty, with exceptional personal charm, intransigence towards the enemies of communism - with sensitivity and paternal concern for people. He has the utmost clarity. thoughts, calm grandeur of character, contempt and intolerance for any hype and external effect.

Finally, the last thing about Beria's anniversary article about Stalin. All other articles in The anniversary issue ended with toasts in honor of Stalin personally in one form or another. And only Beria ended his article with a clear call: "Forward to new victories under the leadership of the great Stalin! Only Kaganovich after wishing Stalin long years ended his life in a similar way: "Under the leadership of the great Stalin, forward to victory communism!"

Like Stalin, Beria was not able to stand still, and the word "forward" is quite characterized both as a statesman and as a person. I think including therefore, we can talk about the unprecedented effectiveness of the managerial "bundle" "Stalin - Beria".

For the first time in an explicit form, as already mentioned, it was formed during the war years and its end was even formalized after the appointment of Beria in 1944 Deputy Chairman of the State Defense Committee, that is - officially the second person after Stalin in the system of state power in wartime. At the same time, Stalin led Beria to the post of chairman of the Operational Bureau of the GKO, which considered all current issues.

To the question "Who pulled the country during the war in the first place?" there is only one Answer: "Stalin!" But among those who helped him in this, justice must be primacy give to Beria. It proved better than words that when the war ended and the GKO was abolished, on September 6, 1945, by the decision of the Politburo, the Operations Bureau was formed Council of People's Commissars of the USSR consisting of: L.P. Beria (chairman), G.M. Malenkov (deputy chairman), A.I. Mikoyan, L.M. Kaganovich, N.A. Voznesensky and A.N. Kosygin. This Bureau was in charge issues related to the work of industrial enterprises and railway transport, i.e. all key issues of the country's economy. And this meant that even after the war, the "bundle" Stalin - Beria did not break up. Soon

she became even stronger, due to the fact that Beria became the figure No. 2 in the Soviet atomic project. It was then the highest "atomic" rating, given that figure No. 1 was Stalin himself.

At the same time, already before the war, their managerial "bundle" worked well - especially after Beria was appointed one of the deputies on February 3, 1941 Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR Stalin and immediately expanded the scope of his government initiatives.

A characteristic moment: on March 8, 1941, Beria sends a project to Stalin

Decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks "On measures to implement the logging plan in navigation in 1941 on the People's Commissariat of Forests and the Office of the Forest Industry Camps. Behind the day before, Malenkov and Beria reported to the then Presovnarkom Molotov (since May he was replaced by Stalin himself) about the need to replace the people's commissar of the forest industry, and proposed to "appoint an employee, although he does not know the forestry, as the head of the People's Commissariat affairs, but able to organize and restructure the work. The last

wording betrays the authorship of Beria - it was his style: to be able to organize well what you have never encountered before. And organize not for due to bossy scolding, but due to accelerated self-education in the required (but not moreover!) limits, efficiency, corrosiveness and the right selection of specialists.

However, Stalin and Beria understood each other well back in those days when the first was in Moscow, and the second - in Tbilisi. There are interesting notes of the chairman Boris Shumyatsky's Film Committee on Stalin's (for Shumyatsky - Koba) films in the Kremlin. December 9, 1934, after watching the films "Chapaev" and "The Last masquerade", Shumyatsky wrote, in particular:

"Koba, turning to Comrade Beria (he was at the screening with Mikoyan, Kaganovich, Zhdanov and Ordzhonikidze. - S.K.) ... made a number of playful remarks ... He joked ... that with this film Comrade Beria well achieves only one the goal is to show how much the city of Tiflis needs investments for repairs and reorganization...."

The film "The Last Masquerade" produced by the State Film Industry of Georgia, released on screens on October 25, 1934, shot, of course, not by Beria, but by director M.E. Chiaureli. However in every joke there is, as they say, a share of a joke. The share of truth in Stalin's joke was in the fact that the architect by education and vocation of Beria in the socialist the reconstruction of Tbilisi invested a lot of efforts of the organizer, and the talent of the architect. Stalin knew and supported it - later it would be Beria who would be instructed to oversee projects "Stalinist" high-rise buildings in Moscow. And now I found a reason to tease Beria.

Another touch from the business relations between Beria and Stalin ... Beria did not have time to become People's Commissar of Internal Affairs, replacing Yezhov, how on December 7, 1938 he turned to Stalin and Molotov with objections to the transfer to the NKVD of Intourist, an organization for serving foreign guests, which until then was under informal care "organs". Beria assured:

"The fact of Intourist's transfer to the jurisdiction of the NKVD will certainly become known for

border. Capitalist Travel Companies and the Hostile Press

will try to use to deploy harassment around representative offices

Intourist, they will call them branches of the NKVD and thereby make it difficult for them normal work, as well as their provocation will scare away people from small bourgeoisie and intelligentsia from trips to the USSR. Based on these considerations I consider it expedient to remove Intourist from the jurisdiction of the NKVD.

On this note, Stalin wrote: "TT. Molotov, Mikoyan. It seems that Comrade Beria is right. It would be possible to transfer Intourist to the People's Commissariat of

Foreign Trade. I. Stalin. 10.1.39". And this regime "Beria's initiative - Stalin's support" was preserved in the future, because Beria was competent, and Stalin always encouraged competent opponents. Actually, he encouraged the activity of Beria from the time when the latter led Transcaucasia, and encouraged things in the most joyful way for a person - taking Beria's proposals for execution. The

"atomic" cooperation between Stalin and Beria was also highly effective. Question "Who played the most important role in the elimination of the US nuclear monopoly and the elimination nuclear threat to the USSR? there is also only one answer: "Stalin!" But among those who helped this, the primacy in justice must be given again to Beria - as in the case ensuring the victory of 1945.

In my book "Beria: The Best Manager of the 20th Century" I wrote that the "atomic" Beria today it is "documented" most fully, therefore, when studying a multi-volume collection documents "Soviet atomic project" the role of both Stalin and Beria is well revealed in this project. The almost invariable signature of Stalin under the most important documents concerning the Special Committee and the First Main Directorate under the Soviet Ministers of the USSR, proves that Stalin did not lose anything from his field of vision for years significant relating to the nuclear project. Beria did not miss anything at all here. - no more or less important papers passed by him. And it wasn't petty. It was thoroughness - both innate and conditioned by high personal Beria's responsibility for the success of the case.

And yet, there were ebb and flow in the relationship between Stalin and Beria. Meaning personal relationships – from the daily and essential business services of such an outstanding an employee like Beria, Stalin could not refuse even for the shortest time. But the closest business daily contacts did not mean human closeness.

In business, on a state scale, Beria was invariably in the first roles, and this was well shown by the end of 1951.

Anniversaries of the Great October Socialist Revolution in Stalin's Moscow was celebrated with a solemn meeting of the Moscow Council in the Bolshoi theater. This tradition was not violated and on November 6, 1951 - the year of celebration of the 34th anniversary of October. On the stage, in the presidium, sat Malenkov, Beria, Voroshilov, Mikoyan, Bulganin, Kaganovich, Andreev, Khrushchev, Shvernik, Suslov, Ponomarenko, Shkiryatov, members governments, deputies of the Moscow

City Council. Stalin was not among them. He was not there the next day and on Red Square - at a military parade. Stalin was not in Moscow at all then - from August 10 to December 22 1951, he was on vacation, and the meeting participants accepted a greeting to him, where he was called "a brilliant leader and teacher of the Soviet people, a great standard-bearer peace."

There was nothing to argue with here - for all the hackneyed wording, they reflected reality. Two times two always equals four, and Stalin was decades ago and By the beginning of the 50s, he remained not only a leader, but also a teacher of peoples. Still in the hall he was not there, and someone had to make a report. In the report on the ceremonial meeting, published in Pravda on November 7, Malenkov is on the list of the presidium of the ceremonial meeting stood first. However, Beria made a report at a meeting of the Moscow Council.

Actually, the practice of alternate speeches by members of the Politburo with reports on ceremonial meetings of the Moscow City Council was introduced in 1945, but some established. There was no queue, of course. In the text of Poskrebyshv's failed speech. At the "Anti-Beria" Plenum of the Central Committee in July 1953, Stalin's former secretary stated that, "sending his report to Comrade. Stalin for viewing, Beria declared boastfully that his report surpasses in content all previous reports of members of the Politburo ... "But, they say," comrade. Stalin, after reading the report, noted the incorrectness of a number of provisions put forward in a section of the report on the international situation, having made serious amendments to this section in principle..."

"So what?!" I will say to that. Well, Beria boasted, so that's it! First, this was said to Stalin's closest collaborator face to face - by the way. Why not a person and not express satisfaction from a job well done by him in this way?

Secondly, well, Stalin made amendments! So he, after all, in his own texts in the course of work on them made amendments - such documents are not done in one sitting. AND was it any wonder that Stalin read the draft report with a pencil in his hand and something in corrected him?

Thirdly, Beria had every reason to commend his own report, especially considering that he thereby praised not only himself, but also his assistants. for the preparation of the text. The language of the report, although it was not alien to official turns, turned out to be quite lively, businesslike and intelligible. Reading it, I assumed that some blocks Beria preliminarily dictated the report to the stenographer - in those years he sometimes did this. In any case, the report was easy to read.

In Pravda, he occupied three pages (with a photo of Beria and a general photo of the presidium with Beria on podium), and it said a little about everything, although the speaker stopped at something more thoroughly, for example, on the problems of oil workers and miners. At the same time, general the provisions were not heavy-handed, but the specific figures were weighty and convincing.

The focus was on success. The shortcomings were also mentioned, but in passing, in what there was no special crime - the internal political section of the report was called: "New successes in peaceful construction in the

USSR." In 1950, the first five-year plan ended, and in 1951 industrial output in twice exceeded the production of 1940. There was something to be proud of here - five years ago in some regions of the USSR sometimes ate rats, because almost the entire European part countries lay in ruins. Now the first recovery period is over, and Beria, with well-founded pride, reported that, compared to last year, production of textiles increased by 24%, meat and meat products - by 20%, butter vegetable - by 35%, bicycles - 2 times, cameras - by 39%. Beria said:

"Our industry is already beginning to mass-produce televisions, room refrigerators, washing machines and other household items."

The second section of the report was entitled "The Soviet Union in the Struggle for Peace", and already in at the very beginning, his speaker cited a quote from Stalin, powerful in its persuasiveness, saying this:

"The huge scale of peaceful construction in our country is eloquently talks about the peaceful nature of the foreign policy of the Soviet Union and denounces slanderers ranting about the aggressive intentions of our government.

"No state can," says Comrade Stalin, "including The Soviet state, to deploy in full (as in the text of the report. - S.K.) civilian industry, to begin great construction projects like hydroelectric Volga, Dnieper, Amu Darya, requiring tens of billions of budget expenditures,

continue the policy of systematically reducing prices for mass-produced goods consumption, which also requires tens of billions of budget expenditures, to invest hundreds of billions in the restoration of the destroyed by the German occupiers of the national economy and at the same time, at the same time, multiply their Armed Forces, develop the military industry. Not difficult to understand that such a reckless policy would lead to bankruptcy states."

This was said not just by the Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR and a member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, but also the chairman of the Special Committee that oversaw the nuclear and missile problems, one of the creators of the nuclear and missile industries in the USSR. However, speaking in this way, he was not cunning, just as Stalin himself was not cunning, uttering those words that Beria quoted. The question of eliminating the US nuclear monopoly as soon as possible was for Russia then a question of life protected by a Russian bomb, or a question of death according to "Hiroshima-Nagasaki" version, as well as - and according to the "Dresden-Hamburg" version, when the Anglo-Saxons lit over Germany the first man-made fiery

tornadoes. Russia solved the nuclear problem under the leadership of Stalin and Beria, and now such "sizzling" options with her "did not pass." Exactly one month before the report Beria, October 6, 1951, in the Saturday issue of Pravda, an extensive "The answer of Comrade I.V. Stalin to a Pravda correspondent about atomic weapons.

There were a lot of noisy comments after that in the world, and perhaps the best summary made one of the mouthpieces of the American "hawks" - the weekly "News Week", publishing an article called "The balance of atomic forces" ...

True, it was still far from equilibrium then, but it certainly became easier for us to breathe. Although the Yankees were developing new plans for the atomic bombing of the USSR, they were already afraid to burn yourself on it. I

think it will be interesting for today's reader to get acquainted with one more block from the foreign policy section of Beria's report:

"... the leaders of the United States do not stop talking about their supposedly peaceful intentions. You see, they are not averse to "preserving" peace, but on "conditions" to be dictated by the United States. What are these "conditions"? The peoples of the world must kneel before American capital, refuse from their national independence, to accept that form of government which impose American "advisors", introduce the "American way of life", develop only those branches of the economy and only to the extent that is pleasing and beneficial to the American monopolists (emphasis mine. - S.K.) ... In a word, the peoples must ... become subjects of the newly-made American empire.

Every honest person has a legitimate question: on what basis claim the United States to an exclusive position among other countries? Perhaps on the basis of the fact that they have a lot of gold acquired on blood and suffering of millions and bribeable? But nations do not trade freedom..."

At the time when one of Stalin's most brilliant associates uttered these words, neither he nor Stalin knew yet that, although the peoples did not trade in freedom, Russia would soon those who, having become adults, will be born right and left to trade in the freedom of peoples, betraying the historical future of their own and other peoples of the world.

And at the same time - to keep in Russia only those branches of the economy and only in those sizes, which are pleasing and beneficial to American and international monopolists.

Returning to 1951, we can say that Stalin's shares of Beria are already high - rose. But I repeat: trusting Beria with such important matters as the pre-October report in his absence, Stalin did not see him as his successor. The current "historians" are many

spread gossip that at the end of his life, Stalin allegedly did not trust Beria at all, that the so-called "Mingrelian case" inflated by these "historians" had as its goal the resignation and arrest of Beria, etc. All this, of course, is

nonsense! But I believe that Stalin was turned against Beria. No, Stalin did not deprive Lavrenty Pavlovich of his trust and even, on the contrary, clothed him with even greater trust - which I will say in my place. However, the grounds for sincere resentment against Stalin Beria sometimes had. He,

like Stalin, was strong as a statesman in many ways. He was also strong in that he was the only one of all Stalin's comrades-in-arms who had a full-fledged experience of large independent state activity as the first person. He

acquired it in those years when he was at the head of the Transcaucasian Regional Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, the Central Committee of the Communist Party Georgia and, at the same time, the Tiflis city committee. During the years he was leader Transcaucasia, Beria did for the Caucasus region, and above all for Georgia and Tbilisi, so much, as no one did either before him or after him in the entire history of these blessed ones, but very, alas, difficult places.

Neither Malenkov, nor Molotov, nor Zhdanov, nor Mikoyan, nor Voroshilov and Bulganin never independently led the countries. From top political leaders The USSR had a similar experience, except for Beria, only Kaganovich and Khrushchev had, at different times who served as First Secretary of the Central Committee of the CP(b)U, but Ukraine was a special case. On The Ukraine of its top leader has always been supported by a strong and numerous asset, Ukraine has always been the most industrially developed part of Russia. There a strong hand was required, but that personal independence was not required, which was essential for success in Transcaucasia. So in this respect, Beria is better than others. Stalin's assistants was prepared to lead the entire USSR.

Beria felt like Stalin's successor and was offended and expressed discontent out loud when Stalin preferred others. In the unspoken "speech" mentioned above, Poskrebyshv - without realizing it himself - testified in favor of Beria when he wrote:

"Beria sought ... to take Comrade during his lifetime. Stalin's place first deputy comrade. Stalin according to the Council of Ministers, believing that he alone is real successor to Comrade. Stalin.

When the decision to approve Comrade. Bulganin first deputy comrade. Stalin according to the Council of Ministers, then Beria was dissatisfied with this decision, characterizing Comrade Bulganin as poorly prepared and unable to cope with this work."

So, even after the arrest of Beria, Poskrebyshv admitted that Beria was not behind the scenes, not holding a fig in his pocket against Stalin, but openly, publicly, without fear that it will come to Stalin, considered himself his successor.

The question is, firstly, if a person cherishes some evil intent against his leader and prepares his secret death, he will blow "throughout Ivanovo" that he and should become the new leader? Secondly, will he openly take offense at the leader for criticism, stating, as Poskrebyshv reported, that he does not understand "why he is criticized so comrade Stalin, after all, he is a faithful student of comrade Stalin ..."?

Most importantly, Beria was absolutely right in assessing Bulganin, and even in comparison with Beria! Bulganin, after all, was indeed poorly prepared. And was unable fully cope with the work of Stalin's first deputy. In order to be convinced of this, no special work is needed - a few facts are enough. It was like this ... On April

7, 1950, the Politburo approved the formation of the Bureau Presidium of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, "entrusting him with the consideration of urgent issues current nature, as well as secret questions, "and at the direct suggestion of Stalin appointed Bulganin First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR.

The composition of the Bureau was approved as follows: Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR I.V.

Stalin, First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR N.A. Bulganin, Deputy Chairmen of the Council of Ministers of the USSR L.P. Beria, L.M. Kaganovich, A.I. Mikoyan, V.M. Molotov (April 15, 1950, G.M. Malenkov was introduced to the Bureau, and on August 30 1952 - also M.G. Pervukhin).

Preside over meetings of the Bureau and Presidium of the Council of Ministers in case of absence Stalin was supposed to be Bulganin alone. But already on February 16, 1951, it was necessary to one decision of the Politburo to entrust the chairmanship in such cases alternately on Bulganin, Beria and Malenkov. And even before that - formally "not in a legitimate way" - from December 6, 1950, the meetings of the Bureau almost constantly began to be held Beria. He led them on December 9, 12, 16, 18, 21, 26, 30 December 1950 and then on January 6, 13, 20, 1951, and only on January 30, 1951 Malenkov "illegitimately" replaced him, and only on 8 and 21 February - Bulganin. However, on February 27, Beria again presided - for the first time "legally", and then it went "mixed": Malenkov, Bulganin, Beria ...

And I do not rule out that Stalin then realized his mistake. Perhaps that is why he pre-October report of 1951 and instructed to do not someone else, but Beria. Until the spring of 1953, then there was still almost a year and a half.

At the beginning of this chapter, I quoted the book of the anti-Soviet Avtorkhanov "The Riddle of Death Stalin." Let me remind you that he started it like this:

"At the top of the pyramid of the Soviet partocracy there was not enough space for two criminal geniuses - for Stalin and Beria. Sooner or later one must was to yield to the other, or both perish in mutual struggle.

In a strange way, this statement turned out to be similar in its "message" and constructions with a later statement by a former major Soviet party leader Dmitry Shepilov. It was cited in a collection about him from the words of Shepilov's grandson, Dmitry Kosyrev:

"Two of the bloodiest Stalinist executioners grabbed the throne of Stalin - Beria and Khrushchev. The one who managed to shoot first won ... "

Contrary to the statement of Shepilov, who "joined them", Beria, unlike Khrushchev, did not have "executive" inclinations. Being, by the way, a good shooter, Beria is special had no passion for hunting and shooting. But Khrushchev, shooting excellently, simply loved to make accurate shot. Once a government cameraman successfully caught the moment when Khrushchev - already the First Secretary of the Central Committee - in front of the "comrades-in-arms" shoots at the air targets ... Taking aim, Khrushchev did not look like his usual self - where did the simulated kindness and kindness! Nikita's face was hard, cruel and merciless, and this was his true, though carefully concealed, face.

As for Shepilov's second assertion, it is also false and ahistorical. Beria is not I was going to shoot at no one, and at Khrushchev too. If he, by the way, was plotting this, then with his experience of operational KGB work back in the turbulent Transcaucasian years and later, with his acumen and organizational talent, with the Ministry of Internal Affairs, finally, available in his disposal, Beria is already with whom, with whom, but he would deal with Khrushchev jokingly! After all, Khrushchev did not enjoy popularity and special authority with any of the top management.

"Shot" Khrushchev. But even before he "shot" at Beria, he "shot" according to Stalin. However, without making the first "shot", it was impossible to make the second.

And the time for this vicious "shooting" was already approaching.

Chapter Nine

Autumn and winter 1952. XIX Congress and beyond ...

1952 was the year of the long-awaited party congress - the first post-war. Thirteen years, but what years! The Party Congress was not convened for a long time, but was it really necessary collect it in accordance with the formal statutory requirements at the moment when the immediate tasks of the party were extremely clear: first, win the war, then restore what was destroyed?

Now, enough problems have accumulated for discussion, and on Wednesday, August 20, 1952 The 235th issue of Pravda came out with a heading in the right corner:

"The Central Committee of the CPSU (b) decided to convene on October 5, 1952 regular 19th Congress of the CPSU(b).

Below went:

"For the information of all organizations of the CPSU (b). Plenum held in Moscow recently Central Committee of the CPSU (b). The Central Committee of the CPSU (b) decided to convene on October 5, 1952 regular 19th Congress of the CPSU(b).

The order of the day of the XIX

Congress: 1. Report of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) - Speaker Secretary Central Committee tov.

Malenkov G.M. 2, Report of the Central Audit Commission - speaker Chairman of the Audit Commission Comrade. Moskatov P.G.

3. Directives of the 19th Party Congress on the Fifth Five-Year Development Plan USSR for 1951-1955 - speaker Chairman of the State Planning Committee of the USSR comrade. Saburov M.Z.

4. Changes in the Charter of the CPSU (b) - speaker Secretary of the Central Committee Comrade. Khrushchev N.S. 5. Elections of the central organs of the party.

<...>

Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks I. Stalin "

So, the event was announced, and preparations began for it. Stalin finished his "Economic Problems" and supervised the preparation report of the Central Committee. The national republics, ministries, as well as individual delegates.

The control figures were finally stitched together in the Council of Ministers and the State Planning Committee of the USSR the five-year plan that has already begun ... However, this work was endless - already in the course of work Congress delegates from different union republics proposed - who are small, and who are not very small - adjustments in terms of priorities, in terms of funding, in terms of placement production infrastructure, etc., etc. The tasks were solved grandiose - one plan "Great construction projects of communism" what was it worth! - and to link everything once and for the whole five-year period was just impossible. Moreover, for the first time in the history of the USSR, almost equal the rate of production of means of production (group A) - 13%, and the production of items consumption (group B) - 11%. Everything was logical here - having created the basis for the growth of well-being, it was necessary to create this well-being. It was necessary to determine the pro development of the country

as a whole. So there was

enough work for everyone. On the eve of October 5, all this organizational pre-Congress colossus was in action, and the next morning in the Grand Kremlin Palace opened the first congress meeting. The new position of the USSR in the world was also expressed in the fact that there were delegations of communists from European countries of people's democracy, from China, Korea, Vietnam, Mongolia ... There were many delegations of communist parties from large and capitalist countries.

Malenkov and Moskatov made presentations ... The report of the Chairman of the Central Audit Commission Moskatov was "Technical", but the program was, of course, Malenkov's report. Many historians unanimously argue that Malenkov's speech itself, instead of Stalin "made him, under the living Stalin, the new first secretary, and maybe even sole leader in a narrow leadership" (Yu. Zhukov), was "obvious evidence the fact that it is Malenkov who is the formal successor to Stalin in the CPSU (b)" (Zh. Medvedev), etc. But these

interpretations are not, perhaps, worth a damn, because everything was obvious. The report of the Central Committee is not the report of the General Secretary of the Central Committee, but Central Committee report. Even thirteen years ago, Stalin, making this report in person, read out not only your own text. Also now, Malenkov read out the text on which he was working. many people, including Stalin, who was the final editor of the report. AND there was no secret for anyone.

Stalin could no longer stand on the podium for several hours and speak, and even then was now needed. So who was to read the report instead of him, if not Malenkov, who was the most prominent figure in the purely party leadership? Not Khrushchev! Accordingly, the role of Malenkov here was not "significant", as they are trying to do today. present "historians" as purely technical. And, for example, the words of the report that "Peaceful coexistence of capitalism and communism and cooperation are quite possible," belonged, of course, to Stalin. The report of the

Central Committee was traditionally divided into three parts: the international situation, the internal situation, and questions of party life. And in each part felt not just the presence of Stalin, but his conceptual primacy.

The report said:

"The position of the USSR in relation to the USA, England, France and other bourgeois states is clear ... even now the USSR is ready to cooperate with these States, bearing in mind the observance of peaceful international norms and ensuring a lasting and lasting peace ... The Soviet policy of peace and security of peoples proceeds from the fact that the peaceful coexistence of capitalism and communism and cooperation are quite possible...

Already now more sober and progressive politicians... not blinded anti-Soviet enmity, they clearly see into what abyss they are being dragged by presumptuous American adventurers, and begin to oppose the war ... Standing on this new path, European and other countries will meet with full understanding from all peace-loving countries..."

The report of the Central Committee also said that the economy of the United States and other Western countries is in stagnation ... At the same time, in the "internal" section, it was said about the stormy economic development of the USSR. Historian Yu. Zhukov is ironic about this, but it's true then it was. Even the United States, for the second time pumping gold, blood and sweat of the peoples at the expense of organized by the Golden Elite of the world war, were not able to support relatively high standards of mass consumption without the militarization of the economy and without constant replenishment from the outside, provided by the system operation of the rest of the world.

And the USSR has changed over the seven post-war years - it was no longer the ruins that determined the appearance its cities and villages in the former occupied territories. Gone are the first post-war famine years. The population grew rapidly, and children in an atmosphere of social uncertainty and pessimism are not willingly turned on. Universities graduated up to 200 thousand graduates per year, to which were added about 300 thousand new graduates of technical schools.

It was not, of course, the initiative of Malenkov and his open attack on corruption. IN as an example, the Ulyanovsk party organization was cited, where, as reported report of the Central Committee, "some of the economic, Soviet and party workers from the leading

the tops of the regional organization morally decomposed, embarked on the path of embezzlement, pilfering and plundering state property. The report stated:

“There was a well-known danger that the Party organs would be separated from the masses and transforming them from bodies of political leadership ... into a kind of administrative and administrative institutions ... <...> Parties are not needed hardened and indifferent officials who prefer personal peace of mind interests of the cause, and tireless and selfless fighters for the implementation of directives parties and governments that put the interests of the state above all...”

And further Malenkov declared: “At the helm of leadership in industry and agriculture economy, in the party and state apparatus there should be cultured people, experts in their field.”

Such motives could not be liked by the "partoplasm" - because they foreshadowed dashing days. Our external enemies could not like them either, as they foreshadowed dashing days that "partoplasm", on the basis of which in the USSR external enemies built far-reaching

calculations. These motives could not please Khrushchev either. Although there was no stone in Malenkov's rep in the "garden" Khrushchev alone, the thesis of the report on the need for smart leadership pretty infringed on Khrushchev's hypertrophied pride. And he infringed not only because Nikita Sergeevich's culture was rather weak, but also because in the spring of 1951 Secretary of the Central Committee and First Secretary of the Moscow Regional Committee Khrushchev seriously blundered. March 4 1951, he published in Pravda, as well as in the newspapers Moskovskaya Pravda and "Socialist agriculture" article "On construction and improvement in collective farms", where he proposed the mass resettlement of villages in large collective farm settlements such as "agrocities" and considered this as "the most important task of organizational and economic strengthening collective farms.

It is safe to say that the article was not written by Khrushchev. It can be assumed and why it was slipped to Khrushchev *by someone*. On the one hand, it was, speaking the language modern, "populist" step, designed to "set" Khrushchev's "points" before only among collective farmers near Moscow - after all, they were promised urban life in the countryside. With another side, it was clear in advance to the true initiators of such an article that Stalin Khrushchev will warm up strongly for, to put it mildly, untimely projecting. Stalin

Khrushchev warmed up - though not publicly. On April 2, 1951, it was accepted corresponding resolution of the Politburo. Khrushchev made excuses, but, knowing him vindictiveness, those who set him on fire could be sure that the extra “tooth” Khrushchev appeared on Stalin. And for some it was a positive, encouraging moment. After Malenkov, Saburov made a

keynote speech on the five-year plan. The reading of the draft directives under the five-year plan was lengthy, because the plan did not just impressed. The control figures depicted a qualitatively different country.

Then the debate began on the report of the Central Committee and the report of the Chairman of the State Planning Committee THE

USSR. Once upon a time, party congresses were held in an atmosphere, sometimes very tense and tough, which was understandable. Trotskyists, "Left" Zinovievites, "Right" Bukharinites, "working opposition", "new opposition", "Stalin's core of the Central Committee" - once all this determined the rigidity of the confrontation almost to fights. Now it was all in the past, and the tone The rank and file reports were no longer snooty.

Outwardly, everything looked decent: the secretaries of the republican Central Committees and regional committees, chairmen of the republican councils of ministers and union ministers ... Ukrainian secretary Melnikov, Azerbaijani Bagirov, Lithuanian Snechkus, Moldavian Brezhnev, Andrianov from Leningrad ... The “oil” minister spoke

Baibakov, Minister of Ferrous Metallurgy Tevosyan and Minister of Shipbuilding Malyshev, Marshal Vasilevsky and the writer Korneichuk ... With an extensive speech - in fact, with a program in the field of food policy, food and light industry - Mikoyan spoke.

Beria also spoke on October 7. I will not dwell on his speech in detail, limiting myself to a few remarks. Say, already known to us Abdurakhman Avtorkhanov writes that Beria delivered not only the largest speech at the congress, but also that it was the only living speech, filled, however, with "glorifications to Stalin." But this was not entirely true, because there were no doxologies in Beria's speech, but there were many talked about the successes of the national

republics. Also known to us, the historian Yuri Zhukov saw in Malenkov's report and speeches Beria some kind of hidden struggle between the "hawk" Beria and almost the "dove" Malenkov. However, this, of course, is not the case! Yes, Beria said that the US is "afraid of the world more than wars, although there is no doubt that, having unleashed a war, they only will hasten their downfall and their doom." But from whose mouth, if not from the lips of the head of the Soviet of the atomic project, America should have heard a very appropriate warning regarding the inappropriateness of military adventures against the USSR?

Beria's speech was great. However, Mikoyan's report was huge. Moreover, for all its loaded with numbers, even today it reads like a poem - they looked so seductive in it is the prospects that open up in the USSR not only for ordinary consumers, but also for fastidious gourmands.

The volume of Bulganin's report (by the way, very insipid) was also hardly less than that of Beria. And in terms of liveliness, Beria's speech was by no means an exception. Ekaterina Furtseva, then secretary of the Moscow City Party Committee, spoke very brightly and spoke, for example So:

"What kind of criticism and self-criticism can be discussed, say, in the Physical Institute of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, where 102 employees are related relations, and some of them are directly subordinate to each other.
from a friend?"

Furtseva told about such a case ... May 31, 1952 to the Ministry of River The USSR Navy received a letter from the USSR Gosnab with a request to move an important cargo. On June 5, the relevant head office prepared a response and handed it over to the deputy for signal Minister Vakhturov. Six days later, the answer returned to the headquarters with Vakhturov's visa: "Refresh" ...

To the laughter of the audience, Furtseva said: - The letter was "refreshed", 4 new visas were put in and again sent to the deputy minister ... However, Vakhturov returned it again, now eight days later, with a note: "Written

poorly." - The letter was "strengthened", - Furtseva continued the story, - they put 5 new visas, but a five days later the letter was returned crossed out.

And on June 30, Vakhturov's visa appeared on a new version: "To the Deputy Chief head office to Comrade Solovyov. I informed Gosnab about the measures taken by phone and letter We will not send.

"Thus," Furtseva concluded, "it took thirty days of fruitless correspondence, while the issue could be resolved within a few minutes ...

I will focus especially on the first of Stalin's speeches at the congress. No, no, "advanced" "Russian" "historians" need not worry - I did not report. Formally, Stalin spoke at the congress once - on October 14. However, even before the Congress heard in fact a Stalinist speech performed by his longtime assistant and Secretary A.N. Poskrebyshev.

At first glance, Poskrebyshev's speech was devoted to an important, but private

question - the need to strengthen party and state discipline. But let

The reader will judge for himself whether the head of the special sector of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks spoke about this only ... And whether he said it himself, on his own behalf, or Stalin spoke through his mouth.

So:

"We have, unfortunately, among the Party and Soviet workers (note that economic workers are not mentioned here. - S.K.) those who for some reason are sure that it is not they, but someone who is obliged to comply with the laws another, but that they themselves can circumvent the laws, violate or apply them according to discretion according to the principle: "The law that drew, where it turned, there and out." From such a very strange understanding of the laws, there is only one step to ... a crime. <...> Some leaders for some reason believe that criticizing only his subordinates are allowed, and subordinates, you see, have no right criticize your boss. This ... has nothing to do with partisanship. The leader ..., protecting himself from criticism, deliberately digs the abyss between themselves and the

masses <...>. Criticism and self-criticism is a powerful force that can do wonders if it skillfully use if it is applied honestly, openly, in the Bolshevik way. <...>.

Criticism and self-criticism are not respected only by people with a bad conscience, this either violators of party and state discipline, or contemptible cowards, or miserable townfolk, unworthy of wearing the high rank of a member parties..."

Of course, Poskrebyshchev himself could not say anything of the kind on his own initiative. would! After all, he did not speak at a district or regional party activist, but at a long-awaited the highest party assembly of the entire Soviet Union, in front of the entire communist the "head" of the planet, in the presence of Stalin

himself! Poskrebyshchev could never, in any way, show any serious initiatives are not even due to some of their personal qualities. Poskrebyshchev never and never in which he could not show any serious initiative, simply because if he once dared to do this, then all the same everyone would consider that the initiative comes from Comrade Stalin, and Poskrebyshchev is nothing more than a

performer. So it was said, of course, by Stalin. But if he said it himself, then the effect would be not only deafening, but also not the one that Stalin sought. After all, it was not yet everything that he said through the mouth of Poskrebyshchev, because even more formidable, weighty

and significant words:

"There are ... cases when some noble officials, abusing their power, inflict punishment for criticism, directly or indirectly subordinates are subjected to repression and persecution. (Further emphasis is mine. - S.K.) But everyone knows how severely our party and its The Central Committee, regardless of ranks, ranks, or past merits ... "

Could Poskrebyshchev say this - always emphatically modest, emphatically an inconspicuous and emphatically dependent person, in a public setting in a hall where in all the splendor and splendor of ranks, uniforms and awards, the entire party color was assembled

countries? Of course not! Stalin said it. But he spoke in such a way that, with all the menacing and the seriousness of the warning, it was not taken as a harbinger of new major purges in the party-state leadership and apparatus. Through

the mouth of Poskrebyshchev, Stalin did not threaten, did not frighten. He warned. But warned seriously and, as always, in Stalin's style. That is, first of all,

with restraint - that's why he instructed to say what was said to another. Secondly - weighty.

And there was no doubt that all the selfish "partoplasm" - both sitting in the hall, and operating outside its walls - understood Stalin correctly.

And how could she not understand him, if Stalin spoke on this subject not for the first time. And not even in the second ... So, on April 13, 1928, at a meeting of the Moscow activists organization of the CPSU (b), he devoted a separate section of the report to self-criticism, saying, in particular, here's what:

"I know that there are people in the ranks of the party who do not like criticism in general, self-criticism in particular. These people ... grumble: ... they say ... is it possible let us live in peace?... I think, comrades, that we need self-criticism as air is like water... <...> The

slogan of self-criticism was especially strongly developed after the 15th Congress parties. Why? Because after the 15th Congress, which liquidated the opposition ... party may be in danger of resting on its laurels... And what does it mean to rest on laurels? This means putting an end to our forward movement. And in order to prevent this from happening, we need self-criticism, ... honest, open, Bolshevik ... "

However, these were so far general words ... But Stalin further said something more specific:

"...Finally, there is one more circumstance pushing us to self-criticism. I have in mind the question of the masses and the leaders. <...>. Of course, the fact that we a group of leaders has been created who have risen too high and have great authority - this fact is in itself a great achievement of our parties. It is clear that without such an authoritative group of leaders it is impossible to run a big country. But the fact that the leaders, moving up, are moving away from the masses ... cannot but create a certain danger of separation of the leaders from the masses and the distance of the masses from the leaders.

This danger can lead to the fact that the leaders can become conceited and recognize themselves infallible..."

And now this hardly guaranteed a quiet life for many of the "leaders" who wanted to rest not only on laurels, but also on soft beds. Although at that time Stalin emphasized that it is not a matter of changing leaders, but of preserving them by "organizing a permanent and unbreakable contact between them and the masses.

Six years passed, and on January 26, 1934, in the report to the XVII Congress of the CPSU (b), the General Secretary of the Central Committee was already tougher, starting the topic like this:

"As regards the selection of people and the removal of those who did not justify themselves, I would like to say a few words. In

addition to the incorrigible bureaucrats and clerks, about the elimination which we have no disagreements, we have two more types of workers who hinder our work, interfere with our work ... " ..

About the first type, Stalin said this:

"One type of workers are people with well-known merits in the past, people who have become nobles, people who believe that party and Soviet laws written not for them, but for fools. These are the same people who do not consider their obligation to carry out the decisions of the party and government, and which thus destroy the foundations of party and state discipline. What are they

calculated by violating Party and Soviet laws? They hope that The Soviet government will not dare to touch them because of their old merits. These arrogant nobles think they are irreplaceable... What to do with such workers? Their should not hesitate to remove from leadership positions, regardless of their merits in past ... This is necessary in order to knock down arrogance from these arrogant nobles-bureaucrats and put them in their place ... "

And then Stalin spoke about the second type of unfit workers, whom he called "honest talkers", and with purely Stalinist humor he complained:

"And when you remove such talkers from their posts ... they shrug their hands and they are perplexed: "Why are we being filmed? Haven't we done all the things necessary for the cause, haven't we gathered a rally of drummers, haven't we proclaimed the slogans of the party and the government at the conference of shock workers. Is we didn't elect the entire composition of the Politburo of the Central Committee to the honorary presidium, didn't we send greetings to Comrade Stalin - what else do you want from us?"

These Stalin also recommended that they be removed from leadership positions - in 1934. Through three years, in 1937, it was not always possible to limit oneself only to removal from posts ...

Perhaps the reader has already noticed the undoubted textual similarity of Stalin's speeches in 1934 and Poskrebyshev in the year 1952, and perhaps not. But as far as "partoplasmic" "leaders" of the 1952 model, then they noticed him.

And if someone would not even notice, then the referents immediately pay attention to this similarity The "boss" would have been turned. Here, they say, is what Alexander Nikolayevich Poskrebyshev said, and this is what is said on pages 369-372 of the thirteenth volume of Comrade Stalin's works, published a year ago.

And if the referents had overlooked something, then those changes in the leadership of the party that occurred after the congress would have caused serious reflection even not very distant of people. But more on that later.

The 19th Congress of the CPSU(b) ended on October 14, 1952. According to the chairman's report Gosplan Saburov, he adopted directives on the fifth five-year plan for the development of the USSR for 1951-1955, and according to Khrushchev's report on changes in the Charter of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, in particular, it was decided to rename the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Some of the modern researchers, for example, Rudolf Balandin, see in this decision a certain desire of Stalin belittle the status of the party, relegating it with such a name to the level of almost allied ministries. However, everything was clearly explained by what it was explained at the congress. The presence of the letter "b" in parentheses in the name nevertheless became an anachronism, which caused the need to rename. And the new name of the party turned out to be even more significant - if we talk about the external impression.

Stalin spoke at the congress at its very end - October 14, with a closing speech. At the same time, he "did not please", for example, the historian Yu.N. Zhukov in that instead of "to sum up," as Yu. Zhukov writes, "the result of an implicit, hidden discussion," he said short speech, which the same Zhukov assessed as "far from pressing concerns, from the real situation of the country, from the struggle in the narrow leadership ... "It was given to the current historians, this "struggle in a narrow leadership"! Well, what was this "fight" for? The working day of each member of the "narrow leadership" was always filled with "under tie." They did not give an extra state dacha. And if someone "won" in the "struggle for power", then getting two or three extra sectors of the economy under one's hand did not mean acquiring controlling stakes, marrying supermodels and swimming in the waves Mediterranean Sea. And everything necessary for a normal life and work is "narrow leadership" and so it was. There was a squabble, but - at the level of the environment of the "narrow leadership".

As for Stalin's speech at the congress, it was delivered not only with regard to the new, quite real, situation in the USSR, but also became an underlined demonstration of this new provisions. Speaking about the celebration of the 70th anniversary of Stalin, I wrote that it is not may not have been an international event. Three years later, the 19th Congress the Soviet communists, all the more, could not but be the most important event for all leftist forces on the planet.

Stalin emphasized this new position of the CPSU and the USSR, speaking in the spirit that all progressive people in the world can regard the CPSU and the USSR as their "advanced brigade, which is at the forefront of the movement towards a just and humane way of life.

At the congress, a commission was formed to revise the party program. It included: I.V. Stalin - chairman, L.P. Beria, L.M. Kaganovich, O.V. Kuusinen, G.M. Malenkov, V.M. Molotov, P.N. Pospelov, A.M. Rumyantsev, M.Z. Saburov, D.I. Chesnokov, P.F. Yudin.

As you can see, Beria was on the commission, everyday ideological issues unoccupied, but there was no "clean" party leader Khrushchev. It was hardly random, and it is unlikely that this pleased Khrushchev and the Khrushchevites. But it wasn't about the behind-the-scenes intrigues, but in the fact that Stalin gradually put Nikita Sergeevich in his "rightful" place an operational officer who can still quite energetically deal with current deeds, but nothing more. That is, regarding Khrushchev's business qualities, Stalin no longer was mistaken. However, he, alas, was tragically mistaken about personal qualities.

Khrushchev. But Khrushchev's position did not seem to be such an important problem. Main the personnel results of the congress turned out - after it the leading core of the CPSU became younger and expanded.

The Plenum of the Central Committee, held on October 16, 1952, elected instead of the old Politburo of the Central Committee VKP(b) the new Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU in such an unprecedented number of members: V.M. Andrianov, A.B. Aristov, L.P. Beria, N.A. Bulganin, K.E. Voroshilov, S.D. Ignatiev, L.M. Kaganovich, D.S. Korotchenko, V.V. Kuznetsov, O.V. Kuusinen, G.M. Malenkov, V.A. Malyshev, L.G. Melnikov, A.I. Mikoyan, N.A. Mikhailov, V.M. Molotov, M.G. Pervukhin, P.K. Ponomarenko, M.Z. Saburov, I.V. Stalin, M.A. Suslov, N.S. Khrushchev, D.I. Chesnokov, N.M. Shvernik, M.F. Shkiryatov. Candidates for members of

the Presidium were: L.I. Brezhnev, A.Ya. Vyshinsky, A.G. Zverev, N.G. Ignatov, I.G. Kabanov, A.N. Kosygin, N.S. Patolichev, N.M. Pegov, A.M. Puzanov, I.T. Tevosyan, P.F. Yudin. Together with the candidate members,

the Presidium of the Central Committee was expanded to 36 people, and proposed such composition Stalin. At the same time, at the suggestion of Stalin for operational to resolve issues, a Bureau of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU, not provided for by the Charter, was created: Beria, Bulganin, Voroshilov, Kaganovich, Malenkov, Pervukhin, Saburov, Stalin and Khrushchev.

The secretariat of the Central Committee, proposed, again, by Stalin, looked like this: Aristov, Brezhnev, Ignatov, Malenkov, Mikhailov, Pegov, Ponomarenko, Stalin, Suslov, Khrushchev.

What the reader has just read can be learned today from many, including quite accessible sources. But what he now has to read, "Russian" "historians" do not bring to the attention of the reader. The thing is, for some reason

The archives do not contain a transcript of the October 1952 Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU, at which passed all the above appointments. Personally, I'm sure it's just destroyed after the double murder of Stalin and Beria, and now the "historians" have the opportunity to maliciously distort the atmosphere of that plenum, arguing, in particular, that Stalin allegedly did not leave a living place from Molotov and Mikoyan, after which de their final "disgrace".

Fortunately, a delegate to the 19th Congress, then a 40-year-old member of the Central Committee of the CPSU, Leonid Nikolayevich Efremov, recorded Stalin's speech at the plenum, which was the first published in 1998 in Efremov's book "Roads of Struggle and Labor". November 16, 2005

year, it was clarified with the author and published in the 18th volume of the Collected Works of I.V. Stalin, published by the prominent Marxist scholar Richard Ivanovich Kosolapov.

I will give this recording of Stalin's speech in its most significant fragments:

"So, we held a party congress. It went well, and many can it seems that we have a complete unity. However, we do not have such unity. Some express disagreement with our decisions.

They say: why did we significantly expand the composition of the Central Committee? But isn't it clear that new forces had to be poured into the Central Committee? We old people will die, but we need to to think to whom, in whose hands we will hand over the baton of our great cause. Who will carry it forward? This requires younger, more dedicated people, politicians. And what does it mean to raise a political, statesman? For this great effort is needed. It will take ten years, no, all fifteen years, to educate a statesman.

But desire alone is not enough. Cultivate ideologically steadfast statesmen can only be in practical affairs ... "

In fact, Stalin here continued the thoughts that were expressed by him in "Economic problems", but then he said even more interestingly:

"They ask why we dismissed prominent ministers from important posts. party and government officials. What can be said about this? We dismissed ministers Molotov, Kaganovich, Voroshilov and others and replaced them with new workers. Why? On what basis? Job being a minister is a man's job. It requires great strength, specific knowledge and health. That is why we have released some distinguished comrades from occupied posts and appointed new, more qualified, enterprising workers in their place. They are young people, full of strength and energy...

As for the prominent political and statesmen themselves, they remain prominent political and statesmen..."

And then Stalin spoke about Molotov and Mikoyan. From politicians of the first row only they did not enter the Bureau of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU - Stalin at the plenum on October 16 seriously criticized. But this did not mean for them - as they say "democratic" "researchers" - a complete fall and close repression almost to execution.

According to some recollections, Stalin's speech, free and frank, lasted an hour and a half without a break. It is unlikely that this was the case in reality, and the reason was not in health problems - Stalin's was far from perfect, but not out of hand either bad. It's just that the system itself and the meaning of Stalin's speech at the plenum did not imply very a long conversation. But the meaning of what he said was so serious and weighty that for him time was compressed to the audience, and they no longer noticed its course. Extra confirmation such a statement of mine may be reminiscences recorded by a participant in the congress and plenum writer Konstantin Simonov after 27 years. Simonov recalled: "And the tone of his speech, and the way he spoke, his eyes fixed on the hall, - all this led those sitting to some kind of numbness."

Simonov, although later he tried Stalin (and, by the way, Beria) more than once, had the personal scale is immeasurably smaller than those whom he condemned with a tip. And in describing the atmosphere of the plenum, he - as a "master of the pen" - thickened the colors. But Stalin really he spoke harshly, especially when he "got personal":

"It is impossible not to touch on the misbehavior of some prominent politicians if we are talking about unity in our affairs. I mean Comrades Molotov and Mikoyan.

Molotov is a man devoted to our cause. Call, and I have no doubt that he will not hesitate to give up his life for the party. But you can not pass by his unworthy deeds..."

Stalin blamed Molotov for three very real sins of his: supporting the claims of Soviet Jews to the Crimea, leaking important state secrets to the West through Molotov's wife and Molotov's favorable attitude towards proposal of the British ambassador "to publish in our country bourgeois newspapers and magazines..."

The first two sins were old and date back to 1944 and 1949. The third one is more fresh - had a background dating back to 1945. Then Molotov also inadvertently hinted to a correspondent from the United States that the Soviet The Union could weaken the censorship regime "on terms of reciprocity", and Stalin was just angry. On December 5, 1945, he sent a cipher from the south, first to Molotov, Beria, Mikoyan and Malenkov, and on December 6 - only to Malenkov, Beria and Mikoyan, where reprimanded all three for their "naivete", criticized Molotov and wrote:

"I am convinced that Molotov does not really value the interests of our state and the prestige of our government, if only to achieve popularity among some foreign circles. I can no longer count such a comrade his first deputy. I am sending

this cipher only to you three. I did not send it to Molotov, because I do not believe in the conscientiousness of some people close to him (emphasis mine. - S.K.). I ask you to call Molotov to me, read this telegram of mine to him in full, but do not send copies to him.

Now history was repeating itself, but everything was more complicated - Molotov was knocked out of the "iron" working "clip" and, as they say, "floated". Not without reason, back in 1945, Stalin doubted his environment. In addition, Molotov's wife Polina Zhemchuzhina, until May 1948 the head of the Main Directorate of the Textile and Haberdashery Industry of the Ministry of Light Industry of the RSFSR, in January 1949 she was arrested and in December 1949 she was sentenced to five years of exile, moreover, for the cause. As a result, Molotov's life was unsettled, and this did not add optimism to him. On the other hand, he often and extensively traveled abroad, to the United States, and unwittingly fell under "the discreet charm of the bourgeoisie". Indeed, in the slums of the western cities of Vyacheslav They didn't take Mikhailovich - for nothing, that in general all the impoverished regions of the planet were then already possible was considered the "backyard" of the West and the United States.

There were also problems with Mikoyan, who was also no stranger to skepticism towards the prospects of the USSR in comparison with the windows of the central avenues of New York. That's why Stalin did not forget to personally commemorate with an unkind word Anastas Ivanovich, an old but very perishing quirky his colleague.

However, even after Stalin's criticism, Mikoyan and Molotov remained "in business." 27th October 1952, by the Decree of the Bureau of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU, Molotov was assigned "Observation of the work of all types of transport, the Ministry of Communications and the Commission of the Central Committee for relations with foreign communist parties", and on Mikoyan - "leadership of the work of all types ministries: food industry, meat and dairy industry and fish industry". It was not so little - if you want to work seriously.

Kliment Efremovich Voroshilov did not fall out of the top leadership "clip".

In the entry of L.N. Efremov there is a description of that now famous moment when Stalin, after a proposal from his place to elect him again as General Secretary of the Central Committee, was very insistently - twice - asked to be released from the duties of Secretary General Central Committee, and from the duties of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, saying: "I am already old. No papers I read. Choose another secretary."

The starting point of the perverted description of this, emotionally really

saturated moment in various authors such as Radzinsky was, most likely, an "artistic" description of it by Konstantin Simonov. He painted and the "expressively raised hands" of the objecting Malenkov, and the "terrible expression" of his supposedly mortally frightened face, but was hardly accurate in his "memoirs".

One way or another, after the protests of Malenkov, Beria and Marshal Timoshenko, it is reasonable who declared that "the people will not understand this," Stalin no longer asked to resign, he stood for a long time, looking at the audience applauding him, then waved his hand and sat down.

And even before that, he read out those proposals on expanded composition of the Presidium of the Central Committee and the Secretariat of the Central Committee, which were the Plenum accepted and which I have already cited above.

After reading them, Stalin noticed that all members of the Politburo were on the list. of the old composition, except for Andreev, and added: "Regarding respected comrade Andreeva, everything is clear: he is completely deaf, he can't hear anything, he can't work. Let him heal." Andreev, however, lived until 1971, having died at the age of

76. Stalin's attempt to get away from the formal leadership is presented today - not without the influence of Simonov's later "memoirs" - as a kind of "Jesuit" probing move the true state of affairs and moods in the "top". But Stalin - no doubt - was sincere. After all, he would still remain Stalin and continue to be final arbitrator in all disputes, and besides ...

In addition, in this way he would almost automatically provide himself with the option imminent "withdrawal to Soviet power" by moving to the legal heads of state.

But Semyon Konstantinovich Timoshenko was also right - the people would not understand this. Necessary there was some time to wait - at least until the next session of the Supreme Council.

They cast a shadow on a clear day and in the question of the expanded list of the Presidium of the Central Committee proposed by Stalin. In Khrushchev's "memoirs" it is explicitly stated that Stalin alone could not know the majority of those whom he proposed to elect, and that no one supposedly unknown "newcomers" were not recommended to Stalin either by Khrushchev or, in Khrushchev's words, by Malenkov

and Beria. Memoirs are generally rarely a reliable source, although they have to be studied. But what As for Khrushchev's "memoirs", how clearly the low cultural level of their nominal "author", and the very nature of these "memoirs" convinces me personally of almost their complete falsification. "Memoirs" Khrushchev, in my opinion, are not stupid constructed element of psychological warfare against socialism. It's not always is simply provable, but in this case the lie of Khrushchev and his "co-authors" is set to a rarity is easy - a simple nominal analysis of the social situation for the autumn of 1952 of all those recommended by Stalin. All of them - without exception - one way or another could not help but be within Stalin's direct line of sight.

But it was, so to speak, the leading "extras". An equally important circumstance after the congress, the Plenum of the Central Committee formed the "leading five": Beria, Bulganin, Malenkov, Stalin, Khrushchev. Beria was

in first place here, Khrushchev was in last. But it was all explained only the order of the letters of the alphabet with which their surnames began.

And at the very end of 1952 - December 30 - it was 30 years since the formation THE USSR. But there were no special celebrations on this occasion, only Pravda published Poskrebyshchev's article "The Great Multinational State". However,

suddenly there was no time for anniversaries - events began to accelerate. The internal political situation was tied into a strange but tight knot. Already in the book previously mentioned R.K. Balandin "Malenkov" quite rightly noted that report by Malenkov (it would be more accurate to say: the report of Stalin, Malenkov, and also - in one or otherwise - the rest of the members of the Politburo and a number of employees of the apparatus of the Central Committee) had to reinforce hidden anti-Stalinist sentiments among the party nomenklatura, since

Stalin stopped corrupt tendencies and forced leaders of all levels to work hard with relatively little benefits. It was really so -

R.K. Balandin only forgot to add that the speech Poskrebysheva turned out to be even more "significant" in this regard. And since the "eternal" battle given once again to the "partoplasm" at the congress and plenum, Stalin was inclined turn into a serious political battle, hidden anti-Stalinist sentiments among the party nomenklatura should not only be strengthened, but acquire a special intensity. The accumulated passions and ambitions - malicious, petty, philistine, consumerist - had to find their logical outlet.

And the logical solution was the death of Stalin.

Chapter Ten

Winter of 1952/53... What were the "tops" of Soviet Jewry afraid of...

The Gospel of Matthew (ch. 21, verse 12) tells us: "And Jesus entered into the temple of God, and he drove out all those who sold and bought in the temple, and overturned the tables of the money changers ... "

In the Gospel of John (ch. 3, verse 18) it says: "The Jews told him in Answer: By what sign will You prove to us that You have authority to do this?"

Stalin was not Jesus, but he also did not tolerate merchants in the temple. On the other hand, Jews and in the USSR remained Jews. This is not "anti-Semitism", this is just a statement fact. But sometimes very ambiguous consequences followed from this fact ...

Unfortunately, I do not have the opportunity to quote the full text of the special reports of the Minister of State Security S.D. Ignatiev, which is placed in collection of documents "Lubyanka. Stalin and the MGB of the USSR. March 1946 - March 1953, published by with a circulation of 2000 copies in 2007. This is special message No. 1880 / and dated January 5, 1952 on the completion of the investigation into the case of the anti-Soviet terrorist organization, consisting of Jewish youth, occupies 14 pages of dense text in the collection. However, one I will give an excerpt from this report by Ignatiev in the chapter "13th GRU Department". Now it's just I will say that what has been called the "struggle against cosmopolitanism" had deep objective grounds. Not alien, alas, to excesses, in fact, this struggle has become a struggle with internal Jewish nationalism, after the formation of Israel, more and more approaching American and Israeli Zionism.

I suggest that everyone who wants to think honestly, think about at least three of these destinies.

Member of the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee Wolf Wilensky was born in 1919 in Kovno (Kaunas). He was a member of the Left Zionist Youth Organization in Lithuania "Ga-Shomer Ha-Tsair". Since 1940, he served in the Red Army, fought as part of the Lithuanian Rifle division, was a battalion commander. May 24, 1945 by the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the USSR he was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. After the war he graduated from Honors Academy. Frunze.

And then? And then the author of the book "Stalin and the Jews" Arno Lustiger reports that when in September 1983, an El Al aircraft with Vilensky on board landed in In Tel Aviv, many of his comrades-in-arms (!), wearing orders on civilian jackets, greeted their former commander. And a few years later, Vilensky died, being general in the Israeli army. Polina

Gelman was born in 1919 in Berdichev. Studied in Gomel, graduated flying club, studied at Moscow State University. Fought in the famous 46th Taman Guards Women's regiment of night bombers, from May 15, 1946 - Hero of the Soviet Union.

In 1976, former professor of the Academy of Social Sciences under the Central Committee of the CPSU Gelman first came to Israel, where she met with fighting (!) comrades. When she visited Israel in March 1998 as a guest of honor, the commander of the Israeli Air Force General Eitan Ben Eliahau showed her the latest aircraft.

Yevsey Vainrub was born in 1909 in Belarus, in Novy Borisov. served career commander in the Red Army, fought, became a general of tank troops, Hero of the Soviet Union. In 1995 he left for Israel, where he met many of his former brother-soldiers (!). Eat a photo where he was taken with the Israeli Minister of Absorption Yair Tsaban.

And these are only the most striking and striking examples, my dear reader. People were born on the land where their fathers, grandfathers, great-grandfathers and ancestors were born. They grew up on this land, grew up, learned ... This land raised them to considerable heights. Yes, they had merit before her. But does the Motherland reward all its faithful sons according to their merits? At some point, these people leave - physically, legally and spiritually - their Motherland and fall at the feet of some other "homeland" - "spiritual". Well,

let's say that this is their right - albeit doubtful for many. But can they really - no matter how they shake off her ashes from their soles - Motherland count them trustworthy of its citizens, trust them? Trust not something serious, but anything at all? Moreover, such renegades betray

not only their homeland! They actually betray and their fellow tribesmen who remain faithful to their true homeland! Colonel-General of Tank Troops, twice Hero of the Soviet Union David Dragunsky was born in 1910 in Bryansk. At twenty he became a Bolshevik, at 23 he became a commander Red Army, in 1938 he fought on Khasan, and then valiantly won the war, commanded for 15 years Higher command courses "Shot". He was a faithful son of the Motherland, but someone else's betrayal indirectly - without his fault - deer after all, and him. He had two Gold Hero Stars, but Vilensky, Gelman and Yevsey Vainrub, taken together, there were three of them.

Yes, renegades of other nationalities also emigrate to a foreign land, but at the same time, as a rule, they do not consider their new place of residence to be their homeland.

I do not intend to develop my idea further and confine myself to a simple statement: Stalin at the turn of 1952-1953, enough specific information has accumulated to in order to take against precisely Jewish nationalism - as the most dangerous in all respects - tough preventive measures.

At the same time, there could be no question of any mass deportations, the creation of special concentration camps for Soviet Jews, rumors about which are full of "works" of "democratic" "researchers" who never operate with anything other than these rumors, and never presenting any, even the most dubious, documents on this score. Even such an energetic author in exposing "Stalinist anti-Semitism" as Arno Lustiger, was unable to confirm these rumors with anything other than a "confession worker of the Central Committee N. Polyakov" from the book by Zinoviy Sheinis, published in Moscow in 1992.

There could be no talk of some kind of mass "personnel repression". If a Jew was just an engineer, he would have remained just an engineer. The chief engineer of the plant, a Jew, with a careful approach to personnel policy, would remain in his post when he was really the best organizer of engineering work in his field.

enterprise. After all, the situation developed in such a way that the "percentage norms" really it was necessary to change. Say, in the fall of 1948, the situation with the teaching the composition of the departments of social sciences in the universities of the USSR was approximately as follows:

Кафедры	Процент по национальности			
	русские	украинцы	евреи	другие
Философии	43,6	13,6	22,2	20,6
Марксизма-ленинизма	50,6	10,5	19,8	19,1
Истории СССР	48,0	11,0	13,0	28,0

And for example, at the Institute of Economics of the USSR Academy of Sciences, out of 83 senior researchers there were: 44 Russians, 34 Jews, 5 - other nationalities.

But any "percentage" measures would affect no more than one or two percent of this a national group that does not constitute even one percent of the total population

countries. By the way, Moscow at the turn of the 40s and 50s and in the early 50s severely suppressed all kinds of active nationalism, primarily Ukrainian and Lithuanian, flooded native lands with blood. However, active Jewish nationalism was especially dangerous.

Firstly, the social composition of this kind of nationalists and their social status was, as a rule, immeasurably higher than the status of Ukrainian "Gritsko" and Lithuanian "Gediminasov". At the same time, it was necessary to take into account not only the directly guiding cadres, but also cadres of advisers, referents, assistants, consultants, etc.

Secondly, these nationalists considered as their own not the land on which acted, and the land of a distant hot country, completely tied by all its interests in the most powerful enemy of Russia - American capital.

The objective information of the Soviet special services unequivocally testified to the total growth of all types of subversive and intelligence work of the West, and before of the whole USA, against the USSR. And the most promising and influential channels for carrying out such work were Jewish.

This, of course, is not about all Soviet Jews. Although to Israel in one way or another soul stretched many Jews - citizens of the Soviet Union, active nationalism pro-Israeli (that is, one way or another - and pro-American) sense was still struck a minority of them. Therefore, Stalin's actions in the early 50s could and did frighten first of all, the "tops" of Soviet Jewry.

And here the interests of two, if not three or four, powerful forces were affected at once. Firstly, the interests of the above-mentioned "tops" themselves were painfully hurt and the less influential environment. Despite the purges of the 30s, even in the early 50s it was enough to look at the surname lists of the Soviet "tops" and their entourage in science, in management - state and economic, and especially - in the field of formation social atmosphere, that is, in the literary "workshop", in the press, cinema, stage to understand how great was the influence of the Jews in Soviet society. In there would be, perhaps, nothing bad, if it were not for the undoubted, even outwardly manifesting, sympathy for the West, for Israel, for the United States. For example, demobilized poet-translator M.D. Zisman from Kyiv spoke in a narrow circle:

"The Soviet Union is a lying country, a country of darkness and horror. Everything in the USSR are in bondage. Serfdom prevails. Our people live worse than serfs. The Communist Party is a party of self-seekers ... I wanted them to fly American "flying fortresses" and English "Lancasters" and swept off the face of the earth Ukrainian-anti-Semitic nest - Kyiv.

Similar words, uttered then in most drinking companies in the USSR,

would have cost Zisman not even a call to the local department of the MGB, but a broken blood physiognomy. However, in a very specific environment, they met with sympathy. At the same time, many influential Soviet Jews had influential relatives abroad. Yes, not only Jews had relatives abroad, but also Latvians, Lithuanians, Armenians ... However representatives of these and other peoples of the USSR did not even have that influence on life huge country, which was possessed by the Soviet Jewish elite. So don't 'bloody purges', but some personnel purges in the form of assignment to the reserve, resignation, retirement, withdrawal from sensitive organizations, transfer to "grassroots" work were, alas, necessary.

However, all these measures also affected the interests of powerful external forces, starting with Golden Elite of the world and ending with the secret services of the West. They were deprived of channels in the USSR information and channels of influence. At the same time, the Soviet Jewish "tops", in fact, betrayed, as already mentioned, the "bottom" of Soviet Jews. The actions and sympathies of the "tops" cast a shadow

over the "bottoms". The knot by the beginning of 1953 was tied tightly, and it had to be untied. So accidentally at the end of January 1953, Molotov's wife Polina Zhemchuzhina, whose last name was Russified version of her Jewish surname Pearl, was again arrested in exile and transferred to Moscow.

On the one hand, Zhemchuzhina-Pearl possessed undoubted reserves of Soviet patriotism and anti-Stalinist was not - on the contrary, her behavior after 1953 (she died in 1970) proves otherwise.

On the other hand, she knew a lot - suffice it to say that during her stay Golda Meir in Moscow, both women often met and had long conversations in Yiddish. A Jewish doctors arrested in the "doctors' case" pointed to Zhemchuzhina as a Jewish nationalist.

Nevertheless, it was very likely that in a situation where it would be necessary to choose between loyalty to "blood" and loyalty to the Soviet Union and the party, Zhemchuzhina chose would be the second. And then many, still unclear, "chains" could be continued further and further. And the pieces of the "mosaic" could begin to take shape for the MGB and Stalin into a kind of picture.

This possible perspective also aggravated and dynamized the situation.

The "doctors' case" led to Zhemchuzhina, however, quite sincere Zhemchuzhina's confessions could lead further not only the "doctors' case", although it spoke to himself about

many things. This "case" in its "democratic" version can be stated extremely briefly So. In the bowels of the MGB of the USSR, an idea arose to falsify a certain conspiracy of the group leading Soviet doctors responsible for the health of state leaders, and make them responsible for the death of A.S. Shcherbakov and A.A. Zhdanov, allegedly intentionally euthanized by knowingly wrong treatment. "Manic paranoid" (or "paranoid maniac"?) Stalin seized on this fiction. And as a result, not only a good name, but the lives of innocent people turned out to be hanging in the balance. Stalin, by all means, accelerated the "investigation" of this completely fictitious "case" and set strict deadlines: trial of doctors on March 5-7, execution (according to earlier the mentioned "employee of the Central Committee N. Polyakov" - at the Lobnoye Mesto) on March 11-12.

Arno Lustiger, for example, describing the alleged origins of the "case of doctors", reports that in At the beginning of 1952, Stalin's doctor V.N. Vinogradov "fell out of favor, as he recommended dictator to completely withdraw from political activity in order to save heavily broken health." And "the paranoid Stalin interpreted this as an attempt to deprive him of power and threatened Minister of State Security S.D. Ignatiev, that the fate of V.S. Abakumov, if he does not expose the behind-the-scenes leaders of the conspiracy of doctors. From that, they say, it began ... Yes, and the denunciation of M.D. Ryumin on Abakumov, where they talked about confederate doctor Etinger, who died during the investigation, also came in handy ...

Unfortunately, not a single honest book has been written about the "doctors' case", although only for period since the bad memory of 1991, many documents have been published, moreover, by "democratic" historians, making at least doubt the truth the versions above.

Having no intention of writing such a book, I will give below only some facts related to this "case", the sources of which will be the works or collections of documents, the authors or compilers of which are exceptionally loyal to the "victims Stalin" and completely disloyal to Stalin himself.

As a kind of epigraph to this "case" I will cite Stalin's resolution on note of the Deputy Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR A.Ya. Vyshinsky on the death of the People's Artist USSR Boris Shchukin, who died on the night of October 7, 1939, and about the organization his state funeral.

Shchukin was an outstanding actor, brilliantly played the role of Lenin, and Stalin on the note Vyshinsky wrote:

"I vote for, but I would like to know who treated Schukin, why they didn't tell us about his illness, about the nature of the illness, etc.? I propose to investigate this matter. without noise, entrusting the investigation personally to Vyshinsky and Beria. I. Stalin.

Whether such an investigation was carried out then or not, I do not know. But the very fact that Stalin purely business, not intended for prying eyes, the document expressed a similar doubt, which says something. Is not it? And in the course of working on this book, I found in memoirs of Mikhail Romm, who made two of the most significant films about Lenin - "Lenin in October" and "Lenin in 1918" (both names belong, by the way, to Stalin) - interesting additional information. Romm writes: "Already in the

painting "Lenin in October," Shchukin often complained about his health. On "Lenin" in 1918" he got even worse. Shchukin's liver constantly hurt ... He always complained about his heart, and he was considered suspicious; doctors believed that the heart had nothing to do with it, but they treated the liver. Subsequently, it turned out that Shchukin was right - he some defect in cardiac activity, resulting in swelling of the liver. Treat something I needed a heart, not a liver ... "

I hope the reader will appreciate the full significance of this evidence a little later - when get acquainted with how someone "treated" someone in Moscow later. premature Shchukin's death could be attributed to the category of absurd accidents ... But remember that in response to Budyonny's lamentations about the "absurd" death of Artyom (Sergeev), Stalin remarked: "If an accident has political consequences, then such an accident requires take a closer look."

But the "unexpected" death of Shchukin also had considerable political consequences, for Shchukin was then more than just a great actor, as can be seen from the following passage memoirs of M.I. Romma:

"Two months after our conversation, B.V. Shchukin, my favorite actor, ... a wonderful, deep person, a real great Russian talent, ... all of a sudden

died. ... Shchukin's death put an end to my work on the Lenin series ... more Lenin paintings were conceived ... Before Shchukin's death, I dreamed of making biography of Lenin in 5-6 scenes. But I don't have any other actor in the role of Lenin could imagine..."

Shchukin really delved into the image of Lenin in such a way that, for example, who knew and perfectly copying Lenin - to the pleasure of Lenin himself - Manuilsky, for the first time Hearing Shchukin's "Leninist" laugh, his face changed. Seen all kinds and familiar

to everything "Mosfilm" extras at the first entrance of Shchukin-"Lenin" into the "conference room II Congress of Soviets" gave him a deafening ovation, knowing full well that the camera would not included. Romm later tore his hair out - the filmed double was only a weak copy of the first impulse. So Shchukin's death had a serious political significance - "Lenin's" films not only had a huge audience success, they were a powerful tool

political education.

Now - about the "case of doctors" ...

Much has been written about him and by many. For example, in the monograph by Gennady Kostyrchenko Stalin's secret policy. Power and anti-Semitism" a separate chapter is devoted to this case. At the same time, as already mentioned, the "doctors' case" is being presented today exclusively "Falsification of Stalin and his henchmen" ... But not everything is so simple! Let's say in the capital monograph by G. Kostyrchenko there was no place for the name of Immanuel Davitashvili, rabbi Tiflis, a native of Akhaltsikhe, who turned 45 in 1953. But this rabbi was then arrested in connection with the "doctors' case" (in 1973 he left for Israel, where safely and died in 1985).

It is not so easy to get to the fact that one of the main "defendants" of the "case doctors" Miron Vovsi, who occupied a leading position in the circle of Kremlin doctors, was cousin of Solomon Mikhoels (the real name of Mikhoels was Vovsi, and "Mikhoels", which meant "son of Mikhail", was his stage name, taken back in youth). So, besides many other - cold and cynical - considerations, Miron Vovsi could be additionally driven by the desire to avenge Solomon Vovsi.

And the factor of revenge for, for example, those executed in 1938 for anti-Soviet religious activities of the father and son Medalier from the Lubavitcher family Hasidim. Father, Shmaryahu-Yehuda-Leib Medalier, was born in 1876, in 1933-1938 he was rabbi of Moscow - I already mentioned him once. His son Moishe was a rabbi in Tula and Rostov-on-Don. And the second son, Hillel, who was born in 1916 in Vitebsk, became, by the way, one of the leaders of the Zionist movement "Mizrahi" and a doctor of philosophy in Great Britain.

However, the main motives that could induce (and, apparently, did) a number of leading Soviet doctors to covertly kill inconvenient for the tops of Soviet Jewry leaders, there were quite rational motives, to emotions having no relationship.

Here, for example, Alexander Sergeevich Shcherbakov ... Very hardworking, modest, born in 1901. Born in a working-class family in Ruza near Moscow, he began working early - in Rybinsk as a student in the printing house. In 1917 he joined the Red Guard, participated in suppression of kulak revolts in the Yaroslavl region, since 1918 - a member of the RCP (b). In the same 1918, he began working in the Komsomol and party bodies and became a personnel officer. "apparatchik". Moscow, Turkestan, Gorky, Balakhna, Murom, Leningrad, Irkutsk, Stalino (Donetsk) ... Such a "geography" of his biography proves that he was constantly in demand, and the peak was the appointment of Shcherbakov in 1938 as the first secretary Moscow city and regional committees of the CPSU (b). Since 1941 he has become in parallel, the secretary of the Central Committee for ideology and a candidate member of the Politburo. Since 1942 - head of the Main Political Directorate of the Red Army, since September 1943 - Colonel General.

Shcherbakov died on May 10, 1945, and Khrushchev in his "memoirs" reports that Shcherbakov himself "drowned strong drinks and dragged others into drunkenness for the sake of Stalin ... "Khrushchev owns the statement that" Beria ... correctly said that Shcherbakov died because he drank too much. Got drunk and died. Stalin did say another: that he was a fool - he began to recover, and then did not heed the warnings doctors and died at night when he allowed himself excesses with his

wife ... "Four people are discredited here at once: Stalin, Beria, Shcherbakov and Shcherbakov's wife,

who allegedly lustfully could not resist not only accepting rising to his feet husband. But what else can you expect from Khrushchev! Moreover, it is Shcherbakov succeeded Khrushchev as first secretary in Moscow, and Khrushchev was vengeful and those who crossed his - in his opinion - the road, never forgot. Shcherbakov was by no means a drunkard. First, it's just a fact. Second, alcoholism was completely incompatible with the scope of duties and daily business workload Shcherbakov. Thirdly, he could not have been a drunkard just because in that case he would never would not have risen in positions as quickly and successfully as he had. Moreover, Stalin is not a drunkard endured and did not have them in his inner circle - even Khrushchev, who loved to drink did not suffer from alcoholism.

But Shcherbakov had other "vices", which Arno Lustiger reports as follows: "The favorite of Stalin and the purest water is an anti-Semite, not knowing abroad and taking positions Great Russian chauvinism..." etc. Well, of course! back on January 5, 1926, edited to the newspaper Nizhny Novgorod Commune, Shcherbakov published an article on the death of Yesenin, imbued with sympathy for the poet. Do not say anything - a sin before the fans poet Bialik was really considerable.

Shcherbakov was, of course, not an anti-Semite, not a Judeophobe - he should be a developed person cannot, by definition, just as he cannot be an Anglophobe, a Japanophobe, or any another "...phobe". However, the exaggeratedly disproportionate percentage of Jews in all the most important spheres of activity of Soviet society, and above all in the sphere of culture, education and science, Shcherbakov could not help but worry - after all, the situation was really crazy, if not explained by his misanthropic racist theory about the Jews as representatives of the highest race of "black-haired beasts", supermen! In addition,

Shcherbakov had quite strong foundations in life, and at the same time he had victorious for Russia in 1945, only 44 years old and good prospects further growth. According to the official version, he died due to the fact that on May 8 and 9 twice made long and tiring trips from the government office near Moscow sanatorium "Barvikha" to Moscow, where he admired the illuminations and celebrated Victory Day.

But he did them with the consent of the deputy director of the sanatorium for medical parts of R.I. Ryzhikov and doctor G.A. Kadzharduzova, convinced by them that such a trip recovery will not hurt! Arrested in February 1952, Ryzhikov confessed to Lubyanka in the deliberate shortening of Shcherbakov's life. Today they write that Ryzhikova de frightened by the arrest of his wife and children, but only a cretin will confess that he did not commit gravest crime, caring for the well-being of relatives who automatically fall into as a result of the self-incrimination of the husband and father in the category of "members of the families of traitors to the Motherland." And not after their arrest, which would somehow excuse him, but only under an alleged application of such a

measure. No, Alexander Sergeevich Shcherbakov died without getting drunk and not from sexual excesses, but because it immediately interfered with many in the capital's "tops" and stood in the way realization of the desires of the "partoplasm" and other "elites" to ensure personal a comfortable existence.

Moreover, Shcherbakov was replaced by the same Popov, whose history the reader already knows.

However, this "case" began with an investigation into the circumstances of the death of not Shcherbakov, but Zhdanov. And they began to seriously start it in 1952, when they raised a letter from Lydia Fedoseevna Timashuk (1898–1983) to the Central Committee, written and given to her by the MGB in

1948. "Democrats" often present Timashuk as a "nurse", but since 1926, after graduating from a medical institute, she worked in the LSUK - medical and sanitary administration of the Kremlin, and since 1948 she was in charge of the electrocardiography room of the Kremlin hospitals.

On August 28, 1948, while taking a cardiogram to Andrei Andreevich Zhdanov, she, an experienced practical specialist, diagnosed him with "myocardial infarction in the region left ventricle and interventricular septum. But Professor V.N. Vinogradov, V.Kh. Vasilenko, P.I. Egorov and attending physician G.I. The majors said that there was nothing serious happened.

Timashuk ended up in Valdai, where Zhdanov was treated at the Dolgie Brody sanatorium, almost accidentally. She was taken with them instead of the diagnostician S.E. Karpay, which then was on vacation, flying to Zhdanov Egorov, Vinogradov and Vasilenko. Karpay same until 1950 she was the head of the functional diagnostics department of the Kremlin hospitals and in 1944-1945 regularly took cardiograms from both Zhdanov and ... Shcherbakov. There were

never any problems with Karpay, but Timashuk immediately diagnosed Zhdanov's heart attack. Nevertheless, three "Kremlin" medical luminaries forced her rewrite the conclusion in accordance with their diagnosis: "functional disorder on soil of sclerosis and hypertension. And the head of the LSUK, Professor P.I. On August 28, 1948, Yegorov wrote in Zhdanov's medical history: "It is recommended ... to increase movement, from September 1 to allow travel by car, on September 9 to resolve the issue of travel to

Moscow". But Zhdanov was taken to Moscow earlier - on August 31, 1948, he died. They say that criminals do not change their criminal style. Well, Zhdanov's death was "prescribed" to him in the same handwriting as Shcherbakov's death.

No doubt, any doctor can make a mistake ... However, for a heart attack, a cardiogram always points confidently! And was it permissible to neglect the conclusion of an experienced professional Timashuk, who did not occupy, like Vinogradov and others like him, a string lucrative positions, but all her life she was engaged in her direct business - treating people ?!

The events of that summer developed

as follows ... Zhdanov was seriously ill - he had atherosclerosis. The disease worsened in the summer 1948, and ended up with Zhdanov in mid-July in Valdai. well-being improved, but on July 23 Shepilov suddenly called him from Moscow, and after After a long conversation with him, Zhdanov had a heart attack at night. July 25 the same Vinogradov, Vasilenko and Yegorov flew from Moscow - that time with Karpay - and after the examination, it was stated that the patient had an acute attack of cardiac asthma.

After that, local doctors worked on Zhdanov for some time, but after a week he was "treated" in such a way that the "treatment" itself was a crime. Since August 7 though Zhdanov's condition required constant monitoring, he did not take cardiograms. The attending physician Mayorov (a native of the landowner's environment, by the way) instead of an organization proper care and treatment, Zhdanov entrusted everything to the nurse, and he himself left for long hours to fish. On

August 27, Zhdanov again became ill, and the next day she again flew to Valdai professorial far from holy "trinity", taking with him - on his head - Timashuk.

As the reader already knows, Professor Yegorov recommended to Zhdanov "to increase movement ", which Zhdanov did: he walked in the park, watched a movie - in addition emotionally charged. Although in fact he needed the strictest bed rest. The result of the "recommendations" was not slow to affect - on August 29 at Zhdanov again had a heart attack, and two days later he died. Then the

events unfolded interestingly too ... Instead of

ordering the urgent delivery of the body of the deceased member of the Politburo, the body of Zhdanov (!), For an autopsy to Moscow, the head of the LSUK Professor Egorov, pathologist of the Kremlin hospital A.N. Fedorov, and also ... Secretary of the Central Committee Kuznetsov - "Leningrad", member of the Politburo N.A. Voznesensky and the first "Leningrad" party secretary P.S. Popkov.

Historian G. Kostyrchenko, citing this information, for some reason believes that the latter

"Trinity" - also not a saint, but no longer medical nomenclature, but party nomenclature, gathered in Valdai, "having instinctively felt that, having lost influential patron, it is necessary to rally. G. Kostyrchenko does not understand, firstly, that it is unlikely that the "Leningrad" "trinity" had to "rally" so instantly and defiantly, and secondly, that her reaction to death described above Zhdanov rather resembles the actions of those who, to put it simply, "snout in fluff" ...

Moreover, "rallying" looked all the more suspicious because the most reasonable the parties of Kuznetsov and Voznesensky would have demanded that the body be covered with ice and send to Moscow by plane. But for some reason they did not show perseverance. But they were obliged to do this, since they were already at the scene of the event - even Popkov, who Valdai was not required to be either by rank or by duties. They were obliged because the death of such a major political figure as Zhdanov could, after all, not be natural! Zhdanov could well have been poisoned. For all possible reasons pathoanatomical study should have been, in fact, complex and very thorough!

So, frankly speaking, an urgent and not caused by circumstances arrival to the body Zhdanov Kuznetsov and Voznesensky and their presence in Valdai seems to me a conscious cover for that criminal action called "opening the body", which the "doctors" were to play here. Popkov's presence in this case was cover already for Kuznetsov and Voznesensky - they say, all three of the closest students arrived at the teacher's body, which had not yet cooled down, in order to immediately honor his memory.

And with the strange connivance of the "comrades-in-arms" of the deceased, the action took place: supposedly under the pressure of Professor Egorov, Professor Fedorov performed an autopsy in unsuitable for this room in the dark bathroom of one of the sanatorium dachas. Yegorov forced, but Fedorov for some reason

agreed. Fedorov discovered fresh and old (!) Scars on Zhdanov's heart, proving that Zhdanov had already suffered several heart attacks, which were successfully "not detected" by Karpay and other diagnosticians. However, Egorov demanded that the results of the autopsy corresponded to the previously false clinical diagnosis. A Fedorov for some reason, he agreed to this, and in his description, heart attacks were replaced by "necrotic foci", "foci of myomalacia" and "foci of necrosis" ... Moreover, these "tricks" continued in Moscow, where the "council" of professors V.N. Vinogradova, V.F. Zelenina, A.M. Markova, V.E. Nezlin, Ya.G. Etinger, P.I. Egorov, having familiarized himself with an anatomical preparation of the heart of the deceased, delivered - instead of the body itself the deceased - from Valdai on an airplane, they also "did not notice" anything.

When Zhdanov died, Timashuk wrote a letter to the head of the Main Directorate protection of the MGB Vlasik. An investigation began, and on September 6, 1948, Professor Yegorov called a meeting in his office, where he branded Lydia Fedoseevna as ignorant doctor and "alien, dangerous" person.

Timashuk was really dangerous with her professionalism and honesty. Therefore, Egorov was supported by Vinogradov, Mayorov, the pathologist of the Kremlin hospital Fedorov and Professor Vasilenko.

Vinogradov then still enjoyed the full confidence of Stalin (he "treated" both him and other members of the Politburo, accompanied Stalin in 1943 to Tehran), and a letter from Timashuk then managed to hush it up. Vinogradov told the Minister of Health of the USSR E.I. Smirnov: "Either I will work in the Kremlin hospital, or she." Left the professor Vinogradov, and the doctor Timashuk was transferred to one of the branches of the "Kremlin".

As for Vinogradov, could this chief therapist of the Medical and Sanitary administration of the Kremlin to qualitatively take care of the health of the country's leadership, if it in parallel, he headed the department at the 1st Moscow Medical Institute, was the chief editor of the Therapeutic Archive journal, head of the electrographic department of the Institute of Therapy of the USSR Academy of Medical Sciences and held a number of other positions not related

with practical medicine? At the same time, even the author of the monograph "Stalin's Secret Policy. Power and anti-Semitism" G. Kostyrchenko admits: "In the famous "Kremlin" ... ^{vital} the dead spirit of bureaucratic hierarchy, corporatism, mutual responsibility."

From whose, one asks, "feed"? And was it only a matter of corporateness?

Finally, the last thing I have to say here about Zhdanov ... After the arrest, Professor Vasilenko on November 15, 1952 showed:

"The trial in the case of Pletnev (a professor accused of murder of Kuibyshev and Gorky, received 25 years in prison and shot on September 11, 1941 in the Oryol prison before entering the city Germans. - S.K.) revealed to me the technique of killing by knowingly improper treatment of the patient. From the materials of the case, I understood that the doctor may not only harm the patient, but also in an insidious way to bring him to death. TO I returned to this thought more than once in subsequent years, recalling Pletnev, whom I knew personally. When, in July 1948, I found myself at the bedside of a sick Zhdanov, I involuntarily remembered Pletnev again ... And I decided to go to the killing of Zhdanov ... "

Today these testimonies are considered "knocked out" of Vasilenko, but they are much more resemble a sincere confession - the whole psychological structure of the above passage.

Vasilenko, Egorov, Vinogradov, Vovsi and many other prominent physicians who had attitude to ensuring the health of the leaders of the USSR, were people of quite definite outlook on life. When on November 4, 1952, MGB operatives came for Vinogradov, they were struck by the rich decoration of his apartment, which could be confused with an average museum. Vinogradov came from a family of a small Kharkov employee, but even before revolution managed to become a wealthy man, kept his own prize horses at the hippodrome, collecting paintings, antiques.

Chekists described the paintings of Repin, Shishkin, Bryullov and other first-class Russian masters. During the search, gold coins, diamonds, etc. jewelry and a substantial amount in American currency.

Looking ahead, I'll tell you that when the "doctors" were "rehabilitated" after Stalin's death, for some reason no one remembered that Vinogradov was unambiguously guilty of a number of vulgar criminal acts, secretly keeping gold, jewelry, currency. Nobody did not ask another reasonable question: why did Professor Vinogradov secretly keep "pebbles" and dollars? Did he not hide them until better times, hoping for such changes in USSR, which became possible only after 1991? The last

question can perhaps be answered in the affirmative. But if so, did not Vinogradov and his colleagues try to make such changes real much earlier?

How Zhdanov was "treated" the reader

knows. And here is how Kalinin was "treated" ... She told about his "treatment" at the investigation in the doctors "the attending physician of Kalinin from January 1940 to June 1942 ... S.E. Karpay. Karpay told about the juicy details of the "treatment" with a fright, but she got scared and untied language, not because her teeth were knocked out in the MGB (although "Russian" "historians" claim vice versa), but because the charge of killing Kalinin was first brought against her. And

then Karpay, "laundering", reported amusing facts. In June

1942, she suggested a thorough examination of Kalinin, who complained of pain in the intestines. And the chief therapist of Lechsanupra, Professor Vinogradov limited to the appointment of an enema, diet in combination with drug treatment and replaced Kalinin as the attending

physician. Only on June 10, 1944, Professor A.D. Ochkin performed an operation on Kalinin,

diagnosed with stomach cancer in a very advanced state. Ochkin tried his best, but only delayed the inevitable - in June 1946, Kalinin died. One

can also recall that Dr. Ryzhikov, who healed Shcherbakov, confessed to after his arrest, at the same time he repented of the deliberately belated diagnosis of cancer stomach of the old Bolshevik Emelyan Yaroslavsky (Gubelman), who died in December 1943. Handwriting, as we see, was similar here.

As for the reliability of Ryzhikov's confession regarding Yaroslavsky, why would we take this reliability into doubt if Ryzhikov, obviously just as frightened as Karpay, confessed to a long-standing and uninvestigated case. And confessed in his initiative - they asked him about Shcherbakov. Is it

any wonder after this that even in a closed letter of the Central Committee of July 13, 1951 "On the unfavorable situation in the Ministry of State Security of the USSR", which reported on the results of the work commission of the Politburo consisting of Malenkov, Beria, Shkiryatov and Ignatiev, it was said and now What:

"Among doctors, there is undoubtedly a conspiratorial group of people who seeking to shorten the life of party leaders during treatment and government."

The following letter from a member of the Politburo of the Central Committee may also be of interest to us. VKP(b), chairman of the CPC A.A. Andreev Malenkov, referring to the beginning of 1949:

"T. Malenkov.

It's been a month since I had to leave my job again and start treatment, and so far things are not going well for me. Despite the exact implementation of the instructions professors, dizziness recurs almost every other day <...> I have one gets the impression that something is wrong with the treatment, or here the diagnosis of the disease is incorrectly determined, or the treatment is incorrectly carried out. After all, in the end, the second year went and it would be time to have some results, and I On the part of those who treat me, I have only new assurances that my disease is not dangerous and that it is transient and the dizziness must end..."

The most qualified, according to their official position - the best in the country and physicians with great potential "treated" at the same time suffering from strong headaches and Andreev's insomnia ... large doses of sleeping pills in combination with cocaine.

Andreev, after writing this letter, lived another eighteen years, having died in 1971 at the age of 76. But does he not owe his longevity to the latter? lines of his letter, in which he asked Malenkov, "if possible, intervene in this matter"?

Shcherbakov, Zhdanov, Kalinin trusted their doctors. And died from them knowingly actions unacceptable for professionals.

Andreev doubted his doctors. Maybe this was his salvation? After all If we summarize all of the above, then the picture of such a conscious conspiracy of doctors, when high-ranking patients are slowly killed not with poisons, but with a method of treatment that is deliberately murderous for them. Here we can recall how, already in the 80s, the Kremlin medical academician Chazov "treated" the General secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU Konstantin Chernenko by staying in the mountains ... After this "treatment", the asthmatic Chernenko from a fairly strong old man turned into a ruin before our eyes. And the "gravedigger of the USSR" Mikhail Gorbachev was already ready to replace Chernenko. And changed.

However, in 1953 this was still far away. Timashuk January 21, 1953 was

awarded the Order of Lenin. Professors Vinogradov, Egorov, Vasilenko, Vovsi, Kogan, Grinshtein, Feldman, Temkin by that time were sitting in the Lubyanka ...

And they weren't the only ones. Interrogations have been conducted for a long time, for example, former responsible employees of the MGB of the USSR Yakov Mikhailovich Broverman, Leonid Fedorovich (Eliazar Faitelevich) Raikhman, Lev Leonidovich Shvartsman, Mikhail Ilyich (Moses Elevich) Belkin, Aron Moiseevich Palkin. According

to Broverman's testimony of December 6, 1952, there were not yet arrested Iosif Yakovlevich Lorkish, former deputy head of the Department counterintelligence of the Leningrad, and then the Carpathian military district, former assistant Grigory Samoilovich Bolotin-Balyasny, Head of the 3rd Main Directorate of the USSR Ministry of State Security; former Deputy Head of the Counterintelligence Department of the MGB of the Far East Troops Avraam Moiseevich Vul, former Deputy Head of the 5th Directorate of the USSR Ministry of State Security Ilya Izrailevich Ilyushin-Edelman ... This is

according to the testimony of Broverman alone. On

January 14, 1953, Deputy Minister of the State Security Service of the USSR Goglidze, special message No. 14 reported to Stalin about the arrest of Belkin, who, as Jewish nationalists, was the former deputy head of the counterintelligence department, who were no longer Broverman, but Belkin MGB of the Central Group of Forces V.Ya. Dubrovinsky, who has recently been consultant of the Krasnopresnensky district party committee; head of financial department Ministry of the Fishing Industry of the Latvian SSR I.I. Faktorovich; deputy head of the counterintelligence department of the MGB of the 128th rifle corps of the Belarusian military districts; pensioner A.A. Brandenburgsky, as well as Major General of the MGB reserve I.Ya. Lorquish. The same

Broverman, Belkin had dozens of colleagues and acquaintances, many of them who were Jews, and many of them were not. But the testimony appeared quite their specific connections. For some reason - these, and not others. But face-to-face confrontations were coming, where slanders - if they had taken place - could have been revealed. So it is unlikely that Broverman Belkin slandered someone.

And these were the testimony of just Belkin and Broverman. Basically, the volume revelations - not exaggerated, but real - could quickly grow like a snowball.

In addition, all this took place against the backdrop of the Slansky trial in Czechoslovakia, where, too, there were such details as malicious doctors and the Zionist "trace" ... But more on that process that ended in early December 1952 - later.

A new year has come, 1953. In the past year, the last meeting of the Bureau of the Presidium of the Central Committee The CPSU passed in full force - under Stalin, on December 29. Then considered state plan for the development of the national economy of the USSR for 1953 on military and special industries, the state budget, plans for exports, imports and accumulation of material reserves, issues of trade with Norway and France, the abolition of state insurance of animals on collective farms and among the population, "as not conducive to the development of animal husbandry", and something else - "on trifles".

In addition to members of the Bureau of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU, the secretaries of the Central Committee Aristov, Brezhnev, Ignatov, Mikhailov, Pegov, Ponomarenko, Suslov and the Chairman of the Communist party control Shkiryatov.

The next, the first in 1953, meeting of the Bureau of the Presidium of the Central Committee was scheduled for January 9, and it gathered in the same composition - only Stalin

was not present. In addition to those who were at the meeting on December 29, the editor-in-chief was also sitting Pravda Shepilov and Deputy Ministers of State Security Goglidze and Ogoltsov. However there was no Minister of State Security Ignatiev himself - which for now we will just note for memory.

A draft TASS report addressed to the whole country about the arrest of the group was discussed "doctors-saboteurs" and a draft editorial in Pravda - "Sneaky spies and murderers

under the guise of medical professors, edited by Stalin. The date of publication of the TASS message was chosen, as I suppose, too Stalin and was, most likely, "significant" - January 13, 1953. On January

13, Pravda, by no means on the front page, published in the TASS Chronicle a message about the discovery and investigation of the case of a "terrorist group of doctors who aimed, through sabotage treatment, to shorten the life of active workers Soviet Union". Professors Vovsi, Vinogradov, Kogan M.B. were named among the members of the group. and Kogan B.B., Egorov P.I., Feldman, Etinger, Grinshtein, Tyomkin and doctor

Mayorov. It was reported about their involvement in the deaths of Zhdanov and Shcherbakov, about connecting majority of the "international Jewish groups" of the bourgeois-nationalist organization "Joint" and a smaller one - with the English intelligence.

The message ended with the phrase: "The investigation will be completed in the coming days." The editorial said:

"... Socialist relations reign supreme in the USSR ... On We are making progress in all areas of economic and cultural construction. From these facts, people conclude that the danger of sabotage, sabotage, espionage has now been removed, that the rulers of the capitalist world can refuse to their attempts to conduct subversive activities against the USSR. But only ... people standing on anti-Marxist point of view of the "fading" of the class struggle. They do not understand that our successes are not leading to a fading, but to an intensification of the struggle. The more successful as we move forward, the more acute will be the struggle of the enemies of the people... This is what the immortal Lenin teaches, this is what Comrade Stalin teaches... In the USSR the exploiting classes have long been defeated and liquidated, but ideologies, remnants of bourgeois private property psychology and morality - carriers have survived bourgeois views and bourgeois morality - living people ... It is these hidden Enemies supported by the imperialist world will continue to harm in the future..."

Stalin knew more than those who prepared the draft editorial, and its last two paragraphs looked after Stalin's correction in such a way that not only "overseas" ones were revealed - as it was initially in the project, but also the English connections to internal enemies of the USSR. Stalin added the end of the front line. And it ended up as follows: in words:

"As for the inspirers of these mercenaries and murderers, they may be sure that retribution will not forget about them, find a way to them to tell them your strong word.

All this is true, of course. But it is also true that in addition to these enemies we also have one enemy is the mouthwashing of our people. There is no doubt that while we have rotozeystvo, there will be wrecking. Therefore, in order to eliminate wrecking, we need to put an end to the rotozey in our ranks.

So, Stalin warned friends, that is, the Soviet people, and warned enemies - not only internal, but also external. His words that retribution will not forget about masterminds of hirelings and murderers and find a way to them, could be understood in any way, but given that they belonged to Stalin, this was not an empty threat.

After that, one should not be surprised that Stalin had less than eight years to live. weeks.

However, judging by the further course of events, the disclosure of criminal acts and

plans of the "Kremlin" doctors gave only part of the overall picture and, perhaps, not the most essential. After all, the most important - not only for the investigation, but also in fact, was the question of who inspired the doctors? It is unlikely that they went to such serious sins.

just on your own initiative. The

fact that the "top" of the LSUK had criminal tasks can hardly be denied, approaching to the situation objectively. But who assigned these tasks to her? The editorial of Pravda indicated only external inspirers and "cartridges": American and British intelligence services, "Joint", "US bigwigs" and their English "junior partners", "Anglo-American arsonists war" and even "cannibal slave owners from the USA and England." The last definition was directly entered by Stalin instead of what was originally in the draft article: "bloodsuckers and misanthropes from Wall Street." Stalin, after the words "... sold for dollars," additionally entered "and sterling." And these persistent instructions of Stalin to the British proved that Stalin understood that secret connections from the USSR stretched not only to Wall Street, to Rockefellers, but also to London, to the City, to the Rothschilds and other old "masters of the world", not prone to advertising and even more so to self-

promotion. However, the "doctors" could not help but have internal inspirers, and this was, perhaps, even more serious. Moreover, the most important question turned out to be whether it could be in their including one of the old and close associates of Stalin? A

student of Professor Pletnev V.B. Egorov, a former nobleman, and by the beginning of the 50s professor-consultant of the central clinic Lechsanupra of the Kremlin, back at the end of 1949 at one of the family celebrations he said: "Stalin will soon die, and all the rest leaders will fight for power. Then the foreigners will intervene, and you and I We will see Kirill Vladimirovich Romanov on the Moscow throne again."

Even earlier, holding a newspaper with a report on the solemn meeting at the Bolshoi theater on the occasion of the 70th anniversary of Stalin, he lamented: "It's a pity that during the meeting dropped the bomb. The head of government and the entire government would have been destroyed. Then live it would be easier."

However, is it a professor's job to throw bombs if there are less loud ones in the world? and obvious, but no less, and even more effective than bombs, means to eliminate heads of government?

In addition, although the arrested "luminaries" of the Lechsanupra of the Kremlin were up to their ears in dirty actions, they were not the only ones who had free access to the head of government. Their arrest it was even convenient for some people - it diverted attention from other options for the assassination of Stalin and facilitated the actions of others who were maliciously plotting against him.

Stalin no longer believed doctors, but this does not mean that he no longer believed in any one at all. to a person. But there was no one but the Kremlin doctors to plot against Stalin.

For a variety of reasons.

Chapter Eleven

Winter 1952/53... What Khrushchev was afraid of...

In 1946, the apparatus of the Central Committee prepared for Stalin a summary of the questions asked at meetings of city party assets in September 1946. Here is a small fragment of it:

"...2. How to explain to the workers what caused the price increase?
(Tula) ...23. Why are there no fixed prices in the markets?
(Riga) ...53. Will the staff of employees be reduced, preferably by 40%?

(Saratov) ...56. How to answer the workers: if they ask why we help with bread France, Poland and Finland, but we ourselves raise the price of bread?.."

Even from the above short passage, one can understand what to set sharp questions to the authorities in Stalin's state were not only possible, but simply accepted. This

it was okay! By the way, there were 61 questions in the summary quoted above. This does not sound much like the silence of the supposedly "slaves" of the "Stalinist

Gulag". Moreover, in the early 50s, the tendency for the voice of the people to sound louder and reached the leadership of the country, did not weaken - a little lower I will illustrate this with an example simple veterinarian Kholodov. And this growing activity of the "lower classes" also had to push the "partoplasmic" "tops" to already their own activity, which has the purpose of neutralizing the activity of the "lower classes".

The past 19th Party Congress and the expansion of the leading core objectively strengthened the activity of the masses and whether such activity would become truly mass, depended a lot. The people discussed the results of the congress, and Stalin stepped up another Stalinist blow for mediocrity and those "non-knowledgeable" whom Alexander Vasilyevich still did not tolerate so much Suvorov. On the evening of October 20, 1952, Stalin gathered in his office Malenkov, Khrushchev, Aristov, Brezhnev, Ignatov, Mikhailov, Pegov, Ponomarenko, Suslov, Shepilov, Chesnokov, Rumyantsev and Yudin, that is, all the secretaries of the Central Committee plus the highest ideological frames.

What he then said was partially recorded by Shepilov and Yudin. And thanks to them something From what Stalin said then, I can also quote:

"Our propaganda," Stalin said, "is conducted poorly, some kind of, and not propaganda ... There is not a single member of the Politburo (so in the record. - S.K.) who was I would be pleased with the work of the Propaganda Department. Our cadres, especially the youth, do not have a profound knowledge of Marxism... <...>

It is necessary to control the cadres, to study them and in time to promote the youth to leadership work. We have many talented young people, but we do not know well young cadres. But if a person was nominated for some kind of work and he sits in this job for 10 years without further promotion, it stops growing and disappears as an employee. How many people were killed due to the fact that time is not pushed..."

Of all those present, only Khrushchev reached his career "ceiling", all the rest, even during the life of Stalin, had certain prospects for growth. So ideas Stalin for them meant hopes for the future, and for Khrushchev - something directly the opposite, because he was just near retirement age.

Stalin went further:

"We must also think about better management of industry ... Bad going on in agriculture. Party workers do not know the history of agriculture farms in Europe, do not know how livestock is conducted in the United States. Only papers they sign and ruin the deal..."

But these words "a major specialist in the field of agriculture" Khrushchev could take it to your account in full. Moreover, the imminent future threw him through Stalin, a very unpleasant "agricultural" incident for Nikita Sergeevich.

It is useful, especially for today, to quote the following Stalinist words:

"The Americans refute Marxism, slander us, try to debunk us. We must expose them. We must acquaint people with the ideology of the enemies, criticize this ideology, and this will arm our cadres. We are now leading not only national policy, but we are conducting world politics. The Americans want to take control of everything. But America is not in any capital respect."

Shortly thereafter, on October 27, 1952, Stalin held the first meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee, and the Bureau of the Presidium of the Central Committee, in which all members of the Bureau took part, except

Voroshilov (he first appeared at the meeting of the Bureau on December 29), that is, Beria, Bulganin, Kaganovich, Malenkov, Pervukhin, Saburov and

Khrushchev. Stalin continued to personally conduct all meetings of the Bureau of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU. The last, seventh, meeting on January 26, 1953, after which the Bureau met only on March 2, 1953 - for the first time without Stalin.

All the current work on the Council of Ministers, he shifted to his deputies for the Council of Ministers, the first of which was Beria. After the 19th Congress, he chaired the meetings of the Presidium and the Bureau of the Presidium of the Council of Ministers 8 times, Saburov - 6 times, Pervukhin - 5 times, and once led the Bureau Malenkov. At the

meetings of both Bureaus - both the Presidium of the Central Committee and the Presidium of the Council of Ministers four people were constantly present: Stalin, Beria, Pervukhin and Saburov. With the first everything was clear to the two last, it can be assumed that Stalin had on some of them in the near future.

The new position of Malenkov also attracted attention. Bureau Decree Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU on November 10, 1952, it was determined that he should focus on work in the Central Committee of the CPSU. Indeed, after November 10, Malenkov meetings in the Council of Ministers no longer appeared, but was an indispensable participant in the meetings in the Central Committee. Perhaps one of the readers will see in this some secret intrigues of Stalin. I understand it's wrong. But here are some plans that he even communicated ahead of time did not want to close employees, Stalin, perhaps, arose. Current in economic affairs, he completely relied on Beria with Pervukhin and Saburov, but he was not inclined to entrust the current political affairs to anyone.

Meanwhile, time passed. November 7, 1952 marked the 35th anniversary of October Revolution, and, as always, a solemn meeting of the Moscow

City Council. On November 7, Pravda published a report about him with a photo of the presidium on the front page, and I give its composition according to the signature under this photo. So, Saburov, Mikoyan, Pervukhin, Molotov, Ponomarenko, Malenkov, Suslov, Beria, Stalin, Shkiryatov, Kaganovich, Bulganin, Mikhailov, Pegov, Khrushchev, Aristov, Ignatov, Shvernik, Yasnov, V.V. sat on the stage. Kuznetsov, Kapitonov, Furtseva, Mironova, V.V. Grishin, A.M. Puzanov...

However, the caption under the photo itself did not give a complete picture of the state of affairs - it listed the names of those sitting from left to right in both the first and second rows. At looking at the photo itself, it was clear that in the front row were sitting - among others - Malenkov, Beria, Stalin, Kaganovich, Bulganin ... Beria was

sitting on the right hand of Stalin, which was hardly accidental. The report was made this time Pervukhin. Compared with last year's report by Beria on the same solemn meeting of the Moscow City Council Pervukhinskaya report was colorless, although his revived this message:

“...many Americans have lost their peace of mind. They are every now and then peer into the sky, and some of them began to imagine ... strange objects resembling huge "flying saucers", "saucers", "frying pans", "green fireballs"... Newspapers and magazines claim that they are either Russian mysterious projectiles, or ... - aircraft sent from some other planet to observe what is being done in America...”

They laughed in the hall, not suspecting that the time would come, and the same wave of the final fooling fools will come to Moscow, rolling back from it to the very outskirts of the country. However,

to hell with them, with flying "frying pans"! In Pervukhin's report there was a certain block, which had a fundamental meaning and contained very new transparent and

unpleasant hints for some ...

Something similar - and, presumably, not only on his own initiative - was said for exactly a year back in the same hall Beria. Now the thoughts already stated in Beria's report were framed in Pervukhin's report - and here certainly not on his initiative - much more hard. In order to verify this, it is enough to compare both blocks.

November 6, 1951 Beria said:

"Individual enterprises, fulfilling and overfulfilling the plan for gross products, do not always fulfill the plan for the production of the most important types of products. The leaders of these enterprises apparently want to make their work easier and produce those products that require less effort and hassle. It's time for them to understand that the state does not need any fulfillment and overfulfillment of the plan, but only one that will provide the national economy with the products it needs.

Pervukhin, on November 6, 1952, stated this:

"To the heads of enterprises and industries (the emphasis here and below is mine. - S.K.), who do not fulfill state plans and produce products low quality, it doesn't hurt to think that if they don't straighten position, then they will have to step aside and give way to others, more energetic and better knowledgeable workers.

Do you catch the difference in tone and meaning of speeches? A year ago, Beria and, of course, Stalin publicly they only scolded the "eager" leaders. And scolded, in general, gently.

Now, through the mouth of Pervukhin, Stalin was already beating them almost backhand. It is possible that and Pervukhin was chosen as a speaker as a "significant" figure ... Relatively young - 48 years old (Beria, however, was only 53 years old), had just entered the highest party leadership, but has long declared itself as a large and sensible economic and state leader, one of Stalin's deputies in the Council of Ministers ... Young shoots, so to speak ...

The proposal to "step aside and give up your seat" made by the nomenklatura "partoplasm" with such a figure, this "partoplasm" could not but excite and alarm to the extreme. If we recall the speech of Poskrebyshev (read, in fact, Stalin) on XIX Congress, then the statement of Pervukhin (read, actually Stalin) was able to plunge all mediocrity and self-seekers of the all-Union scale in general in a panic!

Having said this, I do not mean, of course, those whom the historian Yu. Zhukov calls "narrow leadership", that is, a really narrow circle of undoubtedly outstanding party and statesmen, namely Beria, Bulganin, Voroshilov, Kaganovich, Malenkov, Mikoyan, Molotov, Pervukhin, Ponomarenko, Saburov and a few more a wide, adjacent to the first, circle of leaders such as Kosygin, Tevosyan, Malyshev, Vyshinsky, as well as many others - relatively young and not very young responsible employees who worked hard, honestly, selflessly and, perhaps most importantly, competently, were in the right place.

I mean, firstly, those who, while occupying high positions, did not correspond to them. Secondly, I mean various kinds and calibers of "stuck" and "referents", which in the Moscow nomenclature had enough and to which the words of Stalin, Beria, Pervukhin and Poskrebyshev belonged. This bureaucratic "army" had every reason to tremble if not for your skin, so for the chair - for sure!

How to understand this - to give up your place to others? What is it - to lose a solid office, secretaries, retinue, personal car, state dacha, medical care in the "Kremlin"?

For the leading and near-leading "partoplasm" the only significant thing was just this. They were no longer seduced (if she ever seduced them at all) by the possibility

daily improve and develop the assigned work, improve work and lead it to ever higher scientific, technical, technological and organizational level. They already accustomed to complacency ...

And suddenly - step aside! Give place to!

Yes, with one such proposal, Stalin was able to sign his death sentence! After all, the bastard, uncontrollably and satisfyingly eating, when it is pulled away from the feeder, is capable of such an embittered reaction, in comparison with which the roars of lions and tigers will look like a cute homemade pussy purr! I think Stalin

understood this. That's why I tried in a dynamically developing situation keep it under control. Looking ahead, we can say that under its control it is not managed to keep neither Stalin nor Beria - the blows came from where they were not expected at all neither one nor the

other. They came from theirs. Or rather, from those whom Stalin and Beria considered their own. comrades and good colleagues. We

have yet to talk about this with you, dear reader, but now I have come it's time to talk more about Khrushchev ...

In the deep autumn of 1952, as part of the top party and state leadership the leading "five" was formed: Stalin, Beria, Bulganin, Malenkov, Khrushchev.

It was, as we can see, a very "dense" list. It was not easy to get into it, but from it wasn't that hard to get out of it. However, three from this list had a place in it guaranteed solid. First,

Stalin was, naturally, an indispensable member of the high assembly. Secondly, the following two places could be considered firmly reserved: for Beria - as an outstanding manager and jack of all trades and Malenkov - as "reinforced concrete" "second number" of the Molotov type, but younger and more educated Vyacheslav Mikhailovich.

Bulganin's positions were weaker, however, he was in the "five" in his place. one reliable "second number" for Stalin, but in the military department.

Khrushchev's position was the most precarious. He was also the least educated (if the word "educated" was generally applicable to him), and the least competent. Yes, and passed according to the party "department", the role and significance of which Stalin in the future reduced to ideological rather than administrative leadership of society. As an example of high morality and high mind Nikita Sergeevich pulled weakly.

And he also got into trouble from a side where he did not expect them no way. The trouble - for Khrushchev and those like him - came from the most party and social bottom.

And it came like

this ... By the fall of 1952, it became clear to Stalin that there was something wrong with animal husbandry in the country - meat production did not grow, and in general there were no special successes in agriculture ... The reasons were called different. It is unlikely that the explanations of colleagues satisfied Stalin, but it is always not easy for the head of state to find out the true state of affairs. And then Stalin the masses helped - on November 1, 1952, veterinary technician N.I. Kholodov from Orekhovo-Zuevsky district of the Moscow region wrote him a letter about the situation in the collective farms areas.

This seems to be a quiet and almost unknown event in our history, I tend to regarded as one of the most important at the end of 1952 and not properly appreciated. Sometimes a mountain gives birth to a mouse. In this case, one could say that on the contrary - the "mouse" gave birth to the "mountain", if it were not for the fact that the author of the letter to Stalin, an ordinary communist Kholodov could not be compared with a quiet mouse! He was an intelligent, honest man with a developed civic sense, brought up by the Soviet system.

On November 5, his letter was already in the Special Sector of the Central Committee, and the head of this Sector,

Stalin's secretary Poskrebyshev put it on Stalin's table. The fact, by the way, is a lot speaking about the atmosphere in the country, and about the order in Stalin's apparatus, and about Stalin himself.

On November 10, Stalin addressed a copy to Malenkov and Khrushchev, and on November 10, the Bureau Presidium of the Central Committee approved the agenda for the next meeting of the Presidium, where the third paragraph stood "Note of Comrade Benediktov on animal husbandry (comrade Benediktov)".

"Comrade Benediktov" is the then Minister of Agriculture of the USSR. Difficult to say whether his note "On the reduction of the number of cattle in 38 regions, territories and republics" was prepared on Benedict's own initiative or it was an intermediate result of Stalin's study of Kholodov's letter. So or otherwise, these two documents coincided very well in time and complemented each other.

Stalin, presumably, read a letter from a veterinary technician from Orekhovo-Zuevskaya district veterinary clinic carefully - it was worth it, but it began like this:

"Dear Joseph Vissarionovich!

As a member of the Communist Party, I would like to hear from you about such questions that perhaps worry millions of people in the Soviet Union and about which no one dares to speak openly at meetings, because such criticism will be severely punished. I want to dwell on issues related to agriculture. According to our press, in agriculture we have enormous achievements, and you will not see any signs of shortcomings in any newspaper. To you the secretaries of the regional committees report, the secretaries of the district committees report to them, the last reporting from below. They broadcast on the radio ... Orekhovo-Zuevsky district successfully completed the agricultural year, paid the state ahead of schedule. Let's see how things really are..."

And then Kholodov described the picture, not only gloomy, but ... However, I'm better Here are a couple of direct quotes:

"Here is the united collective farm" Red Star - from 500 hectares (hectare. - S.K.) 200 hectares of the best water meadows remained unmowed, now flooded with water.

Potatoes seem to be removed, but what kind of cleaning is this? It was removed by mobilized workers from factories and factories who for this period kept their wages at 50%, and they didn't try to pick all the potatoes... and they only picked what was upstairs, and so more than half of the potatoes were left in the ground. It is ridiculous to hear that potatoes have been harvested per hectare (that is, from one hundred acres. - S.K.) in some fields of all one ton (that is, 10 (ten) kilograms per hundred square meters. - S.K.). You go along the furrow, you scatter the earth with your foot and you see potatoes again ... "

This is how potatoes were harvested in the Moscow region, where the first secretary of the regional committee was part-time secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU Comrade Khrushchev. By the way, after the arrest of Beria, on "Anti-Beria" plenum of the Central Committee in July 1953, Khrushchev, Mikoyan and others were charged with the bad situation with potatoes in Moscow in the winter of 1952/53, not to anyone, but to Beria, who allegedly put spokes in the wheels of allegedly perspicacious and business-minded colleagues. They also slandered Stalin there - which I will say in due time! As for Kholodov's letter, there were also such lines:

"Here is a field of buckwheat - a rich field ... a reaper is launched - the buckwheat is mowed, somehow mowed, but there is no time to thresh, there are no people. It starts "thresh" pigs ... they graze without supervision and now mercilessly "thresh" buckwheat and rye under a canopy ... "

And these:

“... annual milk yields from year to year do not exceed 1200–1400 liters per forage cow. It's funny - it gives the average goat. <...> Livestock is kept in an unsanitary condition (in some brigades, livestock belly is in the dung)...”

Similar examples that he saw "everyday actually sober eyes" in field and animal husbandry, Kholodov cited a lot and summarized:

“At first I thought that this state of affairs was only in a few areas industrial value, but it turns out not - the same picture, as I found out, and in a number of districts of the Vladimir, Ryazan, Kursk and Voronezh regions, not to mention others I don't know about.”

However, Kholodov did not deny that "we have solved the grain problem", and the main part devoted letters to animal husbandry, offering many practical things, including piecework wages of collective farmers. And he wrote this:

“I have been working since 1935. Then the collective farms were completely different. Then you can it was necessary to demand the rules of the veterinary-zootechnical order, and they were carried out, since then there was something to ask for and from whom to ask. And now it's gone. How many no matter how acts, reports are written, but all this remains unfulfilled, and if labor and performed, then as a pro forma. <...>

Let's see how the regional leadership looks at this. We had a secretary of the district committee, Comrade Nikolaev, a good leader, but not did the job and was dismissed in disgrace. Comrade Polikarpov has now been installed, like a reliable person, since, being the director of the Likinsky machine-building factory, worked pretty well, and now his picture is worse than that of Nikolaev. What is the conclusion? And the conclusion, it turns out, is such that sometimes it's not in the manual the reason...

Such a question becomes strange. All members of the party among themselves in a narrow the circle is told about serious shortcomings, but no one says anything at the meeting, much less at the regional committee of the CPSU. For this they will warm up in the tail and in the mane ... ”

So, Kholodov pointed to the regional committee of the CPSU ... And the regional committee is Khrushchev. So it's unlikely Nikita Sergeevich in those days felt himself in his saddle, that is, in an armchair, confidently. The hard-hitting truth of Kholodov could have turned out to be serious for Khrushchev and Co. troubles, and even organizational conclusions. An

even more serious thunderstorm could break out - tough and effective measures initiated by Stalin and directed: a) against the party, not the economic priority in managing the economy; b) against the practice of juggling with “sticks” of workdays, replacing it with the practice of direct material incentives for labor in agriculture (and possibly not only in agriculture, but in general in the national economy).

After all, Kholodov in his letter revealed a good understanding of the urgent general state problems, supported his conclusions with specific examples, or, on the contrary, drew correct deep conclusions from specific and illustrative examples. At the end Communist Kholodov wrote in his extensive message to Communist Stalin:

“In the near future, under the existing conditions of wages for collective farmers we may face the fact that there will be no one to work on the collective farms - the old people will grow old, and the youth will be all in the cities and in production. I

find this state of affairs rather abnormal. When introducing the proposed payment, the economy of the collective farms will grow rapidly, and the life of the collective farmers will be prosperous and joyful ...

Perhaps you will say - these are unfounded inventions, no, this is the voice of the

collective farmers, the voice of the

people. <...> Maybe I'm thinking wrong, maybe I'm seriously mistaken, but I it seems, as a citizen of the Soviet Union, as a member of the Party, that the existing the state of wages of collective farmers ... is completely insufficient, contributing to the deterioration ..., and not improvement of the life of collective farmers, ... the deterioration of their material condition, and at the same time their spiritual appearance (terribly hear obscenities from women in the collective farm yard or somewhere in the field).

It would be necessary to dwell on the work of the MTS, but you will not cover everything and in a letter everything you won't write.

This is where I end, I apologize if I am guilty of anything. With
communist greetings

Vet technician Orekhovo-Zuevskaya District
Veterinary hospitals Kholodov
Orekhovo -Zuevo.

No, Kholodov wrote not only about agriculture, but still the main theme of his the letter was agriculture, and therefore the discussion of Kholodov's letter at the "top" took place in the agricultural department. On November 11, Minister

Benediktov somehow reported to the Bureau of the Presidium, and in his words, it turned out that the culprits were, they say, first of all, the collective farmers themselves - they take poor care of with a cat.

Stalin then remarked that this meant that the collective farms were not interested in public animal husbandry economically, that special attention should be paid to increasing the interest of collective farmers in the development of animal husbandry. And on December 2, 1952, a resolution was adopted by the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU, which instructed the Bureau Presidium to develop a draft of the relevant resolution and submit it to the consideration of the Presidium, and on December 3, the Bureau of the Presidium of the Central Committee instructed Khrushchev consider the facts set forth in Kholodov's letter. Further,

events developed as follows ... On

December 11, 1952, Khrushchev, in a note to Stalin, recognized the validity of a series the provisions of Kholodov's letter, but argued that Kholodov writes "only about bad collective farms" and "does not know how advanced farms work," although Kholodov himself, addressing Stalin, declared: "Perhaps you will say that you should not look at those who are lagging behind, but you should equal to the advanced - I understand that. But I do not understand that from year to year these lagging behind, and we have the majority of them, are not growing economically, but are degrading..."

A positive letter from a veterinarian near Moscow was issued to the secretary of the Central Committee and the first Secretary of the Moscow Regional Committee Khrushchev sideways. This letter, if you think about it, was capable of to highlight to Stalin the entire system of subtle sabotage that developed after the war (another it's hard to find a word) in planning the economy and blowing it up. And one of specific "extreme" was obvious - Khrushchev, who unambiguously discovered managerial incompetence. However,

Stalin - contrary to the malicious myths about him - held on to the worker until the latter and punished him only when he was convinced of his complete inadequacy - a businesslike or political. He held on, alas, to Khrushchev, whom he favored. That's why when

On December 11, the Bureau of the Presidium of the Central Committee adopted a resolution "On the composition of the commission for to develop fundamental measures to ensure the further development of animal husbandry, "Khrushchev was still entrusted to head this commission. The commission

also included Benediktov, secretary of the Central Committee and at the same time minister blanks of the USSR Ponomarenko, Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR Mikoyan, Minister state farms of the USSR Skvortsov and others.

By December 26, 1952, the draft resolution of the Council of Ministers of the USSR and the Central Committee of the CPSU "On measures for the further development of animal husbandry on collective farms and state farms "was ready, but he

Stalin was not satisfied, which was not surprising. Firstly, from Kholodov's letter one could understand that the root of evil lies in the stupid and irresponsible "leadership", and the draft resolution, replete with not very obligatory tables and figures, this slippery moment bypassed. Secondly, although the second section of the draft resolution was entitled "On increasing material interest of the collective farmers in the development of public animal husbandry", measures were proposed either formal or dubious. So, Kholodov proposed to issue milkmaids for every 100 liters of milk yield 2 liters of milk daily, pigs - one at a time a piglet in case of saving at least 8 piglets from the uterus, employees of sheep breeding farms - one two-month-old lamb from 10 lambs queens, etc. In Khrushchev the project did not have any of this - it was supposed to "stimulate" livestock breeders with an increased number of workdays, that is, not liters and kilograms, but all the same "sticks". It would seem that in agriculture, piecework payment "in kind" was the most natural - especially at that time - form of remuneration in animal husbandry. It's on a plant with a production plan of a thousand engines does not need three thousand crankshafts. A on a farm, the more a milkmaid milks liters per cow, the better. However for some reason, the commission of Khrushchev and Mikoyan did not offer natural "piecework work".

But the purchase prices for meat in the draft resolution were proposed to be increased immediately almost four times! For example, the price of meat-cutting pigs Khrushchev's commission offered to increase from 72 kopecks per kilogram to 3 rubles! Specific figures came, of course, from experts, and I don't know if it was stupidity or subtle on their part. provocation. Personally, taking into account the further development of events in the country, I am inclined assume the second. After all, such a "good deed" is not solving the problem radically, because which did not ensure the interest of the collective farmers about which Kholodov wrote and Stalin told Benediktov, "either it would raise retail state prices in cities, or it would require large additional expenses from the state, which, in fact, in the draft resolution provided for.

Kholodov suggested otherwise ... If his proposals were accepted, then livestock productivity could quickly be doubled, or even tripled, and even with an increase in purchase prices by only one and a half to two times (on which Stalin insisted), the wealth of collective farmers would have increased significantly in

a matter of a year or two! But Khrushchev and Mikoyan insisted on "their own" (in fact, on the fact that slipped the referents), and the "question", as they say, hung ... In the meantime, the cows even near Moscow they drowned in manure and fell ill under the leaky roofs of farms. And this Khrushchev's position was not strengthened. The likelihood of his expulsion from the top management The "five" increased, and he - presumably - was more and more afraid of falling out of it.

And it was not in vain that Khrushchev was afraid ... In the depths of Stalin's brain, the idea of a special and a mysterious power structure in which there was no place for Khrushchev.

And what kind of body it was, I'll tell you now ...

Chapter Twelve

The Story of Troika

Stalin was getting old ... Many authors cited with references to the already famous "Journal of visits by I.V. Stalin in his Kremlin office" evidence that by 1952 Stalin had drastically reduced the reception of visitors to the Kremlin. Indeed, if in 1940 in magazine recorded more than two thousand visits, then in 1950 there were about seven hundred, and in 1951 and 1952 - less than five hundred, and the last long break amounted to more than six months - from August 9, 1951 to February 12, 1952.

But even more revealing and conclusive in this sense is

Resolution of the Bureau of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU on the work of the Bureau of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Bureau Presidium of the Council of Ministers of the USSR on November 10, 1952.

Since all his provisions are important for further narration, I will have to (and one more document adjoining it) cite in full.
So:

IV. On the work of the Bureau of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Bureau of the Presidium of the Council of Ministers THE USSR.

1. Recognize it as necessary that Comrade Malenkov G.M. focused on work in the Central Committee of the CPSU and in the Permanent Commission for Foreign Affairs under the Presidium of the Central Committee CPSU, releasing him in connection with this from the duties of Deputy Chairman USSR Council of Ministers, member of the Bureau of the Presidium and the Presidium of the USSR Council of Ministers.

2. Recognize it as necessary that Comrade Bulganin N.A. focused on work in the Permanent Commission on Defense Issues under the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU, releasing him in this regard from the duties of a member of the Bureau of the Presidium and Presidium of the Council of Ministers of

the USSR. 3. Release the secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU Comrade Khrushchev N.S. from the duties of a member Bureau of the Presidium of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, obliging him to focus on work in Moscow Party Organization and the Bureau of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU.

4. Presiding at meetings of the Bureau of the Presidium and the Presidium of the Central Committee CPSU in the absence of comrade. Stalin to assign in turn to TT. Malenkov, Khrushchev, Bulganin. Instruct them also to review and resolve current questions.

Decrees of the Central Committee of the CPSU to be issued signed by the Bureau of the Presidium of the Central Committee CPSU.

5. Presiding over meetings of the Bureau of the Presidium of the Council Ministers of the USSR and the Presidium of the Council of Ministers of the USSR in the absence of comrade. Stalin to assign in turn to the deputy chairmen of the Council of Ministers USSR vols. Beria, Pervukhin and Saburov. Instruct them also to review and solution of current issues.

Decrees and orders of the Council of Ministers of the USSR to be issued for signed by the chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR comrade. Stalin.

Protocol No. 2.

On November 17, 1952, the Decree of the Bureau of the Presidium of the Central Committee was also adopted CPSU on the work of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the CPSU:

"74. - On the work of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the CPSU. Accept the following proposal of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the CPSU: as needed depending on the urgency of the issues. Chairmanship at meetings of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the CPSU in the event of lack of goods Stalin to assign in turn to TT. Malenkov, Pegova and Suslova. Instruct them also to review and resolve current issues.

Decrees of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the CPSU to issue signed by the Secretariat Central Committee of the CPSU. Protocol No. 3.

How was all this to be understood?

The obvious lay on the surface - Stalin was no longer able to quickly consider and decide all "current affairs". And the life of a huge Power to wait and freeze I could not.

But this double decision of the Bureau of the Presidium of the Central Committee, one part of which was separated from the other by an interval of only a week, there was, as I understand it, a hidden lining. However, for the main political figures in the Kremlin, she, presumably, is not a special secret. was and gave abundant information for reflection to all.

Malenkov and Bulganin were, in fact, released from cases related to the Council of Ministers, and now

should have been engaged in work only "on the party line". Regarding the "regular" party apparatchik Malenkov, this was even more or less understandable, but Bulganin ...

Nikolai Bulganin was never a pure party worker, having started his ascension in 1937 - at the age of 36, from the post of chairman of the executive committee of the Moscow City Council, and then moving along the lines of the Council of People's Commissars and the Council of Ministers. And his actual "transfer" to the Central Committee under the preservation of the post of deputy chairman of the council of ministers could only mean the strengthening of the "council of ministers" principle of top leadership of the party. And the "concentration" on the Central Committee of Malenkov objectively pushed back to the background Khrushchev. And the procedure for chairing the Bureau of the Presidium of the Central Committee of this the second (if not the third) role of Khrushchev was fixed quite definitely, and the decision on the work of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of November 17 put forward even more in terms of party Malenkov and even more "pushed" Khrushchev.

At the same time, Khrushchev lost his positions in the USSR Council of Ministers - that is, in the highest body executive power. That is, Khrushchev and those who "bet" on Khrushchev, here it was over than to think. And then it was not yet the time - for Khrushchev - the veterinarian Kholodov appeared with his prickly letter.

It seemed that Khrushchev was gradually losing Stalin's trust - so far only in deeds economic. But after all, this could have been followed by Stalin's political disappointment in him - as it already happened in relation to Voroshilov and Molotov. Could Khrushchev and those who "bet" on him or stood behind him allow such a turn of the situation?

Zhores Medvedev in his book Stalin and the Jewish Problem. New Analysis" writes that Stalin's structure of real power in the USSR was quite well reflected in the volume of those reports of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Ministry of State Security, which were sent to certain members of the Politburo. He is reports that the following is evident from the archival documents published in the 90s... Bulganin, and on international affairs - for Vyshinsky.

Khrushchev, as we see, was not very quoted by this criterion. He is even in the Central Committee - after "concentration" of Malenkov there - was, perhaps, not the first figure, and Khrushchev was clearly pressed Suslov - even without effort on his part, but due to an unconditionally higher business potential and level of education.

With all this, the essentially double decision of the Bureau of the Presidium of the Central Committee on the actual the transfer by Stalin of his current duties to others, returned the situation to some extent to that moment of the recent October Plenum of the Central Committee, when Stalin asked to resign. Now, after November 10 and 17, 1952, he could rule but not govern. But since Stalin was in no way similar to the English king, this state of affairs could not last long. Moreover, the most logical option would be to elect Stalin as Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, followed by the final surrender of "operational" prerogatives to successors.

On January 26, 1953, the Bureau of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU met for its seventh general account of the meeting. At the second meeting, on November 10, 1952, it was decided to hold meetings of the Bureau weekly on Mondays, but this schedule is not strictly adhered to, there were gaps of two weeks, and at the end of January the turn came seventh.

If on January 9 Stalin was not in the hall, now there was a "complete set" available: all members of the Bureau of the Presidium of the Central Committee, headed by Stalin, the entire secretariat of the Central Committee and the CCP Shkiryatov.

The main thing that happened between two adjacent meetings - January 9 and January 26 1953 - there was, of course, the publication of the "doctors' case". Such, for example, a "democratic" historian as G. Kostyrchenko claims that all foreign diplomats called the "doctors' case" a "crazy story", but he himself reports that the envoy Israel in Moscow, S. Elyashiv sadly stated: "The whole mission is very saddened ... In the case

war (that's how! - S.K.) it may be decided to send all the Jews to Siberia ... "

And - not a word about the madness in the Kremlin! The well-known Moscow theater administrator Nezhny assured everyone that "this" will be used by various "pogromists" standing "at one or another steering wheel", and "they will lead the ship to destruction ..." It is unlikely that Nezhny meant the entire state "ship".

The second secretary of the British embassy argued that the report about the doctors was a continuation of the line of anti-Semitism begun at the Slansky trial. And here he was completely wrong, to clarify - the lines are not "anti-Semitism", but anti-Zionism and opposition to Anglo-Saxon imperialism.

At the end of 1952, in Czechoslovakia, there really was a trial in the case of the former General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia Rudolf Slansky. It opened on November 20, 1952, and among the fourteen defendants, former high-ranking Czechoslovak leaders, eleven were - as it was said in the message about the beginning process - "persons of Jewish origin." Moreover, at this process there were such words:

"All these traitors are related to each other by the bourgeois-Jewish past. Even joining the Czechoslovak Communist Party and taking high positions in its leadership, they always remained bourgeois nationalists, ... contacted Zionist organizations and representatives of the Israeli governments that are in fact agents of US imperialism..."

The Slansky trial was widely covered in Pravda - whole bands, and it lasted until the beginning of December 1952. Eleven out of fourteen the defendants, including Slansky, were sentenced to death on 3 December execution.

The verdict noted that Slansky "took active steps to reduce the life of the President of the Republic Klement Gottwald", having selected "for this purpose the attending physicians from medical environment, with a dark past, establishing a close relationship with them and counting use them in your enemy plans."

Gottwald, speaking after the trial at a national conference, stated:

"During the investigation and during the trial of the anti-state conspiratorial center, a new channel was opened through which betrayal and espionage infiltrate the Communist Party. This is Zionism."

Well, it was true. The post-war situation in the world evolved more and more in favor of the United States and the Golden Elite, and it was necessary to weaken as much as possible only the emerging camp of socialism, and above all - the Soviet Union. It had to be done quickly and totally. And objectively, both in the USSR and in the European countries of people's democracy, the most a simple, far-sighted and reliable option for the United States for subversion was the option "fifth column" based primarily on Jewish nationalist circles. Although, of course, not only Jewish ... Stalin understood that

countermeasures could be effective only if they will also be fast and large-scale. In addition, serious changes in general in the entire state administration - not so much in its structure, but in terms of personnel. Case in

point: on May 14, 1951, at a diplomatic reception, completely drunk Consul General of the USSR in Bratislava P.P. Razygraev, interspersing his speech with obscene words, told the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Czechoslovakia Shiroky: "Wilem, what kind of minister are you confidant of Stalin ... "Razygraev was immediately recalled to Moscow, but such "cadres" in the country had enough, and anyone could play "cards" of such play-offs. Respectively,

serious personnel purges were required - this time without mass arrests and sentences, and simply by dismissal, demotion, etc. By the way, this had a deep inner meaning. During the first years of construction socialism, the hostile strata were still quite numerous in the "top" and still had a very massive support in the "bottom". And then the purges had a forced mass character. It was a drama with elements of tragedy, aggravated by the provocations of the Trotskyists and anti-Soviet. At the same time, the Soviet government often had to deal with ideological enemies, possessing albeit alien, but - beliefs.

Now, however, the Soviet government most often had to deal with unprincipled selfish degenerates, with careerists or full-blown slobs like the ex-consul Razygraev who took a sip. Moreover, mass support in the active part of the people they didn't have. Therefore, purges at any level of their "mass character" both in scale and in punishment would be limited, affecting only those leaders and their "referents" who have become detached from the people. It came off, because by the beginning of the 50s years, the main layers of leaders in the USSR almost without exception consisted of people from people. And in most cases it was enough just to "return them to the primitive state" - in whole or in part. If we continue the dramatic analogies, then a satirical comedy comes to mind. For example - "Bath" Mayakovsky.

"The Case of Doctors" - even though it was very far from comedy - turned out to be here it is indeed "significant", although not in the sense in which the "democrats" interpret it. It was not falsified by the MGB, but was the result of very real pustular processes in Soviet society - on the whole then quite healthy. Until some point hidden from the eyes of the public, but not hidden, we note, from the highest party and state leadership, this "case" did not affect the social situation. Now, after its promulgation, it could not but become the starting point for major changes. But

who personally, except, of course, Stalin, was to lead this new extensive purge of cadres, in which the downgrading of the status of many Soviet Jews would only one of the sides of the process, and quantitatively, perhaps, not the most ambitious?

For the broad masses, this question did not arise - they are about very quick and very beneficial for the position of the masses of change simply did not know.

For the service "nomenklatura" "masses" something was clear. And those of her representatives who, for less than a dozen post-war years, as they say, got stuck, did not could not be worried. I have already spoken about this

more than once. But then what intensity should have reached by the end of January 1953, the anxiety of the metropolitan circles, which not only got stuck, but in one way or another slandered - against Soviet power, against Stalin, in the form of future gratitude from the West, whether from Stalin's successors? I mean, of course, not only Jewish nationalists and not only nationalists, but in general all the diverse representatives of the Soviet "partoplasm". Their anxiety only intensified from the fact that it manifested itself secretly.

The anxiety and nervousness of the external "inspirers" - as Stalin called them - after January 13, 1953 broke through surprisingly openly. So, in New York there were mass Jewish protest demonstrations, and Albert Einstein sent our Minister Foreign Affairs Vyshinsky an indignant telegram. In Israel,

Foreign Minister M. Sharett stated in the Knesset that the government Ben-Gurion "with deep regret and concern is watching the official launched in the Soviet Union anti-Semitic slander campaign. Note: here the fundamental possibility of what the "Kremlin" doctors were accused of was immediately rejected, but what grounds did Tel Aviv have for this? There that - got acquainted with investigation materials?

At the same time, there was not a single anti-Semitic attack in the editorial of Pravda, in it said that "the exposure of a gang of poisoning doctors is a blow to

International Jewish Zionist Organization. Looking ahead a

little, I will inform you that at the end of January and the beginning of February 1953, he himself Ben-Gurion on the pages of the largest Israeli newspaper Davar published under pseudonym for a series of articles with sharp attacks against the USSR and Stalin personally. A February 9 a bomb was thrown on the territory of the USSR mission in Tel Aviv, injuring three employees, among whom was the wife of the envoy Yershov. On February 13, the USSR broke diplomatic relations with Israel.

And all this hype was self-revealing. Well, actually! Some repressive measures against a number of Soviet Jews were taken in the post-war USSR for a long time. Chronologically, their beginning can be dated back to January 1949, when the fight against "cosmopolitanism" was unfolding. At its core, this struggle was historically and socially necessary, but sometimes the "child" was thrown out with dirty water in its course - sometimes not only Jewish professors and directors, but also intelligent specialists, quit. However, no bombs, no "journalistic" exercises by the Israeli prime minister on this has not yet been observed. And here ... The

nervous reaction of the West to the arrest of "Kremlin" doctors is better than many others proved their guilt not just in criminal negligence, but in connection with so by the Zionist circles of the West who unitedly came to their defense.

Let us return, however, to the day of January 26, 1953, in the meeting room of the Bureau of the Presidium

Central Committee ... The agenda - quite routine - included issues of reporting to the All-Union Central Committee of regional party and state bodies, discussed draft reply note to the US government on the Austrian question.

We talked about the sale of grain to Pakistan and the exchange of goods with Egypt, finalized directives to the Soviet delegations at the meeting of the Executive Committee of the World Federation trade unions and to the session of the Council of the World Federation of Democratic Youth...

The second item on the agenda was modest: "The question of monitoring special jobs." And the result of the consideration was the Resolution of the Bureau Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU on the formation of a certain "Troika":

214. – The issue of supervising special works.

Instruct the troika as part of TT. Beria (chairman), Malenkova, Bulganina management of the work of special bodies (hereinafter, all the highlights are mine. - S.K.) on special cases.

This short paper is published today in several collections of papers, and in

a note to it in the collection "The Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council of Ministers of the USSR. 1945–1953" (M., ROSSPEN, 2002) says: "Judging by the fact that the minutes of the Troika meetings have been preserved among the materials of the commission on defense issues under the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee, the Troika served as the operational governing body of this commission ..."

But is it? Firstly, all defense special work went according to plan. and there was no urgent need to change the structure of their leadership, and it did not change - in decisions of the Bureau of the Presidium of the Central Committee of November 12 and 22, 1952 were quite clearly the structure and staffing of the apparatus of the Permanent Commission on Defense Issues were determined with the number of responsible employees of 18 people and technical employees of 31 people. At the same time, the two leaders of the Commission, released by its members, in the resolutions not personally indicated, "in matters of wages and material and household provision" were equated "to the Head of Departments of the Central Committee of the CPSU", that is, they were significantly lower in status than even the secretaries of the Central Committee, not to mention the members of the Bureau Presidium of the Central Committee. Moreover, the scope of the Commission's activities included, first of all, issues Military, Naval ministries and questions of the mobilization plan.

So could the "Troika" of the three leading members of the Bureau of the Presidium of the Central Committee be the operational governing body of the Defense Commission? And what kind of work special bodies and on what such special cases (and not works) should lead this "Troika"? It seems

that four minutes of the meetings (February 2, 9, 16 and 23) of the Troika are given on this question, starting with the first, held on February 2, 1953 and determining the day and the hour of the Troika meetings (so in the documents, with a capital letter) Monday, 2 pm.

For example, on February 9, at a meeting of the Troika, decisions were made on special works on: -

the first (atomic. - S.K.) section (comrades Vannikov, Klochkov, Malenkov, Beria); - the second (uranium mining. - S.K.) section (comrades Antropov, Klochkov, Malenkov, Beria); - joint-stock company Wismuth (uranium mining in Germany. - S.K.) (comrades Sergeev, Malenkov, Beria); - the Soviet-Romanian mining society "Quartzite" (comrades Sergeev, Beria); - section "B" (systems "Berkut" and "Kometa". - S.K.) (comrades Ryabikov, Vladimirsky, Beria); -

production of an experimental batch of products 32-B (comrades Beria S.L., Vladimirsky, Malenkov, Beria L.P.); - experimental

design and research work on products "R" (rocket technology. - S.K.) (comrades Ustinov, Korolev, Nedelin, Vasilevsky, Bulganin, Malenkov, Beria). Nevertheless, it is unlikely that the true purpose of the

creation of the Troika was just defense work ... Already after the death of Stalin, on March 16, 1953, it was accepted Resolution of the Council of Ministers No. 687-355ss / op "On the management of special work", which formed the Special Committee under the Council of Ministers of the USSR consisting of: L.P. Beria (chairman); B.L. Vannikov (First Deputy Chairman), Vice-Chairmen THEM. Klochkov, S.M. Vladimirsky, members N.A. Bulganin, A.P. Zavenyagin, V.M. Ryabikov, V.A. Makhnev.

Here on this Special Committee, which was, in fact, a reproduction of the former Special Committee under the leadership of the same Beria, was entrusted with the leadership of all special works - in the nuclear industry, in the systems "Berkut" and "Comet", for long-range missiles, but - not in special cases. And already

the difference in official terminology (a thing, it should be noted, is subtle!) to assume that the management of "all special works" provided for Decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR No. 687-355ss / op and management of the "work of special bodies on Special Cases", provided for by paragraph 214 of the protocol No. 7 of the meeting of the Bureau Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU were different things. The two formulations are very different. in form as well as in meaning.

So how can all this be explained? In

search of an answer to this question, I finally drew attention to the fact that a special The "troika" was a variant of the "leading five": Beria, Bulganin, Malenkov, Stalin, Khrushchev, truncated to Khrushchev. It was on Khrushchev, because Stalin, without special reservations was implied by the head of this Troika.

But why did Stalin need it? And why

on January 9, 1953, the Minister was absent from the Bureau of the Presidium of the Central Committee state security Ignatiev? However, about Ignatiev - later, while we try to deal with mysterious "Troika", formed on January 26, 1953 at a meeting of the Bureau with the participation Stalin.

Formally, it was the same Special Committee of Beria with purely "technocratic" goals, but in fact the main systemic feature of the Troika turned out to be that within its framework activities quite legally, without arousing anyone's suspicions, could act and confer with three people: Beria, Malenkov and Bulganin. And what they were conferring about, he only knew

Stalin. At

the same time, Beria had strong ties and authority in the Ministry of Internal Affairs - the MGB and in the system of national economy.

Malenkov knew the party apparatus well and was experienced in matters of ideology and propaganda.

Bulganin, the former Minister of the Armed Forces of the USSR, was the most

other members of the Bureau of the Presidium of the Central Committee, except for Stalin, is connected

with the modern army and knew it. Now, after January 26, 1953, Beria, Malenkov and Bulganin were closely connected with each other within some legal organizational structure, the "keys" to which were with Stalin, but to which neither Khrushchev was a member - from the leading "five", nor anyone else from the Bureau of the Presidium of the Central

Committee. Everything was logical ... Molotov, Voroshilov and Mikoyan, although they were devoted to the people, "political horses" were no longer fit for workers. The reason was not even fatigue, but in the loss of a true historical perspective and social optimism.

Kaganovich was experienced, energetic and also devoted to the cause of the USSR, but at the same time too emotional and at times unrestrained. It could be connected to the process after the process "goes". Pervukhin and

Saburov were simply not yet sufficiently formed as the highest statesmen, and they, like Kaganovich, could only be included in the process of change that

has begun. Khrushchev? Well,

Khrushchev is like Khrushchev ... In the light of what was said, the Troika looked like some kind of political superorgan capable of instantly becoming a leading triumvirate under the highest Stalin. In fact, the "Troika" replaced the leading "five" and threw out Khrushchev from a trusted leadership.

Moreover, Stalin appointed Beria the chairman of the

Troika. On the one hand, it was a sign of high trust. Now there is a lot to read about that Stalin "suspected" Beria and "feared" him, that, for example, the "Mingrelian case", which affected the decayed part of the leadership of Georgia, was conceived by Stalin as a kind of "hunt" for the "Big Mingrel" Beria. I don't intend to detail

analyze this nonsense, just informing the reader that the Politburo Resolution of On March 27, 1952, the state of affairs in the Communist Party of Georgia ended with the phrase: "For participation in the work of the plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) of Georgia to send a member of the Politburo of the Central

Committee of the CPSU (b) comrade. Beria L.P.". However, even without this fact, one fact of the appointment of Beria at the end of Chairman of the Stalinist "Troika" refutes all anti-Beria insinuations. With another

On the other hand, of all the members of the Troika, Lavrenty Pavlovich was not just formally the first. Of all three, he was the only one who was a real man of action with a quick reaction. And all this promised, perhaps, really some cardinal changes in the life of the country, conceived Stalin by no means only in the field of defense projects. Of

all the three members of the Troika, Beria turned out to be, perhaps, "out of the ordinary" in that sense that he was least associated with Khrushchev. Bulganin, for example, with Khrushchev had almost friendly relations since the time of the 30s, when Khrushchev headed Moscow party organization, and Bulganin - the Moscow City Council. They were then called "fathers cities".

Was unofficially associated with Khrushchev and Malenkov, after returning Khrushchev visited Moscow at his dacha on weekends.

But then this was hardly taken into account by Stalin, and it was hardly true very significant under the living Stalin.

Yes, on the "troika" with the "root" Beria, the "coachman" Stalin could take Russia to a very tempting future, where ignoramuses like Khrushchev, slobes like the ex-consul Razygrayeva and cunning people like hardware "referents" could no longer occupy in society

serious positions!

Could this not disturb Khrushchev - to the point of panic? Could this not disturb the crafty environment of Khrushchev, whom Khrushchev has could not but be already because Khrushchev was from the entire closest circle of associates Stalin - was it the easiest to manipulate?

And, I hope, the dear reader has not forgotten about the "livestock" collision that arose in the Soviet "top" after a letter to Stalin from a veterinary technician

Kholodov ... In the previous chapter, I already said that after December 11, 1952

Khrushchev's commission was formed to develop measures to improve the situation in agriculture economy, things were going badly. But more than that, it deliberately slowed down! And I'm here I don't invent anything. In an introduction to such a solid source as a collection of documents

"The Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council of Ministers of the USSR. 1945-1953", published by the publishing house "Russian Political Encyclopedia" in 2002 with a circulation of one and a half thousand copies and mentioned by me more than once, it is said this way:

"A typical example is the extremely cautious actions the leading group of the Politburo in the preparation (on behalf of Stalin) of the draft decisions to change the system of procurement of livestock products. realizing the need for significant changes (most importantly, an increase in purchase prices), they they were just playing for time (emphasis mine. - S.K.) ... "

It should be immediately noted that the compilers of the collection, "notebook" "Russian" historians led by O. Khlevnyuk, made a number of inaccuracies here. So, after the XIX Congress, the Politburo was replaced by the Bureau of the Presidium of the Central Committee, and from the composition of the Bureau in the Khrushchev commission there were two members of the Bureau - Khrushchev himself and Mikoyan, and to talk about some kind of "leading group Politburo" in relation to the Khrushchev Commission meant, at least, to exaggerate.

Secondly, Kholodov and Stalin actually had in mind changes in the system blanks, and the production of livestock products. I don't

know whether by accident or on purpose the compilers of the collection on Kholodov's letter did not did not say a word in the introduction, as I don't know whether they accidentally or intentionally brought a problem to increase purchase prices, and not to the need for introduction in animal husbandry natural piece work. I don't

even know what they meant when they reported that Khrushchev was just dragging time. But I would like to know ... Well, really - how to understand this? You can take time it was only counting on some fundamental changes in Stalin's position, for example, counting on his death. Is not it? So, for one reason or another,

Khrushchev's commission "pulled the rubber", and in February 1953, this commission was additionally introduced ... Beria and Malenkov - two out of three Troika members.

Stalin decided that, of course, and I think that he did not decide so by chance. I also think that Khrushchev also came to the conclusion that Stalin did not decide so by chance. And if this were not Khrushchev understood, then his crafty environment would have prompted him.

That is, in February 1953, Khrushchev's position, already difficult, became even more complicated. more. And in February 1953, Khrushchev's subjective, personal interests, which are quite would answer the death of Stalin, objectively coincide with the interests of those to whom the death of Stalin was more and more necessary ... After all, the Russian "bird" - "troika" was about to start its movement towards the formation of a genuine socialist democracy, mortally dangerous for the internal bureaucratic bureaucracy and the external world plutocracy.

And start it under the leadership of Stalin!

Yes, Stalin clearly had grandiose plans, moreover, on a global scale. This

there were not ideas for exporting revolutions, but ideas for such an anti-imperialist association peoples and countries for which the USSR could become a support - at first political and military-political, and then - and economic. Stalin

once said that if Germany were "red", then it could mutually beneficial to supply "red" Russia with cars in exchange for food, and that's how it should be make your own cars.

Now Russia has learned how to make cars and could supply them to Asia, South America in exchange for food. And thereby unload the Soviet economy from the need to speed up the solution of the food problem.

On February 7, 1953, Stalin received the Ambassador of Argentina, Leopold Bravo, who returned to Moscow after a four-year break. Here is part of the record of this most interesting 40 minute conversation:

"Bravo declares that it is a great honor for him and a great pleasure in visiting the Generalissimo and that this visit will remain with him in memory for life.

Stalin notes that the reception of ambassadors is his duty, his duty ... that the USSR is interested in trade with Argentina ...

Bravo reports that...he...expresses his admiration for the enormous construction being carried out in the Soviet Union ... Stalin

says that it is impossible to force the people to build, but the Soviet people themselves want to build, and this facilitates construction. Bravo notes that Argentine President Perón has also launched a movement for

country's independence.

Stalin asks: isn't Argentina at present an independent country?

Bravo replies that Argentina is an independent country, but what happened before in the country there were many foreign imperialist monopolies... President Perón started a campaign for nationalization... Declares that without economic there is no independence and no freedom. Stalin agrees with this ... "

This conversation is of interest to everyone. Let's say, earlier, before the war, Stalin very rarely accepted ambassadors, especially ambassadors of such non-leading countries in the world as Argentina. And this new the post-war role of Stalin also increased the account of the hatred of the developed West towards him.

Stalin spoke with Bravo about very real areas of cooperation, including supplies meat from Argentina in exchange for wagons and cars that would allow Argentina get rid of dependence on England. Stalin also said that "Latin American countries should unite" and "form something like the United States South America..."

After all, this was a direct encroachment on one of the ancient "sacred cows" of US foreign policy, the Monroe Doctrine, which proclaims the principle of "America for Americans." In words, they meant all of America for all Americans, but in reality - all America is for North Americans only. And here

is another interesting part of the conversation, especially in light of the topic of this book:

"Bravo says that he is very glad to see Generalissimo Stalin in good health, cheerful and cheerful. Stalin asks what can cause such joy, what benefit he brought to Argentina?

Bravo says that Stalin is the man that people think of everything of the world, and not only communists, a person who interests everyone, about whom everything they ask whose books they read and whose sayings guided.

Stalin remarks that the ambassador is obviously exaggerating.

Bravo says that his words are from the heart..."

On February 17, Stalin received the Indian Ambassador K. Menon and had a long talk with him. Moreover, according to Menon, Stalin, despite his seventy-three years, looked a perfectly healthy person.

That is, two foreigners, without saying a word, noted a good - let's say - tone Stalin. If it were otherwise, they, presumably, would simply remain diplomatically silent - after all, they, being diplomats, knew how to do it professionally. However, Bravo and Menon found it possible to note the peppy appearance of Stalin, which he says, taking into account the events the coming weeks, about many things. There was no reason to assume any catastrophe. Yes, health problems could not disappear - age is age, and past overload had an effect. But Stalin rested and at the beginning of 1953 was, as we see, age in sufficient shape. The time for action was approaching.

There is no doubt - Stalin's health was fooling around, otherwise he would not have asked to resign from two highest government posts at once. If he defined the work of the minister as "peasant" in terms of their workload, then how was it necessary to determine the workload of the Chairman Council of Ministers?! However, Stalin's departure from the posts of the General Secretary and the Presovmin was by no means meant his retirement. Assuming the position of official head of state, he would have retained strategic leadership, transferring operational-tactical leadership to others, most likely to Beria and Malenkov.

So, the "Troika" was harnessed, the "coachman" was moderately cheerful. And, as Stalin believed, already in the near future it will be possible to deal with both the new "fifth column" and played out play games, and with the strangely sluggish actions of the Minister of State Security Ignatiev, and with Khrushchev, who stopped "catching mice", and with many other things and with whom.

February is coming to an end, winter is coming to an end. "On the nose" was a new spring. And Stalin expected that it would be a spring, active and successful both for him and for Russia...

Chapter Thirteen

13th department of the GRU

Manly Palmer Hall's now almost forgotten book was published in 1928. "An Encyclopedic Exposition of Masonic, Hermetic, Kabbalistic and Rosicrucian symbolic philosophy. Here is a quote from it:

"The meaning of the mystical number 13, which often appears on the Great Seal of the United States, not limited to the number of colonies of which the United States have been compiled. The sacred emblem of the ancient initiates, here consisting of 13 stars, also appears above the head of the "eagle".

The motto contains 13 letters, as does the inscription. "Eagle" holds in its right paw a branch with 13 leaves and berries, and in the left paw a bunch of 13 arrows ... "

This figure is interesting - the number 13, the right word! But sometimes she turns around and against those who love her. After all, the Hermetic symbolism is now known not only to the Rosicrucians. One way or another, it was on January 13, 1953 that the "doctors' case" was made public.

On January 26, 1953, the Troika was formed from Beria, Malenkov and Bulganin. And on January 27, 1953, the writer Ilya Ehrenburg, among other laureates for 1952, received International Stalin Prize "For strengthening peace between peoples", awarded to him on December 20, 1952 - on the eve of Stalin's birthday.

Awarding the Peace Prize to Ehrenburg, an active figure in the movement of supporters world, was quite logical. However, in that it was awarded on December 20, 1952

the most famous Soviet Jew on the eve of the anti-Zionist action on January 13, 1953, there was, of course, a "significant" hint that the policy of the USSR leadership did not notorious "anti-Semitic" connotation.

By the way, although in the course of the Slansky trial, the aspect of malicious acts doctors and arose, they executed not doctors, but their "customers". And this already allowed to suggest that the outcome of the undoubtedly close Moscow trial of the "Kremlin" doctors would have been a minimum of death sentences. They were inevitable - through fault, but endured they would, presumably, those who were most obviously guilty, like, say, Professor Vinogradov and head of LSUK Yegorov. And another big question, would these sentences brought into execution.

But a close trial in the "doctors' case" would most likely foreshadow another process similar to the Slansky process. And who knows - would not be his main figure Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev, together with the former Minister of State Security Ignatiev? After all, after "accession" of Khrushchev, the central archives were subjected to a uniform pogrom - for the first time in history of the USSR, but, alas, not for the last time.

There are circumstances not often noticed by many ... Say, on

August 21, by the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR for employees bodies of state security, general military ranks were abolished and instead of them special ranks were reintroduced - instead of the military "lieutenant" - "lieutenant State Security, etc. and a new uniform. At the same time, surcharges were removed from the officers of the State Security Service for military ranks and a number of benefits. As a result, the salary of an average cadet, for example, the Higher School of the Ministry of State Security, decreased by about a third - from 1200 to 800 rubles.

What caused it? Perhaps Stalin saw the need for reorganization and reduction of the MGB, but it is possible that *someone* cleverly arranged the matter in such a way that the number of dissatisfied people immediately increased sharply in the "organs". In the same Higher School of the MGB, it re cadet unrest.

Noteworthy is the agenda of two meetings of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU - 1 and 2, December 1952. The agenda for December 1 included the following questions: a) On sabotage in medical practice. b) Information about the situation in the USSR Ministry of State Security.

On December 4, two issues were also considered:

- Information on the supply of food products to cities and regions. - On the situation in the Ministry of State Security of the USSR and on sabotage in the medical business.

Transcripts of these meetings - if they survived at all - to this day are not published. However, more than a decade ago, excerpts from diary of a member of the Presidium of the Central Committee V.A. Malyshev, who outlined some of said by Stalin on December 1. These notes are so significant that I have to bring them fully:

"T. Stalin. 1.XII.

The more success we have, the more enemies will try to harm us. Our people forgot about this under the influence of our great successes. complacency, arrogance, arrogance.

Any Jew is a nationalist, an agent of the Americas. intelligence."

Here it is necessary to immediately clarify that Stalin spoke to a very high-status audience and understood that they would understand him correctly, that is, not in the sense that one should suspect and "press" any Jew, but in the sense that it is from the Jews of the secret services of the West through Zionist connections, they can most easily receive information. And a continuation records of Malyshev proves that Stalin, of course, drew a line between Jews and Jewish Nationalists:

“Nazi Jews believe that their nation was saved by the United States (there you can become rich man, bourgeois, etc.). They consider themselves indebted to the Americans. There are many Jewish nationalists among the doctors...”

And here is what Stalin said further about the department of Ignatiev:

“Unfavorable in the GPU. The vigilance was blunted. They themselves admitted that they were sitting in manure, in a hole. You need to treat your GPU. Ministers should be politicians and intelligence officers. T. Stalin

The GPU is not free from danger for all organizations - complacency from good luck, dizziness. There

is one means - control and criticism. Here, in the GPU, they hid behind a special secrecy and these means were not used. The Chekists themselves also did not have desires.

It is necessary to create some forms of control and verification. Revive primary. party organizations (cells). Cells sing

praises to the leadership of the MGB. Any initiative at the cells taken away. They have no rights, they sit at the head of the cells of sycophants. This must be ended. We must give her the right to criticize the authorities, so that anyone has the right to criticize (limits of criticism).

Report of the regional leadership to the regional committees. Central Committee control over the work of the MGB. Laziness and corruption have deeply touched the MGB...”

There was something to think about both the head of the MGB and those of his employees whom he brought to MGB Ignatiev and who atoned for the lack of professionalism with fawning? And then Stalin added "information for thought" ...

I mean the creation within the framework of the USSR Ministry of State Security of the united Chief Intelligence Directorate, which was created on the initiative of Stalin and lasted, in fact, no longer than until the death of Stalin. His fleeting history so little known that at the mention of this GRU subconsciously associates him with the Army Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff, although the "Chekist" GRU had nothing to do with that GRU. On December

30, 1952, a resolution was adopted by the Bureau of the Presidium of the Central Committee BP7 / 12 on the basis of which Ignatiev on January 5, 1953 issued an order on the MGB No. 006, which read:

**“In accordance with the decision of the Instance of December 30, 1952
I ORDER:**

1. Create in the MGB of the USSR the Main Intelligence Directorate on the basis of merger of the existing 1st (intelligence. - S.K.) and 2nd (counterintelligence. - S.K.) of the Main Directorates, including also in the Main Intelligence Directorate Bureau No. 1, Radio Intelligence Division, Division operational equipment, department "D" (manufacturing and examination of operational documents. - S.K.), the first department of the 4th department (search. - S.K.), the first department of the 5th department (secret-political. - S.K.), the first and third departments 7th department (surveillance). 2. Appoint:

Head of the

Main Intelligence Directorate of the USSR Ministry of State Security - the first Deputy Minister of State Security of the USSR Comrade Ogoltsov S.I. Head of the Directorate for Intelligence Abroad - Comrade Pitovranov E.P.

**Head of the Office for Counterintelligence within the country - Deputy
Minister of State Security of the USSR Comrade Ryasny V.S.
Minister of State Security of the USSR S. Ignatiev.**

All three leaders of the new GRU, unlike the minister, were professional Chekists of the Beria temper and, in addition, worked closely at one time with arrested in 1951 by former Minister of State Security Abakumov. 53-year-

old Sergey Ivanovich Ogoltsov became Ignatiev's first deputy on November 20 1952 upon his return from Uzbekistan, where he headed the republican MGB.

38-year-old Evgeny Petrovich Pitovranov, who came to the MGB for mobilization The CPSU (b) in 1938, being a deputy minister, was arrested in October 1951 for case of Abakumov and was under arrest until November 1952.

49-year-old Vasily Stepanovich Ryasnoy, first deputy in 1946-1952 Minister of State Security Abakumov, and before the new appointment was what he was - the head counterintelligence of the MGB and "just" the deputy minister.

I will report on the further fate of Ogoltsov a little later, what about the two the latter, their fate was different. Both, after the arrest of Beria, initially remained in the Ministry of Internal Affairs, but both were downgraded. Pitovranov was sent to the GDR as a "liaison officer" with the Stasi, the secret service of the GDR. In 1956 he was promoted to lieutenant general, but in 1966 he was already retired from the KGB at the age of 51. He died in 1999, having managed, however, in the 70-80s direct the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of the USSR.

Ryasnoy from May 28, 1953 to March 30, 1956 was the head of the Moscow Department of Internal Affairs and Moscow region, then he was removed, transferred to the head of construction Volga-Baltic Canal, and three months later - on July 5, 1956 - they were fired from the Ministry of Internal Affairs "for discrediting facts. Ryasnoy died in 1995. In 1953, before

these sad changes in the fate of the leaders of the new GRU, there were still far. Abakumov was in prison, but the fact that after the creation on the initiative Stalin in the MGB of the new head office, the influence in the MGB of Abakumov's former employees is growing, Ignatiev's wrinkles, no doubt, have added. At the same time, the creation of the GRU MGB Stalin actually created between Ignatiev and the operational work of the MGB, if necessary, two barriers called "Pitovranov-Ryasnoy" and "Ogoltsov". At the same time, the GRU MGB The USSR was, in fact, an organization within an organization and, again, with necessary, could for some period perform all the most important functions "big" MGB, replacing it.

So on January 5, 1953, Ignatiev signed order No. 006, and already on January 9, 1953 was absent from the "anti-Zionist" meeting of the Bureau of the Presidium of the Central Committee as a result of either really a heart attack, or a "diplomatic heart attack". The last one is even more it is likely that on December 4, 1952 at a meeting of the Presidium of the Central Committee on the state of affairs in the MGB it was not Ignatiev who reported, but his deputy Goglidze, who was also at the meeting

Bureau of the Presidium of the Central Committee January 9.

Ignatiev, however, fell ill with something - at least for the sake of appearance, because on January 27, 1953 special message No. 317 / and he reported to Stalin: "... after an illness, I set to work." In fact, after a heart attack, they don't enter service so quickly, and if they do, they don't live long. Ignatiev, after 1953, lived exactly thirty years! In his report dated January 27, Ignatiev

informed Stalin that he "joined the work team for the further opening and investigation of enemy activities terrorist doctors and their criminal connections, on the organization of intelligence work in accordance with instructions of the Central Committee, the liquidation of the nationalist underground and its armed gangs in western regions of Ukraine, Belarus and the Baltic Soviet republics, according to selection and more expedient placement of personnel ... freeing itself at the same time from people who have become lazy, decomposed and have lost their sense of duty to the party.

But these were words ... The essence of Ignatiev's true deeds from the spring of 1952 to the spring of 1953

years is still unclear to me personally.

One way or another, hot time was coming ... Below I will give only one, previously promised by me, a brief fragment of the voluminous special messages No. 1880 / and dated January 5, 1952, where Ignatiev reported to Stalin about completion of the investigation into the case of the anti-Soviet terrorist organization, consisting of Jewish youth. It was

about a group led by Boris Slutsky, which since August 1950 systematically gathered for illegal meetings and prepared for terrorist attacks etc. So far, these were only conversations, but at one time the conversations of the Socialist-Revolutionaries ended the creation of a very serious detachment of militants and a series of high-profile political assassinations.

As for the nature of the intentions, it was visible at least from such a place of communication Ignatieva:

Speaking about the positive attitude of the accused ELGISSER to tactics individual terror, FURMAN, at a confrontation with her on December 4, 1951, testified:

"... ELGISSER, echoing my slanderous fabrications, declared: "Yes, this cannot go on for a long time, the leaders of the party and the Soviet governments... must be destroyed..."

<...>

... in August 1950, GUREVICH, in a conversation with SLUTSKII and FURMAN, which took place in SLUTSKOY's apartment, suggested that they "in order to achieve the greatest effect" to organize the explosion of the depot of the Moscow Metro..."

This was not an invention of the investigators - it was possible to invent something more effective, for example, attempts to establish contacts with the Zionists from the Joint, with Wehrmacht special services, etc. However, in the indictment there is nothing like sixteen young citizens of the USSR - fourteen Jews and Jewish women and two Russian girls - were not charged. Among them were the children of the repressed, but no one was an outcast society: twelve - students of universities in Moscow, Leningrad, Ryazan, originally from Moscow, Leningrad, Kyiv, Odessa, Astrakhan and even from New York. Plus - four prosperous Moscow schoolgirls. Almost all of them were born in 1931-1933... The generation of the future "Khrushchev" "thaw".

These were representatives of a stratum not numerous, but dangerous. If these young potential terrorists were not arrested in time and if people came out to them older and more experienced, then anything could happen. And although the Slutsky group was not purely nationalistic, with its logical development, it would certainly become such. To

illustrate the possible development of events, I will also acquaint the reader with excerpts from Ignatiev's special message No. 5589 / and dated April 9, 1952, where the minister informed Stalin about the testimony of the person arrested in the People's Republic of China white emigrant I.I. Varfolomeev, Japanese, and then "by inheritance" - American spy. back in China, he was completely exposed by material evidence and materials secret listening to his conversations with resident Yu Zongbing, which, as he wrote Ignatiev, were received by the MGB from "Chinese

friends". I note that, using only this special report by Ignatiev as a basis, one can write a poignant political novel—quite entertaining and quite realistic.

Varfolomeev, in particular, was associated in China with his old, since the time civil war, friend, American intelligence officer P.A. Rogalsky. Rogalsky, periodically appearing in China, lived in New York since 1940, worked in one of the banks and was married to the daughter of a certain Hartman, who held the position of senior secretary with financial magnate Pierre Samuel Dupont.

Ignatiev reported:

“... ROGALSKY told VARFOLOMEYEV that around the financial DUPONT tycoon Pierre Samuel is grouped by American billionaires who make up the so-called "financial center" that directs US foreign and domestic policy. As part of this "center", according to ROGALSKY, includes: brother of DUPONT P.S. — DUPONT Lammoth, who is Honorary Vice President (National Association of Industrialists of the USA), Owen Young - Chairman of the Board (General Electric Company) and ABRAMS D.V. - President (Standard Oil Company of New Jersey).

ROGALSKY also informed Varfolomeev that he supported friendly relations with Colonel MAKIPHERSON and Generals L.E. MEEM and TWINING, who hold powerful positions in the War Department USA.

Friendship with these persons, as well as connection with HARTMAN gave opportunity for ROGALSKY to receive information from them on a number of important questions...”

Mentioned in the testimony of Varfolomeev and the intelligence officer of the Vatican - the head of the French missionaries in northern China, Cardinal de Vienne. All

this was interesting, but then it was even more interesting:

“... In particular, from these persons ROGALSKY allegedly became aware of that in 1949 the American military attache General O'DANIEL sent to the US War Department, the so-called plan (internal strike), proposing to fire (at the time of the attack on the USSR. - S.K.) with the help of new (silent) ejectors the territory of the Kremlin with large bombs destructive force, developing a high temperature during the explosion.

As an attachment to his "plan," O'DANIEL allegedly sent to Washington detailed plan of the Kremlin showing the location of members' apartments Soviet government, bomb shelters and power plants received O'DANIEL through undercover means ... "

According to Rogalsky, this plan had powerful supporters in the "center" of Dupont and in administration of the United States, including President Truman, but there were also a number of opponents in the State Department. But the first ones were more decisive.

However, although O'Daniel performed after returning to the United States in August 1950 in American press with anti-Soviet articles, the US "hawks" were already afraid "frontal", "power" solutions to the "Russian" problem. But

Varfolomeev, according to Rogalsky, said that “in 1949 the American the embassy in Moscow was instructed to take special account of all more or less prominent party and Soviet workers, who, according to the Americans, from outside "offenses" were inflicted on the Soviet government (removal from responsible posts, demotion service, etc.), and find opportunities to involve them in work in favor of the United States ... "

Already from all this it was possible to understand that the main trends in the policy of the West towards attitude towards the USSR and the socialist camp were determined - hidden, but energetic and if possible, total subversive work and the search for "agents of influence". Stalin saw

the danger of such tendencies more acutely than others, but how he intended to counteract them within the framework of the activities of the Soviet special services?

In the famous "Protocols of Soviet Wise Men" by the famous renegade Grigory Klimov a certain 13th department of the KGB appears. But in the real KGB of the USSR, such a department seems to never did not

have. But it was formed - according to some historians - in the structure of the 2nd Directorate of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Ministry of State Security of the USSR. And the task of this 13th -

The "anti-Zionist" department was supposedly assigned to fight the Jewish "fifth column" inside the country.

If this was true, then, judging by the number of the department, Stalin was well understood the "games" of the Masonic "brothers in aprons", to which the department number is unequivocally and hinted.

However, one of the competent historians of Soviet intelligence in a conversation with me claimed that there was no 13th department in the GRU MGB. This, they say, is a "duck" ...

Well, let's look at the situation, taking one and the other in turn for reliable statement.

Let's say it really is a "duck". But they do not launch it into public circulation yellow tabloids. Information about the 13th department of the GRU MGB comes from serious professional historians. If the

13th department of the GRU did not exist in nature, then why would historians, quite loyal to domestic Jewish circles, claim that there was such a department? Vladimir

Mayakovsky rightly remarked: "If the stars are lit, then this is someone need ... "So who needs to light false beacons in a sea of historical information, where Are there enough such false beacons? Why is this project being created at a high academic level? another "horror story"?

One of the two ...

Or the 13th department of the GRU, whose task was to fight the Jewish "fifth column" inside the country, was created with the sanction of Stalin (it could not have been otherwise) in the structure of the GRU MGB, although in the order of the Minister of the MGB No. 006 of 05.01 .53 nothing was said about this.

And then all the more one should not be surprised that Stalin had to live after that less than eight weeks. Then we have the right, at least as a version, to put forward a correct assumption about the involvement in the death of Stalin, including the Jewish "fifth column" inside the country.

The second option: the 13th department of the GRU, whose task was to fight the Jewish "fifth column" inside the country, Stalin did not create. But then we have the right at least as a version to put forward a correct assumption that, including the myth of supposedly sinister 13th "anti-Semitic" department, someone wants to retroactively justify the physical elimination of Stalin.

So Arno Lustiger confidently declares that "only the death of the dictator on March 5, 1953, about the circumstances of which there are different hypotheses, saved many thousands of Jews and led to the release of doctors. But such a statement is almost identical with the recognition the existence of at least an indirect "Jewish" trace in the circumstances of death Stalin.

Yes, when the number "13" interferes with the matter, the matter always turns out

to be dark. Take, for example, the role of Beria in the liquidation of the "case of doctors." What was she like here? Any historian, answering this question, will immediately refer to the note of the Minister of the cases L.P. Beria dated April 1, 1953 to the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU on the rehabilitation of persons involved in the so-called case of pest doctors, which was followed by The resolution of the Presidium of the Central Committee of April 3, which closed this case and completely rehabilitated doctors and members of their families "in the amount of 37 people."

But it turns out strange - very persistently "democratic" historians submit "bloody" - in all other cases, except for one more - the "executioner" of Beria as a benefactor "innocent victims" in snow-white robes ... sorry, in medical gowns.

Why did it

happen? And how to understand the strange inconsistency of one place in the uncorrected transcript Khrushchev's speeches at the Anti-Beria Plenum of the Central Committee in July 1953 (see collection documents "Lavrenty Beria. 1953" of the 1999 edition, p. 92) and in the corrected "verbatim" report of the plenum intended for typographic reproduction (Ibidem, p. 233)?

The uncorrected transcript says:

"An interesting detail, I noticed. I find it a shameful deal with doctors, the Georgian case is a disgrace. We, members of the Presidium, among ourselves We spoke several times, I spoke to Lavrenty (emphasis mine. - S.K.). I got a letter to the Central Committee, of course, from Colonel General Kryukov, and Zhukov received this letter. I showed the Presidium of the Central Committee, we need to consider ... ", etc.

In the "shorthand" report, this place looks like this:

"Pay attention to this detail. After the announcement of the shameful case of "pests doctors", about the same shameful Georgian case, I a letter was received at the Central Committee from a Colonel General sentenced to 25 years Kryukov. Marshal Zhukov received the same letter. I sent this letter to the members Presidium, including Beria ... "

A comparison of the two places shows that the key phrase dropped out of the report: "We, members of the Presidium, they spoke to each other several times, I spoke to Lavrenty.

Why was this important phrase omitted? Is it because Khrushchev let slip in his oratorical ardor that the actual, and did not the official initiative to end the "doctors' case" come not from Beria, but from him -

Khrushchev ?! But why should someone from the very beginning of falsification of the meaning of life and act Beria, back in 1953, it was unprofitable to link the initiative to revise the "doctors' case" with in the name of Khrushchev and profitably - with the name of Beria?

Why do they so willingly give up such an advantageous initiative in the eyes of the "democrats" "Executioner" Beria - in any case, willingly push him to the fore?

Is it because otherwise, for an attentive analyst, it would float out into the light of God the connection between Khrushchev and the "doctors-poisoners"?

As for Beria, he, as I understand it, simply had to give in to Khrushchev's pressure and Khrushchevites, to concede in a visible way, for resistance was then mortally dangerous. Deadly in the truest sense of the word! And, logically, who should have officially raise the issue of rehabilitation, if not the head of the Ministry of Internal Affairs? After all, operationally only he had investigative information. Beria can be

understood. Stalin died a strange death. In the Lechsanupra of the Kremlin, obviously something is wrong. Someone was arrested, but someone could stay. With the Security Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs not everything is fine either ... What was left for Beria to do, how not to allegedly demonstrate loyalty and lull the vigilance of the poisoners, "showing" the "initiative"? At the same time, it is possible that the very date of the note to the Presidium of the Central Committee - April 1 - was Beria's hidden allusion to his true attitude towards her (note). The same note "about doctors "Beria insured himself and got the opportunity to postpone the analysis of this case for more quiet time. And we

must not forget that even two, at least, weeks after death Stalin, the investigation into the "doctors' case", launched in the MGB Ignatiev, in the Ministry of Internal Affairs - MGB Beria was not curtailed and continued as before. But the anti-Zionist propaganda associated with this "case" was stopped immediately after the death of Stalin, and this concerned first of all, the organ of the Central Committee of the CPSU "Pravda". The Central Committee is Khrushchev, Pravda is not yet Shepilov, who joined them. Beria never had anything to do with propaganda, and he never had a strong position in the press. So, one

wonders, Beria initiated at the highest level a revision of the attitude towards "the cause of doctors" or Khrushchev and the Khrushchevites?

In the development of thought, I will additionally inform the reader that in 1995 General Mikhail Stepanovich Dokuchaev, who for a long time was a member of the leadership of the 9th Directorate of the KGB of the USSR,

testified:

“After Stalin’s death, by releasing doctors from investigation and declaring amnesty mainly to criminals (Beria suggested releasing women, the sick and the elderly. - S.K.), Khrushchev appeared before everyone as a hero ... ”

An interesting interpretation of Khrushchev's role in the "case of doctors", isn't it? In the same case that today the “democrats” are putting forward the “liberator” of poisoning doctors Beria, there is, I repeat once again, a deep meaning. After all, the doctors were actually guilty of both at least in the most severe, criminally unforgivable medical errors. And the one who liberated, willy-nilly gave reason to believe that he may be related to death of Stalin.

The “democrats” expose Beria as the murderer of Stalin. And to confirm this heinous and the false "version" they "whitewash" Beria in the case with the doctors - "whitewash" in order to pour black paint over him in the case of Stalin's death.

Moreover, the "whistleblowers" of the "executioner", "sadist" and "monster" Beria made him in our days and another rehabilitation "curtsey" by publishing a note from the Minister of the Interior Affairs of the USSR L.P. Beria to the Presidium of the Central Committee of April 2, 1953 on bringing to criminal responsibility of those responsible for the murder of S.M. Mikhoels and V.I. Golubova. And this the historical "generosity" of the "democrats" towards Beria is also suspicious. Very much he is persistently credited with the glory of the “liberator of doctors” and “exposer” of “murderers Mikhoels”. This is all the more strange since it is possible that the notes about Mikhoels Beria did not write at all, and she is the latest Khrushchev falsification. In

confirmation of the latest version, I will briefly report the following. In the "note of Beria" in the organization of the "murder of Mikhoels" with links to direct the testimony of those arrested was accused by the Minister of State Security of the USSR Abakumov, Deputy Minister of State Security USSR Ogoltsov and an employee of the USSR Ministry of State Security Shubnyakov, who allegedly liquidated Mikhoels and Golubova at the country dacha of the Minister of State Security of the Byelorussian SSR Tsanova.

What is the fate of all four? But what is...

Abakumov Viktor Semenovich, born in 1908, Minister of State Security in 1946-1951 USSR, in July 1951 arrested. Condemned by the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR on December 19, 1954 to capital punishment. Shot.

Sergey Ivanovich Ogoltsov, born in 1900, actively developed the “doctors' case”, in April 1953 he was arrested at the direction of Beria, in August 1953, after his arrest and murder of Beria, released by decision of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU. Dismissed in January 1954 from the state security agencies to the reserve and expelled from the party. In April 1959 he was deprived military rank of lieutenant general. Died in 1977.

Lavrenty Fomich Tsanova (Dzhandzhava), born in 1900, lieutenant general, from October 1951 to February 1952 - Deputy Minister of the State Security Service of the USSR and at the same time - Head of the Second (Counterintelligence) Main Directorate of the Ministry of State Security of the USSR. February 1952 removed from office. On April 4, 1953, he was arrested and in April 1955 (for more exact data, 10/12/55), while under investigation, committed suicide in Butyrka Prison Hospital.

F.G. Shubnyakov, born in 1916, in 1951 the head of the Second Chief Department of the Ministry of State Security of the USSR, in 1951-1953 he was under arrest in the case of Abakumov, in 1953-1954 Deputy Head of the First Main Directorate of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR, then Deputy Head of the Second Main Directorate of the KGB of the USSR. my further destiny unknown. He died in 1998 (!) year.

Isn't it - unexpected biographies for such "main killers" of Mikhoels as Ogoltsov and Shubnyakov?

By the way, speaking to the activists of the Leningrad party organization in May 1954, neither the USSR Prosecutor General Rudenko - May 6, nor the first secretary of the Central Committee Khrushchev - May 7, summing up the results of the "investigation" of the history of the "Leningrad case" and densely slandering not so much on the "organizer" of this case, Abakumov - then still alive, but on Beria - then already killed, not a word was said about such a "crime" of Abakumov as organizing the murder of Mikhoels. So did Beria write

a note on Mikhoels or did he not? And if he wrote, was he himself Are you sure you signed? And was not this note - if Beria even signed it, another tactical move on his part?

Finally, is further evidence needed that Miholels-Vovsi was not killed? at the direction of Stalin, but was vulgarly hit by a truck along with Golubov, with whom, presumably, he walked, embracing closely - for mutual maintenance of balance - along the dark deserted street of post-war Minsk. After all, if it were otherwise, why neither Ogoltsov nor Shubnikov were not punished for a serious criminal act allegedly committed by them?

I don't know if a certain 13th department was really created in the short-lived GRU MGB, but I think that he would be useful in the MGB.

As for the GRU itself, Beria, having replaced the Minister of State Security Ignatiev and Minister of the Interior Kruglov, and becoming the head of the combined Ministry of Internal Affairs - the MGB, abolished the freshly minted GRU, again dividing it into separate intelligence and counterintelligence department. But this was understandable - Stalin needed the GRU as his support in the MGB. Beria did not need such support. On the contrary, redundant the management structure prevented him from exercising operational control over the work Chekists.

And such control was all the more necessary because the "legacy" after Ignatiev Beria got not the best, but the role of the Security Department in the events around the death of Stalin looked strange and suspicious.

Chapter Fourteen

Who will guard the watchmen themselves?

I will start this chapter with a fragment from the special message of Minister of State Security Viktor Abakumov Stalin No. 6523/a dated March 1, 1950:

"... I ask for your permission to consider in the Military Collegium of the Supreme court of the USSR and sentenced to death Ivan Ivanovich FEDOSEEV, a former employee of the Main Directorate of Security of the USSR Ministry of State Security, accused of suspicion (the emphasis hereinafter is mine. - S.K.) in espionage activities.

The investigation established that FEDOSEEV, being on a particularly important object of protection, for a number of years secretly read secret documents of state importance and blurted out their content in conversations with colleagues and their relatives.

FEDOSEEV repeatedly took state documents to his office. apartment and left them there for a long time. Fedoseev treated his official duties criminally. In addition, FEDOSEEV, sharing with his wife his impressions of a trip to Potsdam, spoke positively about the conditions of life in Nazi Germany and praising Hitler...

Fedoseev, apparently, was part of Stalin's guard! And this means: preliminary selection, a series of thorough checks, service in less responsible places and - as a manifestation

special confidence of the state - admission to the protection of

its head. Nevertheless, Fedoseev turned out to be at least a slob, his fate is completely deserving. Well, even the Latins rightly asked: "Quis custodiat ipsos custodes? (Who will guard the watchmen themselves?)". It was

somewhat strange, however, that Abakumov considered it necessary to shoot Fedoseev without a serious development of ties, but perhaps the minister wanted after the disclosure "Arts" Fedoseev to punish him as quickly as possible - to admonish others. After all Fedoseev chatted with his colleagues for years, but the leadership did not immediately find out about this. However, it was not easy for Fedoseev's colleagues to separate idle conversations in a trusted circle from criminal chatter.

In 1951, the arrested Abakumov was replaced by Ignatiev. What are the security changes? Stalin occurred under him? Perhaps the most serious was that the guards of Stalin was soon seriously weakened due to the removal of two of its most experienced leaders. That's how it was. Until May

1952, the Main Directorate of Security (GUO) of the MGB was headed by the famous Lieutenant General Nikolai Vlasik - he founded it in 1946. However, in May, Vlasik, the tried and tested head of Stalin's personal security since 1935, in the department of Ignatiev deftly framed - they say, Vlasik "permitted criminal waste and lack of control in spending funds." And obviously in order to arouse the wrath of Stalin, they painted him a picture of Vlasik's terrible "decomposition" with a list of his numerous mistresses. I will note in brackets that, rather embellished, this list of "note" Moscow whores will then be useful to the Khrushchevites for the moral discrediting of Beria.

The 56-year-old aging Vlasik really got a little confused in his "wide" life, although I didn't put quotation marks here for nothing - people close to Stalin don't go on special sprees fell. Nevertheless, Vlasik, in accordance with the Decree of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks of May 19, 1952, was removed from the post of head of the GDO, removed from the Collegium of the MGB, expelled from and sent to the disposal of the "neighboring" Ministry of Internal Affairs "for appointment as deputy chief camp management in the mountains. Asbestos of the Sverdlovsk region. In parentheses, I note that for some reason it was to Asbest that he was exiled after the June plenum of the Central Committee of 1957 and L.M. Kaganovich - manager of the Soyuzasbest

trust. On May 23, 1952, the GUO was transformed into simply the Security Directorate (UO), and the Minister of State Security was appointed its head "in combination" Ignatiev, as it was said in the Decree of the Central Committee, - "temporarily." But this "temporarily" lasted for some reason until the very day of Stalin's death.

So, instead of Vlasik, unconditionally devoted to Stalin, to "lead" the protection of Stalin became Ignatiev. At the same time, the Deputy Minister of State Security of the USSR Rjasnoy was approved by the Central Committee as Deputy Minister of State Security of the USSR - also "temporarily".

But even before Vlasik, in 1950, the 42-year-old Major General Sergei Fedorovich Kuzmichev. He is very little known, and that in itself proves that things are not clean with the death of Stalin - very much for bad thoughts leads a comparison of the fates of two guards close to Stalin in the years preceding his death. It is impossible to silence the name of Vlasik, so the name of Kuzmichev was silenced.

But in 1946, during the formation of the Main Directorate for the Protection of the MGB, the 1st Directorate The GUO, which provided direct protection for Stalin, was headed by Kuzmichev. In 1948 he was appointed authorized representative of the USSR Council of Ministers for the resorts of Sochi - Matsesta, in fact controlling Stalin's resting places - not everything was safe there.

Since 1949, Kuzmichev returned to the GUO to the same position. Organization of security the first person in the state is full of subtleties, and those who know them, move to another place unnecessarily inappropriate. Nevertheless, Kuzmichev was transferred in 1950 deputy head of the Department of the Ministry of State Security of the Bryansk region, and in 1952 they were generally withdrawn from the MGB system - like Vlasik, and just like Vlasik, they are transferred to the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs - the deputy head of the Dubravny camp of the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

December 16, 1952 under the pretext of investigating certain circumstances in the case "Group of Abakumov - Shvartsman" Vlasik was arrested and transferred to Moscow. And although from his testimony, it was immediately clear that Vlasik's fault consisted only in the fact that he handed over Timashuk's letter dated August 29, 1948 on the same day to Abakumov, without reading, Vlasik did not released. And

in January 1953, like Vlasik, Kuzmichev was arrested. That is, Ignatiev the last months of Stalin's life isolated from the outside world those two people who they were best acquainted with the organization of Stalin's guards and with the people who guarded him. After all, while remaining at large, Vlasik and Kuzmichev could either pay attention to strange moments and unreliable people in the security, or give someone else qualified expert assessment of what is happening. By the way,

Beria, having come in March 1953 to the Ministry of Internal Affairs - the MGB, immediately released Kuzmichev and immediately appointed him head of the restored Main Directorate Security Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR. And this greatly resented Khrushchev. And the very next day after the arrest Beria was arrested and Kuzmichev.

In order not to return to these two generals, I will inform you that Vlasik was detained under arrest until 1955 and sentenced to 5 years of exile in Krasnoyarsk with deprivation of his rank, and in 1956 he was released with the removal of a criminal record. He died in 1967.

Kuzmichev was released in February 1954, and since then this full of strength, survived before the age of 81, a person fell out of active life, having died in 1988.

So, from the second half of May 1952, Ignatiev was in charge of Stalin's security. For part of our society, the immutable "truth" is the conviction that Stalin allegedly poisoned Beria through his people. But from January 1946 until the death of Stalin, the guards not Beria, but Ignatiev, was in charge of the leader and his service. And people surrounded Stalin not by Beria, but by Ignatiev! And it was Ignatiev who cut off Kuzmichev and Vlasik from the guards of Stalin ...

Therefore, it does not prevent us from taking a closer look at the third and last Minister of State Security of the USSR Semyon Ignatiev, that is, to that main figure who, one in two persons, from May 1952 bore full responsibility for life, health and safety of Stalin.

Born in 1904, a native of the village of Karlovka, Kherson province, the son of a peasant, at the age of 14 he already worked at a cotton gin in Termez, in distant Turkestan. I don't know how he was brought there, but it can be assumed that young Ignatiev's nature was energetic and combative: at the age of 15 secretary of the Komsomol cell, at 16 years old - a political worker in Bukhara Group of Forces, at the age of 20 - head of the organizational department of the Central Committee of the Komsomol of Turkestan. At the same time, he joined the CPSU (b) only in 1926, working in trade unions. And in 1935 Ignatiev already worked in the industrial department of the Central Committee

of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks. I do not know who was the first of the high leadership to pay attention to him, but the fact someone turned - no doubt, because in 1937 Ignatiev was sent first Secretary of the Regional Party Committee in Buryat-Mongolia, where he stayed until 1943. Then the post first secretary in Bashkiria, and since 1947 - second secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Belarus. In 1949, Ignatiev was the secretary of the Central Asian Bureau of the Central Committee, and from 1950 to 1952 he was the head of the department of party, Komsomol and trade union bodies of the Central Committee. At the same time, from August 9, 1951, he was also the Minister of State Security of the USSR in p the main "personnel officers" of the party and at the same time - the chief Chekist.

As Minister of State Security, Ignatiev was, of course, directly related to the affairs Jewish nationalists, and to the "case of doctors", during the investigation of which Ignatiev allegedly received a heart attack, having lived after that with him (?) to almost 80 years.

Ignatiev was also involved in many other "unseemly", by the standards of Khrushchev "thaw", affairs of the MGB. But what he was undoubtedly guilty of was partly degradation and deprofessionalization of "organs", in flooding them with non-professionals from the number of party apparatchiks, and at the same time - in encouraging measures of physical influence on

under investigation. The notorious "torture", as I understand it, was not in the MGB Ignatiev, but the regime in the prisons at Lubyanka and Lefortovo was more than harsh for some.

After the death of Stalin, the combined Ministry of Internal Affairs - the MGB received Beria, and Ignatiev becomes secretary of the Central Committee, but not for long - until April 5, 1953, when he, until recently a member of the Presidium of the Central Committee, by a poll, was relieved of his duties as secretary of the Central Committee, and on April 28 by a poll removed from the Central Committee "due to serious mistakes made in the leadership of the former MGB THE

USSR". At the suggestion of Beria, supported by other members of the Presidium of the Central Committee, the Committee for party control under the Central Committee was instructed to consider the issue of party responsibility of Ignatiev. However, thanks to the intercession of Malenkov, he goes to Bashkiria - all the same first secretary. After the arrest of Beria Ignatiev, Khrushchev's proposal now, who announced on July 7, 1953 that Ignatiev had been expelled "according to a well-known slander," they are reinstated in the Central Committee. Since June 1957 he has been the first secretary of the Tatar Regional Committee of the CPSU, from where he retired in October 1960. Died Ignatiev in 1983, buried at the Novodevichy Cemetery, but already in 1954 in the three-volume "Encyclopedic Dictionary", published by the State Scientific publishing house "Great Soviet Encyclopedia", biographical information on a member of the Central Committee. For some reason, Ignatiev's CPSU is absent.

This figure has long been vague for me personally. Someone considers him a creature of Khrushchev, someone - Malenkov, but it is unlikely that in 1951 the 47-year-old head of the department of party, trade union and Komsomol bodies of the Central Committee would have simultaneously become the Minister of Stalin's interest in him. As

for Malenkov and Khrushchev, then, most likely, Ignatiev at different times supported by both, because both had to deal with him at work, and Ignatiev's abilities were. But, it seems, there was no integrity, and it seems that he was an ideal performer of the will of the one who subjected him to his will.

So, in my opinion, the "swing" of Ignatiev's career after the death of Stalin, after the death of Beria and after the fall of Malenkov are themselves capable of providing food for thought about Ignatiev's possible role in a multi-layered conspiracy against Stalin. Interested in this regard, both Ignatiev's "heart attack" at the time of summing up the results of the "doctors' case", and his absence at that meeting of the Bureau of the Presidium of the Central Committee, where the publication of this "affairs".

Moreover, Beria's line in relation to Ignatiev once again proves not only Beria's non-involvement in the anti-Stalinist conspiracy, but also Beria's serious suspicions and conjectures regarding the role of both Ignatiev and someone higher in death Stalin.

It is possible that Ignatiev was also used "in the dark" in a conspiracy against Stalin, deftly palming off the people needed by the attackers. After all, Khrushchev could have been used in the same way, although I am inclined to believe that by the spring of 1953 he fully wished Stalin's death consciously.

A well-known employee of Beria, General Sudoplatov, later recalled that at the end of February 1953, a few days before Stalin's death, he noticed in the behavior of Ignatiev "growing uncertainty".

Sudoplatov wrote that after the death of Stalin, Beria sought the arrest of Ignatiev, but did not receive support from the Presidium of the Central Committee. Sudoplatov links Beria's initiative with the participation of the MGB in the case with the doctors, but in any case, Beria could not help but understand that there was something Ignatiev had nothing to do with it - to conduct a business that was under the control of Stalin, the Minister of State Security was must. So, most likely, Ignatiev Beria wanted to arrest for the purpose of investigation of circumstances of Stalin's death. But it seems to have run into such resistance that chose to retreat temporarily.

I repeat, I cannot assert that Ignatiev deliberately joined the conspiracy

against Stalin, that he hated Stalin. But he could be subtly and vilely confused, provoked, frightened by Stalin ... After all, since the beginning of 1952, the "game" for all anti-Stalinist forces inside the country and outside it became more and more acute. Stalin had already partial personnel purges, but was preparing for even more serious personnel purges in an atmosphere of widespread criticism by the lower ones of the higher ones.

On the one hand, this would mean strengthening the Soviet social order at the expense of development in it of socialist democracy, previously more proclaimed than realizable, due to the harsh times for the USSR.

On the other hand, this would drastically narrow the workforce base for that multinational "fifth column", without which the West, the United States and the Golden Elite of the world could not even dream of weakening and destruction of the USSR and the camp of socialism.

The West pressed on. June 5, 1952 Chairman of the Information Committee under the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs V. Zorin, in a top secret special message to Stalin, wrote about the intention of the United States and England to create a military-political bloc in the Balkans "comprising Yugoslavia, Greece and Turkey, in which Italy, other Mediterranean countries and Austria ... "It

was not easy to bring such countries into one block, and Zorin also wrote about plans creating a "wider Mediterranean bloc that would unite under American leadership of both the Balkan satellites of the United States and Turkey, and Spain and Arab countries".

And this was only one of the elements of that mosaic, which, first of all, for Stalin evolved into a very definite and quite sinister - if nothing is done - a picture.

The situation escalated, the West did not want an honest partnership and open competition two social systems. The Golden Elite of the world wanted to keep not their political and economic leadership in the world, but to secure an undivided monopoly on power over the

world. All this was hindered primarily by Stalin's USSR and Stalin himself. The knot

was being tightened... On March 22, 1952, more than a three-year investigation into the case of Jewish nationalists from the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee, and on May 8, 1952 in the club hall The MGB named after Dzerzhinsky began a trial in the JAC case, which ended on July 18, 1952. Were these events and the operation to decompose Vlasik and discredit him connected with the purpose of removing Vlasik from Stalin and starting an operation against Stalin?

Or maybe the operation against Vlasik as the initial phase of the operation against Stalin was initiated by internal "partoplasm"?

Or maybe this operation or some other actions with the ultimate goal of death Stalin, were conceived and produced by Trotskyists or other haters Stalin?

It's hard to say... But the fact that something was being prepared by someone can no longer be denied today. Moreover, many other questions arise today, for example,

such ... Who initiated the combination of Ignatiev's posts and the Minister of State Security, and the head of the Security Department of the

MGB? And why was this "temporary" decision, stretching for almost a year, made?

And why is Ignatiev, in the context of a clear (for the Minister of State Security) aggravation of the external anti-Soviet activities was in no hurry to pick up for the leadership of the guard Stalin not the "wedding" generals Ignatiev and Ryzanov, who already had a lot of everyday duties and tasks, but a strong and proven professional?

And why, since October 1952, employees of state security agencies lost payments for military ranks after replacing combined arms ranks with special ones? It is believed that the reform of ranks, in fact, is a partial return to the old special ranks, but without a priority of two "steps" compared to the army team, was the idea

Stalin, who allegedly wanted to give a chance to the colonels of the MGB, who are in leadership positions, become generals. So be it ... And the reduction in monetary allowance that followed this was also Stalin's idea?

Why did they disturb the Chekists? To save money? But it was necessary to reduce the bloated it was under Ignatiev that the MGB was staffed, and not to provoke the discontent of all its employees. What was the explanation for

all this? What, by the way, explained the unexpected and not clearly explained to this day resignation of Stalin's personal secretary Poskrebyshv in February 1953 from his post Secretary of the Presidium and Bureau of the Presidium of the Central Committee and his replacement by a certain V.N. Chernukha, who retained his position as deputy head of the General Department of the Central Committee of the CPSU until his death in 1965, at the age of 65?

At the beginning of the secret "chains" there could be "centers" like the "center" of Pierre Samuel du Pont, agents of influence of the Golden Elite, agents of the secret services, spies, Trotskyists, Zionists, simply dissatisfied or feeling "offended" ...

Moreover, in the "chain" that really threatened Stalin, it was not necessary at all to have some "link" from the above. A suitable system example here would be the case of Konstantin Ustinovich Chernenko. In fact, he, as a capable leader state, ended in 1983 after the Minister of Internal Affairs of the USSR and the recent chairman of the KGB of the USSR Fedorchuk treated Chernenko in the Crimea with horse mackerel "own smoking". On the same day, Chernenko's health abruptly and irreparably worsened, as his former assistant Viktor Pribytkov writes in his book "Apparatus".

Andropov was then the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, already strongly (and suspicious!) ill. And Chernenko ended up in the party table of ranks second figure. After the imminent death of Andropov Chernenko in 1984 - exactly 13 months, to word, - became General Secretary, but the state of his health as a result of the "treat" of Fedorchuk and "treatment" of Academician Chazov was such that Chernenko could not count on a long life had to. And "at the door" was already Gorbachev.

If Fedorchuk "treated" Chernenko with horse mackerel, knowing in advance about its special properties (I don't approve of this, but I don't exclude it either), this does not mean that Fedorchuk was a licensed CIA agent. He could do this even for reasons of the highest Soviet patriotism - if *someone* suggested that he do it. Like, this old asthmatic and his colleagues, old n ..., they only discredit the Soviet system, and it is necessary from it not by washing, but by rolling get rid of it as soon as possible and make way for the young.

Here is Mikhail Sergeevich Gorbachev! Why not a candidate? Come on, comrade Fedorchuk, serve the Soviet Union, and it will not forget you. Under the young General Secretary and his young comrades, we will beat off such a Soviet superpower at the fear of imperialism, which Comrade Stalin never dreamed of!

This is how they could treat (if they treated him) the ingenuous Fedorchuk ... And they could also process someone from those who were related to the protection of Stalin.

Or they could just buy it.

And they could be

confused. And is it really so important - for what reason, next to Stalin, at least from the beginning 1953 turned out to be such intruders and enemies that they could detect and neutralize extremely difficult, almost impossible...

For "who will guard the watchmen themselves"?

King Louis XI in response to the naive objection of the young shooter Quentin Dorward regarding the fact that, surrounded by a select Scottish guard, the king in a powerful you can be calm in the castle, he cited this particular Latin verse, put in the epigraph chapters.

The correctness of this bitter maxim was impressively proved not only by the ancient,

but also recent history. I mean, for example, a successful assassination attempt on an Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, who fell victim to the betrayal of her own bodyguards. But an even more vile example of this was the betrayal of Stalin by his own security. Moreover, the behavior of Stalin's guard of the Ignatiev model must be considered treacherous in any case - even if the Ignatiev "watchmen" were not involved in the murder of the most significant person of the twentieth, and not only of the twentieth century.

Well, actually! How much longer will we believe the tales of everyone there "guards" about the fact that one of them "didn't dare" to enter Stalin? .. What they allegedly called Beria, and he, allegedly arriving at the dacha, allegedly told them that comrade Stalin is sleeping that you are, they say, raising a panic.

Based, among other things, on such "historical evidence" Beria is accused as the organizer of the assassination of Stalin. We are with these "evidence" of protection and accusations against Beria, we will still deal with you, my dear reader. But even now let's think

- is everything in such "evidence" smooth? Firstly, why would it be with the living Minister of State Security S.D. Ignatiev and the living head of the Security Department of the MGB S.D. Ignatieff people directly subordinate to him began to call even the Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, but who did not have to the MGB of Beria's direct relationship?

Beria, after he was "transferred" at the end of 1945 from the Ministry of Internal Affairs to the Special Committee for atomic problem, could not solve it without problems in 1947 with the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Sergei Kruglov and the Ministry of State Security Viktor Abakumov, even the question of guarding the building of the Special Committee by the MGB. And with the passage For years, Beria retired from business and Ignatiev was already more and more from the staff of the MGB. In particular, to At the beginning of 1953, Beria had been cut off from the activities of the Security Directorate for seven years!

Seven years! A considerable period of time ... And here with the current - it seems - question regarding the protection and immediately - to Comrade Be comrade Ignatiev for what? Suppose it was Ignatiev who redirected the guards to Beria ... But Beria was not a boy. So Stalin's guards called him. He's the first thing should have asked: "What does Ignatiev say?" And, having heard that the guards are calling Beria on Ignatiev's instructions, Beria immediately could not help but be wary - what's the matter? And go to Stalin would not be the first in any case!

Secondly, if you, the guard, have any doubts about the state of health of Comrade Stalin, then first of all call the "Kremlin" or where there ... And what does Beria have to do with it? He is not even a paramedic by training. He is an architect.

Thirdly, if Beria had been somehow involved in organizing the events of the last conscious days in Stalin's life, then he would have kept on those days from Stalin's dacha to maximum distance. And even if someone from the guard called him, then he is a man more than intelligent and experienced - he would have immediately forwarded the call to Ignatiev. Like, I'm here which side? You and your minister are responsible for the life and safety of Comrade Stalin, call the minister. Beria - if he

prepared and committed a crime against Stalin - of course, not I would go to the country! I would not have gone also because, as an experienced investigator, he could not help but to know how many criminals "got burned" because they were drawn to the crime scene.

Why go, "light up", if the case, one way or another, "went", but against "poisons NKVD Beria "there is no antidote. Who, if not Beria, knew about it!

Fourthly, let's say that Beria nevertheless ordered one day (without having authority, no service law) about everything related to Stalin's well-being, call first of all to him. How do those who received such an order act in such cases? A simple - this is not a question for any person engaged in business, and not paperwork. Necessary report on the order of a superior person to his immediate superior. And he will either confirm the received order, or protest it, or before the one who exceeded his powers, that is, before Beria, or before those who stand above both Beria and Ignatiev, that is, before Stalin.

However, Ignatiev "provided" Stalin's security in general with strange and in an unacceptable way. And on this, fourth, consideration, I have my enumeration series I will finish - so as not to tire the reader completely. So,

fourthly... Okay, let Stalin did not tolerate doctors or did not trust them. But it's STALIN! For those who are connected with the protection of his life, what is important is not what you like or dislike. Stalin likes it, but how to ensure the protection of his life comprehensively, reliably and fully. Lenin also did not like guards, but the people responsible for his guards found a simple and obvious way out is to guard Lenin secretly, so that the bodyguards once they did not meet his eyes. That's with the necessary medical health insurance Stalin could have done the same ... To have everything you need at hand in the country, and a shift doctor to include in the number of guards of the external guard, whom Stalin in person could and not know, and did not know.

If, God forbid, something happens, then the equipment is at hand, and an experienced specialist.

What happened in reality?

For example, Zhores Medvedev reports that when doctors were finally called to see Stalin, they asked to urgently bring his medical documents, that is, a "medical history" from Kremlin hospital, without doubting its presence.

And she didn't exist. No one even knew since when Stalin had hypertension. The entire dacha did not have even the most primitive medicines and medical devices. Among the numerous servants from the Ignatiev Security Department, not a single one was found. a nurse, not like a doctor. Zh. Medvedev

writes that one of the doctors exclaimed during the consultation: "At least a nurse was brought in under the guise of one of the maids or a doctor under the guise of one of colonels! After all, the man is 73 years

old!" It is unlikely that comments are needed here. So in this sense, Ignatiev and his apparatus guilty of at least criminal negligence. Although they

seem to be guilty of more - a direct crime. And something Much has been written in the literature about guards, but nothing has been written about maids. Meanwhile at Stalin's dacha, in addition to the guards, there were a lot of attendants - on duty, attached, waiters, cooks, librarians, gardeners, who constantly were near Stalin. But it says: "Look for a woman" ...

As for the fact that the guards were allegedly afraid to disturb Stalin once again, then in it's not very believable. In any case, Stalin did not eat anyone alive - neither for breakfast, nor for dinner. In any case, when General Vlasik was in charge of his protection.

And do not the former guards of Stalin (or the unknown editors of their testimony) cast a shadow on the already not very clear either February or March day, and at the same time night? If there was a conspiracy against Stalin - and he was, then in real time none of participants in this conspiracy - neither from among high-ranking officials, nor from among the performers - could not assume that the circumstances of Stalin's death would ever analyzed publicly and independently of official authorities. Therefore, as I I guess no one has a plausible and consistent version of the cover taken care of, neither then nor later.

One of the guards could lie intentionally - like a dodgy participant crimes. But it is unlikely that all the internal security of the dacha deliberately lied ... After all, from among them if someone was involved in the murder of Stalin, then - no more than one or two people. A perhaps, and none at all - in addition to the guards, there were after all

the servants. The guards - both then and after many years - could confuse a lot and without malicious intent witnesses of crimes often confuse the most important details. Yes, and the state of shock is also necessary consider.

The uninitiated and uninvolved could lie unintentionally ("He lies like an eyewitness,"

lawyers say) and even with their truthful testimony and reminiscences involuntarily cover up the intentional lies of others. I hope the reader does not need to explain what I have in mind?

And trying to take this whole conglomerate of "evidence" seriously, those researchers who are trying to unravel this confusion and reduce it into a consistent picture.

But if Stalin was killed - and he was killed, on the basis of testimonies it is impossible to build a picture of his death in principle! I'm late on this a bit stop.

At the same time, as I promised at the beginning of the book, I will not engage in criminal research on the last days of Stalin's life, conducted by him in his right mind and clear memory.

But something must be said about these last days.

Chapter fifteen The Last Supper and the Kiss of Judas

Then one of the twelve,
called Judas Iscariot, went to
the chief priests and said, What will
you give me if I betray Him? They
offered him thirty pieces of silver; And from
that time Judas began to seek
opportunity to betray Him.

...

When evening came, he
lay down with twelve disciples;
And as they were eating,
he said, " Truly, I say
to you, one of you will betray
me." Gospel of Matthew, (Chapter 25, verses 14-16, 20-21).

...poison to the outcast

They presented it in a bowl.

...

They told him: "Damned,
Drink, drain to the
bottom ... And your song
is alien to us, And your truth
is not needed ..." Joseph Dzhughashvili (Stalin)

In 1953, the penultimate day of winter, February 27, fell on a Friday. 28th of February - Saturday, and on Sunday spring was already beginning, at least officially.

Winter was, consider, lived.

Stalin rarely took in February, but this was hardly a sign of ill health, especially if we recall the testimonies of Bravo and Menon. Rather, Stalin considered upcoming events and did not consider it reasonable to spend strength and energy before they began. Strength has not come over the years.

On February 16, he held a meeting with Troika in his Kremlin office. Beria, Malenkov and Bulganin did not stay with him for long. And the very brevity of their stay with Stalin allows us to assume that this meeting will not discuss problems, but an operational report "Troika" to Stalin and receiving instructions from

him. On February 17, Stalin received the Indian ambassador Menon, after which in Stalin's The Troika gathered again for 15 minutes in the office.

Communication with other members of senior management was limited to a minimum. Even last autumn, on November 10, 1952, it was decided to hold meetings

Presidium of the Central Committee once a month, and meetings of the Bureau of the Presidium of the Central Committee - weekly Mondays.

Starting from the first meeting of the Presidium of the Central Committee, held on October 18, 1952, Stalin led all subsequent meetings, except for the meeting of the Bureau of the Presidium of the Central Committee on January 1953, when propaganda activities for the "doctors' cause" were discussed.

At the same time, the last meeting of the Presidium of the Central Committee took place at the beginning of December, and in January and in February the Presidium of the Central Committee did not meet.

As for the Bureau of the Presidium of the Central Committee, it met for the last time on January 26, not meeting in February never once. All this was like the calm before the storm, and this calm did not promised nothing good only to Khrushchev - if you mean the top leadership.

The position of Ignatiev also turned out to be difficult. He could assume that he was surviving as minister, last days. "Flaws" and even sins from Ignatiev accumulated by the end of winter 1953 is a long time, and he could not help but recall the fate of his predecessor, the ex-minister GB Abakumov, who is currently in prison at the minister of GB Ignatiev. And if Ignatiev was at least indirectly connected with the conspiracy against Stalin, then all the more he should have feel not in the best way, and this could be reflected in his behavior in such a way that it looked even more suspicious. On Monday,

March 2, 1953, although according to the "staff schedule" it was a day meeting of the Bureau of the Presidium, an extended meeting of the entire Presidium of the Central Committee, which

everyone was waiting for, was scheduled. Yes, a lot of things were to be decided on March 2, both concerning personnel. At the Presidium, they could not but consider the course of the investigation in the "doctors' case" - with making key decisions about it.

And Stalin decided to rest. On the evening of February 27, he went to the Bolshoi Theater to watch Swan Lake. He sat alone in the government box, in the depths - so that he was not seen from the hall.

Stalin loved Tchaikovsky's ballet and watched it many times, but on the eve of his death he watched it, there is no symbolism and hidden meaning - Stalin watched what was in repertoire. I say this so confidently because it is confirmed by the very fact keeping Stalin incognito that evening. If, for example, he asked in advance put on a certain performance for a certain evening, then with any disguise personal interest in that would hardly have been completely hidden from the curious the fact of Stalin's upcoming visit to the Bolshoi Theater. However, everything coincided successfully - Stalin had to relax and rest alone with himself before the tiring, emotionally difficult and lengthy meeting on March 2, and here, by the way, was his beloved ballet with your favorite music.

And on Saturday, February 28, Stalin invited members of the "Troika", that is, Beria, Malenkov and Bulganin, and ... And - Khrushchev.

In his memoirs, mentioning which every time I want to put both words - both "my own" and "memories" - in quotation marks, Khrushchev wrote:

"... He invited there (to the Kremlin office. - S.K.) personally me, Malenkov, Beria and Bulganin. We've arrived. Then he says again: "Let's go Let's eat at a nearby dacha. Let's go, have dinner... Dinner dragged on... Stalin I was tipsy, in a very good mood ... "

Zhores Medvedev, quoting these lines from Khrushchev, writes that this dinner, "which looked for Khrushchev as unexpected, was, of course, prepared ... "

Perhaps Zh. Medvedev does not even realize how right he is here! And perhaps he is everything

understands, but deliberately leads us away from the correct guess. No, it was not a matter of striving, as Medvedev assures, "...distract, relax, have dinner with friends, drink wine" before making "after a long period of reflection ... a radical decision." If it was a matter of wanting

to relax, Stalin would have had company for sure.

the other - none of the four invited by Stalin to dinner on February 28 was included in his intimate circle. Already Kliment Voroshilov with Semyon Budyonny, and Vyacheslav Molotov Stalin would have invited. Modern falsifiers of the image and the era of Stalin they attribute to him the intention in those days to almost send three of these four to the chopping block, but I do not recommend anyone to somehow take into account such "versions". Politically Stalin really moved away from his old friends, or rather, they are not politically moved away, but lagged behind Stalin ... But Stalin, according to Khrushchev and Medvedev, wanted just relax. And Voroshilov, Molotov, like the cavalryman Budyonny, in the circle of his soul were included. And in a day, he would not be hindered by their understanding and support ...

But did Stalin want to relax on the last Saturday of the winter of 1953? Is it for this did he invite, in addition to the members of the Troika, also Khrushchev?

What happened that evening at the table at Stalin's dacha remained between him, four his companions and God. Therefore, what the reader will now read is just a guess. author. But I hope I reconstructed the gist of that historic evening correctly. And if I am not mistaken, Stalin did not relax then, did not rest, but was already working! And he worked

hard! Great and active natures - and Stalin always treated them - do not relax in ahead of big events twice! It's like a hard hike. You go, you're tired. You need a halt, and you do it, relaxing as much as possible - after all, you

Again, a difficult road awaits. But after a halt, when he is behind, immediately do another halt is stupid. The result will inevitably be not additional relaxation, but the loss the desired tone.

So Stalin arranged a "halt" for himself, watching the enchanting ballet of Tchaikovsky, very suitable for spiritual recreation. And if he wanted to keep a fighter relaxed before the battle on March 2, then he would spend Saturday February 28 and Sunday March 1 again alone with himself.

And on Saturday he invited Troika and Khrushchev to an allegedly "relaxing" dinner. For

what? According to Zhores Medvedev - to "relax".

And for example, according to the "general" Volkogonov, it turns out that Stalin invited them almost in order to slander everyone except Bulganin. Moreover, Beria Stalin allegedly asked about the "case of doctors", to which Beria then had nothing to do. Volkogonov claims that the guests saw in this some ominous allusions to their loved ones. arrests, etc. Not only is this a lie, it is also a stupid lie, if only because through a stormy Central Committee Presidium was coming up, and Stalin would not have thrown any reproaches and accusations of a narrow feast, when all this was more appropriate to do in a public and official setting.

As far as I understand, by the beginning of the spring of 1953, Stalin had already completely laid down for themselves all the elements of the political "mosaic" - both external and internal - into something a single whole.

That is, he was convinced that the "cold war" proclaimed by Churchill and continuously expanded by Truman, begins to reach its systemic peak. And The peculiarity of the situation lay in the fact that for the first time, despite the increasingly escalating situation, none of the parties could already transfer the war of two world camps from the "cold" phase to the "hot" phase without the risk of getting - in the language of later times - unacceptable damage.

Both sides already had nuclear weapons, and on November 1, 1952, the United States tested in the Pacific

ocean, the world's first thermonuclear device "Mike" with a capacity of 10 megatons, that is, 10 million tons of TNT equivalent. True, it was a building weighing tens of tons, but Stalin knew about the possibility of creating a transportable thermonuclear charge - work on the Soviet thermonuclear bomb RDS-6s was already coming to an end.

There was a "nuclear stalemate", and there could be two options for the development of the situation on the planet. The first is still a "hot" option. Stalin knew that in terms of quantity and total Russia's nuclear arsenal is far inferior to America's. Three and a half months ago, November 16, 1952, the United States in the test "King" successfully detonated a bomb with TNT equivalent of several hundred thousand tons, that is, they already had atomic bombs such power that Kurchatov and Beria promised to provide only in thermonuclear bomb. And the West at the hands of the United States could decide on a "hot" "crusade" against USSR and socialism - while he still had a real chance of success. But more

likely and advantageous for the West - and Stalin understood this - would be everything the "cold" version of the gradual destruction of socialism due to internal subversive work in the camp of socialism, directed and coordinated from outside. Bombs don't atomic, not hydrogen, but ideological, propagandistic. Plus - the "fifth column" ...

There was a struggle between World Good and World Evil for the minds and souls of people on the planet, and Stalin had already considered and was ready for the first serious Stalinist blow in this war. apply. To deprive the enemy of peoples and freedom - imperialism of his internal agents in the USSR, and to deprive him not through purges along the lines of 1937-1938, but through a quick and decisive deliverance of Soviet society from the reborn and selfish part of the leadership, depriving it opportunities to influence society - that was the idea of this Stalinist strike.

If due to the deployment of that self-criticism, which has been much about lately was said, but which so far has not been very successful, from the leading and other systematic tyrants, bureaucrats, slobs, mediocrity and grabbers were cleaned out of significant seats, then ... Then among them many of the already existing or potential members of the fifth column.

That commander cannot be successful who is not confident in his marshals and generals. This bitter lesson was taught to Stalin by his own pre-war generals, who "blundered" the beginning of the war. You need to rely on those in whom you are confident. But to whom?

The role of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command was now played by the Bureau of the Presidium of the Central Committee, and the role of the General Staff is the entire Presidium of the Central Committee.

How could Stalin build the calculation?

Perhaps so ... The Bureau of the Presidium of the Central Committee is Beria, Bulganin, Voroshilov, Kaganovich, Malenkov, Pervukhin, Saburov, Khrushchev. To them it was necessary, with a serious calculation, to members of the Presidium, like Molotov and Mikoyan.

Beria, Malenkov and Bulganin are the Troika. At the very least, but Stalin decided to lean on on her.

Voroshilov, Kaganovich and Molotov are old comrades-in-arms who at the decisive moment will follow him, not even agreeing with him - as before the true Bolshevik-Leninists went for Lenin.

Pervukhin and Saburov are intelligent workers, up to the highest state level so far not up to par, not having independent political weight, but behind Stalin walking confidently and consciously.

An old friend Anastas ... Long ago, on March 28, 1928, he wrote him a letter, which finished like this: "In a word, hold on and do not lose heart - ours must take. Yours /. Stalin. Now Anastas passed ... But he will not go against it either - neither in public, nor inside himself. After all, they all started life and continued it as people of a very definite idea. And from her none of the old friends backed down - Stalin did not say in the past for a red word October that Molotov was ready to give his life for the party at any moment. Stalin himself was ready to do so at any moment.

So, it was necessary to doubt only in Khrushchev. Moreover, Stalin could already have about him serious negative information. But Stalin believed people to the last and was inclined to forgive rather than punish, although often it was necessary to

punish. And he decided on the eve of decisive conversations on March 2 to look Khrushchev in the eye. This, as I understand it, was the meaning of that "Last Supper" at which Stalin invited Khrushchev on Saturday February 28, 1953 from the Nativity of Christ.

Zhores Medvedev declares that, on the contrary, it was Beria and Malenkov that Stalin invited because he could assume: "He meets Beria and Malenkov at his dacha for the last time". Stalin, hints Zh. Medvedev, has already decided the fate of both so that it should have been soon break off at least politically, and possibly physically.

But everything was, as I understand it, "exactly the opposite"! fate was decided Khrushchev. And he, it seems, knew this in advance or understood

during the "supper". But I don't know if Stalin understood this ... Of all the members of the Stalinist Politburo, only Khrushchev was truly talented hypocrite. Let's compare two characteristics of it ... First:

"I was bribed by the simplicity and accessibility of Nikita Sergeevich. native of workers, he behaved very democratically, and at first I was just in love with him. Yes, and the majority he aroused great sympathy ... "

Second:

"In general, Khrushchev was an evil and vengeful person. Characteristic in this regard, his reprisal against Tevosyan, an outstanding metallurgist, a clever woman who knows world practice very well (he worked at the Krupp factories). Somehow he argued with Khrushchev on a special issue. Khrushchev: "What are you doing with me are you arguing?" - "Yes, I'm a metallurgist and I know this issue, but you are talking nonsense." Through two days Tevosyan was removed and completely removed from business.

The first characteristic belongs to D.T. Shepilov and is given in the book about him "And Shepilov, who joined them. The Truth About Man, Scientist, Warrior and Politics, 1998 edition on page 123. The second

characteristic belongs to ... also D.T. Shepilov and is given in a book about him "And Shepilov, who joined them. The Truth About Man, Scientist, Warrior and Politics 1998 on page 134. Any

comments? Examples can be continued, but is it worth it? About how this evening went, we know mainly from Khrushchev's "memoirs", on which not only can be relied on in the last place, but in general cannot be relied upon in everything related to the dialogues of the time, the atmosphere, Stalin's reaction, etc.

So, Khrushchev was a sophisticated hypocrite - as is often the case with people, from childhood dreaming of one thing: to break out into the people. "Mykyta," as Stalin jokingly called him, got out. And, like all people of his warehouse, after that he lived with one thing - to hold on.

He was energetic, not stupid in his own way and talented in his own way, but certainly talented. he was in one thing - in the bestial desire to live. When I say animal, I don't mean ruthlessness - although Khrushchev could be and was ruthless; not bloodthirsty - though Khrushchev was no stranger to this feature either. When I say animal, I only mean the instinctiveness of this internal desire of Khrushchev. The instinct for self-preservation is inherent to all living things, but only a person is able to transgress it, to hold it in oneself in the name of duty or other intangible purpose.

So, in this sense, Khrushchev was a beast, not a man. As, however, and all

the rest of the people of his warehouse and his philosophy of life, if in their case we can talk about any philosophy. Stalin

was first of all a man - always and in everything, if we mean high and the exact meaning of this concept. And so he was perceptive only in relation to enemies. Mayakovsky wrote about Lenin: "He was kind to his comrades with human affection, he got up to the enemies of iron is harder ... "But this was also a generalized moral trait of all in general Bolshevik-Leninists and, of course, Stalin.

Stalin never trusted his enemies, and sometimes this incredulity of his even played with him. bad jokes.

But he always trusted his own - if he considered his own. At his dacha, there was always, for example, an electric kettle on the table and next to it - everything you need for tea leaves. This was done so that Stalin, working at night, could drink tea without disturbing maid! Moreover, the sentry, of course, did not stand near the teapot. And this, dear the reader, speaks not of suspicion, but of the gullibility of Stalin - in his own circle. And this gullibility also played cruel jokes with him more than

once. The last time he made a mistake with Khrushchev. And

wrong to death. In his memoirs, Khrushchev is lying about Stalin every now and then. He lies, for example, that during one of his visits to Stalin's dacha, he allegedly said far from to Khrushchev, who sat down, something like: "Why are you hiding? I'm not going to you arrest. Move the papers and sit closer..." Of course,

this is a lie. Not being, of course, a witness to the scene described by Khrushchev, I can say this with confidence - she is absolutely not in the style of Stalin.

It is also indicative how Khrushchev over and over again tries to present Stalin almost alcoholic. Here he recalls a meeting at the "near dacha" in 1953 and writes that Stalin was in a good mood and therefore he himself drank a lot and forced others ...

And here is how the Hungarian Matthias Rakosi, who lived in Russia for a long time, describes Stalin's table:

"Food and drinks were placed on a large table, and each served himself, in including Stalin ... In the evenings, even Stalin (highlighting in bold italics my. - S.K.) drank. I often observed how, from a narrow ... glass, he was small drank red Tsimlyansk wine or champagne in sips. But it looked like Stalin on how he smoked, spending more time opening the box cigarette "Herzegovina Flor" and pipe stuffing than smoking itself ... The atmosphere at such dinners was laid-back..."

I don't know how it was there on that last Stalin evening, especially if keep in mind its psychological pattern. And if someone claims that he knows someone, such "Researcher" can not be trusted initially.

But for Stalin and for all his other companions, this was not friendly. feast, although outwardly it looked like this. I must say that in addition to Khrushchev, we have evidence of another then Stalin's guest - Bulganin. It has come down to us, however, in a written retelling - also not very reliable and authentic - of Marshal Zhukov, recorded either in 1963, or - in 1964, either by Zhukov himself, or by someone from his environment. Twenty-six pages of typewritten text from Zhukov's personal archive since 1974 they were kept in the General Department of the Central Committee, and in 1995 they were transferred to the Russian State military archive from the Archive of the President of the Russian Federation.

Here is a snippet of that entry:

"During the funeral of STALIN, Bulganin told me about that night in during which a misfortune happened to STALIN. In the evening at STALIN's dacha gathered Khrushchev, Beria, Malenkov and Bulganin - three inseparable friend, as BULGANIN always boasted about this (this is not confirmed,

generally, nothing. - S.K.). After talking about business (emphasis mine. - S.K.) everyone sat down at the dinner table. STALIN was in a good mood and joked a lot. Dinner, as was often the case with STALIN, dragged on until 2 a.m. ... "

We will return to these memoirs of Bulganin - for all their dubiousness origin, I believe them for a number of reasons more than many others, and even more so "memoirs" of Khrushchev ... And now I have brought this fragment in order to show that outwardly the atmosphere was really open, and Khrushchev himself reported that the object of Stalin's good-natured jokes was most often he. Well, and Christ noted of all disciples of Judas.

Khrushchev, of course, did not decide everything for himself during dinner - everything was decided by him and those with whom he was already "tied" by common malice, earlier. But I do not rule out that dinner, he became even more strengthened in the understanding that Stalin must die.

And is it really so important now, whether Khrushchev poured poison into Stalin's bowl or is it someone from the staff or security of the dacha made a Khrushchev nod. And perhaps everything was done without Khrushchev - he might not even know which one of those around Stalin was. But the fact that there is such or such in the country, Khrushchev, as I

understand it, knew. That is why he fawned and fawned

over Stalin. By the way, Khrushchev, the only one of all his colleagues in the top leadership, had a personal motive for the assassination of Stalin: the fate of Khrushchev's son. Was Leonid Khrushchev shot down in battle, or simply did not return from the battle and was captured. This dark history is also evident from the testimony of such, for example, an informed person as General Dokuchaev, who served for many years in the 9th Directorate of the

KGB of the USSR. Stalin also had a son Yakov in German captivity. And today you can do enough confidently say that he did not die, but was precisely in captivity and behaved there absolutely worthy. However, Stalin could not do anything to free the private artillery officer Dzhugashvili and did not authorize any actions on high level on the release from captivity of an ordinary pilot, all the "extraordinary" and The "meaning" of which was that he bore the surname "Khrushchev".

Khrushchev held a grudge - after all, he was a vengeful person, but to explain his participation in a conspiracy against Stalin, personal motives would be frivolous. Everything was more serious. and more prosaic.

But was Stalin deprived of his life by force? I am throughout this book I speak of this as a factually reliable fact, but is it so - in spite of all my statements despite seemingly genuine medical records of the course of the disease and about the autopsy of Stalin's body after death, cited by Dobryukha-NAD, etc.?

We will soon talk about Dobryukha's book and other similar books ... But, since the question is raised, we will dwell on it regardless of imaginary and genuine discoveries Dobryuhi.

So, Molotov, when he was directly asked if Malenkov, Beria and Khrushchev could have poisoned Stalin, "when they drank with him on the last day before his illness," replied: "It could be. Beria, Malenkov were closely connected, Khrushchev joined them and had his own goals. He of all outsmarted..."

Beria and Malenkov were really friendly - for many years they could not help but bring them closer at least the responsibility that they bore for the same or interlocking with each other other areas of government work. But their bloc with Khrushchev? Yes, since the formation of the Troika in 1953? No, something is not right with Vyacheslav Mikhailovich contacts. But his very admission of the version of the violent death of Stalin

meaningfully.

According to Zh. Medvedev, there are at least ten versions of a political conspiracy against Stalin in order to eliminate him. Medvedev also reports that the assumption of Stalin's assassination can be found in half of the biographies of Stalin published in the West, and even

in a short biography of Stalin, placed in the British Encyclopedia. The above-mentioned General Dokuchaev, who knew more than one former Stalin's bodyguard, writes that Stalin was undoubtedly a permanent object attempts on him by the Trotskyists, the repressed, agents of the Abwehr, intelligence foreign states and, finally, Zionism. And then he continues:

"To assume that this heinous act (the murder of Stalin. - S.K.) was committed someone from the inner circle, it would not be logical, but at the same time it the assumption remains an occasion for certain reflections ... According to the stories Colonel S.V. Gusarov, who at that time served in the protection of I.V. Stalin, such there was a possibility..."

Alas, it did not just exist, it was implemented. And that's how she was implemented, now it is hardly possible to establish, even if a thorough study of the entire mass of testimonies and "testimonies" of witnesses and eyewitnesses with the compilation cyclograms and other things - even if the most experienced investigative brigade.

I do not intend to compete with her, limiting myself to a number of examples of inconsistencies in testimonials. And to begin with, I'll let you know that the same General Dokuchaev testifies: in the USSR any records of even minor incidents from the personal lives of state leaders for security workers were strictly forbidden, because for any "little thing" could be a state secret, even the oral disclosure of which could lead, for example, to diplomatic complications with one state or another.

On the other hand, the same Dokuchaev testifies that the guys in the guards worked so healthy that they could drink a glass of vodka and go to the post, saying: "What is wrong with me will?"

The question "What can happen to the ward, "guarded" by a bodyguard in such condition?", it seems, did not arise not only for the guard himself, but also for his immediate superiors.

True, Dokuchaev makes a reservation that such people, they say, were fired in the end ... But after all their moral character was doubtful even when they were still guarding this or that statesman - the same Stalin? And a drinking person is a godsend for a spy and terrorist is potentially much more valuable than the most garrulous talker.

It is interesting that, speaking about the assassination of Stalin in 1995, General Dokuchaev was more categorical in the assumption of the version of the murder than ten years later, in 2005. A after all, in 1995, although he was inclined to "hang up" the murder on either Beria or Khrushchev, leaning towards Beria's version, he himself suggested that Beria was just had reliable data on a conspiracy against Stalin, in connection with which Lavrentiya Pavlovich and "removed from the road"!

The latter is very similar to the truth, although Beria interfered not only with the murderers of Stalin, but also throughout the decaying "partoplasm". However, what he was able to expose conspirators, also had, of course, its significance. I will only clarify that Beria, most likely, did have some reliable data about the anti-Stalinist conspiracy, but received them not before, but after the murder, having come to the

united Ministry of Internal Affairs. Many are slandering Beria, but not excluding - carefully - his guilt. General Dokuchaev is almost the only one among such "accusers" who deserves respect, although he is mistaken here. Renegade and outright state criminal Avtorkhanov, traitor defector Oleg Gordievsky, renegade Volkogonov, chameleon Radzinsky, the confused Dobryukha, the Medvedev "historian" brothers, etc., etc., are far from only a complete "domestic" list of those who point to Beria, who could not, and was not among the murderers of Stalin. Only political chameleon Leonid Mlechin doubts the fault of Beria, and even then, of course, the Pharisees ...

At the same time, another author who wrote about the death of Stalin, Nikolai Dobryukha, in his

book "How Stalin was killed" (I'll talk about it later) seems to accuse Beria, but he himself reports that even he doubts evidence of Beria's involvement in the assassination of Stalin, emanating "from the gossip collector Roman living in the West Brakman". Dobryukha cites "gossip", referring to the desire to give full "information picture".

What can be said here? What there "completeness"! One more lie, one less... But the disinformation picture outlined by Dobryukha turns out to be surprisingly full: Brakman-de learned from a certain Nugzar Sharia, Honored Artist of the Georgian SSR and allegedly an employee of the Georgian editorial office of Radio Liberty in Munich, that he, Nugzar Sharia, with his own eyes ... sorry, I heard with my ears how his uncle Peter Sharia heard how Beria "in the circle of the Mingrelian generals released by him from prison ... boasted that he had poisoned Stalin and saved them from certain death, and all the Mingrelians from expulsions".

So: Brakman told what he heard from Nugzar Shariy, who heard from Peter Sharia what Beria said to the last. Y-yes ...

But

here, perhaps, something needs to be explained in more detail ... Pyotr Sharia was indeed part of Beria's entourage, was arrested according to the well-known "Mingrelian case", released in April 1953, before the arrest of Beria was one of his assistants to the Council of Ministers, and after the arrest of Beria was again arrested, convicted, in 1963 released and worked at the Academy of Sciences of the Georgian SSR, having died in 1983 at the 81st year of life.

However, in a very complicated "Mingrelian" case, with which they were associated, although significant, but not total, deportations from Georgia to Kazakhstan, there has been a gap during the life of Stalin. The chronology is...

On November 9, 1951, the Politburo adopted a resolution "on bribery in Georgia and on the "anti-party group Baramia", and on March 27, 1952 - another Decree "on position in the Communist Party of Georgia. But already on June 4, 1952, Stalin in his telegram First Secretary of the Central Committee of the CP(b) of Georgia Mgeladze and other members of the Bureau of the Georgian Central Committee expressed dissatisfaction with the activities of the Minister of State Security Rukhadze and wrote:

"The Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks believes that Comrade Rukhadze has embarked on an incorrect and non-party way, involving the arrested (meaning the Baramia group. - S.K.) as witnesses against the party leaders of Georgia ... The Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks did not doubts that if you take the path of comrade Rukhadze and involve the arrested in as witnesses against Comrade Rukhadze, the arrested members of the Baramiya group could say much more about him and incomparably worse. It's a fact that it was they, led by Baramia, who demanded the removal of Comrade Rukhadze from the post of minister eight months ago and accused him of all kinds of criminal cases ... "

It was, on the one hand, a transparent hint that not so hopelessly black in the eyes of Stalin, the arrested "Mingrelians" and the one who arrested them is not so snow-white Rukhadze... Stalin knew his Caucasians!

And on June 9, 1952, Rukhadze was completely removed and soon arrested. Because it Rukhadze initiated the "case of the Mingrelians" and, together with Ignatiev, led it, it was possible to assume that the ending of this "case" will not be so bleak for the "Mingrelians", regardless of whether Stalin is alive or not. By the way, Rukhadze was shot by sentence Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR in 1955 - much later after his death and Stalin, and Beria.

There is, however, another figure, guilty - according to the above-mentioned Leonid Mlechin - in the death of Stalin. This is ... Stalin himself, who, according to Mlechin, created there is such an atmosphere of fear around him that both the guards and the members who arrived at the dacha on a call The Bureau of the Presidium of the Central Committee did not dare to touch the leader once again in order to help him.

Therefore, de Stalin killed himself, Mlechin sums up thoughtfully. echoes him and "democratic" "historian" Professor Naumov, who claims that in the "empire" de Everyone was afraid of Stalin, including Stalin himself.

Mlechin, however, oddly enough, correctly notes the inconsistency of the versions that the guards first called Beria, and reports that at first she called, like supposed to, Ignatiev. And he allegedly forwarded it to Malenkov, who raised Beria, Bulganin and Khrushchev. But then Mlechin - you can't get away from yourself! - repeats nonsense about Beria, allegedly either rejoicing at Stalin's unconsciousness, or allegedly pretending to fall in front of on his knees...

Mlechin's "objectivity" is, perhaps, an explanation. He just follows "General" Volkogonov, who refers to the story (or - stories?) Guard Rybin containing exactly this algorithm: a call to Ignatiev is his advice to call Malenkov and Beria, etc. Volkogonov flourished this "story" even more, but about this - a little Later.

As for the list of "accusers" of Beria, I also forgot to mention Nikita Khrushchev! He also claims in "his" "memoirs" that the only person interested in the death of Stalin, was allegedly Lavrenty Beria ... But in this case, you can definitely say: "The cap is on fire on the thief ..." Khrushchev simply threw it from his sore head and onto healthy.

Yes, after all, he once and directly let slip about his sinister role! Speech Nikita Sergeevich in his later years, when he imagined himself a great historical figure, sometimes "carried" more abruptly than the Great Schemer Ostap Bender. And here, by according to the "internal chronicler of the Central Committee of the CPSU" N. Zenkovich, July 19, 1964 on rally in honor of the Hungarian party and government delegation Khrushchev actually confessed to the violent death of Stalin and declared that in the history of mankind there was there are many cruel tyrants, but that they all "died just as much from the ax as their own power supported with an ax ... "Ax

in the hands of Khrushchev? Well, he knew how to hold a shoe in his hands, sitting in a boardroom General Assembly of the United Nations, knew how to hold a gun in his hands, accurately hitting the target ... And hardly whether he found it difficult to pick up an ax against someone who could deprive him of his high position, obtained in a cruel struggle with life.

Do a lot of criminal chronology of that fateful night when Last Supper, I, as I have warned more than once, will not.

But here is the continuation of Bulganin's story in Zhukov's retelling:

"... At 2 o'clock in the morning, he, BULGANIN, was the first to leave STALIN, and MALENKOV. At about 3 o'clock in the morning BERIA AND KHRUSHCHEV allegedly left.

After the departure of BERIA and KHRUSHCHEV, in 15-20 minutes, to the dining room to General VLASIK came to STALIN to help STALIN go to bed, and he I saw STALIN in a fainting state lying on the floor ... "

Vlasik, in fact, at that time was sitting in a cell either in the Lubyanka, or in Lefortovo, but, let's say, here Bulganin or Zhukov experienced an aberration of memory. For Marshal Zhukov and the general was, as I understand it, no higher than a corporal, and although Vlasik was not a simple general, so be it ... But the main sequence of events and the participating persons Bulganin I could hardly confuse ... And his story or refutes a number of "evidence" - as in part chronology, and according to the composition of the characters, or he himself is fundamentally wrong, intentionally or not intentionally:

"VLASIK immediately called (called? - S.K.) BERIA and called the doctors. VLASIK and the guards allegedly carefully carried STALIN to the bed. Arriving doctors in the presence of BERIY, MALENKOV and KHRUSHCHEV tried to help STALIN, but everything was in vain, STALIN was unconscious, and

he was diagnosed with paralysis. Somewhat later, Bulganin and others arrived. members of the Presidium. It was decided to install a permanent duty members of the Presidium and professors of the Kremlin clinic. After a short time, STALIN, without regaining consciousness, died.

In Bulganin's story there is a discrepancy on a discrepancy. Well, okay, "Vlasik", or there guard Lozgachev, or guard Rybin, or someone else found Stalin in a swoon and "called" Beria. And how did Malenkov and Khrushchev end up at the dacha? And what does it mean - "through short time"? Is a day a short time? And from the story Bulganin, it follows that Bulganin could have known about part of the events of that night only from hearsay. Moreover, it turns out that he arrived at Stalin's dacha somewhere not earlier than at the beginning of the Sunday March 1st. But

General Dokuchaev in 1995 cites the story of one of the then Stalin's guards Colonel S.V. Gusarova ... On the night of February 28 to March 1, that is, in the night of the "Last Supper", he stood on guard at the entrance to the main house of the dacha and saw how they were leaving at about 4.00 Malenkov, Beria and Khrushchev. And Gusarov remembered that "Malenkov then breathed a sigh of relief...

Let me remind you that in Bulganin's story in Zhukov's program, Malenkov left with Bulganin, and at 2 in the morning. But

in the book of Nikolai NADA-Dobryukha, former lieutenant of the State Security Service Pavel Ivanovich Ego from Stalin's field guard "ready to talk about the time from zero to 2 o'clock in the morning", because that "precisely this watch" remained "forever" in his memory.

But it is not very clear - what hours of the night did he remember? According to Yegorov, he stood "on that tragic March night" at post No. 6 "just at the windows of that very A large dining room, where, as is commonly believed, Stalin's life ended. And just in this time, the first deputy head of the field guard "Comrade Starostin" allegedly worried about the fact that the light in the dining room was on, but there was no one there, and Starostin de does not know how to serve Stalin that tea with lemon that she allegedly usually brought to him security. (Colonel S.V. Gusarov, however, recalled that in Stalin's office on the table there was always an electric kettle with everything you need to make tea, and Stalin did everything himself at night so as not to wake the maid.)

But something else is more strange and surprising: after all, according to the testimony of both Gusarov and Bulganin (albeit in the retelling of Zhukov), and Khrushchev himself, Stalin's guests began to disperse well no earlier than 2 o'clock in the morning. So where did Yegorov stand and what did he see and what did he not see?

And how to understand Yegorov in general? He reports that he allegedly changed on the morning of March 2, knowing nothing about the commotion at the dacha. And according to Yegorov, it turns out that "the tragic March night" is the night from March 1 to March 2.

But everything seems to have happened on the night of February 28 to March 1, right?

I hope the reader has already understood why the author has no desire to conduct - according to the example of many other "researchers" - their own scrupulous investigation of - what, when and how happened at Stalin's dacha? I had to work on this to re-read so many lies in a book that, without much need to overload oneself and the reader of its analysis I, right, have no desire! As there is no desire to try to establish which of the witnesses and participants in the events of that night is lying "as a witness", and which - as a scoundrel.

One thing we know for certain about that night is that it was the last conscious night in Stalin's life and foreshadowed his imminent death! And from the hands of anyone, but only - not Beria. But

I will have to tell you about one more lie ... At first, I deliberately did not want to turn to Sergei Khrushchev's book about his father, Nikita Khrushchev. I treat Khrushchev's son with squeamishness just because he left Russia. And acquaintance with his book of respect for

it was not returned to its author, but the feeling of hostility and rejection aggravated even more.

"Apple", alas, fell not far from the "apple tree".

The book of Khrushchev Jr. is false in the manner of books by Volkogonov, Avtorkhanov, Radzinsky - that is, it is false almost page by page, false even when the author writes about what actually took place.

At the same time, she does a good job of exposing both the hero of the book and its author. Exponential I will give an example of this in the last chapter of my own book, but now I will turn to that place in the memoirs of Sergei Khrushchev, where he writes about the death of Stalin. Khrushchev the son was 18 years old in 1953, and he writes this:

"... The last time my father waited for Stalin's call was at the beginning of March 1953, in Sunday, the first. The day before, or rather that morning, he returned home to the dacha at five o'clock (How does the son know this? Is he to his father on an early Sunday did you open the door on a March morning, or what? - S.K.), as usual, when he dined at Stalin. Father had no doubt that Stalin would not withstand the loneliness of the day off, he would demand to himself (yes! - S.K.) Father did not dine, he went for a walk, punishing him if call from there, pick him up immediately.

He made such an order for the sake of formality, everyone knew perfectly well what was needed do in this case..."

But excuse me - after all, Khrushchev was summoned to Stalin almost immediately after he and "near dacha" left? So when did he "not start dinner" and "walk"? And what is he had reason to wait for a new "invitation to a party" when he was well aware of tomorrow's difficult meeting of the Presidium of the Central Committee, before which Stalin in any case did not would he "set the table" – did he have to rest and prepare for tomorrow?

But this is not so important, but what is important is the testimony of the son that the father, after returning from Stalin and a piece didn't fit into his mouth, and he couldn't sit still, and he was waiting for a call like that impatiently, that he even reminded that everyone already knew ...

After all, this is typical behavior of a poisoner or an accomplice in poisoning, waiting: did it work or not? We read further:

"Father never received a call. It began to get dark, he had a snack in loneliness and sat down at papers. Already in the evening, Malenkov called and said that something had happened to Stalin. Without delay, the father left ...".

So - the guard Yegorov was still right, and Stalin became ill not on the night of February 28 to March 1, but on the night of March 1 to 2? According to Sergei Khrushchev, it turns out like this, although in reality it wasn't like that though. However, this is not the point here! We read further:

"... Some surprise was caused by the imminent return of the father, he was absent an hour and a half or two ... Silently went up to the bedroom and again delved into his papers (?! - S.K.).

The second time he left almost at night and returned in the morning. And only on the next day he said that Stalin was ill, his condition was very serious, and they Bulganin will be on duty at night at the bedside of the patient ... "

Here again the chronology of the two days is reversed in the strangest way. She is not given the way it is traditionally served, and not the way it was in reality ...

But this, perhaps, is not the most important thing. And that is not all! Sergei Khrushchev wrote So:

"On the evening of March 5, 1953, my father returned home earlier ... He came in, sat wearily on the sofa and stretched out his legs. He paused, then said:

Stalin is dead. Today. Will be announced tomorrow. He closed his eyes... I... hesitated and asked: – Where is the farewell? — In the Hall of Columns. Tomorrow they will announce - as it seemed to me, indifferently and the father answered in a somewhat aloof way. Then he added after a pause, "Very tired these days. I'm going to sleep..."

Khrushchev really could not help but get very tired during these days - in any case, with any internal dislike or even hatred for Stalin, he, like his colleagues, endured considerable psychological stress. But even his son was discouraged so that after many years recalled:

"I was confused and indignant: "How can you go to sleep at such a moment? And neither not say a word about him. As if nothing had happened!" Father's behavior shocked me..."

Like this...

Like this!!!

Even the son was struck by the indifference of his father at such a moment ... Yes, for Khrushchev, as well as for all the highest officials in the USSR, Stalin was actually dead for more than a day, and all of them have already forgiven themselves. But the son found out about the death of Comrade Stalin just now ... For it was stunning news to him ... And the supposedly Bolshevik Khrushchev did not have the son of a Komsomol member at such a moment, not

a single word! Why? Is it because even Judas' reserves of lies are not unlimited? In the gospel parable, the traitor Judas betrayed Christ by kissing him. Evangelist Matthew describes it this way: "He who betrayed Him gave them a sign, saying I kiss him, he is, take him" (ch. 25, verse 48).

Evangelist Mark narrates further: "And having come, he immediately approached Him and said: Rabbi! Rabbi! And kissed him" (ch. 14, verse

45). Evangelist Luke continues: "Jesus said to him: Judas! Do you betray with a kiss Son of Man? (ch. 22, verse 48).

And the Evangelist John finishes: "Then the soldiers and commander and ministers The Jews took Jesus and bound him" (chapter 18, verse 12).

Khrushchev did not kiss Jesus goodbye, but Stalin. But it was also the kiss of Judas.

However ...

However, the most interesting thing is that there might not have been a kiss, because by no means the fact that that famous "Last Supper" of Stalin with the "Troika" and Khrushchev took place in addition, which we know from the memoirs of Khrushchev and a number of security officers Stalin.

Yes, all my previous analysis proceeded from the premise that dinner on the night of February 28 On March 1, 1953, he was at Stalin's dacha. However, after meeting with a little-known, although brilliant book by Ivan Ivanovich Chigirin "Dirty and White Spots of History. About the mystery death of I.V. Stalin and about some circumstances of his reign "and cited in it documents, I do not rule out that there was no dinner! There are reasons to assume that the dinner story is fictionalized by Khrushchev and the Khrushchevites in later times.

Of all the participants in that either real or virtual feast, Khrushchev (1894–1971) died third after Stalin (1879–1953) and Beria (1899–1953). That is, by the time dictation by Khrushchev of "his" "memoirs" Bulganin (1895–1975) and Malenkov (1901–1988) were still alive. I

don't know if they were familiar with Nikita Khrushchev's magnum opus - "his" "memoirs"

published abroad. But if the two former Soviet leaders knew them, then in some public way they did not express their objections, although Khrushchev lied not only through the page, but through the word. So the fact that Khrushchev, if he lied about dinner on February 28, 1953, two still living failed

"companion" should not embarrass us. Khrushchev could lie, but was not caught.

Ivan Ivanovich Chigirin, who very convincingly analyzed those days with reference to on the testimony of the historian A.N. Shefov, who worked at the Near Dacha in 1955 (see Rodina, 2003, No. 4, p. 94), cites the preserved menu for the evening of February 28, 1953: "Steam potato cutlets, fruit, juice and curdled milk."

It looks a little like the "feast of Lucullus" and even the table of the "Last Supper". At the same time, there are deaf reports that on February 28, Stalin was visited by Khrushchev and Ignatiev. And this is very similar to the truth. What happened between the three of them, he will not say nobody now. But, most likely, both candidates for the political dead came to look around on the spot and make the final decision on whether to live on Stalin or not live. After the conversation, they decided: "Do not live!"

By the way, Sergey's testimony fits well into the latest version Khrushchev. While waiting for news from Ignatiev, Khrushchev could not help but worry. And he worried precisely as an accomplice to the crime that was about to be committed.

Pushkin said that genius and villainy are incompatible things. And this is how to look!

Genius, perhaps, is not capable of villainy. However, his fate may be combined with the villainy that his enemies commit against him.

Pushkin had Dantes.

With Stalin ...

Well, the only question that can be considered open is who became Dantes in relation to Stalin. But everything seems to converge on Khrushchev and, possibly, Mikoyan. In any case, the Albanian leader Enver Hoxha once stated that Mikoyan, years later, confessed to involvement in the assassination of Stalin.

And what? It may very well be.

Chapter Sixteen

And there is a hole in Dobryukha. And on Avtorkhanov with Radzinsky and Volkogonov - too!

Earlier, I already mentioned the book by Nikolai Dobryukha with the spectacular title "How they killed Stalin." Published under the pseudonym "OVER", it appeared on the shelves of elite bookstores in early 2008 and received raucous publicity. However, the

book of Nikolai NADA is valuable, first of all, by a number of information from special archives, and Overall, it is ambivalent. If the books of, say, Volkogonov, Avtorkhanov, Radzinsky evoke only a feeling of disgust, and sometimes a feeling of disgust as texts, and to those who produced them, then the book of Nikolai NADA is more worthy of regret. It is not bad in places, and its author is quite loyal to Stalin.

But when I read, for example, about an operation with a mind-blowing name "Hamlet", which was allegedly developed by Beria with the aim of poisoning Stalin, these "revelations" do not even want to analyze. However, even in this pile of um ... some substance you can find some "pearls" of truth, because Stalin was really killed. Here only Beria had nothing to do with this, except for his desire to get to the killers - which was one of the reasons for his

death. Just as naive are Dobryukha's hints regarding, for example, the fact that Beria almost secretly supervised the development of Soviet thermonuclear weapons. What is in the book Dobryukha subtitle of chapter 20.3 "Beria and Bomba" - "Hydrogen bomb in the hands of Beria could become an instrument of global nuclear blackmail." In fact, these works were known in

the top leadership, everyone who was supposed to know about it: Stalin, Malenkov, Molotov, Bulganin, Vasilevsky, Yumashev, etc. Only people who do not know History of the Soviet Atomic Project.

Here's another example ... For the sake of Dobryukha's own "conceptual" constructions brings down Stalin's "disgrace" (the concept, by the way, is absolutely incorrect for estimates of that era) even to Marshal Rokossovsky, whom Stalin, according to Dobryukha, "sent away" to command the Polish Army.

In fact, Stalin sent Marshal of the Soviet Union K.K. Rokossovsky in August 1949 to Poland at the request of Bolesław Bierut. And there Marshal of the Soviet Union Rokossovsky took the post of Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers and Minister national defense, becoming also a member of the Politburo of the PZPR Central Committee and Marshal of Poland.

Rokossovsky was recalled from Poland only in 1956, and soon - that's for sure in form and in essence - fell into disgrace with Khrushchev, speaking very warmly and positive about Stalin's leadership qualities at the October 1957 Plenum of the Central Committee. After the 20th Congress, in the eyes of the Khrushchevites, this was tantamount to a crime, and, removed from Deputy Minister of Defense of the USSR, Konstantin Konstantinovich was sent to command Transcaucasian military district - to the homeland of the

"tyrant". There are a lot of "sensations" in Dobryukha's book, like a secret report of American intelligence about the powerful prospects for agriculture in the USSR in connection with collectivization ... This report is better than any of my or someone else's arguments coming from any domestic researcher, shows and proves the correctness of Stalin's agricultural policy. But, for the first time introducing into scientific circulation such documents, which he could receive only in official archives, the researcher needs to start with standard references to archive, fund, inventory, file, etc. Instead, N. Dobryukha now and then "puts into circulation" more than dubious interviews, "information" about "Stalin's twins", etc. And - how Dobryukha seems to sanctify their frank nonsense with the "high" authority of the chairman KGB of the USSR in 1988-1991 by Vladimir Kryuchkov. The latter certifies "research" of Dobryukha as "very strong material" and declares that "no one can turn away from the documents cited by Dobryukha". Well, depending on which ones

- this is, firstly ... Secondly, you think -

why and to what is such a figure dragged here as ex-chairman of the KGB Kryuchkov? Not having the opportunity, and indeed the need, to give her a lot of time, I will only say the main thing that I think ... In such a case as an organization in 1991 State Committee for the State of Emergency - GKChP, the role of the Chairman of the KGB was not just one of the leading, but - systemically the main! So, Vladimir Kryuchkov performed the operation in the way that either an impenetrable, mediocre cretin could have performed it, or ... Or - a smart and prudent agent of the influence of the West.

Adherents of Andropov and his deputy Kryuchkov, let them themselves choose more which suits them, but, as Jesus Christ said: "... let your word be "yes, yes", "no, no", and what is beyond this is from the evil one." There is also a good Roman saying: "Tertium non datur", - "The third is not given ..." So the presence of Kryuchkov in as a "supreme expert" on the pages of Dobryukha's book, I personally additionally alarming, and I ask myself another question: "Why and who needed N. Dobryukha as a publisher of really interesting medical papers on the latest days of Stalin and the autopsy of his body? After all, in the book of Dobryukha, compositionally and conceptually extremely, I repeat, uneven and confused, these documents are the most valuable part of the

book. Is it not a secret that the false revelations of the "classics" of the anti-Stalinist genre, Volkogonov and Radzinsky, are increasingly turning into "waste steam". For the last Over the years, things have slowly started to fall into place. Winds of History, even plainly without rising, the dirt and debris are swept away from Stalin's grave. More and more objective and convex the large figures of Molotov, Malenkov, Zhdanov, Kaganovich, Kirov and

other top figures from the Stalinist environment with all their real merits and shortcomings. The dubious appearance of figures like Voznesensky and Kuznetsov-"Leningrad".

The creative scale of such a figure as Lavrenty Pavlovich Beria ... Increasingly, these two are combined in a positive sense Name: Stalin and Beria. And it's dangerous not only for fakers and haters past of Russia, but also for falsifiers and haters of its future!

Even Stalin is not forbidden to praise, but Beria must be blackened and blackened. AND Dobryukha writes with almost evangelical pathos (on page 274): "None of the four who have recently been admitted to His house has been so interested in His death as he - Comrade Beria ...

"Tear Stalin from Beria, and even from the rest of his associates - even if not "solid stone" by 1953, but the Bolsheviks ... Depict

the processes in the top leadership of the USSR in the mature Stalin era as some kind of squabble for power and thereby bring down the outstanding, whatever one may say, state figures to the level of the current "Three percent" ...

To stain Beria in the blood of Stalin, and Malenkov, and a number of other members of the Politburo - The Bureau of the Presidium of the Central Committee, sometimes adding to them for greater "convincing" the truly guilty Khrushchev, then portraying the latter as completely innocent ...

And although the only thing that can be said about the murder of Stalin for sure fits into four words: "Beria had nothing to do with him," over and over again represent Stalin's killer Beria, Beria, Beria...

Here, as far as I understand, those tasks that have system heirs anti-Stalinist "classics". Heirs because the "patriarchs" are gradually emerging into historical "circulation", retaining, however, for the time being publishing

circulations ... But all the same, over and over again, "researchers" rant about the fact that Beria surrounded Stalin with his people, and at the same time they tell the reader - as N. OVER on the page 257 of his book that "Beria was removed from the leadership of the punitive (? - S.K.) bodies ..." But Beria was not removed, and at the end of December 1945 was released from leadership of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, because he had a lot of work to do, firstly, to organize unprecedented in scope and short terms of Soviet atomic work, and secondly, not less huge work on the restoration and development of a number of important national economic sectors.

N. Dobryukha on page 414 of his book reproaches, for example, Yuri Mukhin for the desire to "create an angel out of Beria" ... Nobody from Beria is going to make an angel - Beria was not an angel, but a big man, humanly attractive and bright personality. Why make a devil out of him - as the same Dobryukha does, moreover neglecting the obvious, by himself not disputed facts. For example,

Beria handed over the affairs of the Ministry of Internal Affairs to Sergei Kruglov on January 10, 1946, and the MGB was headed by Vsevolod Merkulov since 1943. However, Nikolai NAD and for the last two years, Stalin's life "was in the networks of the underground Beria mafia from

Ministry of Internal Affairs and MGB ... "

Firstly, what did the post-war Ministry of Internal Affairs have to do with security Stalin?

Secondly, Beria for seven years - I remind you once again - did not have official ties with the Main Directorate of Security of the MGB, headed until May 19, 1952 General Vlasik, nor with the Security Directorate of the MGB, headed since May 19, 1952 Minister of State Security Ignatiev himself.

Nevertheless, Dobryukha-NAD, without hesitation, declares on page 299:

"Comparing the strange" Vinogradov treatment "of Zhdanov (we are talking about the" case doctors." - S.K.) and Vinogradov's medical report in his address, Stalin could not help but reflect: why then, in 1948, always such a vigilant Beria did not show

due attention to Timashuk's accusatory statement?!"

Dobryukha writes this, knowing full well the answer: "Always such a vigilant Beria did not show due attention to Timashuk's accusatory statement in 1948 for that simple reason that I had no idea then either about Timashuk or about her statement.

Timashuk gave the letter to Vlasik, and he, without reading it, gave it to Abakumov, who then had everything and ended. Beria was up to his neck working on the first Soviet atomic bomb.

RDS-1 and did not even supervise the MGB - in 1948 this was within the competence of the Secretary of the Central Committee A.A. Kuznetsov, who was arrested only in August 1949. What -

Dobryukha is not aware of all this? And what are his words on page 344 about allegedly "controlled" by Beria "means mass media"? I recommend the reader maliciously unscrupulous "anti-Berian" collection of 1991, which I critically analyzed in my book on Beria, - there, on pages 190-191, the writer Konstantin Simonov describes how in the evening the day when Beria was arrested, he came to the editorial office of Literaturnaya Gazeta Deputy Head of the Department of Propaganda and Agitation of the Central Committee of Moscow and asked: is there anything about Beria in the issue prepared for publication? Simonov wrote:

"... like a fool, I stood for another two hours at my desk, rereading everything four stripes, on which the name of Beria could only be in some note on agriculture, where a collective farm or a state farm would appear his name..."

Nothing to say - Lavrenty Pavlovich was omnipotent in the Soviet mass media information.

And after all, all the other insinuations of Dobryukha against Beria are no more thorough than last.

Sometimes, it must be admitted, N. Dobryukha strikes not in the eyebrow, but in the eye, as, for example, when he writes that "the defeated in 1917 in the 20-40s had nothing left but organize, wherever possible, secret resistance to the victorious, "and that it was "Secret civil war between the relatively small remnants of the White Guard and huge Red masses ... "

Brilliantly said - no jokes! Valuable are also Dobryukha's data on the actually first edition of the "case of doctors" in 1935, when amazing facts were revealed about the amazing contamination The medical and sanitary department of the Kremlin has more than suspicious personnel: wives large landowners and white officers, daughters of merchants of the 1st guild, cattle merchants, etc. Then they were only "flowers" ... "Berries" were already poisoned Zhdanov and his colleagues. Moreover, some kind of continuity of anti-Soviet groups in the LSUK does not deny, in fact, Dobryukha, mentioning, albeit in passing, the strange deaths of Krupskaya and Gorky ...

Valuable and medical documents of 1953, cited by N. Dobryukha, and this is the main thing, what can be said about them.

N. Dobryukha is also convincing in criticism of, say, the American Robert Tucker and Englishman Alan Bullock - when he convicts them of uncritical rewriting of any stories about Stalin by Roy Medvedev and Dmitry Volkogonov, who, in turn, refer to Tucker and Bullock.

Everything is right here! Yankee Andy ... sorry, confused with the hero O'Henry, Robert Tucker and Sir Alan wrote "biographies" of Stalin, which can satisfy only undemanding, ignorant and gullible people. But to two Anglo-Saxons this is to some extent forgivable - what can you take from the Anglo-Saxons!

But what about such, say, "Russians" as the brothers Roy and Zhores Medvedev,

Edward Radzinsky, Volkogonov? From them, then the demand of History should be stricter?

True, one can hardly ask something seriously from Edward Radzinsky if he does not is embarrassed to publicly write that his father was actually intemperate erotomaniac - after his death, one of the main domestic slanderers of Stalin found between the pages of a book a letter from Sergei Eisenstein to his father traces of their youthful amusements - obscene

drawings. The favorite book of Radzinsky Sr., who was born in 1889 and died in 1969, was *The Gods Thirst* by Anatole France. And he, like the heroes of Frans, according to his son, watched the life of Stalin's Russia with a smile.

What is revealing in relation to the father and self-revealing in relation to Radzinsky found a word for himself! That layer of social parasites, bright whose representatives turned out to be father and son, it was he who observed the life of his country.

And Stalin and his comrades and associates on all the "floors" of the social "building" this life was built.

That's all, in fact, the difference between Radzinsky Sr. and his contemporary Stalin, expressed in two phrases.

Books by Radzinsky, Volkogonov or, say, another similar "classic" - anti-Soviet, former, like "general" Volkogonov, an ideological fighter The Central Committee of the CPSU, Leonid Mlechin, can be analyzed line by line. And line by line it is possible expose their lies. Perhaps, fearing this, these "researchers" hide so carefully for "copyrights", etc., blocking in advance for their potential critics the possibility of detailed analysis.

But they don't really want to do it! Yes, perhaps not really necessary - slander on Stalin today acquires a much more subtle character than it was with the same, for example, Radzinsky. But already,

say, Volkogonov even seemed to praise Stalin in places - for the military period. However, these were also Judas "kisses". Moreover, describing the situation Stalin's "near dacha" at the time of the first commotion, Volkogonov claims that allegedly without the permission of Beria to Stalin and doctors could not be called (what else is this for?), And then "reports" that finally de in one of the government mansions of the Stalinist Monster (That's right, with a capital letter) found out in the company of a "new" woman at three in the morning. Beria - according to Volkogonov - and said fatally: they say that you are drooping ... Com Stalin is fast asleep and snoring.

Vile nonsense! But here - it was published, is being published, and is still being accepted by many on faith ... But even a sophisticated - with elements of supposedly recognition of merit - slander on S life itself refutes more.

As for the books of Radzinsky and Volkogonov, the following can be said about them ... They, written by different authors, but having the same name "Stalin", are issued from of the general anti-Stalinist series, except perhaps in printed volume and special anti-historicity. They are also issued by the fact that they have become a kind of "normative" "sources" according to St for many of our compatriots who want to understand Stalin and his era. Alas, the acquaintance of an unprepared reader with this, in the systemic sense - a two-pronged, opus can only obscure the question, or rather, soil it in the mud of fraud and lies.

These two books are related by the fact that both of them were written by hereditary, so to speak, haters of Stalin, forced to conceal their hatred for many decades.

But I have no opportunity to directly quote these books, because both "pillars" of "Russian" "democracy" in the spirit of "true freedom" of the search for historical truth stated in print: 1) Radzinsky: "Reproduction of the entire book or any part of it prohibited without the written permission of the publisher. Any attempt to break the law will be prosecuted"; 2) Volkogonov: "Any use material in this book, in whole or in part, without the permission of the copyright holder

prohibited."

I understand this approach when it comes to a popular detective or ladies' novel ... But in a study that claims to be historical truth, only one reservation - about the need for a mandatory reference to the source used. And so ... They talked, they talked to simpletons about the inadmissibility of a monopoly on information, but in reality claim it in court! Gee! Either "historians"

or clowns! Entering into a rage from the fortunately acquired opportunity to protect the "sacred right of private property" in "Rossiyaniya", both of our "historians", like many others

"historians from democracy", did not even notice that they claimed exclusive rights to the texts Bible, Napoleon, Rabindranath Tagore, André Gide, Aragon, Berdyaev, etc. And even on ... the text of the national anthem of the USSR of pre-Khrushchev times.

However, democracy is a serious matter, it cannot be protected without rubber or even lead bullets, lawyers, prosecutions and historical falsifications... And therefore, I cannot afford direct quotations from the works of the two "fathers" (or grandchildren, or even great-grandchildren?) of "Russian" "democracy" ...

And, as I said earlier, I am even glad of this. However, I hope I am not violating the rights copyright holders if I inform the reader that Radzinsky in the chapter "Death or Murder?" inadvertently let slip that for the first time "evidence" about the circumstances Stalin's death, allegedly emanating from the lips of Stalin's direct guards, were published in the book by Dmitry Volkogonov.

Volkogonov referred to the guard Starostin, and Radzinsky "specified" him on the basis of the "memoirs" of the guard Rybin. But what are such "memories" worth? I have already shown the reader on a number of examples and I will not

tire him more. Rybin, Starostin, Khrustalev, Lozgachev, Tukov, Yegorov, etc. - can you trust them? If you cross-compare their testimonies and the testimonies of others, you will not get a consistent picture even in general - not to mention the details and chronology. This is recognized, in fact, by everyone.

Moreover, some memories that do not formally correspond to reality may be and the real basis. So, the actor Mikhail Gelovani first played Stalin in the cinema in 1938, and for the last time in 1950. There is evidence that once Gelovani persuaded Stalin to test the accuracy of his makeup by walking past the guards instead of Stalin. The story is quite plausible, but from it grows a whole set of already stupid stories about allegedly "twins" of Stalin.

However, even before the publication of various "declassified" supposedly "memories" about Stalin's death, Abdurakhman Avtorkhanov's book "The Mystery of Death" was written.

Stalin", published in 1976 by the emigrant publishing house "Posev". Her subtitle was, as you might guess, the corresponding one: "Beria's

conspiracy." This is the same Avtorkhanov, with the mention of which I began the chapter "Stalin and Beria"... And the biography of this "political scientist" serves as such a powerful "information to reflection", that I will quote the article about him in full, placed in the first volume Great Russian Encyclopedia. By the way, what is in this volume, published in 2005 scientific (?) publishing house "Great Russian Encyclopedia", in general, there was a place for biography of Avtorkhanov, fully characterizes the "scientific" publishing house "BRE". Only one letter in its name has changed, but how sharply the level has fallen encyclopedic activity in all - except printing - respects. And above all - regarding the moral!

But this is so, by the way. As for Avtorkhanov, BRE reports the following about him:

"AVTORKHANOV Abdurakhman Genazovich (lit. pseudonyms: Alexander Uralov, Surovtsev, Professor Temirov, Mansur) (not earlier than 1908, the village of Lakha-Nevri Tersk region - 24.4.1997, Olsing, Germany), figure grew up. emigration, political scientist,

publicist. Member since 1927 VKP(b). Since 1930 Ch. arr. On the desk work in the Chechen Autonomous Region. Author of a number of works on the history of Chechnya. Managed the drafting team "Grammar of the Chechen language" (1933). (Note that "BRE" does not give any data on the sources of formation of this Chechen "Cyril and Methodius". - S.K.). In 1937 he was arrested on charges of organizing the so-called. Interethnic center, released in 1940, arrested again, and released again in 1942. Then same sent as a representative of owls. authorities to negotiate the surrender of weapons with Kh. Ismailov, the leader of one of the armed forces. Chech. groups activated in con. 1941 as the front line approaches Checheno-Ingushetia. switched to his side, delivered to Germany a document called. "Memorandum of the Provisional people's revolutionary Government of Checheno-Ingushetia. In 1943–45 in Berlin. IN 1943–44 member North Caucasian national to-the one who promoted the ideas independence of the Caucasus from the USSR under the auspices of Germany. Editor of the weekly newspaper. "Ghazzavat". In 1949–79 prof. and head. department of politics Sciences Rus. Institute of Amer. army, which trained specialists for the USSR (Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany). (Note that the period from 1945 to 1949 falls out of the field of view of BDT, although it must be assumed that during these years the main education of "Professor Temirov" in American "institutions". - S.K.). In 1950, at the same time one of the founders and deputy research director. Institute for the Study of History and Culture of the USSR (Munich, Germany). Engaged in the history of the formation and development of the state. and part. system in the USSR, considered the explicit and hidden mechanisms of political. repression. He put forward the idea of the phenomenon of "Soviet colonialism", believed that its purpose it was not Russian domination. ethnos, and communist. ideas. Collaborated with People's Labor Union. One of the organizers of Radio Liberty (Liberation), editor of its North Caucasian edition. Memoir author (1983, Frankfurt am Main; 2003, Moscow)".

Such is the biography, acquaintance even with a brief summary of which is a lot explains about the one who was repressed in 1937. By the way, "gazavat" ("gazavat") or "jihad", "war on the path of God" is a holy war of Muslims against infidels, in which all non-Muslim territories are considered as "area wars", "dar el-gharb" as opposed to the "region of Islam" - "dar el-Islam". AND "Dar el-Gharb" for the faithful is a permanent theater of military operations, the beginning which can follow at any convenient moment. Since

"Professor Temirov" died in 1997, there can hardly be any doubt about that he was not only the leading "ideologist" of the modern Chechen war, but also one from the direct organizers and secret coordinators of this mini-"gazzavat".

So who, who, and this "professor" has hands exactly in human blood according to shoulders. And today the Chechen "leaders" are just trying to implement his old ideas (more precisely, of course, the ideas of its owners). The statements of BDT that Avtorkhanov is something there "pushed forward" and "assumed" something there, they even sound somehow funny ... Figures like Avtorkhanov (as, indeed, many of the current "Russian" "encyclopedists") themselves cannot "believe" anything, because they themselves are believed and placed in any convenient for the employer positions.

In this sense, it is significant how Avtorkhanov's editors presented the public academic journal "Questions of History" in No. 1 for bad memory in 1991. Having reported that Abdurakhman Genazovich Avtorkhanov was born in 1908 in the village of Lakha-Nevri Terskaya regions of the Caucasus region, the editorial note continued further:

"By nationality, he is a Chechen, he graduated from a five-year Russian school, then entered a madrasah, but was soon expelled for reading a forbidden literature and then brought up in the Grozny orphanage, where he graduated from two second grade school. In 1924 he was enrolled in the Chechen regional party school, accepted into the ranks of the CPSU (b), studied in Grozny at the Worker faculty, preparatory department of the Institute of Red Professors and

Faculty of Chemistry of the Grozny Oil Institute, worked as the head of the organizational department and the press department of the

Chechen Regional Committee Since 1932, Avtorkhanov has been working as the director of the Chechen branch Partizdat and studies at the editorial department of the courses of Marxism-Leninism at Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, at the Institute of Red Professors and lectures ... in the Moscow Pedagogical Institute named after Bubnov. In 1937 he was arrested on a false charge, released in 1940, soon arrested again, and in 1942 again released.

After the occupation of the North Caucasus by the Nazis, Avtorkhanov was deported in early 1943 to Berlin. There, until the spring of 1945, he collaborated in printed organs of the Russian emigration, and after the end of the war remained in West Germany. From 1949 to 1979 he taught political sciences at the Russian Institute of the American Army, became a doctor of political sciences ... "etc.

Compared to the article in BRE, the "Soviet" period of Avtorkhanov's life is still covered in detail here, and it is clear that the new Russia raised a capable Chechen boy, whose "ceiling" in tsarist Russia would be the position of a rural teacher, to heights of serious higher education. In "Rossiyaniya" these details were preferred not emphasize. But in "Questions of History" were modestly bypassed, as superfluous, those details of the life of the "deported" ex-Marxist during the war, which in January 1991 could have kept many in the USSR from admiring the ideas of Avtorkhanov.

However, just as modest in covering the juicy details of Avtorkhanov's biography there was then a "perestroika" magazine Slovo. In No. 5 for 1990, publishing excerpts Avtorkhanov's book about Stalin's death, the editors reported only the following about him:

"A. Avtorkhanov is a native of the Caucasus. By education he is a historian. Worked in the Central Committee of the party (in the Central Committee of which party, it is not specified, because in the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks Avtorkhanov is not have worked. - S.K.). In 1937 he was repressed. After his release, he emigrated to West, where he defended his doctoral dissertation, became a professor of history Russia. He published about ten books ... "

But in 2005, in BRE it was already possible to decipher the anti-Soviet side biography of the "fighter against totalitarianism" in full. In the defaults of 1990 and 1991 - all future "Russian" official "historical" "science". But this is also - by the way. Let's move

on ... In the encyclopedic list of works by Avtorkhanov, there are no his book "The Mystery of Stalin's Death" is mentioned, about which the reader is already aware how he is also aware that in 1991 the chapters from it were first published in the USSR in May (No. 5) issue of the Novy Mir magazine, which was then published with a circulation of 957,000 copies (I don't know if it is published now). At that time, the reader (was such, now lost, a habit among the "slaves of totalitarianism") the public got acquainted with Avtorkhanov's "revelations" excitedly... Well, then it could still be understood somehow - the ideologist of the "gazavat" wrote about the "forbidden"...

Today, this political hack can be read only for the purpose of dissecting it. Moreover, the fact that this "historian" could only produce "highly learned" hack work could understand by looking at his photo, placed in No. 5 of the Slovo

magazine. However, for many renegade "historians" in the land of native birches, Avtorkhanov's book turned out to be both a dogma and a guide to action. Once a Marxist historian Mikhail Pokrovsky defined bourgeois historical science as "politics overturned in past". In the performance of Avtorkhanov and others like him, the story - for the first time, perhaps, in the history of the development of mankind - turned out to be a policy overturned into the future!

And just as all subsequent Russian literature of the 19th century grew out of Gogol's "Overcoat", so all Russian literature grew out of old Avtorkhanov's pseudoscientific opuses. historical "science" of the late XX and early XXI centuries ... "Science", shamelessly misrepresenting and

ineptly interpreting the entire recent history of our Motherland and the whole world in general.

It was not for nothing that the Chechen Avtorkhanov slurped cabbage soup at the Russian Institute of Red Professors and tomato soup at the Russian Institute of the American Army. As a result, he became the inspiration for not only Chechen fighters, but also many Moscow professors who - some after 1991, and some before it - simply began to shift the ideas of this bison to the psychological wars into the "new Russian" academic language.

Here you can remember one more "frame" of this war - the former Soviet nomenklatura-party card and defector Mikhail Voslensky, book The "nomenclature" of which, published for the first time in 1980 in Austria and Germany, also became for "ideologists" of "perestroika" desktop. Voslensky prefaced the introduction to his book a very significant epigraph from Heinrich Mann: "Today's books are tomorrow's case".

Said frankly and to the point.

"Tomorrow's" "deed", programmed by books like Avtorkhanov's, today already became our past. But this does not mean that everything is in the past, and therefore in present-day Moscow the amount of waste paper masquerading as social science and historical research, the "foundation" of which was laid by the Avtorkhanovs and Voslenskys. No wonder, no wonder Abdurakhman Avtorkhanov slurped Soviet cabbage soup and American tomato soup.

If we talk about the interpretation of processes and events by Avtorkhanov, directly relating to the death of Stalin, it is not only false, but at times ridiculous. What there is one scene described by the author of "The Mystery of Stalin's Death" from the words allegedly of Ilya Ehrenburg, where the hypocrite Beria either shouts: "The tyrant is dead!", then kisses the hands of the "tyrant", and where all his entourage allegedly came out against Stalin without a hitch, demanding an end to "the cases of doctors",

etc. Avtorkhanov knows how to distort the thesis - that's why he is a master of psychological warfare. But such masters do well only against sheep, or rather, against social rams, who are inclined only to chew the cud offered to them and do not know how to think. Let's say this master writes:

"Under tyrannical regimes, politics is the art of alternating intrigues. The courtiers intrigue to get closer to the tyrant, and the tyrant to set them against each other: after all, the courtiers, constantly competing among themselves, are not able to organize a conspiracy against their master. Stalin surrounded himself with people whose loyalty was conditional not social ideals, but only career considerations ... ",

etc.

We will not expand much on the topic that "whose cow would moo" - already Avtorkhanov always lived not by social ideals, but by career considerations and measures here others on their own. But let's look at what he wrote in relation to Stalin and his associates essentially.

So, Avtorkhanov puts forward a correct thesis about the nature of relations in the highest power under generalized tyrannical monarchy and wrongly applies this thesis to the situation of the USSR Stalin in the mid-30s - early 50s of the twentieth century. As a result, Avtorkhanov is already putting forward an absolutely incorrect thesis about the nature of power in

the USSR. Say, Kalinin ... Avtorkhanov in his "Technology of Power" - without understanding what he writes - reports that they, de, "red professors", "measured the leaders of the revolution on a slightly different scale" than "ordinary people", and "from the point of view of this scale" they it seemed that "Kalinych", although a handsome old man, was, as a politician, someone else's shadow, and how the theorist is round zero"... However, further Avtorkhanov reports that the professors are "ready

were condescending to listen to Kalinin too"...

However, just a "handsome old man" would hardly have entered the highest party circles. even under Lenin. In early June 1946, the terminally ill Kalinin sent a suicide letter to Stalin, and this letter can in no way be classified as flattery "court" "tyrant". But the letter shows the figure of a major politician and an outstanding a man whose "illness and expectation of death did not dull ... interest in the fates" of his country and its immediate future. But

the rest of the top leadership of the Bolsheviks were not lackeys either. extras and Stalinist backbones - to prove this is even somehow embarrassing. Besides This book contains, I hope, enough information to make such proofs redundant.

However, it is interesting to read Avtorkhanov's book with a pencil in hand when well acquainted with the indisputable documents published - albeit in microcirculation - in recent years. When Avtorkhanov's book was first published in the USSR and even later, almost all of these documents were not available for study. Today, their knowledge unequivocally convinces of Avtorkhanov's total dishonesty, but also makes reading his books are a kind of entertainment when you can easily compare the truth of a fact and a lie Avtorkhanova.

Here is an example... Avtorkhanov categorically states:

"So, Stalin simply overslept the radical revolution in world politics and diplomacy as a result of the emergence of thermonuclear (actually, then only atomic. - S.K.) weapons. The troubadours of Stalinism wrote more than once that when President Truman at the Potsdam Conference informed Stalin of a landmark news that the Americans have invented an unprecedented weapon - atomic (this Truman did not use the word. - S.K.) bomb, then Stalin turned the conversation to the topic of weather. The tragedy of the situation lay in the fact that this bomb did not hit Stalin. made a good impression..."

In fact, Stalin understood the significance of the new factor in world politics to such an extent that back in 1943, at the height of the most difficult and devastating war for the USSR, the ongoing against Russia by the owners of Avtorkhanov, who "emigrated" to Berlin, sanctioned Soviet "atomic" work. And by the summer of 1945 they were already in full swing - even before the tragedy of Hiroshima and Nagasaki clearly confirmed to the whole world that physicists in their calculations of the power of new weapons are not

mistaken. Like the books of his followers and the followers of his followers, the books Avtorkhanov can be critically analyzed not only page by page, but line by line. However we, perhaps, will move on ... I will only remind the reader that, just like the original base for all the tales about the "creator of Thermidor" and the "tyrant" Stalin were Trotsky's opuses, and the source of all later stories that Stalin fell victim to a conspiracy precisely Beria, there was an opus by Avtorkhanov. Moreover, he very accurately (he knew, presumably) points to a number of details confirming the version of the conspiracy and murder, notes the dual role Ignatiev, etc. But all this is in order to divert attention from the real driving anti-Stalinist forces and turn attention to Beria.

The country learned that Stalin was seriously ill from a government report published in Pravda "about the illness of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR and Comrade Iosif Vissarionovich Stalin, Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU.

The Central Committee and the Council of Ministers informed about "the misfortune that befell our party and our people - a grave illness of Comrade Stalin. It was reported that:

"On the night of March 2, Comrade Stalin, when he was in Moscow for

apartment, there was a cerebral hemorrhage, which captured important areas of the brain. Comrade Stalin lost consciousness. Paralysis of the right hand developed legs. There was a loss of speech. Severe cardiac dysfunction and breathing.

For the treatment of Comrade Stalin, the best medical forces were involved: professor-therapist P.E. Lukomsky; full members of the Academy of Medical Sciences of the USSR: professor-neuropathologist N.V. Konovalov; professor-therapist A.L. Myasnikov; professor-therapist E.M. Tareev; professor-neuropathologist I.N. Filimonov; professor-neurologist R.A. Tkachev; professor-neuropathologist I.S. Glazunov; associate professor-therapist V.I. Ivanov-Neznamov. The treatment of Comrade Stalin is carried out under the leadership of the Minister of Health USSR t. A.F. Tretyakov and the Head of the Medical and Sanitary Department of the Kremlin t. I.I. Kuperin".

The signatures of these doctors were under the bulletins published in Pravda about Stalin's state of health: at 2 o'clock on March 4, 1953 (not signed by neuropathologists Filimonov and Glazunov), at 2 o'clock on March 5, 1953, at 16 o'clock on March 5, 1953, as and under the message about the death of Stalin at 21:50 on March 5.

So, Stalin left this world. And now it was his funeral. However, Stalin's body was not to be interred, but was to rest in sarcophagus of the Mausoleum next to another sarcophagus - with the body of Lenin. Before this there were complex actions for the autopsy and medical examination of the body and preparing him for embalming. But about the "medical" aspect - later. Now let's

touch on the aspect of mourning and political ... How much lies have been written about those days in the history of the Motherland! They write that many de rejoiced, "forgetting" that Stalin's death really rejoiced, but very few and none of those who had a mind and a heart ...

They write about the "non-Christian" image of the burial, "forgetting" about the tombs of Russians tsars in Orthodox cathedrals, about coffins with the remains of several generations of Russian nobles in family tombs, about a simple black coffin with the body of Lermontov, standing in a niche underground crypt in Penza Tarkhany ...

And how often they write that the "bloody" de "tyrant", leaving for the grave, demanded de "numerous human victims", crushed in a human stream moving towards To the Hall of Columns, where the coffin with the body of Stalin was exhibited ... They write about the second allegedly "Khodynka" ...

Well, without some victims in those days, it would hardly have happened with the most clear organization funerals and under any security measures. It is enough to visit at least once in a dense crowd moving towards the escalator at rush hour in the Moscow metro to understand what it is. true. After all, not

only Muscovites sought to say goodbye to Stalin - then they went to the capital on any transport that turned up from different cities and towns of the Soviet Union. AND it was impossible to completely introduce this element into absolutely clear boundaries, as it was impossible to refuse the very act of popular farewell to Stalin.

Yes, perhaps the only option to avoid human casualties would be a complete refusal of the funeral ceremony.

Although ... Although how Avtorkhanov, Radzinsky, Volkogonov and others imagine it similar "researchers"? What - immediately after the death of Stalin and all the medical examinations and autopsies, it was necessary to carry out embalming and immediately put the body in the Mausoleum? Or just bury him as soon as possible?

But in this case, too, it would not have been without victims, and even what kind! Indeed, in those days - as in the days of Lenin's funeral, as in the days of any sharp historical turns - in their rights truly popular element has entered ... This element would have abandoned its raging

waves to the walls of the Kremlin, to the Novodevichy cemetery, and in general to any place where Stalin would rest in peace. And the same element would flood those who would deprive the people of the right say goodbye to Comrade Stalin. And

then the victims would be really numerous. Yes, there were victims (but by no means "numerous", of course) but how many around this mournful fact, heaped up with philistine rumors, which subsequently passed into many "solid" memoirs, unreliable "evidence" of eyewitnesses (at the command of criminologists "Lies like an eyewitness") and simply deliberate overexposure and slander!

For example, the future KGB general Leonov, who then worked at the Publishing House of a Foreign literature and who was in Moscow in those days, describes them as a witness and participant in the events, but as described! He's writing:

"The sorrow and grief of all my colleagues (but what about Leonov himself? - S.K.) were genuine. But the Spaniards (political emigrants. - S.K.) *were killed even more than us.* Social psychosis (? - S.K.) overflowed its banks in those days. Millions of people (explicit quantitative enumeration, permissible for a newsboy, but not permissible for security analyst. - S.K.) rushed to the Hall of Columns, where, finally (?? - S.K.), lay "leader and teacher" ... "

You can't call this tone otherwise than, to put it mildly, cheeky. But further - more! Talking about his unsuccessful attempt to get into the House of Unions, Leonov claims that in near Trubnaya Square, hundreds of people were trampled to death, and states: "The cult personality took with him to the grave several hundred of his last victims.

Further, he refers to his conversation already in the Chekist tenure with the then performer duties of the head of the Moscow police N.I. Krainov, but does not specify number of victims, although Krainov could not help but know it, and Leonov could not help but take advantage of such a convenient opportunity not to ask her. Fact, as for my taste, speaking for itself

myself! In refutation of perhaps hundreds of pages of such lies, I will not refer to the documents of those days are also not very reliable, but I will give only one evidence, which is worth many others.

Honorary security officer, retired colonel Vladimir Fedorovich Kotov is no longer in alive, but in 2001 in Nizhny Novgorod, in a circulation of 500 copies, his memories with a simple and expressive title: "It was so!" All who knew Colonel Kotov, they note that he remained an honest, careful person to the end and thoughtful Chekist, and this is evident from his most interesting - including by virtue of their unsophisticated sincerity - memories.

Coming to the state security agencies in 1949 as a young guy, in 1952 he became cadet of the Higher School of the MGB and in March 1953 he was directly involved in ensuring security during Stalin's funeral. Here is a direct quote from his book:

"But now, in our student life, as well as in the life of the whole country as a whole, the words of an official announcement suddenly burst: March 5, 1953 in the 73rd year of life, Joseph Vissarionovich Stalin died ... All life in society, as it were, quieted down. No, she did not stop, but, as it were, she froze in anticipation of the future events. I,

like our entire course, had the opportunity to participate in providing security during the funeral. I was on duty, which provided a pass to the Hall of Columns from the side of the street. Gorky. All street, as far as the eye could see, from the Central Telegraph and above, to the side Mayakovsky Square, was crowded with people. Many had tears in their eyes. And in general, the whole dense human mass was somehow hushed, with a mournful facial expressions, and not some crowd of onlookers.

How dissimilar this description is, above all psychologically, to the description General Leonov, who actually disregarded the oath to the Soviet Union and went to ideological conciliation with the "Russian" "Rossiyaniya".

Colonel Kotov testifies:

"At the same time, we must pay tribute to Muscovites and guests - they observed established order of movement and passage. But wishing to enter The hall of columns from the side of our post without a corresponding pass (that's how! - S.K.), to pay the last debt to the deceased leader, there were so many that the living the security chain from the entrance to the Hall of Columns "from the rear" to the Yermolova Theater with difficulty restrained the human pressure, which had to be held for three days, while accessing farewell to I.V. Stalin."

As you can see, there were no excesses in the main organized column, although some there must have been an uncontrollable crush with victims somewhere - on this subject, you can find messages in relatively reliable memoirs. And I do not exclude that in the distant approaches to the main route, someone deliberately formed routes with such areas where the prerequisites for a crush and so on were objectively created. Not I also exclude direct provocations like: "Come on, guys, I know where you can go!" etc.

Considering how many-sided Moscow was already in those years, and the fact that Stalin fell a victim of a conspiracy, such a version cannot be ruled out either, can it?

The same state of mind and body that even serious people could then come to can be judged by such a detail from the story of V.F. Kotova:

"In order to avoid unforeseen situations, a decision was made to help a living chain of guards to form a barrier of trucks drawn up in a row cars. But still, individual daredevils broke through such a barrier. One such daredevil, who dived under a car, I involuntarily had to grab the floor of the greatcoat that flashed by and pull it out from under the car. But what is I was both surprised and embarrassed when an army general appeared in front of me - a junior lieutenant - and with a plea in his voice asked me to let him through so that once in a lifetime to see Stalin at least dead. I understood the general's condition and therefore, he escorted him to the senior operational detachment, who allowed him enter the line moving in a continuous stream parallel to the street Gorky".

This is how the Soviet Chekist Kotov wrote about those days in 2001, adding then: "We, the members of our operational detachment, took advantage, as they say, of position and paid their last debt to the leader of the party and state.

And here is how a former Chekist and "Russian" professor wrote about the same thing in 1997 MGIMO Leonov: "So I didn't say goodbye to" old Hottabych ", as I called Stalin for his capricious omnipotence..."

Leonov in 1953 was 25 years old. How could he know about how he led the country Stalin, to have the moral right to speak insultingly about him? But when it came "Hard times" - as Leonov himself called his memoirs - Leonov and his colleagues in higher education management of the country turned out to be not Stalin's falcons, but wet "two-headed" chickens. Although they judged the era of Stalin at random from a young age. Yes, such as the young intellectual Leonov, who came out of what seemed to be the most the thick of the people, also mindlessly created the atmosphere that led to the assassination of Stalin at the turn of winter and spring 1953.

From the moment when the first mourning columns reached the House of Unions, three days ... Access to the Hall of Columns was closed, and the flow of farewells dried up. Remained in the hall only close relatives, inner circle, technical staff of the House of Unions and

security. What happened there at that

moment? Much has already been written about the fact that Vasily Stalin, for example, openly confessed and that he de and in his hearts threw a sharp phrase about the fact that, they say, they ruined his father, bastards, poisoned him! Well, this was quite in the spirit of Stalin's youngest son. But this accusation was true.

Vasily loosened his tongue and later ... And Beria, as the new Minister of Internal Affairs, sanctioned his arrest. "Russian" "historians" cite this fact as superfluous proof of Beria's guilt. But

everything could be explained

differently! Beria had nothing to do with the murder of Stalin, however, the fact that Stalin was p suspect from the very beginning - as soon as he was with other members of the Bureau Presidium of the Central Committee at the bedside of a dying man. Most likely, Beria from the very beginning suspected something and suspected something.

So, once again standing at the head of the Ministry of Internal Affairs - the MGB, Beria could not help but start this or that a secret investigation in any case - if only to cut off the version of the murder. But with his richest operational experience and - let's not forget - operational talent, Beria could not but understand that such a ball must be unwound carefully and carefully - otherwise you can quickly get to your own solemn funeral.

And here Vasily's expansiveness could, on the one hand, interfere with the delicate investigation, but on the other hand, could break the head of Vasily himself. In this case, having ordered his arrest, Beria acted, firstly, in the interests of the investigation, and secondly, he simply saved Vasily's life!

This assumption of mine is confirmed by the fact that Vasily Stalin was arrested during Beria, but he continued to sit even after Beria's arrest. If Vasily suspected how the murderer of Father Lavrenty Pavlovich, then, it would seem, what could be better - after the arrest of Beria release another "innocent victim" of his "arbitrariness", and that's it. And let Vasily, drunk, once again publicly send curses to vile killer. But no! Stalin's son both "sat" under Beria, and continued to "sit" under Khrushchev. The question is - who did Vasily Stalin blame for the death of his father?

However, let's go back to the day of March 8, 1953... The farewell to Stalin is over.

And the next day was his funeral.

Chapter Seventeen March 9, 1953 Oath of Beria

On March 9, 1953, a double inscription was already reddening on the pediment of the Mausoleum:

L E N I N
S T A L I N

On this day, the country and all progressive mankind said goodbye to Stalin. Say it didn't mean to go astray or be hypocritical - they really mourned Stalin hundreds of millions of people. Chekist V.F., who was on Red Square that day. Kotov wrote:

"Usually, when huge masses of people gather, from a close crowd of people comes a continuous rumble. And here, it would seem, complete silence. Obviously, many are familiar with the expression ... "the hair on the head stirred." I must say that at the moment when the country was saying goodbye to its leader, three-minute signals were heard simultaneously, given by horns and sirens - that's when I felt that not only did the hair on my head move, but it felt like a hat with earflaps spontaneously rose on his head, and a lump stuck in his throat and a chill ran through his body. Such a feeling

my other comrades in the operational lineup also experienced.

So it was later, at 12 o'clock Moscow time, when, after the closing of the mourning rally, those who carried the coffin out of the Hall of Columns removed it from the pedestal in front of the Mausoleum and slowly brought into the Mausoleum.

And the funeral ceremony began at 10:05, when Malenkov, Beria, Molotov, Voroshilov, Khrushchev, Bulganin, Kaganovich and Mikoyan carried the coffin with the body from Kolonnnoye hall and installed it on an artillery carriage. Funeral procession accompanied by military escort moved along Okhotny Ryad and Manezhnaya Square to Red Square to the Mausoleum. At 10:45 she was at the Mausoleum.

The coffin was installed on a high pedestal, and the Soviet leaders, together with foreign guests, among whom were Zhou Enlai, Klement Gottwald, Palmiro Tolyatti and others climbed the Mausoleum.

The rally was opened by the chairman of the commission for organizing the funeral, Khrushchev. spoke Malenkov, Beria and Molotov.

The writer Konstantin Simonov, who was present on Red Square, left about this important hour in the history of the State of remembrance, extensive excerpts from which I simply have to bring ...

Here is what Simonov wrote about Beria:

"Flipping through now the numbers of ... newspapers of the fifty-third year, comparing it all with my personal memories, I could not help but pay attention to ... some pictures that did not attract attention then (highlighting here and below bold italics mine. - S.K.), and now conspicuous. "Truth" for the tenth March fifty-three. Her first line. Tribune of the Mausoleum... microphone Malenkov in earflaps, and to the right of him between Khrushchev in a hat pie and Zhou Enlai in a shaggy Chinese fur hat Beria, bursting with broad shoulders standing next to him, in a coat, wrapped in some kind of scarf covering the chin, in a hat pulled down to the very pince-nez, a wide-brimmed hat, a look of gloomy purposefulness, unlike anyone else from those standing on the Mausoleum. Most of all, he looks like the leader of some secret mafia from films that did not exist then, appeared much later.

This quote, dear reader, is also a document of history, but not a great one. Stalinist, and later - vile Khrushchev. Simonov blamed Beria

even his broad shoulders and scarf, even his gloomy appearance. And what is he, on the day of the leader's funeral and senior comrade, had to look lively and relaxed - in order to please future "memoirists"? By

the way, Beria in that general photo, which Simonov remembered, really stands out, and the comparison of Simonov is quite accurate ... However, one must notice that the others in this photo look like a caricature. And I'm comparing it today with high-quality photographs taken on the same day, March 9, 1953, and more than once in published in recent years, I wonder: what explains this collective caricature - poor-quality printing of the time or conscious caricature

retouching a picture in which decades of hidden dislike erupted

"some secret mafia" and to Stalin, who died a few days ago, and to the deceased almost thirty years ago, and Lenin already lying in the Mausoleum, and to those gathered on the podium of the Mausoleum in general, and especially to Beria? The printing level of Pravda at that time time was really not very high, and if someone had real time I would even express surprise at the low-quality photo on the front page, then everything is possible would be explained by a shocked state of mind, a bad cliché, frozen hands photographer, etc. And to rejoice about yourself - they say, that's how we are! Before the whole world freaks

exposed, and do not dig!

Indeed, such an assumption can be put forward today! Is not it?

However, that's not all!

Simonov also wrote about the three speeches that were made that day from the podium Mausoleum. And I will also have to cite this place of his memoirs in my book:

“Three different people spoke at the funeral rally ... The first was Malenkov, the second - Beria, the third - Molotov. The difference in the text of speeches to me and then it was not evident ... However, the difference that is now in the text of speeches you won't catch it (how else you'll catch it! - S.K.), but which was then completely obvious, consisted in the fact that Malenkov, and after him Beria, pronounced over Stalin's coffin purely political speeches that had to be delivered on this matter. But in the way these speeches were delivered, as they spoke, there was not even a hint of their own attitude of these people towards the dead, there was not even a shadow of personal grief (by no means. - S.K.), regret (? - S.K.) or excitement, or feelings of loss - in this sense, both speeches were absolutely equally cold. Malenkov's speech, delivered by his rather rounded voice, a little less exposed the absence of any feeling. Beria's speech with his accent, with its sharp, sometimes croaking intonations in her voice, exposed the absence of this sorrow is more evident. In general, the state of mind of both speakers was the state of people who came to power (and before that they were in taverns served pineapple water? - S.K.) and satisfied with this factor”.

Simonov's later moods affected this description - there is no doubt about it. account for. But if he took the trouble to check his memories with direct texts speeches, I might not have written some of what I have written. For just according to the texts speeches, the difference in their content and direction is not so difficult to catch!

But first, I will give one more recollection of a contemporary of the events - the author of a book about Malenkov R.K. Balandin, who writes:

“... I listened to these speeches on the radio. Their text immediately vanished from memory, but it seemed to me that Malenkov's intonations were calm, business-like; Beria spoke with force and, as it were, with some kind of triumph, and Molotov's voice sometimes trembled with suppressed grief.

And now I will also take up the issue of Pravda for March 10, 1953, with three funeral speeches.

At first glance, they really do not differ much from each other, since in all Three common words are enough. And this is especially characteristic, by the way, of Molotov's speech. Stalin in 1924 found words, amazing in their power, to express grief and his understanding of Lenin, saying: "It was a mountain eagle!" Then, in front of Lenin's coffin, Stalin gave a direct oath - on behalf of the country, the party and myself personally - to continue the work of Lenin. And what was said from the podium of the

Mausoleum over the coffin of Stalin? I will not (and cannot) quote the speeches of that time in full, but Malenkov concluded his speech as follows: “Farewell, our teacher and leader, our dear friend, dear comrade Stalin! Forward, on the way to the complete triumph of the great cause of Lenin-Stalin!

And Molotov - like this: “Long live the great all-conquering teaching of Marx and Engels - Lenin - Stalin! Long live our mighty socialist motherland, our heroic Soviet people! Long live the great Communist Party of the Soviet Union!”

As you can see, Molotov did not even say goodbye to the departed leader and comrade! Don't know,

where did Simonov and Balandin see barely restrained grief ...

Molotov was the only speaker connected with the late struggle and party work long before the revolution. The only speaker, he is in the thirties for years he addressed him in private: "Koba" ... And now, not only did he not say anything about Stalin one bright word and delivered an amazingly colorless speech! Molotov in this speech clearly emphatically put the party in the first place, not the government! Although he could not know that Stalin has long been rightly rearranging these concepts - in fact.

In Beria's speech, these priorities were, as a rule, arranged "in Stalin's way", moreover, in a number of cases, Beria generally spoke only about the Soviet government.

Malenkov was also inclined to give priority to the state over the party, however less pronounced than that of Beria, in a way.

I was not the first to draw attention to these subtle points - a number of authors have already written about them. However, everything is correct here. For my part, I will add that Beria's speech turned out its printed version - and the least saturated with exclamation marks. This sign punctuation was used in the text once - in the appeal "Dear comrades, friends!". The most saturated with official parties ... sorry, "patriotic" exclamations turned out to be the text of Molotov's speech. Slightly less intense is Malenkov's speech.

To be honest, I didn't read Beria's speech right away and didn't appreciate it the first time. When I first met her while working on my book about Beria, I considered her also in to a large extent official and not bright. It took some time interval and work over a book about Stalin so that I can read Beria's speech the way it deserves.

Its general structure and vocabulary suggest that the author of the text was not someone of Beria's assistants, and Lavrenty Pavlovich himself, but that he did not write it, but dictated stenographer - in his last years, Beria did this more than once when it came to voluminous texts signed by him. And in this speech there were several places quite "significant".

Beria said: -

The enemies of the Soviet state expect that the heavy loss we have suffered will lead to confusion and confusion in our ranks. But their calculations are in vain: they are waiting for cruel disappointment. He who is not blind sees that our Party, in its difficult days, is still closes its ranks more closely, that it is united and unshakable. He who is not blind sees that in these mournful days all the peoples of the Soviet Union in fraternal unity with the great Russian people rallied even more closely around the Soviet government and the Central Committee Communist Party.

Beria knew his colleagues ... He was aware that almost all of the old the Stalinist guards - with the possible exception of Kaganovich - were increasingly inclined to rest on our laurels, and not pull the sovereign cart the way she pulled it for decades. Myself For many years now, Beria has been up to his neck in a pile of urgent and important matters - one Special Committee was worth something!

When things are up to the neck, there is no time for intrigue. But if the business tension abates, the formed "ecological niches" begin to occupy self-esteem, which is transformed gradually into selfishness. And over the coffin of Stalin, Beria took a kind of oath to keep cohesion of the leadership, without which there is no cohesion of society, and publicly reminded colleagues about the need for friendly work.

Beria spoke about the strength of a multinational state and further stated: - The workers, the collective farm peasantry, the intelligentsia of our country can work calmly and confidently, knowing that the Soviet government will carefully and tirelessly protect their rights, written in the Stalinist Constitution ...

To this part of the speech of Lavrenty Pavlovich, who was now not only the First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR Malenkov, but again headed

united Ministry of Internal Affairs, researchers of Beria's activities have paid attention for a long time. However, in real time, some people paid attention to these words - about which a little later. AND indeed, they were worth it - it was Beria, the only one of the three speakers, who directly mentioned the Stalinist Constitution and the rights guaranteed by it ...

Moreover, there was one more moment that few people in the country knew about, but not so much and a few in the party "tops" and in circles close to them. before the very first elections to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, in 1937, Stalin was determined to ensure alternative elections, but met such resistance in this matter - albeit deaf, but stubborn, that then the intention had to be abandoned, and after the war - in the elections of 1950 - the principle of alternativeness would hardly have been politically justified. Now also initiates, and initiates, listening to Beria, could immediately think - does not it have mind "Lavrenty" and this constitutional right, has never really been used, but allowed by the Constitution? Here

Anastas Ivanovich Mikoyan, by the way, thought about something. And immediately after the funeral meeting, he asked Beria something. Four months later, on that July Plenum of the Central Committee, where the political execution of the already arrested Beria took place, Mikoyan He talked about it this way (I quote from an uncorrected transcript):

“At first I told him why you need the NKVD (Mikoyan, out of old habit said "NKVD", referring to the Ministry of Internal Affairs. - S.K.)? And he answered: it is necessary to restore legality, such a situation in the country cannot be tolerated. We have a lot of arrested people, they need to be released. The NKVD must be reduced (under Minister Ignatiev, the states were very bloated. - S.K.), send guards to Kolyma and leave one or two a person for protection (members of the government. - S.K.) ...

When he spoke on Red Square over the coffin of Comrade Stalin, after his speech, I said: in your speech there is a place to guarantee (the emphasis here and below is mine. - S.K.) every citizen has the rights and freedoms provided for by the Constitution. This is not an empty phrase in the speech of a simple speaker, but in the speech of the Minister of the Interior - this is a program of action, you must fulfill. He answered me: I will fulfill it ... "

It is unlikely that this program could suit everyone. Let's say - the same Khrushchev, inclined act not with conviction, but with a fist. Yes, and not only Khrushchev was the case! I think not accidentally in the already corrected and intended for distribution verbatim report on At the plenum, Mikoyan's words looked somewhat different: "... I told him: in your speech there is a place to guarantee every citizen the rights granted to him by the Constitution personality"...

The difference was, in fact, fundamental: guaranteed rights and granted rights are unequal things. And one more thing - as we see, even in the Central Committee apparatus of that time there were individuals who dreamed of "personal rights". Vocabulary familiar and having like it turns out, much earlier than the "disaster" years, "hardware" origin.

Let us return, however, to Red Square, where Beria is already moving on to foreign policy: - Our foreign policy is clear and understandable. From the first days of Soviet power, Lenin defined the foreign policy of Soviet power as a policy of peace. This policy of peace steadily carried out by the great successor of Lenin's work, our wise leader Stalin

Beria spoke about the strengthening of peace and the development of "business ties with all countries of the world on the basis of reciprocity" and, separately, on cooperation with China, the GDR, the DPRK and other "people's democracies".

This, too, was not a routine phrase - even then there was a tendency for "countries People's Democracy" to swindle at the expense of the USSR with a complacent attitude towards this Kremlin leaders. And Beria insisted on the exact fulfillment of business contractual

obligations, and he already had skirmishes with colleagues about this - with the same Mikoyan, for example.

"To defend the Soviet Motherland," continued Beria, the only one who spoke not forgetting about the army - our valiant Armed Forces are equipped with all types of modern weapons. The

permanent chairman of the Special Committee since its formation in 1945, Beria, like no one else, knew what he was saying...

Soviet hydrogen bomb RDS6-s, and in the rocket design bureau of Sergei Korolev, the first sketches of the future first Soviet intercontinental ballistic missile R-7, "seven" ...

Beria ended his speech as follows:

"Stalin, like Lenin, left a great legacy to our party and country, which must be cherished like the apple of an eye and tirelessly multiplied. Great Stalin brought up and rallied around him a cohort of battle-tested leaders on whose shoulders fell historical responsibility to bring to a victorious end the work begun by Lenin and successfully continued by Stalin. The

peoples of our country can be sure that the Communist Party and The government of the Soviet Union will not spare their strength and their lives in order to to maintain the steely unity of the ranks of the party and its leadership, to strengthen indestructible friendship peoples of the Soviet Union, strengthen the might of the Soviet state, invariably preserve loyalty to the ideas of Marxism-Leninism and, following the precepts of Lenin and Stalin, lead the country socialism to communism.

Eternal glory to our beloved, dear leader and teacher - the great Stalin.

So Beria ended his speech, and her last phrase was brighter and more humane than any words of sorrow ... Beria did not say goodbye to Stalin, but reminded everyone that Stalin was immortal!

Molotov at the end of his speech proclaimed - I think not by chance, a toast in honor of not Stalin, but the

CPSU. Malenkov - without a second thought, of course, said "goodbye"

to Stalin. And Beria - not in opposition to the words of Malenkov who spoke to him, of course, but by virtue of the movement of the soul showed that Stalin remains alive for him already because his work is alive, which must be continued and brought to a victorious end by all together.

Stalin over the coffin of Lenin made a vivid speech and took an inspired oath. It was the time of the early youth of the country, the time when very many did not believe in its future as in Russia, and - even more - beyond its borders. Saying any words, Stalin was responsible for them, first of all, before the people whom he now had to lead, and the international significance of Stalin's oath, to be honest, was not paramount at that time. Too many then were sure that they had the right to scoff - they say, you never know what is there this Bolshevik will say in his Council of Deputies ...

Every word that was heard in speeches over the coffin of Stalin - the head of the second power of the world, confidently moving towards the role of the first power in the world, should most carefully have been studied all over the world. Everyone understood this, and Beria understood it too. Therefore, even the most sincere pathos in mourning speeches would hardly be appropriate ... The country has already entered the time maturity, and the speeches of its leaders could and should have been restrained and weighty in in all cases, and even more so at Stalin's funeral!

Perhaps that is why Beria's speech was outwardly not saturated with emotions. However, this was - unlike the speeches of Malenkov and Molotov - a serious keynote speech, not only appropriate for such funerals as Stalin's, but even necessary for them!

Indeed, in those days the whole country asked itself: "How to live without Stalin?" And Beria's speech answered this question in a manner characteristic of Beria clearly and specifically: to live, work and seeing a clear and inspiring goal ahead!

And this was also the oath of the disciple over the coffin of the Teacher.

After Beria, Molotov spoke, and then Khrushchev closed the funeral rally. Malenkov, Beria, Molotov, Voroshilov, Khrushchev, Bulganin, Kaganovich and Mikoyan descended from the podium to the coffin of Stalin and brought him to the Mausoleum.

Then they returned to the podium. The chimes struck noon. And at that time they parted the first volleys of a thirty-fold artillery salute and the beeps of factories were heard, lasting three minutes. The day was

cold and gloomy, to match the mood of those gathered. Some stood on Mausoleum, others - on the cobblestones of Red Square, but at that moment they were all thinking about one thing: "What is

there ahead?" The fireworks went off, the horns blared. On Red Square with a chased parade step military units passed, and a line of aircraft flew over it in the sky. Funeral

Stalin are over. The tribune of the Mausoleum was empty, now Lenin-Stalin. from the square people slowly dispersed. Life

went on. But what was

there, ahead, in the short, medium and long term? And what did happen in Moscow with Stalin in the days from February 28 to March 5?

Chapter Eighteen

"Star" routes of the conspiracy of the century ...

The book by Ivan Chigirin that I mentioned is interesting to everyone, but especially valuable. cited in it by the diary of Stalin's illness. Moreover, Chigirin is convinced of the violent the nature of Stalin's death and the complete non-involvement of

Beria in it. The most interesting pages of the book by the well-known reader Nikolai Dobryukha "How killed Stalin" - from 348 to 369, which contains extracts from the journal of doctors who treated Stalin from March 2 to March 5, 1953, blood test data taken on these days, and an autopsy report is mentioned.

Dobryukha notifies readers that he tried to select the most important places from that piles of secret papers, in which, as he writes, "at the direction of the then ruling

Minister of the Ministry of Internal Affairs Beria, everything that was written in those terrible hours was dumped ... "

Nikolai NAD wrote about this as if he accused Beria of something ... However, this with evidence, he involuntarily whitewashes him, convincingly proving that Beria was not involved in assassination of

Stalin! After all, the criminal, on the contrary, would do everything so that this pile of documents was thinner, or even somehow lost. Beria ordered to save everything, including drafts, thanks to which Dobryukha was able to establish the fact of numerous

rewriting of medical documents and inconsistencies in the final versions drafts. As

for the documents themselves, I will not quote a single line from them here, only informing the reader that they are, in my opinion, authentic and as such really transfer the version of the deliberate poisoning of Stalin into the category of historical fact. I

will not quote documents - this will add little to the understanding of those days readers, except that among them may be professional medical experts. In addition, N. Dobryukha cites cautious, but not rejecting the fact of poisoning opinions of the chief toxicologist of Moscow Yu.N. Ostapenko and chief forensic Moscow expert V. Zharov. So,

Stalin was killed.

Poisoned.

And he was not killed by Beria, although Abdurakhman Avtorkhanov's book "The Mystery of Stalin's

has a subtitle: "Beria's conspiracy".

Beria did not need the death of Stalin, but the first one hundred and a few days of the life of the USSR without Stalin passed under the sign of more and more expanding and deepening initiatives Beria in various spheres of activity of Soviet society. Avtorkhanov

twitches provocatively - there is no way to conspire against Stalin Beria had no relationship, of course. In addition to quite obvious considerations, this also proves logical analysis, which I have had to undertake not for the first time, but - which do!

So ...

Let's say that the murder of Stalin was organized by Beria, using his old connections in the MGB Ignatiev.

Actually, this is incredible! Even if we assume that there were enough reliable connections, and not "in general", but precisely in the Security Directorate of the "Ignatievsky" department, Beria, seven years after he left the "bodies", had enough, the question was very delicate, according to which he would have to turn to former colleagues.

Such cases have some chance of success when they are handled by a full-fledged head of the secret service. Already he can cook everything in the best possible way: gradually pick up desired future performers with relevant personal, biographical and service data, and then check them and place them in all the necessary key points, replacing them with cadres devoted to Stalin and his cause.

So the Minister of State Security and the head of the Security Department of the MGB, Ignatiev, In this sense, compared with Beria, he had unlimited possibilities. And even anti-Soviet Leonid Mlechin admits that Beria then did not have power in the MGB and could not to influence the selection of personnel for the Stalinist guard.

But, as said, let's say ... Personnel directly subordinate to Ignatiev completed "Order" Beria. Stalin is dead and Beria takes over the united Ministry Internal Affairs, which absorbed the Ministry of State Security. Now frames Ignatiev, who eliminated Stalin on the "order" of Beria, these are already Beria's cadres.

Beria aims to seize power, and he already legally has at his disposal cadres of guards who betrayed Stalin, tainted in the direct murder of the leader. So why would they not be "transferred" now to the "guard", say, Khrushchev or Malenkov? After all, Beria is a criminal, he killed Stalin, and killed with impunity! And what better than impunity, encourages and inflames the criminal? Having taken one successful step, Beria should have been very quickly take another step - the iron must be struck while it is hot! At the same time, Beria needs behaved very prudently, that is, not to irritate colleagues in any way, and especially not take no initiatives to disturb them. Beria, on the other

hand, behaves exactly the opposite of how he should have behaved. conspirator. He just splashes with ideas, suggestions, he acts - but he acts openly and forcefully. He

prepares for the Ministry of Internal Affairs and sends note after note to the Presidium of the Central Committee. He is active and constructively intervenes in the economy, in foreign policy, in domestic national policy. And every time his proposals are so reasonable that they have to accept! Good

"conspirator"! He has to take care of the organization of a series of new "deadly diseases" - at least a couple, and he eliminates the Gulag and passport restrictions for hundreds thousand people, is busy with projects of republican orders for cultural figures union republics, causes dissatisfaction with the party leadership of Ukraine, Belarus, Lithuania with their murderous notes on the situation with national cadres in these republics! And to top it all, he achieves a decision to abandon the decoration buildings on holidays and columns of demonstrators with portraits of the leadership ...

Khrushchev's behavior turns out to be different. Looking at his line in the first four

years after Stalin's death, then it completely fits into the scheme of the conspiracy.

The first step is to physically remove Stalin. It can only be removed physically - he is politically unshakable.

The second step is to physically remove and politically discredit Beria. Him too it would not be easy to destroy politically if it were an open political confrontation. But, suddenly arresting him, depriving him of the opportunity to defend himself publicly, in the presence of all members of the Central Committee, it was possible to ensure first political, and then the physical murder of Beria. At the same time, it was possible to soil in complicity and almost all party and state leadership of the USSR.

The third step is the 20th Congress with its political discrediting of Stalin. This step puts the beginning of discrediting the case of Stalin, that is, the cause of building in Russia socialist and then - in many ways - the communist society of new, comprehensive educated, developed and therefore free people. The fourth step

is the political elimination of the rest of the "Stalinist" "core" senior leadership - Molotov, Malenkov and Kaganovich.

The fifth and final step taken directly by Khrushchev is the neutralization the most inconsistent remnants of this "core" - Bulganin, Voroshilov, Pervukhin, Saburov and the final "taming" of Mikoyan ... Today you can see that the "chain", later

supplemented by a number of new "links" that led us to the Belovezhskaya "agreements" of 1992 - was built flawlessly and effectively. It is not yet complete, because the last "link" is the final disintegration and death Russia - is still forged in the three-time presidential "Rossiania". But this "chain" is being built, starting from March 1953, very cleverly.

However, the first link in this whole cleverly and precisely thought out chain is the assassination of Stalin, disguised as natural death.

Could Khrushchev himself have thought through this whole far-sighted algorithm - a man not smart, but just cunning and at the same time - evil, vengeful, emotional, self-confident, narrow-minded and unable to see the future? The man who later became personification of the murky concept of "voluntarism". It is

unlikely that all this clever sequence of iron interconnected steps could to come to Nikita Sergeevich's head - even to the last, undertaken by him, the fifth step.

Khrushchev was neither a conscious nor a subconscious enemy of socialism. He was - if we keep in mind his personal likes and dislikes - even quite a Soviet patriot. AND Khrushchev turned out to be a systemic gravedigger of socialism not because of his hidden anger against Soviet power, not due to moral degeneration, but due to the fact that the gravedigger the affairs of Lenin, Stalin and millions of conscious citizens of the USSR Khrushchev were done without knowledge of the most "dear Nikita Sergeevich" - "blindly" ...

And he just wanted to stay at the pinnacle of power, to take revenge on Stalin for his son, and then eclipse Stalin ...

It didn't work

out ... But everything worked out for those who were a conscious enemy and hater of Stalin, socialism, Soviet power and Russia.

And Russia, Soviet power, socialism and Stalin had more than enough. And was it only Khrushchev who needed the speedy death of Stalin at the beginning of 1953?

From a certain moment, the conspiracy against Stalin presented itself to me in the form of a kind of "star" run or hike ... About this once popular form of mass sporting events described even in the 2nd edition of the Great Soviet Encyclopedias (vol. 16, p. 553) are now firmly forgotten. The essence of such a trip is that it participants leave from different starting points on the periphery and according to pre-designed routes are collected at one point.

So, to Stalin, or rather, to the idea of his assassination, from some moment "routes" of the systemic "star" conspiracy. No, I do not want to say that around Stalin, like some kind of monstrous octopus, an ominous, powerful secret organization was intertwined, the tentacles of which were spread all over the world. I mean just systemic its presence and branching, determined by the principle that was introduced in epigraph of chapter zero of this book.

Accordingly, far from all the "routes" of this "conspiracy" were directly or even indirectly coordinated. Not every participant knew or even suspected the existence of other routes. Not everyone went along the "route" really - there were many those who only indulged in desires akin to Manilov's: here, they say, how good it was if Stalin would disappear. And not every one of those who really went on the road reached the end point - Moscow at the turn of February and March 1953.

Someone developed their "route" while sitting in London or Washington ... Someone - in Moscow or Zhmerinka ... Someone had huge material opportunities for organizing a conspiracy, but did not have reliable approaches to Stalin and his entourage. Somebody had approaches, long-standing personal acquaintances, but had no means for bribery, intimidation, confusion ...

Someone, I repeat, only dreamed that Stalin would die as "on time" as in the spring of 1945, "died" - having fully fulfilled the role of the "Moor" of the Golden International - US President Roosevelt. Someone was probing the ground for a conspiracy along the lines of the surviving anti-Soviet, Trotskyist or Socialist-Revolutionary

connections. Some of Stalin's enemies wore a top hat, some wore a yarmulke or a baseball cap, and some an intellectual hat or a pseudo-democratic cap.

For some, Stalin's death was only desirable in principle, so the question timing was not critical. And for someone, Stalin's death was needed on a real scale time - right now, in the coming days. Someone could wait, but for someone the delay was like death. The poet

Viktor Bokov already today, on the eve of his 85th birthday, has confessed to Stalin, stating:

"At 26, I was arrested. They slandered. I served 5 years ... I hated Stalin, dreamed of killing. And now, after what he experienced with the country, in recent years, changed his attitude towards him ... "

But what if this Bokov was really aimed at Stalin when Bokov turned not eighty-five, but thirty years old? Or a little later - in 1953, when Bokov was about forty years old?

Moreover, I mentioned Bokov only as an example ... There were enough dissatisfied with Stalin in the "lower

classes" even without Bokov ... But the poetic testimony of the poet Pasternak, taken out in the epigraphs of the book. His lines about the death of Stalin, previously unknown to me, I learned from the book of N. Dobryukha and I must admit that I did not expect such a thing from the outwardly apolitical Pasternak. A bold political accusation! After all, the "dark forces of the temple" are a direct indication of involvement in the death of Stalin "knights of the Temple", "builders of the Temple", "children of the Widow", "heirs of Hiram", "freemasons", and simply - Freemasons! No,

no, get me out of any discussion now! Boris Pasternak wrote this, and Nikolai Dobryukha cited his lines. So

all claims are against them. The anti-Stalinist forces that had formed in the world by spring were different, very different. 1953. They were different in citizenship, in worldview, in material and social status, by origin, by the level of ideology and even by the level of personal hatred for Stalin. But

it is important that all these forces together wanted one thing - the death of Stalin.

Someone, I repeat, only wished for
it ... Someone - acted ...

Someone at the same time found himself in a dead end or went along a false "route" that never would not lead to the end point - Stalin, lying in the Mausoleum. Someone walked potentially successful "route", but not energetically enough and not consistently enough.

And someone has reached a really successful
end. But its success was due to the general atmosphere prevailing in the international anti-Stalinist environment, its general desire to destroy Stalin not by washing, so by rolling, not bullet, so poison, not today, so tomorrow ...

On July 23, 1934, Stalin received the English science fiction writer Herbert Wells in the Kremlin.

Wells. A recording of this conversation was published in No. 17 of the Bolshevik magazine of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks for

1934 Wells had already visited Russia in 1920 and met with Lenin. Upon return home, he wrote his then famous book "Russia in the Darkness", where he called Lenin "Kremlin dreamer". Now he was talking again with another leader Soviet Russia and admitted his long-standing wrong. Many interesting things could extract from the recording of their conversation, but now I remember the place when Wells asked Stalin the question: "You, Mr. Stalin, know better than anyone else what revolution, and moreover in practice. Do the masses ever revolt themselves? Don't you think Is it an established truth that all revolutions are made by a minority?

Stalin then replied: "A revolution requires a leading ... minority, but the most talented, dedicated and energetic minority will be helpless if not rely on at least the passive support of millions of people. Wells

asked again: "At least passive? Maybe subconscious? And Stalin clarified: "Partly for both semi-instinctive and semi-conscious support, but without support of millions, the best minority is powerless.

Speaking of the "minority", Stalin had in mind, as he himself noted, a revolutionary minority serving the ideas of socialism. When he said "millions" he meant millions ordinary people living a life that is not active, not conscious, semi-vegetative, but living. However, there was

another minority in the world, the systemic elite of which was the chosen Golden Elite of the world, which relied on the power of gold millions - dollars, pounds, francs, pesetas ... However, this

Golden International could rely on the support of millions people, but here it is only as long as that boundless ocean existed in the world mass human stupidity, in which the shell of lawlessness floats forever. However even in the presence of this ocean, the Golden Elite could not count on even a passive massive support for the assassination of Stalin.

In this case, she could only count on the support of her own kind of elite layers. And also - and to support those who with all their might aspired from the category of those whom - according to Talleyrand's definition - they cut their hair, go into the category of those who cut their hair.

However, there were also those whom Stalin and his cause did not allow to live a petty life, but well-fed and possessive... Those who wanted not to be, and not even to seem, but simply to visit.

Let's not forget about one more category - a very specific one, but really existing and often, alas, enjoying a certain influence on society. This people who have a certain "democracy gene" that determines their special social, or rather anti-social, behavior. They feel bad when the world is good. These "people" different from people do not see normal people. At the genetic level. They put into circulation expressions like: "It's better to be dead than red ..." They are under camera flashes devour with their own - presumably, also possessing the "gene democracy" - the offspring of a huge cake in the form of Lenin lying in a coffin ... And their genetic brothers who lived in the era of Stalin on both sides of the state border The USSR, could not help but hate Stalin.

And they hated

it. And then there were people who were simply internally undisciplined, greedy for money, pleasures, a career ... Such people could also become - not organizers, no, but - executors of someone else's will, who wanted to kill

Stalin. I deliberately only at the end of the book will acquaint the reader with the revelations of a ce Doctor of Historical Sciences, Professor Boris Samuilovich Klein, who is currently in USA. In 2006, in No. 6 of the "Russian" "academic" anti-communist In the journal "Voprosy istorii" he published an article "US Policy and the "Doctors' Plot".

Today, after not only the long-standing assassination of Stalin, but also the recent assassination of the USSR, much can be said. And Professor Klein, as a result of investigations in Amer declassified archives reported that in June 1951, President Truman created the Council on psychological strategy (Psychological Strategy Board, PSB) as part of the deputy Secretary of Defense, US Assistant Secretary of State and Director of the CIA. Serious

company, isn't it? At the same time, SPS Executive Director J. Morgan personally headed one of the units of the Union of Right Forces - the Stalin group (code designation PSB D-40), which studied the possibility of removing (?!!) Stalin from power as part of the Plan for Stalin's passing from power. At

the same time, in October 1951, the US Congress passed the "Law on securing Mutual Security, which provided \$100 million for support for subversive work against the USSR and the countries of the socialist camp of persons living there, or defectors. At

the time, \$100 million was a huge amount. And the speech only about legally allocated funds, not counting "special", "unaccountable" amounts.

On the other hand, Samuil Klein reports that on January 16, 1953, an assistant SPS Executive Director Morgan-Taylor presented a memorandum where, in In particular, it was stated that "the obvious devotion of world Jewry to the cause anti-communism opens up new horizons for using it in the interests of American strategy. And

the American strategists of psychological warfare in 1953 seriously planned international actions to declare Stalin crazy and did not exclude in their "forecasts" (?) of the beginning of 1953 of the "murder of Soviet diplomats and their satellites", up to attacks on the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR Vyshinsky.

I'm not quoting Notes of a Madman, but Professor Klein from anti-communist magazine Voprosy istorii (No. 6, 2006, pp. 41, 44).

The natural conductor of the interests of world Jewry, devoted to the cause anti-communism and ready to act in the interests of the American strategy, was in the USSR just the top of the Moscow elite Jewry. After all, many Rabinovichs from Moscow, and before 1917, and after 1917, and before 1991, and after 1991, there were many close relatives, the Rabinovichs as well, not only in Zhmerinka and Bobruisk, but also in New York, London, Paris...

So, were there objective roots in, for example, the "case of doctors" or not? And what - the "Stalin" group from the US Union of Right Forces, having at its disposal on legal one hundred millionth subsidy, expected to be limited to only psychological figs against Stalin or carried out very specific work on the organization of physical elimination of Stalin?

And is the possibility of a connection between the creation in the USA in 1951 of the powerful state group "Stalin" and the doctors from the LSUK arrested in 1952 so improbable? Why is the Kremlin professor

Vinogradov so enthusiastically "collecting" gold, antiques, paintings and finally dollars? In the Soviet Union?

Even Samuel Klein admits that on January 23, 1953, in a dispatch that arrived in

Washington from Bonn, it was reported that after a joint study of the British Foreign Office and Eastern specialists from the Social Democratic Party of Germany they tend to regard the "doctors' case" primarily as an "internal measure security (bold italics mine. - S.K.)."

Is it possible to say briefly and more clearly that the MGB of the USSR and Stalin did not falsified the "conspiracy of doctors", but only opened it? But was it all limited to this conspiracy? Of course not!

By the spring of 1953, many, many anti-Stalinist forces had accumulated in the world. And they to succeed in the "star" conspiracy against Stalin without the support of each other - albeit often passive, subconscious, semi-instinctive and semi-conscious.

Someone just

wished. Someone estimated the chances ...

Someone acted. And

someone has been successful. Does it really matter who exactly? Important - why?

Chapter Nineteen

Stalin died? Long live Khrushchev!

Only a little more than a week passed after Stalin's funeral, and on March 18, 1953, The Central Committee of the CPSU received a letter written on the letterhead of one of the bodies of the Military ministries of the USSR - newspapers of the Air Force "Stalin's Falcon":

"To the Secretary of the Central Committee
Communist Party of the Soviet Union
Tov. Pospelov P.N.

The editorial office of the newspaper "Stalin's Falcon" received a letter from the group military personnel of military unit 13638. In it, aviator soldiers turn to Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union with a request create a series of films depicting the life and work of great leaders of the Soviet Union and the working people of the whole world Vladimir Ilyich Lenin and Joseph Vissarionovich Stalin.

"These films," the servicemen write, "will be a huge contribution of Soviet cinematography, will have a huge educational importance for the Soviet youth, as well as for all the working people of our Motherland and peace. These films will educate millions of staunch fighters for happiness humanity."

We are sending this letter for your consideration.
Newspaper editor S. Ustinov.

The letter was signed by four sergeants and four privates of military service, and it was, of course, sincere, and not "prompted" by the political officer - in the latter case, signatures it would be ten times more ...

This letter was also sincere because the guys wrote it after their death. Stalin.

On March 25, Pospelov submitted the letter for consideration to the Department of Artistic Literature and art of the Central Committee and on March 30 received the following answer:

"... Tov. Ustinov and the authors of the letter were informed that the Soviet cinematography produced a number of films reflecting individual stages of life and activities of V.I. Lenin and I.V. Stalin (you might think that about these, more than once seen in the country by everyone, the authors of the letters did not know the films. - S.K.). Release

such films will be made in the future.

It was a rebuttal both in form and in essence. And a film about Stalin, neither in Khrushchev's, nor in later times it was not filmed like that. No one!

However,
almost nothing worthwhile was also filmed about Lenin during these times. What's the matter? In overcoming Stalin's "personality cult"? But the idea of a "cult of personality" was condemned more than once in the USSR long before it was introduced into wide circulation at the 20th Congress CPSU Nikita Khrushchev.

Say, on February 16, 1938, the Publishing House of Children's Literature ("Detgiz") under the Central Committee VLKSM received a letter:

"I strongly oppose the publication of Tales of Stalin's Childhood. The book is replete with a mass of ... exaggerations, undeserved praise. The author was misled by fairy tale hunters, liars... But that is not the main thing. The main thing is that the book tends to implant in the consciousness of Soviet children (and people in general) the cult of personalities, leaders, infallible heroes. It's dangerous, harmful. The theory of "heroes" and "crowds" is not Bolshevik and Socialist-Revolutionary theory. Heroes make a nation, turn it from crowds to the people - say the Socialist-Revolutionaries. The people make heroes - they answer the Socialist-Revolutionaries Bolsheviks. The book pours water on the Socialist-Revolutionary mill. Any such book will pouring water on the mill of the Socialist-Revolutionaries will harm our common Bolshevik case.

I advise you to burn the book.

This letter was signed "I. Stalin." And it was not a pose - about the fact that Stalin regarded attempts to create a cult of his personality as the intrigues of the Socialist-Revolutionaries, he already said after Stalin's death, at the "anti-Beria" Plenum of the Central Committee in July 1953, Mikoyan.

And since this letter from Stalin was published in the November issue of the magazine "Questions of History" for 1953, one cannot say that with such views of Stalin on the question Khrushchevites did not know

each other. Actually, Khrushchev and company could remember - among many similar Stalin's documents - and his, for example, a letter to K.F. Starostin, written on February 4 1935 with these words:

"Rumors have reached the Central Committee of the Party that the metro staff has a desire to appropriate metro named after Comrade Stalin. In view of Comrade Stalin's decisive disagreement with such proposal and in view of the fact that comrade Stalin just as resolutely insists that the metro be named after comrade L. Kaganovich, ... The Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks asks the metro staff did not take into account the protests of T. L. Kaganovich and the decision to assign the metro named after T. L. Kaganovich.

Secretary of the Central Committee I. Stalin.

Could the Khrushchevites pick up the old issue of the Bolshevik magazine - number 17 for 1934 and reread the recording of Stalin's conversation with the writer Herbert Wells, the place where, in response to Wells' remark: "A captain and a navigator are required for a long voyage", Stalin objected: "True, but for a long voyage, first of all, a large ship. What is a navigator without a ship? A man without a job ... "

It was said for sure ... And Stalin's "navigator" had such a "ship" ... Now everything has changed. The ship remained afloat. But who could be on it "navigator"?

During the days of Stalin's illness, a series of meetings of the Bureau of the Presidium of the Central Committee took place, and on March 5 40-minute joint session of the Plenum of the Central Committee, the Council of Ministers and the Presidium of the Supreme Council USSR, on which the "watch" of the group of "navigators" was formed.

Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR - Malenkov.

Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR - Voroshilov.

The most focused on "work in the Central Committee of the CPSU" - Khrushchev. Beria, along with Molotov, Bulganin and Kaganovich, was appointed the first Deputy Malenkov and Minister of the newly merged Ministry of Internal Affairs, which included the former Ministry of State Security.

The era of seemingly "collective leadership" was approaching, but it soon became clear that only Beria can be a true "navigator" of the Soviet Union. Without higher authorities, he was not just the most active and active. He was active and proactive!

A wave of his memorandums poured into the Presidium of the Central Committee: on a sharp softening of the passport regime for those released from prison; about curtailing a number of expensive, but not priority construction projects such as the Great Turkmen Canal or an underwater tunnel on Sakhalin; on the withdrawal from the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the transfer to the sectoral ministries of all production capacities of the Gulag; on the transfer of the Gulag itself to the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Justice - for exclusion of camps and prisons for especially dangerous state criminals; about a sharp limiting the rights of the repressive Special Conference; on the need to rely on Baltic republics and western regions of Ukraine and Belarus to national personnel (in Lithuania, for example, with an 11,000-strong party organization out of 85 chiefs there were only 10 Lithuanians in the regional police departments); on the need for a realistic policy on attitude towards the situation in the GDR ...

A detail, but an important one: Beria proposed, and the Central Committee and the Council of Ministers were forced to agree with his proposal to abandon "the decoration of columns with portraits demonstrators, as well as buildings of enterprises, institutions and organizations on days public holidays" and the abolition of "proclamation from the government rostrum appeals addressed to the demonstrators. Beria accurately grasped that the mass of the people changes, becomes more educated, more developed, thinner ... And if the response is "Hurrah!" on The Red Square demonstrators of the 30s were a sincere and a little naive impulse, now it's "Hurrah!" in response to more and more official-sounding calls uttered by a cheerful and the sonorous voice of the announcer, it looked different ...

Beria even thought about new national orders - Nizami, Navoi, Shevchenko, to encourage, above all, cultural figures of the national republics.

Most importantly, in the sphere of public administration, this new "navigator" was paving the way for the transfer of the highest administrative prerogatives from the party sphere to Soviet and state, from the Central Committee to the Council of Ministers.

Then did the anti-Stalinist circles eliminate the builder of socialism, Stalin, in order to get on your head, if not the second brilliant, then the second competent "navigator" Beria, capable of leading the state "ship" to new discoveries and success?

The conspiracy against Beria at the top was both more open and more massive than conspiracy against Stalin. Khrushchev managed to provoke almost everyone against Beria.

On June 26, Beria was arrested, from July 2 to July 7, the "anti-Beria" Plenum of the Central Committee was held, and then, at mass rallies, the "enemy of the people" Beria was politically executed. Soon - not later, as I understand it, at the beginning of August 1953, he was executed and physically, "trial" over him at the end of December, it became only a fabrication of a number of necessary papers completing the "process". Merkulov, Kobulov, Dekanozov, Goglidze, Meshik and Vlodzimirsky, who were arrested by Beria in the Ministry of Internal Affairs, were shot in December.

And soon Khrushchev became the first figure in the USSR.

Stalin was a genius, and the outside world understood this well - sometimes even sharper than this the country understood. Big after all is always better seen "at a distance." Already after death Stalin, a lot of true things were said about him, not only by his like-minded people, but also by his

smart antagonists. I will quote only two of them ...

Winston Churchill: "His influence on people was irresistible. When he entered the hall Yalta Conference, all of us, as if on command, got up *and*, strange to say, for some reason kept their hands at their

sides." Charles de Gaulle: "Stalin had tremendous authority. And not only in Russia. He knew how to "tame" his enemies, not to panic when losing and not to enjoy victories."

Stalin knew how to find such arguments that his internal and external political opponents - the same Churchill, Roosevelt, Truman - did not have clear counterarguments.

Khrushchev had no other arguments for the outside world, except for a shoe (son he writes - soft summer shoes), with which (oh) he pounded on the music stand in the meeting room UN General Assembly.

Those who know that era firsthand may object to me that Khrushchev struck General Assembly with the Soviet plan for general disarmament. It wasn't declarative, but quite specific and thoughtful proposal that put the West in position of the "moment of truth". The West did not pass this test, but was there an exposure his militaristic mug is the merit of Khrushchev?

No, perhaps, even here Stalin worked for the country of socialism - his ideas of a peaceful and fair competition between the two systems on an equal footing.

Yes, Stalin publicly stated that Lenin's thesis that imperialism breeds war is not obsolete, that in order "to eliminate the inevitability of wars, it is necessary to destroy imperialism". But Stalin meant the destruction not by force, but by system, that is final ideological, political, economic and social discrediting imperialism, and on this basis - its progressive all-round weakening, which makes his aggression impossible.

But if the foreign policy ideas of Stalin were still in use in the USSR for some time, then his internal political ideas in the USSR were increasingly rejected - not in words, but in deeds. Later, however, - and in words.

Abdurakhman Avtorkhanov spoke of the "Economic Problems of Socialism" disparagingly and stated: "No other work of Stalin after the war has done so much was quoted by Sovietologists... but only one of them remained misunderstood in the West." However, here, of course, he was cunning. Just the West understood everything correctly, why its agents influence, after the death of Stalin, increasingly gaining weight and strength as "referents" and "Advisors" to Khrushchev, and recommended the latter to do the opposite.

Khrushchev did: Stalin was against the transfer of equipment from state machine and tractor stations into collective farms, and the Khrushchevites created collective farms instead of MTS repair and tractor stations, RTS. Stalin

was against the formed nationalization of collective farm property, and The Khrushchevites and Brezhnevites intensively transformed the

collective farms into state farms. Stalin considered it expedient to build as close as possible to the collective farm power plants, the Khrushchevites closed their construction. But the country has grown the construction of giant hydroelectric power plants and long-distance transmission lines of the LEP-500 type, which "provided" the country with large energy losses.

The magazine "New World" in No. 5 for 1991 published notes hydropower-Siberian I.A. Nikulin. He also built the "Stalinist" Kuibyshevskaya hydroelectric power station, and this was the last, as Nikulin writes, "the last great hydrotechnical construction, laid down and to a large extent carried out during the life of Stalin. Well, at the end of his life, Stalin was not always justifiably fond of super projects, some of which are here Beria turned. But the Volga cascade of the hydroelectric power station was still needed to restore itself power.

Nikulin further reports that after the death of Stalin around the problem of hydroelectric power plants arose

discussions, and in 1958 at a gala banquet dedicated to the launch of the Kuibyshevskaya HPP, Khrushchev spoke out against their further mass construction. But it's like once under Khrushchev, through the efforts of his "advisers" the Siberian hydroelectric power stations began. Here is the score for this undertakings by I. Nikulin: "Heavy-duty hydroelectric power plants that turn great self-cleaning rivers into continuous chains of rotting man-made seas, and ultra-long power lines - two sides one medal.

Who "minted" these "medals"? Here

is one of the "chasers", described by the same I. Nikulin as follows:

"I don't know why the first secretary of the Saratov Regional Committee of the Party Novikov in 1943 he was transferred to Moscow to the People's Commissariat of Power Plants for a modest position of head of a small department for the supply of spare parts objects subordinate to it. It is well known, however, that in 1950 Novikov was expelled from the party (construction of a dacha at state expense), removed from work and sent as deputy head of construction of the Gorkovskaya Hydroelectric power station ... Novikov did not remain in disgrace for long, in 1954 he was appointed head of the construction department of the Kremenchug hydroelectric power station. Having built the Kremenchug hydroelectric power station and naming the village with it a city Khrushchev, I.T. Novikov ... in December (1958. - S.K.) is appointed minister construction of stations.

Here is how and from whom the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Chairman of the Council formed Ministers of the USSR Khrushchev his "cohort" of "comrades-in-arms". If Khrushchev understood everything that way, then why did the Bratsk hydroelectric power station in general, the entire cascade of hydroelectric power plants in Siberia? And then from there to Europe they pulled power lines-500, about which they sang that it was a "difficult line." Yes, it's not easy ... In

1962, a stormy All-Union Conference on Energy was held - more stormy, because the backbone of its participants were pupils of the Stalin era, accustomed to live in the interests of the state and the public. But the Khrushchevites neglected recommendations from professionals.

Brezhnevism only developed unprofessionalism, replacing it with hangovers.

And the virgin "epopee"? By 1954, agriculture in Central Russia was just got out, and even not completely, from the devastation. And Khrushchev and the Khrushchevites threw huge financial, logistical and human resources to the uninhabited Kazakh steppes ... Voroshilov objected, but who was under the "faithful Leninist" Khrushchev some Voroshilov, who once started the Bolshevik Party together with Lenin!

For thousands of years, the land that did not know the plow gave, of course, at first such an unprecedented harvest that most of it simply rotted, poured into ravines - elevators and granaries were not built in abundance. And in the coming years, soil erosion began.

Stalin consistently reduced "boss" benefits and privileges. Let's say by as the country moves away from the post-war devastation, prices for consumer goods decreased, resulting in the Politburo Decree of December 29, 1947 on ending the sale of manufactured goods through a closed network for members and candidates members of the PB, secretaries of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and other senior officials supplied through Ministry of State Security.

The Khrushchevites quickly restored all this, developed it, and with brisk steps moved towards anti-Stalinist XX Congress of the CPSU.

I will not write about this fatal congress in detail. Let me just say that the congress itself was quite business-like and its whole course did not foreshadow the end that then seemed dramatic, but actually became the beginning of the end of the State.

It should be noted that Khrushchev's report was discussed by the aged associates of the deceased Stalin and before the congress, but in the text "voiced" by Khrushchev there was a lot of inconsistent

"Gag", the author of which was formally Khrushchev, but in fact - the devil knows!

Nevertheless, none of those who sat in the hall and knew that Stalin did not drink with the beginning war, that he did not kill innocents due to bloodthirstiness, that he did not plan strategic operations around the globe, no one stood up and Khrushchev's slander was not refuted. Costs Is it any wonder that the political death of Stalin programmed an ambulance the political death of his unfaithful associates? Already

in the spring of 1957, Voroshilov told Shepilov about Khrushchev: "Darling, but he is offends us all." But it was said almost in a whisper - getting rid of "Stalin's totalitarian legacy", the Khrushchevites organized non-selectively, with necessity - as under Stalin, and total listening to government telephones, apartments, cottages, cars ...

Ekaterina Furtseva resorted to the same Shepilov and clutched her head: "What to do? Random people are at the head of economic councils! All decisions are impulsive, thoughtless ... "

Oh, I want to object today! But weren't these decisions very good? deliberate, and the people put at the head of the regional educated under Khrushchev councils of the national economy, by no means random, but decisions and appointments were discussed not only and not so much in Moscow, in the departments of the Central Committee of the CPSU, but also in the "Washington Regional Committee"?

Moreover, Shepilov himself was a completely worthy representative of not Stalinist, but Khrushchev style "leadership", hanging between Malenkov and Khrushchev.

The Plenum of the Central Committee, held from June 22 to 29, 1957, "discussed the question of anti-Party group Malenkov G.M., Kaganovich L.M., Molotov V.M. and removed them from membership Presidium of the Central Committee and from the members of the Central Committee, and also "removed from the post of Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU and removed from composition of candidates for members of the Presidium of the Central Committee and from among

the members of the Central Committee comrade Shepilov. The disgrace of

Voroshilov, Saburov, Pervukhin soon followed. And next in line was another one who helped Khrushchev "defeat the apostate from Stalin - Marshal Zhukov. His turn came in October of the same 1957.

The favorite of Stalin, the army and the people, Konstantin Konstantinovich Rokossovsky, returning to the USSR from Poland in 1956, almost immediately after the XX Congress of the CPSU was faced with the need to speak at the October (1957) Plenum of the Central Committee, where Zhukov's career ended.

Rokossovsky spoke impartially, saying the good things about Zhukov that could be said about to say to him, and something unpleasant, which was also impossible not to say - to be honest. At this Rokossovsky - I'm sure it's not by chance - compared the "noble" Zhukovsky mat wartime with the calm tone of Stalin - "a commander, a man," as noted Rokossovsky - who himself takes into account the situation in which we were ... "Rokossovsky at the end of his speech and once again remembered Stalin, and even how:

"We have always got used to the fact that at the head of the Political Directorate of the Red Army ... there is a person politically trained, party, to whom would be treated with deep respect... I recall the words of Comrade Stalin, who said the following. If the party decides to appoint someone in command, he always asked the question, how would his army accept ... "

These were direct soldier's words about the past. However, Konstantin Konstantinovich He also spoke about what he found in the Soviet Army of the 1957 model, that is, in the army that was no longer brought up by Stalin, but by Khrushchev and Zhukov:

"Comrades, I was cut off from the Soviet Army for seven years ... By the will of the party, I was sent to Poland, following the instructions and directives of the party ... In the role of chief inspector of the Ministry of Defense for the fifth month. I succeeded during this time visit many places...

I did not see a strong-willed commander, I did not see a commander capable of defending

his pride, a commander who could prove and tried to prove that he right, I would make him listen to him ... I was at a major operational exercise, where commanders, commanders army looked into the eyes of the senior commander and tried to guess his thoughts ... One has only to feel ... that the opinion of a superior disagrees with his opinion, immediately becomes in the front: that's right, ... I will immediately correct it ... "

This was said by the commander of the Stalinist school, who did not deny his accessories, but emphasized it! Yes, when! Yes where! Yes, in front of

whom! And since he said so after the anti-Stalinist XX Congress, at the Plenum of the Khrushchev Central Committee before Khrushchev and before his comrades-in-arms - who actually betrayed Stalin to that time, with his silence during Khrushchev's slander on him, then, therefore, a typical the commander of the Stalinist Red Army was the exact opposite of the commander Khrushchev's Soviet Army ... But five years have not passed since Stalin's death!

Brezhnevshchina turned out to be only developed and entered the calm shores continuation of Khrushchev's "voluntarism". Actually, the main figures of the Brezhnev era came out of the Khrushchev era, especially if we have in mind the composition of "referents", "advisers", "deputy heads" and other apparatus figures, where they felt more and more at ease large and small agents of influence and just large and small selfish and careerists.

It was not necessary to be surprised - after all, not only they brought up Khrushchev and Brezhnev, but and the atmosphere of Khrushchev's "Thaw" and Brezhnev's "Stagnation" also brought up quite a certain type of "doers" ...

From 1953 to 1964, Khrushchev "educated" them - just that minimum period for formation of a major state figure, who defined in his speech on Plenum October 16, 1952 Stalin. But Khrushchev and the Khrushchevites "educated" them in their own way.

And the pupils of the Khrushchev era, having made up the Brezhnev "cohort", brought up already the next generation of Khrushchev's systemic "grandchildren", that is, Gorbachev with Yeltsin and Gorbachevsev with the

Yeltsinoids. And now they are being replaced by "great-grandchildren" ...

The economic funeral of socialism took place in 1965. And it's necessary explain...

The invariably lying Avtorkhanov also lied about the fact that allegedly half of the Soviet enterprises under Stalin was unprofitable - allegedly because Stalin aimed the economy not on profit, but on a person with his needs.

Stalin understood that the economy cannot work at a loss, but he correctly noted that only such an economy can be healthy, which does not increase profits, but reduces cost of manufactured products.

And could it be otherwise? Economically justified cost reduction means both the introduction of new, "higher" technology, and a reduction in energy intensity, material consumption, and labor intensity per unit of output. If the cost price

has decreased, then the retail price can also be reduced - if our goal is not making a profit by the owner, but increasing the opportunities for the worker to purchase of manufactured products. And then - even with the same pay, if the labor expended has not increased - the worker will be able to buy more and more often, more for himself allow.

Moreover, in accordance with the basic law of socialism, discovered by Stalin, the new a person will feel the need not so much to expand the material as

spiritual consumption of the values of life.

But in 1965, the economic reform began, which was named after Kosygin. The September Plenum of the Central Committee in 1965 declared that it was necessary "...improve the use of such important economic levers as profit, price, premium, credit."

But what did that

mean? Making profit, and not a comprehensively developed person, the main economic indicator for evaluating the effectiveness of the socialist economy and the main goal economic activity, the initiators of the economic reform of 1965 actually ignored the basic economic law of socialism. And thus quite scientifically laid the foundation for the downfall of socialism. After all, the production of profit is economic law of capitalism, and the fact that this profit was the initiators of the reform called "socialist", did not change the essence of

the matter. "Kosygin's reform", the shadow ideologist of which was an ordinary Kharkov Professor Yevsey Lieberman, from a purely scientific point of view, immutably, with inexorability laws of nature laid the methodological foundations for destruction in the middle Soviet man of man and more and more awakening in each successive generation formally the Soviet people are the beast of capitalist greed. It is

unlikely that Lieberman himself understood this - a middle-class provincial economist, author an ordinary textbook "Organization and planning of production at machine-building enterprises", Professor of the Department of Statistics of Kharkov University, who by 1965 had already turned 68 years old.

And Alexei Kosygin, who did not become a disciple of Stalin, certainly did not understand this, and by the time the reform named after him began, he was 61 years old. He's only "studied" in his time the last work of Stalin, but did not study it, just as they did not study and did not understand her and the rest of Alexei Nikolayevich's colleagues in managing the mighty socialist power. As neither

Pope Khrushchev nor his future renegade son, Sergei Khrushchev, understood her. This much later, he admitted that at first he thought that he was not able to master Stalin's work, and only then he realized that it was

nonsense ... But, on the other hand, genuine authors and ideologists understood everything in St. "Kosygin's reforms", for which Lieberman was a puppet - free or involuntary. These ideologists graduated not from Moscow or Kharkov, but from Harvard and other similar universities, but they did not study "Economic Problems of Socialism" for delivery offset, but for the scientific organization of the death of socialism! After all, Stalin did not invent, not formulated, did not introduce, but discovered its basic economic law - just like Newton discovered the law of universal gravitation. And just like the last law acted and before its discovery by Newton, the basic economic law of socialism operated in socialist society and before its discovery by Stalin!

Just after Stalin discovered it, it became possible to develop and to perfect socialism on the basis of a strictly scientific method.

None of the powers that be in the USSR and none of their entourage have ever Understood. But the smart enemies of Russia and socialism in the West understood this perfectly and practically used Stalin's discovery after his death against socialism. Significant fact. In 1982, a book was published in Germany by two authors: Georg von Rauch and Gustav Hilger "Lenin. Stalin." Hilger knew the USSR perfectly - for example, he translated Molotov and Stalin to Ribbentrop for Hitler. On the whole, however, the book was deceitful and hostile to the Soviet Union. However, it is interesting to read it, and that's what was there about the "Economic Problems of Socialism":

"On the eve of the 19th Party Congress ... Pravda presented a new work Stalin ... If individual communists got the impression that the party can safely ignore all economic laws, then Stalin put

these dreamers in place. This serious warning was sounded at the first turn to the powerful economic-bureaucratic apparatus ... "

As you can see, in the West Stalin's work was understood deeper than on Staraya Square, in the building Central Committee. Although this does not mean that in the West Stalin was understood in everything correctly, because further the following was said:

"It is interesting that in Stalin's statements a pessimistic note, recognition of the existence of laws that cannot be eliminated even communist."

Stalin did not show any pessimism, his work, on the contrary, was deeply optimistic, yet realistic. After all, to recognize the law of inertia and not become on the path of a moving train does not mean being a pessimist.

Yes, by the beginning of the 60s, reporting in the Soviet economy had become more complicated impossible, and the limits of its centralization due to "paper" management were already "at limit "... However, a creative socialist alternative to Kosygin's "reform" was. It was offered at the very beginning of the 60s by Soviet specialists in the field of mathematical methods of control and computer technology. At that time even the element base of Soviet computers was not bad, and we were quite competitive here - at the beginning 60s - even with the USA. In fact, even then we had BESM-6 and outlined configuration of a fundamentally new BESM-12.

As for specialist programmers, then the USSR was generally out of competition! Only today the exodus of our programmers to the West began to dry up, because the reserve of quality that was laid down by the world's best system of folk and higher education created in the USSR by Stalin.

Taking into account these achievements, Soviet scientists - without quotes - and engineers proposed Khrushchev to create an end-to-end, total system of accounting and planning of the national economy, in which it would be impossible to hide anything, hold back, sell "to the left", steal - in the future, modern computer networks could take into account everything to the last nail ...

Even Lenin said that socialism is accounting and control. Now under the general formula it was possible to bring a modern management material base. However, instead of the system of Academicians Efremov and Lebedev, we received the reform of Professor Lieberman.

And the "elite", which escaped the post-war Stalinist purge from their seats, is increasingly decayed and more and more betrayed Russia and its peoples.

Chapter Twenty

Farewell, Soviet years... The Elite is moving towards treason...

M.A. Bakunin (1814–1876), anarchy theorist, to civil war anarchists who had nothing to do with it, wrote how he lived in Moscow after Stalin's death:

"... Heroic times ... pass, times come after them prosaic use and enjoyment, when the privilege, being in its real form, gives rise to selfishness, cowardice, meanness and stupidity. class power turns little by little into decrepitude, debauchery and impotence.

Said exactly!

And the rebirth of part of the Soviet elite began long before Stalin's death and despite Stalin's policy. So, the first secretary of the Moscow Committee of the CPSU (b) Uglov

meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks on June 14, 1926, he said (I quote from the transcript):

"When a group of workers of 30-40 people gives administration and puts

before the director-communist to resolve a number of questions ..., and the directorate ... did not agree with them, as if the question is exhausted? No... Here at the factory a partial reduction of workers is planned, and, oddly enough, in the lists workers scheduled for layoffs from among the authors of the statement are almost all 30 people without exception.

Stalin recognized the danger of such a tendency and loved the scoundrels, members of the ruling party, no more than Lenin. Alas, the fight against the ruling scoundrels was hard - too left a lot of lead vile as a bad legacy to the builders of the new society old, tsarist Russia. Including many clever scoundrels left from tsarism, brought up by private-property Russia and now raising themselves to replace already socialist bastards.

Yes, and in the outside world there were enough lead abominations. In conversation with the writer Wells Stalin remarked: "You, Mr. Wells, obviously proceed from the premise that all people kind. And I do not forget that there are many evil people. I do not believe in the kindness of the bourgeoisie..."

But in the USSR, even during the life of Stalin, a layer of such "managers" arose who did not only "believed" in the "modest charm of the bourgeoisie", but they themselves were not averse to "bourgeois to decompose." And so that it does not look too contrasting against the background of a very healthy life of the masses, they were not averse to corrupting the masses - if not material bourgeois values, then at least - intangible, ephemeral, produced on the famous western "dream factory" in Hollywood. I will

give a specific illustration of this ... In early November

1950, to the Party Control Committee under the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks in h Chairman Shkiryatov received an anonymous letter. However, this was not a denunciation and complaint. The letter was written by an unconditionally honest and intelligent person, well knowing what he reported to the CCP.

And yet, for some reason, the letter was not signed. And it started like this:

"Now there is a fierce ideological struggle between progressive countries led by the Soviet Union and the reactionary United The states...seeking to spread their pernicious influence throughout the world. IN this struggle, the art that organizes the thoughts and feelings of people, in particular such mass art, like cinema, plays a huge role. Soviet cinema creates progressive films, which all over the world contribute to the struggle for everything advanced, human (singling out hereinafter my. - S.K.). Americans want their films to reach every corner the globe, carrying its pernicious influence, and, unfortunately, Soviet screens also largely conquered by nefarious American films."

Further, the author of the letter wrote that American films are not shown on mainstream screens of the country, but on club screens and in provincial cinemas. Film distributors show them, considering them harmless, for purely commercial reasons, and show very widely, starting with the workers' clubs in Moscow.

But the author of the letter accurately noted that "... for a long time in America harmless films No. The only question is how carefully the wolf imperialist ideology..."

The accuracy of thought and formulation was amazing - especially for those times. The final victory of the new system in the USSR was not in doubt, and anonymous the author wrote:

"Since American films are often made in a very entertaining way, their harm is especially great ... After American films, it seems to the people that Soviet films are boring ... "

Of course, after all, Soviet films made you think, while American films weaned you from thinking. A at the same time - we must give their creators their due - they gradually taught to look at values of life in a very definite way. The author of the letter captured the essence of the situation:

"Suppose that now, when the Americans are doing monstrous atrocities in Korea (at that time, photos of the Yankees posing with the severed heads of Korean patriots in their hands. - S.K.) ... anyone I would speak on Soviet radio or in the Soviet press with a story that ... an American officer is a model of nobility and honesty, what if an American the officer took an oath, then he will fulfill it, even if he had to give up all earthly good ... Such a person would be looked at as crazy or as a conscious enemy that must be isolated.

But now on the screens of Moscow clubs there is ... the film "Rose Marie" (1936 issue, about the love story of a Canadian girl. - S.K.), in which the honesty and fidelity to duty of an American officer are extolled. <...> Such films ... is a blow to the defense of the Soviet state, undermining its psychological and ideological power in a possible future

war ... The case of "Rose Marie", shown in workers' clubs and praising the high moral character of an American police officer deserves... serious analysis and ascertainment of how this could be allowed to be released. How would have deserved to be clarified during the war with the Germans if he had gone a film that would praise the high moral qualities of Hitler's officer..."

Here everything was said correctly - as it was correctly said in a letter and about other similar films.

"Captain of the Army" Freedom "- it seems to be about the Mexican revolution, but the revolutionaries shown by a stupid bloodthirsty gang ...

"In the power of dollars" - it seems to be about a man who is not allowed to distribute to the poor millionth inheritance, but, as the author of the letter wrote, "... the unstable young spectator it is remembered that in America you can suddenly get rich easily, having received a millionth inheritance..."

"The Journey Will Be Dangerous" shows bloodthirsty Indians and pretty Americans.

"The First Ball", "The Secret of the Actress" - films that the poor, but always honest will achieve happiness in America ...

Or supposedly a film classic - "Notre Dame Cathedral" ... "But from Hugo there there is little left," wrote the author of the letter. - American filmmakers are promoting this film the idea that if the people are oppressed, then it is not the highest power in the country that is to blame, but the evil, bad officials."

One can, I repeat, only be surprised at the accuracy of the view of the author, who wrote in 1950:

"In American films ... America is shown in a monolithic capitalist, with a population satisfied with the capitalist system ... And according to throughout the country (in the USSR. - S.K.) there are films glorifying life in America, the American way of life, as an idyll, devoid of social contradictions, where all people are pretty ... and if there are sometimes evil rich people (mostly the rich are shown as handsome), then they suffer

retribution ... There should be a simple principle: you can show in Soviet cinema only what could be staged in a Soviet film studio ...

Is it really for this that the Soviet government pays great attention cinematography of all towns, clubs, houses of culture, so that Americans propagandized their way of life from the Soviet screen? ..».

The author of the letter was neither a "bourbon" nor a "savonary" and understood that if the Soviet movie studios will release bad films, then cinemas will be empty. But he's was right when he wrote: "How is it possible, for commercial reasons, to allow cinema ... has become a conductor of bourgeois ideology to the masses?"

Despite the anonymity - which in itself was suggestive - on November 29 In 1950, this letter was forwarded by the chairman of the CCP, Shkiriyatov, to Malenkov, who forwarded it to the Central Committee V.S. Kruzhkov and

A.N. Sazonov. On December 6, 1950, they reported to Malenkov that films were selected from trophy fund, no replication, and cause for concern
No.

On December 7, 1950, the issue was closed and all documents were archived. But the problem remained ... And it remained, including because those who created this problem or covered up. For example, one of those who allegedly closed it - V.S.

Kruzhkov. I know little about Kruzhkov, but something about him is found in the sources. 1905 born (died in 1991), in 1944-1949 he was director of the Marx-Engels Institute - Lenin at the Central Committee, in 1949-1950 he held the posts of deputy and first deputy Head of the Propaganda and Agitation Department of the Central Committee, in 1950-1953 he was the head department of fiction of the Central Committee, in 1953-1955 - head of the department agitation and propaganda of the Central Committee, and finally - the director of the Institute of Art History Ministry of Culture of the USSR.

What was this figure?

Well, in the sources you can find a message that after the death of Stalin, the KGB arrested a certain organizer of elite orgies K.K. Krivoshein, a person with criminal past, posing as a playwright and writer. Beginning in

1951, he arranged in his spacious, luxurious apartment and on such the same chic dacha in Valentinovka near Moscow "literary evenings" ... Champagne, cognac, caviar, "ladies" from among the students of the theater school. Shchukin - here arrangements for these

evenings. And among the participants - the director of the Literary Institute S.M. Petrov and others nomenklatura metropolitan "partoplasm", including ... and the head of the Agitprop of the Central Committee Comrade Kruzhkov.

Not Stalin, not Molotov, not Beria or Malenkov, but the leading "riff-raff" - that's who intrigued, whispered, guessed, looked for "profitable places" ...

And the farther from the Stalin era, the more this riffraff was not led by any means
building of the Central Committee on the Old Square.

Yes, and the question is - where were those who more and more led the "Old area"? One

day colleagues drew my attention to the fact that mass Western Radio receivers traditionally receive long-distance radio stations that operate only on long and medium waves, and local broadcasting - on VHF.

Short waves are waves convenient for scouts and ... for conducting ideological war. Their use allows you to receive and transmit messages from limited receiving or transmitting power over very long distances.

The West about the "ideological purity" of the views of the masses, it turns out, baked, technically excluding HF bands from mass consumption. But in Soviet radios - and in stationary radios, and in small "transistors" - these ranges were introduced. That there is someone in the USSR on a state scale who made sure that any a Soviet citizen could easily listen to both Voice of America and Avtorkhanov's Svoboda. N-yes ... Avtorkhanov
said:

“Soviet people brought home (from Europe - returning from the war. - S.K.) germs of freedom and social justice: “in Germany, cattle live better than our people”, “the American soldier has more chocolate than our potatoes”, “in the West, presidents and ministers are ordinary sinners, but in our country gods are touchy...”

Of course, Avtorkhanov twitched ... Not everyone said so, and even - not very much many ... But - and not a few!

Developed people understood that in Germany, even before 1917, cattle lived better than many Russian peasants, but after 1917 the number of such peasants in Russia was constantly decreasing and already, perhaps, it would have come to naught if the Russian peasants had not had to be expelled from limits of the homeland of the patrons of Avtorkhanov.

Developed people could remember the dialogue described by Saltykov-Shchedrin German "boy in pants" and Russian "boy without pants", from which one could to understand that for prosperity it is necessary to work wisely and freely, which is exactly what old Russia and was not enough.

Developed people understood that the chocolate in the satchels of the Yankees, who hardly knew the war, even having come to it, he was paid for with the blood of Europeans and, above all, with Russian blood.

And how could an ordinary Russian infantryman who came to Europe know what Western ministers? But developed people knew the value of these "presidents and ministers" ... They after all, they were really no match for Stalin - which they themselves admitted.

So Avtorkhanov's statements were inventions of his Radio Liberty. But for a certain part of society, they looked like the truth, especially since inside the USSR the “fifth column” increasingly played along with the Avtorkhanovs. And after Avtorkhanov "intellectuals" repeated: "Stalin made two mistakes: he showed Ivan Europe and showed Ivan's Europe...

Vile, basically false, but biting. And yes, there was some truth in that. But the whole truth was this... Tsars and the

“kingdom of sacred private property” brought up the Ivans, Johannes, Johns and Giovannis for more than one thousand years. And brought up on the principle of "man to man - wolf".

And Lenin and Stalin brought up Ivanov and Mari in the spirit of the exact opposite only if you count even straight from 1917, thirty-eight years, if you finish countdown to 1945.

After all, you can't educate everyone for such a period of time as people! And especially not all re-educate ... In

addition, at least ten million faithful and intelligent students of the era of Lenin and Stalin - party and non-party Bolsheviks, Komsomol members and just young patriots - died in the war. If these Stalinist Ivans, who did not reach it, came to Europe, then Europe would be shocked by their education, modest grandeur and natural nobility. They didn't get there...

But what happened to Avtorkhanov?

And what happened before that to those who lived only for themselves?

However, I will not develop this topic. Betrayal of the interests of the Soviet Motherland by the elite of the late 80s - early 90s is still fresh, it was and is being done to this day. day in front of everyone. Instead of philippines addressed to the elite, I would rather inform the reader of some additional information for reflection on the topic of "innocent" Kremlin doctors, which I gleaned from Viktor Pribytkov's book... Viktor Vasilyevich Pribytkov

worked in the apparatus of the Central Committee of the CPSU from 1972 to 1985, moreover, for the last nine years he was an assistant secretary of the Central Committee, and for the last two years -

assistant to the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU K.U. Chernenko.

In 1995, V. Pribytkov published a book of memoirs "Apparatus", which is read in one breath, primarily because its author cited a number of facts, all the meaning of which, perhaps, he himself did not fully realize.

Let's say he reports that Brezhnev and Chernenko were tightly imprisoned by the Kremlin "doctors" on such a "sleeping pill", which was actually a drug. And Brezhnev Chazov is not prevented him from taking the "medicine" in combination with alcohol - to enhance, they say, the action. Here it should be noted, however, that Brezhnev, contrary to rumor, drank little.

And they "put" two friends on "sleeping pills" so that one day, arguing about which hour scheduled for the upcoming meeting, each held on to his version. Come to The General Secretary and his friend were able to agree only with the help of the referent Galina Doroshina, who established from her notes that the third option was correct. This was the result regular intake of "elite" "drugs" that affected memory, provoked sclerotic phenomena.

Pribytkov writes about Brezhnev and Chernenko: "The drugs killed them, but they could not refuse them. This addiction, oddly enough, was indulged in every possible way by medicine. AND Pribytkov also describes a case when, immediately after a conversation with the "Kremlin" academician Chazov, who assured Chernenko's assistant that everything was fine with the "grandfather", he entered the chief's office with papers and did not recognize him:

"The look of a deranged person. The most interesting thing is that he looks in my direction, but with some completely absent look ... The reaction is strange - he seems to understands everything, but says nothing... What should I do? I speak to the end. Zero reaction!

"Here, Konstantin Ustinovich ... you should sign it ... Chernenko quite sensibly takes a felt-tip pen in his hand and ... does not at all commensurate movements, sweepingly draws chaotically broken lines ... "

These were the consequences of Chaz's tranquilizers - Pribytkov spoke with somnambulist.

At the very beginning of 1982, a strange fuss begins around Brezhnev. As writes Pribytkov, "began to die like flies ... supporters of the General Secretary: during a trifling operations in the "Kremlin" the first secretary of the Yakut regional party committee Chiryaev dies, followed by immediately follows the incomprehensible death of the first secretary from Tataria, the first secretary from Tajikistan, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of

Georgia ... "And soon Brezhnev himself died, about which the former assistant to Chernenko wrote as follows:

"Brezhnev died unexpectedly - he fell asleep and did not wake up. His forty guards minutes they tried to revive, but unsuccessfully ... "

But stop! Doesn't this situation remind us of something already painfully familiar to us? This is what happened with Stalin! But Stalin, according to the "historians", did not believe the doctors and did not tole them around him, because he was de paranoid and innocently rotted all the experienced Kremlin doctors at the

Lubyanka. However, Brezhnev did not seem to rot anyone and was not afraid of anyone? So how is it with him? That's how:

"Strange, but there was no medical post at the dacha, there was no medical station on duty. sister ... And this despite the fact that after 1975, when Leonid Ilyich after miraculously dragged from the other world, he could, in principle, die any time..."

Pribytkov is surprised: usually behind the Brezhnev cavalcade of cars,

"resuscitation" And "on that ill-fated night, none of the doctors turned up."

And here, as in the case of Stalin, there was also dinner, however, without guests. After him Brezhnev complained of a sore throat and difficulty swallowing, but from calling a doctor refused.

And then he went to bed, and "in the morning the guards found him still warm." Y-yes ...

Andropov took the place of Brezhnev - he also did not stay too long in the chair of the General Secretary ... But even during his stay in the highest state post, General Fedorchuk, if the reader remembers that he treated Chernenko - the second person in the state - with smoked horse mackerel, after which Chernenko was urgently sent to the hospital in Moscow that same evening.

At the end of the book, Pribytkov actually discards Aesopian language and writes directly:

"... if you want it, you don't want it, but suspicions are intensifying. In one chain line up: smoked mackerel "a la Fedorchuk", recommendation (for asthma Chernenko. - S.K.) of the high-mountain resort "a la Chazov and Gorbachev", impatient expectations of something "a la Raisa Maksimovna" (for the younger generation, I remind you - Gorbachev's wife. - S.K.) and the incomprehensible, inexplicable, hasty, fleeting death of Marshal Ustinov!

Ustinov, if Chernenko's death had occurred earlier, beyond all doubts, I would firmly and firmly become the new General Secretary! But Ustinov died in Kremlin-chazov suite not only before Konstantin Ustinovich, but also because of a stupid sore ... "

But the chain can be continued and reversed ...

1980 - the peak of developed Brezhnevism, when the masses had completely eradicated feeling of selfless Soviet patriotism.

1965 - "reform" "Kosygin - Lieberman". 1963 - a

serious discrediting of socialism as a result of the "activities" of the "voluntarist" Khrushchev.

1957 - the final "accession"

of Khrushchev and the Khrushchevites. 1956 - anti-Stalinist XX

Congress of the CPSU. June 26 - July - August

1953 - the arrest of Beria, the "anti-Beria" Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the execution

of Beria. March 5, 1953 - the official death of Stalin.

The evening of February 28, 1953 - "The Last Supper" at Stalin's with the participation of Nikita Khrushchev ...

Here is the "chain", at one end of which was the death of the great builder of socialism Stalin, and on the other - the bringing to power of the insignificant gravedigger of socialism Gorbachev ...

This chain is closed by two links necessary for its strength - "the case of the Kremlin doctors" in 1953 and the case of the Kremlin doctors in the 80s.

What about the "repressions" of the innocent elite? Well, today "Russian" "historians" sometimes blurt out about them in an amazing way. Thus, the author of the introductory article and one of responsible compilers of the collection of documents "Kremlin cinema. 1928-1953", published in 2005 by L.V. Maksimenkov is by no means loyal to Stalin, to the Soviet authorities and socialism, the historian writes about one of the leaders of the Soviet cinema, who was shot in 1937, the old Bolshevik Shumyatsky, that, "... being a Bolshevik grandee, a type of feudal lord, destroyed in the crucible of purge of the thirty-seventh year, he brought into his work ... ", etc. So, not

the "senseless "Stalinist" meat grinder ", but the crucible of forced purges, forced because too many dirty hands were slapping the case by that time socialist transformation of Russia.

Moreover, Maksimenkov himself further reports on constant "squabbles, denunciations and

incubations" of such nobles and admits:

"Having worked out their administrative resource, a cohort of veterans of the party - middle-aged Bolsheviks with pre-revolutionary experience threatened the collapse of the entire administrative system (that is, excuse me, the state and society! - S.K.) and caused an objective need for the Stalinist consolidation and strengthening vertical of power, i.e. what has remained in the mass consciousness for decades captured (thanks to the efforts, first of all, of Maksimenkov's colleagues. - S.K.), as the fateful thirty-seventh year ... "

So what was, I ask again, the year 1937 at its core - "an inexplicable an orgy of bloody lawlessness of Stalin in relation to innocent victims "or the objectively urgent need to cleanse the country of those who have become detached from the people Bolshevik nobles?

And was it not required - albeit without executions and camps, but simply with resignations and confiscations of property, total or partial, new similar, i.e. cleansing, "1937" in the year 1957? And in 1967? And in 1987?

Finally, in 2007?

"But what is it? the reader may ask. – Good more progressive social a system that cannot do without periodic cleanings! Well, firstly, in a good house, cleaning is done daily, and periodically - and general cleaning. Dirt is piling up.

Secondly, after all, capitalism is also constantly "cleansing" its leadership personnel - he will either impeach the president, or demand the resignation of the cabinet of ministers, and the main thing is that it constantly overthrows those who cannot withstand competition from the heights of well-being. Tens of thousands of firms in the West are still being created and soon fail. And this cleaning - however, spontaneous, uncontrollable, and therefore not

optimal. Thirdly, the constant cleansing of the guide layers is simply necessary for any a society that wants not to rot, but to develop. In this case, the best option is the cleansing is almost continuous, almost automatic, and not from time to time. Cleansing, the principles of which are embedded in the constitutional fabric of society.

You can say this: one OS had to be changed to another OS, that is - Special Meeting at the Ministry of State Security of the USSR - for an effective, constitutionally enshrined Reverse Relationship between leaders and leaders. That is, on the regulatory procedures for recall elected representatives, the regulatory periodic assessment of management enterprises by his team through the procedure of secret elections, etc. Moreover, the strength of such feedback could only be provided by a society consisting of those comprehensively developed, not semi-educated, but well-educated and therefore free people, about the education which Stalin worried while working on the Economic Problems of Socialism. In 1948, the excellent Soviet essay writer Valentin Ovechkin wrote:

"The most difficult thing, perhaps, is to "re-educate" a careerist, a self-seeker. Yes and worth it whether to work on it - in the sense that to save such a person from complete collapse, to keep it at all costs in the "nomenclature", in the cadres leading workers. To protect responsible positions of various scales from such people - task is more timely and important.

Nothing to say - well said!

And yet, speaking of the fate - after Stalin's death - of a power created under

Stalin's leadership, it is impossible not to touch on a number of quite reasonable questions. Well, for example: "So, everything was kept by Stalin?"

And if you answer "yes", then the corrosive opponent will immediately ask: "What is it worth then power of Stalin, if it did not have a solid systemic basis? What to answer

here? Indeed, is it possible to speak of strength and naturalness societies and states, if they actually self-destructed? After all, the Soviet Union 1991-1992 fell not as a result of a foreign invasion, not as a result of an all-Union natural disaster or general pestilence epidemic. Soviet Union, socialist property, socialist morality and moral values

destroyed not Batu, not Charles XII, not Napoleon, not Hitler and not overseas nuclear bombs. All this was destroyed by the President of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party Union, the first secretaries of the republican Central Committees (none rebelled against the death of the USSR), the first secretaries of the regional committees, etc ...

At the same time, the people were not silent - as in the days of Boris Godunov and Alexander Pushkin. The people were idiotic, having every opportunity to go to the squares with impunity and streets with a nationwide protest, and ...

And without going out on them. Although a little earlier throughout the Soviet Union, miners in wide areas banged helmets on the asphalt at rallies of thousands. They were organized. But who?

Yes, Soviet Russia was betrayed by that "partoplasm", which one of its, so to speak, "petrels" Mikhail Voslensky, who reached the Western "carpets" for twenty years earlier than his colleagues who remained in the USSR - in 1972, he called the "nomenklatura".

Another renegade of the cause of Lenin - Stalin - Milovan Djilas from Yugoslavia - called this layer is a "new class".

However, in reality this layer, this kind of social bugs, is almost as old as like the human world.

Why did it happen the way it did? There are many reasons...

Asiaticism in the minds of people, left over from three hundred years of the Tatar-Mongol yoke... Special obedience to the authorities, which was brought up by three hundred years of reign at home Romanovs, as well as the darkness of the masses, carefully cultivated by the same house of Romanovs during all his three hundred years - with the exception of the mature years of the only great Romanov - Peter First ... By

the way, his namesake, satirist writer Panteleimon Romanov, even before revolution, and then after the revolution, in a number of sarcastic, but accurate stories and essays, a general psychological portrait of the small-grass "Raseya" Vanek and Manek, organically hostile Great Russia Ivanov and Mariy.

Lenin and Stalin - the great Russian patriots, the founders of the highest type of Russian patriotism - Soviet patriotism, lived for this second Russia and relied on it.

This second Russia created a new Russia. But the selfish inner "elite", built by the Golden Elite of the world in the "fifth column", relied on Vanek and Manek, who are close to her, "Raseya".

The new Russia was - counting from 1917 to the year 1987 - only seventy years. Yes, looking into the past, she could spiritually rely on the great ancestors - the heroes of Kyiv squads of Vladimir - Yasna Solnyshka, soldiers of Alexander Nevsky and Dimitry Donskoy, on Suvorov and Kutuzov eagles, on Tula craftsmen, Sormovo proletarians, on Pushkin and Mendeleev...

Quite a lot, of

course... But the "Race" of the "partoplasmic" "elite" and the "Race" of Manek and Vanek had in

past, if not more powerful, then immeasurably more numerous "spiritual" roots.

Mikhail Bakunin, Russian revolutionary and publicist of the 19th century, in his book *Statehood and Anarchy* wrote, foreseeing the future "partoplasm":

"... As soon as they become representatives or rulers of the people ... and begin to look at all ordinary workers from the height of the "state": they will no longer represent the people, but themselves and their "claims" to govern people..."

Bakunin foresaw this.

Stalin fought against

this... And he also foresaw a lot. In 1939, he said to Alexandra Mikhailovna Kollontai:

"Many deeds of our party and people will be perverted and spat upon before just abroad, and in our country too. Zionism, striving for the world domination, will cruelly avenge us for our successes and achievements. He is still considers Russia as a barbarian country, as a raw material appendage. And my name will be slandered and slandered. Many evil deeds will be attributed to me.

World Zionism will strive with all its might to destroy our Union so that Russia can never rise again ... The spearhead of the struggle will be directed primarily ... at the separation of the outskirts from Russia. Here, we must admit, we not done everything yet. There is still a lot of work to

be done here. Nationalism will raise its head with particular force... pygmy chieftains, traitors within their nations..."

"Why, if Stalin so foresaw everything, did he not shout about it to the whole country? Why didn't you do anything to prevent it? the reader may ask.

Screaming? .. And what would it give then? And who would then understand Stalin correctly? As for "doing"... So after all, Stalin did everything all his life to prevent this! Are we doing anything for this? But selfish scoundrels threaten the entire planet today. Like someone or dislike, the very life of mankind brings to the fore the dilemma: "Either world socialism, or world cataclysm!"

Afterword

It would not hurt to invent a five-year plan for reconstruction the human brain, which clearly lacks many of the particles necessary for a perfect social order

HG Wells in a conversation with Stalin on July 23, 1934

In the fall of 1939, director Mikhail Romm found himself in a newly released Polish oppression of Western Belarus. He later recalled:

"In a poor Belarusian village, I saw peasants living in two or three families in one hut, partitioned off not even by walls, but by perches ... Shepherds they carried cans of coals on a string and waved them like a censer. When I gave the hostess matches, she gasped and immediately began to cut with a knife each match in half lengthwise ... "

And nearby was the farm of the osadnik - a small landowner from the Polish lancers. Romm described him:

"I put on ... Was ... about a hundred hectares. gloomy stone dwelling surrounded by huge, heavy, also stone sheds, a barnyard, barns ...

The siegeman had thirty cows, they had already been distributed to the peasants. And they already milked them, but did not dare to take them home yet. Women came, each she said to the settler: "Good day, sir", milked her cow and left, saying: "Denka, sir" ... "

"The old man was silent," Romm concluded his story, saying that next to the pan his three daughters-in-law, vigorous maidens, the wives of his three sons who were in the army, also stood to wait on their thirty cows.

Then the Soviet authorities sent these siegemen, together with their sons and their wives, to the interior regions of the country, and she shot someone, depending on how they behaved - they only sullenly remained silent or took an ax in their hands.

And today, over their fate, despising the fate of the murky West Belarusian shepherds, shed tears "historians" and "publicists".

In July 2008, the newspaper "MK in Nizhny Novgorod" published a message about a certain "master's ball in the old estate of the Priklonsky-Rukavishnikovs near Bogorodsk", accompanied by photographs.

Tailcoats sit on the "gentlemen" like a saddle on a cow ... In the hands of a "delicate" young madam with merchant-watermelon breasts is a real "havana" ... Everything is "like with the gentlemen".

And on the back of the same sheet, "MK" reported that life annuity contracts for pensioners turn out to be a trap that a lonely front-line veteran lives out his life in

wretchedness.

Hey, Rusya! And in the same issue, a certain Pavel Khoroshilov once again talks about repressions, about that "a criminal regime headed by an ordinary, not very smart cannibal" doomed the de color of the nation to death. This is it - about

Stalin and the era of Stalin. But what are the

"roots" of this neo-hater of Stalin? Well, he does not hide them and proudly cites an archival reference, on the basis of which in 1937 he was shot

grandfather. Here she is:

**Budberg Boris Andreevich, 1881, prisoner of the
UVBLAG. FORMER BARON. SON OF THE MOSCOW POLICE MAINTAIN. FATHER
BUDBERGA SHOT VChK in Moscow in ... 1919**

**Specialty - mechanical engineer for technology. Since 1925 he has been
position of head of the production and technical department and chief
Belburtrest engineer.**

**Being a convinced counter-revolutionary, he spent from 1925-1929. active
c.-r. wrecking activities ... recruited members of the wrecking
organizations and manage their work.**

**He kept in touch with the wrecking center GUD-6 in Moscow and carried out it
directives. For which the KO of the GPU on 01/13/31 under Art. 58-7 of the Criminal Code sentenced to VMN - 10
years.**

**In the camp, he grouped around himself K.-R. element ... Praised fascism,
spread slanderous rumors about the USSR...**

He expressed terrorist sentiments towards the leader of the party...

Political convictions -

**MONARCHIST. Lagadministration characterized
negatively. The end of the term is in 1941.**

The great-grandfathers and grandfathers of the Khoroshilovs luxuriated at the master's - without quotes - balls a hundred years ago ... They knew how to wear tailcoats, and their ladies did not smoke smelly in secular living rooms cigars. The

great-grandfathers and grandfathers of the current "nobles" from a young age are accustomed to consider themselves and only themselves the salt of the earth, although they were only weeds on earth, which cruelly, but rightly weeded history. Great-

grandchildren and grandchildren are drawn to their ancestors. And they also think

of themselves as the salt of the earth... But how did they deserve the right to such self-esteem? Those that to rejoice in the destruction of Russia and, to the best of their ability, contribute to this?

In just ten years, from 1930 to 1940, the Stalin era transformed Russia. Somebody shrugs his shoulders: they say, this is a banal truth. But it's true!

In just ten years - from 1946 to 1956 - the country went from hungry years and ruins of cities and villages to life, although still modest, but filled with joy and meaning filled with confidence in a better tomorrow. During the first ten post-war years, outstanding scientific and engineering teams that created modern jet aviation, rocket technology, nuclear and thermonuclear weapons, hydrofoils, artificial Earth satellites...

And also in just ten years - from 1991 to 2001 - hundreds collapsed, but what are hundreds of - thousands of famous teams in research institutes and design bureaus, at factories and breeding stations.

And after all this, to have the audacity to write about Stalin's USSR as a "criminal regime headed by an ordinary, not very smart cannibal"?..

Ugh!

"Bedbugs on the body of a genius" - perhaps this is the only way to determine the scale of the current detractors of Stalin.

Nikolai Dobryukha cited in his book about Stalin's death the lines of a modern poet Lev Boldov:

Don't blame the Bolsheviks
All rivers of blood and slop rivers.
All evil and meanness from time immemorial
Laid, unfortunately, in man.

It was said not stupidly - regarding the Bolsheviks, and very stupidly - regarding the fact that that evil is inherent in man from the very beginning.

People like Lev Boldov have been distracted from the core of the problem for two decades various trinkets, "talk shows" and other things. Therefore, he does not seem to understand that, although it will not be in rhyme, it is necessary to add to his statement: "in a person brought up exploiting societies.

Initially, man, having begun to rise above the rest of the animal world, moved on a million-year campaign from animal to man. From Evil to Good, from animal greed for the conscious nobility of thoughts and actions.

Stalin was killed then to kill Russia. But why would anyone need to kill Russia? Perhaps it would be easier to finally turn it into a raw material colony of the "golden billion", into a source of cheap "living goods" of both sexes both for the world's brothels and for black jobs in the "golden" countries?

But no! Even such a Russia is not needed by the Golden Elite of the world. Not only Russians, but also their haters remember the words of the song: "Many times they tortured you, to be Russia or not to be ... Many times they tried to kill the Russian soul in you" ... I think our enemies remember the words Friedrich of Prussia that it is not enough to kill a Russian soldier, he still needs to be knocked down.

Taking into account all the lessons of the past, the enemies of Russia realized that they would be satisfied with a non-enslaved Russian soul, not devastated and not broken. They need the soul of Russia in only one form - in the dead and fallen.

Russian genius Vladimir Ulyanov (Lenin) said to the whole world: "You can be a communist become only when you enrich your memory with the knowledge of all those riches that produced by humanity." But

the opposite is also true - if you enrich your memory with the knowledge of all those riches, developed by humanity, you will inevitably become a communist. If you are really a person, and not a trembling creature! After all, a true communist is a person who wants such a structure of society when no one will have the opportunity to do to other people what he would not like to did with him.

Here is the modern formula of communism. And this formula rejects that particular property that allows a minority to undeservedly appropriate a portion of labor majority and mock the Man in man. And the leader of the peoples of the world in the movement towards a truly human society was Russia Russian genius - Stalin. Without killing Russia, it was impossible to interrupt this great movement peoples.

And without killing Stalin, it was impossible to kill Russia. The brilliant Lenin created the political base for building socialism and communism - a state without private property, where political power operates in the interests of the working majority. And Lenin was already faced with selfish attempts minorities to adapt even such power to their petty, selfish interests. And already Lenin prophetically warned that if anything were to destroy us, it would be bureaucracy.

The brilliant Stalin created the economic basis for building socialism and communism - a new, intellectually and industrially developing Soviet Russia. Stalin's goal was the formation of an absolutely new, unprecedented earlier in history social mass - hundreds of millions of young, physically and spiritually healthy, mentally developed and educated citizens living in a society where free development of each is the guarantee of the free development of all. In

the early 1950s, a turning point came in the life of Russia. And Stalin is understood more sharply and deeper than others. At one time, the Bolsheviks conquered Russia, the Bolsheviks convinced Russia and began to manage it. Socialist transformations tried to disrupt from within, tried to destroy socialism from the outside, but by the beginning of the 50s years, the new Russia looked ahead without fear, no longer fearing for its future.

This worried Stalin. He dreamed of a new Russia in prisons and exile, he created and created. But how to save it? Who can maintain and develop it? And Stalin knew answer: "Only a new person is not only a goal, but also a condition for the final victory Russia!"

Having said this publicly, Stalin objectively hastened his death - he and his Russia became more and more dangerous for the selfish "golden" minority in the world and for selfish "dirty" minority in Russia.

Is it any wonder that Stalin, to an even greater extent than Lenin, faced even more more powerful, albeit forcedly deaf, resistance of the selfish-nomenclature minorities within the country and the opposition and provocations of the Golden Elite during outside world?

The internal successes of Stalin's Russia put an end to the aspirations for the "exquisite life" of the selfish part of the nomenklatura. Millions of young enthusiasts with a wide polytechnic education and strong muscles of gymnasts would simply be thrown self-seekers from their path to communism.

But these same internal successes of Russia programmed an increasingly sophisticated external struggle against it.

Joining together, the highly experienced Golden Elite of the outside world and the "fifth column" of the selfish "partoplasm" inside the USSR planned, prepared and committed the murder Stalin.

How it was done specifically, I'm not really interested. One who is passionate wishes someone's death, contributes to it and participates in the murder, even if formally did not lift a finger for the murder to be committed. A

specific plan for the elimination of Stalin could be conceived and carried out only by a narrow Khrushchev circle. And perhaps - a narrow circle of internal Zionists. And perhaps - a narrow circle associated with one or another special service of the West ... Or

perhaps ... However, I repeat myself - I have already sorted through various possible options earlier ... A the important thing is not that all such options are more or less probable, but that all of them created the same atmosphere of the most favorable treatment for each other ... at least - ideologically favored, if we can talk about any sincere ideology of convinced self-seekers.

Moreover, at the beginning of March 1953, it was not a person who was killed - by that time it was already very tired, exhausted and quickly losing vitality. Killed the trend, killed perspective, killed the Sovereign approach ...

Replacing the idea with profit and a desire for peace, it became possible to soon kill Beria, the only worthy successor to Stalin in building a free Russia. kill politically and physically.

And a little later it became possible to kill politically less worthy, but still successors of Stalin - people of the idea of Malenkov, Molotov, Kaganovich ...

And instead of Stalin's successor, a protege of the most rotten turned out to be at the head of the count part of the Nomenclature and the most intelligent and far-sighted part of the Golden Elite of the world - Nikita Khrushchev. And he himself, perhaps, did not even know about it.

The rest was already a matter of technology ... Not even forty years had passed, and the Soviet Union, whose sovereign roots were first undermined by the Khrushchevites and the then agents with their sn influence, and then the successors of their cause, collapsed.

In 2008, an old chronicle was shown on the Zvezda TV channel - the discovery of the first US Industrial Exhibition in the USSR with the participation of US Vice President Richard Nixon ... Next to the still youthful smiling Nixon stood Khrushchev in a wide-brimmed a hat that went to him, as to the current "gentlemen" - tailcoats.

Nixon, pointing to a color TV screen, said, "You are ahead of us in a number of areas. For example, in the production of engines for their missiles. But we are ahead of you - for example, in color television ...

And "Nikita" with an idiotic self-confident expression on his round face head topped with a hat: - No!

We were ahead of you here and there ...

And this was in 1960, when even black-and-white televisions were still a rarity in the USSR.

These are, sorry, idiots from politics and have already brought up the Brezhnev and Gorbachev swindlers from politics. Then they were replaced by Yeltsin's, "VVPshnye" and "DAMovskie" crooks-politicians.

We live in the Cenozoic era, and its name comes from the Greek words meaning "new life". And this, the newest era in the geological history of the planet, began, according to scientists, either 60 or 70 million years ago. And on anthropogenic the Cenozoic period, that is, the period at the beginning of which fossil man appeared, is about one and a half million years.

The first mammals, to which we belong, were first discovered paleontologists in the Triassic. This is approximately 160-170 million

years. The very first human society, which has systemic features that are also characteristic of "liberal" modernity (that is, divided into the haves and

poor), about 5-6 thousand years.

So, the animal principle in man is at least one hundred million years old.

Selfish, brought up by various kinds of "sacred private property" and the principle "my hut is on the edge" to the beginning in a person - at least five thousand years.

And the era of Stalin did not last even

forty years. The term was

too short ... "So - Stalin was still doomed? the reader may ask. - Very much powerful forces opposed him. And they killed him. So - stronger, it turns out, they turned out to be?

Uh no, dear reader! They were just smarter and meaner. Stalin and They simply got ahead of Stalin's Russia, outplayed it! Evil is more subtle and ruthless than Good! To break - not to build, the soul does not hurt ... The Great Good is by its very nature cannot help but be naive and simple-hearted in some ways; after all, it judges by itself. It overcame the Beast in himself and brought up the Man

in himself. Stalin was ready to rouse the country to new decisive actions to strengthen socialism, but he was

preempted. Alas! However, in 1939 Joseph Stalin told Alexandra Kollontai:

"No matter how events develop, but time will pass, and the eyes of new generations will be turned to the deeds and victories of our socialist Fatherland. Year after year new generations will come. They will rise again the banner of their fathers and give us our full due. They will build their future on our past."

Stalin was not just a genius of power and a genius in power. He was brilliantly humane in in the highest sense of the word, because he devoted all the strength of his genius to the cause of the struggle not for humanity idiotically having fun and mindlessly destroying the Planet, and for mankind is creative and comprehensively developed, living with the Planet in harmony and cooperation.

Here the great Stalin was killed in order to be able to kill all the best in people. AND if so, then so be it! - then the question is legitimate: is it possible to say that the Soviet socialism rotted because it could not help but rot, because it was rotten and unpromising initially, in a systemic sense? Or was he still initially healthy, vital and viable, but was poisoned - like Stalin? Without

killing Stalin, it was impossible to poison socialism - slowly but surely.

Without poisoning socialism, it was impossible to kill Russia. And without killing Russia, it is impossible to destroy the Man in man.

So why was Stalin killed? A?

And the last thing

here ... Stalin was a genius not in music, not in mathematics or painting, but a genius in politics, a genius in the socio-economic sphere of people's lives, a genius in management. A genius of this type is revealed differently than the genius, for example, of a performing musician. It was enough for Rachmaninoff to sit down at the concert piano to it became clear to everyone: a genius is playing. It was enough for Michelangelo to carve out of marble blocks of his "David", so that it becomes clear to everyone: this was done by the hand of a genius. Aristotle and Spinoza, Faraday and Maxwell, Kepler and Euler, Mendeleev and Bohr for proof their genius needed only sheets of paper and a pen.

That is, the ingenious creators of artistic and intellectual values do not numerous, so to speak, "co-authors" of the act of creation are required. And Stalin was a brilliant reformer of society. He could reveal his genius, only having carried out visible and large-scale social transformations with attracting millions of people to these transformations. And for my not very long (only thirty years) activity of the reformer, he achieved just the same fantastic results in creating a new type of society where free development each was to become a guarantee of the free development of all. Stalin is not figuratively, but in literally accepted Russia with a plow, and left it with an atomic bomb (the current "Russian" pygmies in power act exactly the opposite!).

But why was Stalin able to do so much? What is the secret of his success? Answered by myself Stalin in a conversation with the famous English writer Herbert Wells. Englishman asked whether the revolution is being made by the peoples, or is it being made by a minority, that is, professional revolutionaries? And Stalin answered in the sense that the most active, most revolutionary minority is doomed to failure if it does not use at least tacit, at least unconscious support of the majority.

And Stalin enjoyed this support! And, as a rule, support is not just silent and semi-conscious, but quite conscious, active and vocal!

Stalin's success is explained not only by his outstanding, brilliant qualities (the personal genius, for example, of Napoleon was hardly less), but the fact that Stalin, although he faced in his undertakings with considerable opposition from a considerable part society, always and in all his undertakings enjoyed the undoubted support the majority of society.

In the thirties, about 170-180 million people lived in Stalin's USSR (194 million 077 thousand according to 1940 data). Even according to the most likely rigged in direction of overestimation by "Khrushchev" official data, certain repressive measures affected two to three million people during that period. Together with family members, this is approximately ten million people. And even if about five million more people (this is very overstated, but - so be it!) were affected by violent measures during collectivization. Total - no more than 15 million people, including family members. But this is only 8.8% of the general population of

the country. But at least 25% of the country's population, including adolescents (today's supporters new life and tomorrow's builders), was actively on the side of Stalin and Bolsheviks. And this is 42 million people with a population of 170 million. However, the remaining tens of millions were not opponents of Stalin. They, although not always blazed enthusiasm for his transformations, also supported him - albeit passively.

I think that by the end of the 30s, at least two-thirds were actively on the side of Stalin population of the USSR. But the number of his opponents decreased as a result of not only the liquidation potential "fifth column", but also because more and more ordinary people in fact was convinced that Stalin was right.

Except for Lenin, who, for his work as a reformer, had too little time was allotted, in the history of the world before Stalin (and after Stalin) there was no case when at the head of a great, actively transforming itself country was political genius, sincerely living in the interests of the majority of the people. The majority is always laboring, not parasitic or semi-parasitic. And this the working majority, believing in Stalin, gave him the opportunity to realize himself as genius and achieve lasting power.

Let's take the same Napoleon ...

He was, without a doubt, a brilliant personality. However, the results of his work turned out to be very deplorable both for him personally and for France. But even the day before his second abdication in 1815, Napoleon had a real chance not only to save, but even consolidate his position as a national leader and head of state. Literally

On the eve of the abdication, under the windows of the imperial palace, masses of workers manifested, chanting: "There is no need for renunciation, long live

the emperor!" If Napoleon had proclaimed impressive (and then quite possible!) social reforms in the interests of the working masses, he would have received such a powerful public support that would ensure both the reflection of the new intervention and further rapid development of France as a nation state under the leadership of genius Napoleon.

However, Napoleon, in his own words, did not want to become "king of Jacquerie", that is, not the leader of the bourgeois, possessing minority of French society, which Napoleon was, but the leader of the poor working majority. The peasant

uprising of 1358, known as the "Jacquerie" (from "Jacques the simpleton", a contemptuous nickname for peasants by feudal lords), although it ended the defeat of the rebels, shocked France and contributed to the process of liberation peasants from serfdom. Having become the "people's" emperor, Napoleon not only would remain in power, but would be able to provide France with a leading position in Europe, and so already revolutionized by the French Revolution and by Napoleon himself.

But Napoleon did not face the problem of choice. He preferred to fall as a leader the French bourgeoisie than to rise as the leader of working France.

Before Stalin, too, there was no problem of choice. From a young age he gave his genius to the cause securing the interests of the working majority. As a result, the support of this majority and exalted Stalin in a way that no national leader has ever risen anywhere. Moreover, Stalin, at the peak of his abilities, was already becoming the leader of the peoples, not only USSR, but also all the creative, healthy forces of mankind.

Napoleon fell as the leader of the elite, living on its petty interests. So Napoleon is only the past of mankind.

Stalin fell as the leader of the masses, living in the great interests of the masses. And therefore the phenomenon of his genius is not only a bright page in world history, but also a factor and a guarantee possible smart and bright future of mankind. Yes, such a future is still quite

Maybe.

Stalin was a genius, but he was not infallible. Today you can clearly see how achievements, as well as his miscalculations. Achievements inspire, failures teach. However, in general this is clear...

The now established global liberal model of society is criminal already because it imposes camp psychology on humanity: "You die today, and I die tomorrow..." The new socialism offers people the exact opposite: "Let's live, cooperating with each other and with the Planet." Stalin understood that the victory of socialism would not provided automatically, but he was clearly aware that sooner or later the dilemma of Genesis will be: "Either world socialism, or world cataclysm!"

More than any other of his contemporaries, Stalin worked in the name of the former.

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Kremlyov (Arzamas -16)